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INTRODUCTION

In Marbury v. Madison,2 the Supreme Court asserted its power
to strike down on constitutional grounds policy pronouncements of
the Republic's highest ranking political officials. Building on that
foundation, the Court has crafted over the years a body of doctrine
that bespeaks a judicial preeminence in defining constitutional
rights. CitingMarbury,the Court has declared itself the "ultimate
interpreter" of constitutional protections. 3 The Court's decisions, it
has told us, are "final"4 and "supreme."5 According to the Court, the
"very purpose" of having constitutional rights is "to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to

place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."6
This rhetoric supports a vision of constitutional law that
many lawyers and laypersons take for granted. According to this
view, the Court stands apart from the other branches-independent, even aloof-in executing the "solemn function" of judicial
review.7 The political branches adopt rules; the Court evaluates the

2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969).
4. See Plautv. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,223,240 (1995); see also Hayburn's
Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (citing arguments why the Court's decisions should be final).
5. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). InMarburyitself, the Court emphasized
that"[ilt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is," and that the Constitution is "a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinarymeans
... [not] alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it." Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
at 177.
6. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). These
Marbury-inspiredpronouncements also must be read in light of Marbury'sachievement of
the status of a national icon. No ruling is more familiar to those who study history, more
central to the law student's work, or more entrenched in our legal canon as an unshakable
precedent. As Professor Bickel put the point:
Marbury v. Madison... exerts an enormous magnetic pull. It is, after all, a
great historic event, a famous victory; and it constitutes, even more than
victories won by arms, one of the foundation stones of the Republic. It is
hallowed. It is revered. If it had a physical presence, like the Alamo or
Gettysburg, it would be a tourist attraction; and the truth is that it very nearly
does have and very nearly is.
ALXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF PoLITcS 74 (1962).

7. See Mosko v. Dunbar, 309 P.2d 581, 590 (Colo. 1957).
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constitutionality of those rules; the Court declares those rules valid
or invalid-and that's that.'
This "on-or-off" or "hard-and-fast" or "all-or-nothing" conception
of the judicial role not only fits the Court's rhetoric, but also
comports with many of the Court's actual rulings as well.
Governments maynot operate racially segregated classrooms; 9 they
may not criminalize pre-viability abortions;' ° they may not require
prayer in public schools"-all because the Court has told us so
pursuant to an accepted notion of the judicial function.' A Courtdominated, result-centered conception of the Marbury power thus
captures much, perhaps most, of our constitutional law. 3 But it also
8. See, e.g., John Agresto, The Limits of JudicialSupremacy:A Proposalfor "Checked
Activism," 14 GA. L. REV. 471, 471 (1980) (discussing in detail the historic notion "that the
Supreme Court's word is authoritative and final"); Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of
JudicialReview, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 487 (1982) (noting that "judicial review does stand out
from other countermajoritarian practices by virtue of the apparent finality of constitutional
decisions"). This conception of judicial review corresponds with familiar metaphors. The
Court, from this perspective, acts like a tennis or baseball umpire. The tennis ball is in or
out; the baseball is fair or foul. Right or wrong, the call is definitive. There are no "do overs."
9. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
11. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v.Vitale, 370 U.S. 421(1962).
12. Of course, the point is not thatRoe-or the school prayer cases, or even Brown-are
noncontroversial decisions. The point is that the technique of those cases-namely, the flatout invalidation of the content or substance of duly enacted rules-dates back as far as
Marbury itself. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding invalid,
because inconsistent with Article IIrs definition of federal court authority, a congressional
enactment permitting original-jurisdiction mandamus actions in the Supreme Court).
13. I already have given examples from the race discrimination, abortion, and school
prayer contexts. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. There are many other
examples as well. See, e.g., Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964)
("A citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be infringed simply because a majority of the
people choose that it be. We hold that the fact that a challenged legislative apportionment
plan was approved by the electorate is without federal constitutional significance, if the
scheme adopted fails to satisfy the basic requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. ... ");
Terrance Sandalow, JudicialProtectionof Minorities,75 MICH. L. Rzv. 1162, 1186 (1977)
(asserting that "no one can doubt that, within the traditions ofour society, maiming is cruel
and imprisonment is not"); see also Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990
Term-Foreword:Antidiscrimination and ConstitutionalAccountability (What the BorkBrennanDebateIgnores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80,109 (1991) (claiming that William Brennan,
Robert Bork, and "much of the academic constitutional law establishment" take this "Type
Ir approach to constitutional law); Sandalow, supra, at 1184 (noting that "traditional
constitutional analysis generally regards the decisionmaking process that precedes
governmental actionas irrelevant to the action's validity"); cf THEFEDERALis No. 78, at 483
(Alexander Hamilton) (Henry dabot Lodge ed., 1888) (describing the judiciary as an
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fails to capture much of what is important about that law.
Close observers of the Court have recognized this fact, noting that
political officials participate in constitutional decision making in a
myriad of ways.14 Some analysts have emphasized the prominence
ofjurisdictional rules, particularly the "political-question" doctrine,
that grant de facto authority to nonjudicial actors to make key
constitutional choices. 5 Others have noted that political officials
"excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body").
14. See, for example, LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLrTcAL DYNAmICs OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1992):

The complex and pervasive interactions among the branches of government in
making constitutional law are largely unknown to students. They are taught
that the courts are the dominant if not exclusive interpreters of the
Constitution. Beginning with Marbury ... students learn that judges are the
"final arbiters" of the meaning of the Constitution, that all issues of
constitutional moment percolate upwards to the Court for resolution, and that
nonjudicial actors sit passively awaiting the Court's judgment. This picture is
highly simplistic.
See alsoLOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATIONAS POLITICALPROCESS

(1988) (exploring various ways in which political actors participate in interpreting the
Constitution).
15. For example, in applying the political-question doctrine, the Court has committed
constitutional determinations to the Congress, see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224
(1993); the President, see The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863); and the states, see
Lutherv. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). Seegenerally Louis HenkinIs There a "Political
Question"Doctrine?,85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976). Apart from the political-question doctrine, the
Court has channeled de facto authority to the political branches to decide important
constitutional questions by way of specialized standing rules. See, e.g., Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464
(1982) (refusing on jurisdictional grounds to consider whether transfer of government
property to religious college offended the Establishment Clause); id. at 489 (asserting that
it "is not a reason to find standing" that "no one would have standing"); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (rejecting standing of citizen; Court thus declined to decide
whether failure to report CIAbudget information offends public accounts requirement ofArt.
I, § 9); id. at 179 (noting that "the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate
these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process"); Gene R. Nichol, Bivens,
Chilicky, and ConstitutionalDamagesClaims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117,1133 (1989) (noting that
'abstract' constitutional infractions, such as the failure to disclose the CIA budget as
seemingly required by the accounts clause, have been held to be beyond the strictures ofthe
Article III case or controversy requirement"). The Court affords important opportunities for
political-branch participation in the elaboration of constitutional values in its formulation
of remedial, as well as jurisdictional, rules. See Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter
Reality: Enforcing FederalRemedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 735, 740 (1992); see also Nichol,
supra, at 1144 ("If Congress established an administrative agency to oversee the

desegregation of the District of Columbia school system, no doubt a federal court could, at
I
least preliminarily, relinquish control.").
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often take up constitutional questions on their own' 6-- in deciding,
for example, whether to enact laws,' 7 to veto legislation, 8 or to
confirm Supreme Court nominees. 9 An ever-growing body of
commentary emphasizes the congressional power to check federal
judicial delineations of rights by constricting Article IH jurisdiction.2' Other commentary suggests that, when viewed over time,
constitutional rules often are reshaped by the Court in response to
forces exerted by the political branches and the public at large.2 '
16. See generallyLOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND
THEPRESIDENT (4thed. 1997) [hereinafter FISHER, CONSTrTUTIONALCONFICTS]; Paul Brest,

Congressas ConstitutionalDecisionmakerandltsPowerto
CounterJudicialDoctrine,21 GA.
L.REV. 57 (1986) [hereinafter Brest, Congressas ConstitutionalDecisionmaker];Paul Brest,
The ConscientiousLegislator'sGuide to ConstitutionalInterpretation,27 STAN. L. REV. 585
(1975) [hereinafter Brest, Conscientious Legislator's Guide]; Louis Fisher, Constitutional
Interpretationby Members of Congress,63 N.C. L. REV. 707,709 (1985) [hereinafter Fisher,
ConstitutionalInterpretation].
17. See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the
Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 606 (1983) (noting that "constitutional rhetoric
occasionally finds its way into the legislative history ofa statute and may even convince some

members ofCongress to act in a certain manner," but also asserting that "for the most part
the legislators are motivated by a desire to enact any particular piece of legislation that fills
the perceived needs of the moment"); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974
Term-Foreword:ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARV. L.REV. 1, 2 n.7 (1975) (noting that
"the ultimate authority of the Supreme Court does not exclude an interpretative role for
Congress in the formation of legislation").
18. See, e.g., FISHER & DEVINS, supranote 14, at 12 (describing President Jackson's veto
on constitutional grounds ofa bill that would have rechartered the Bank ofthe United States
despite the Supreme Court's previous rejection of a constitutional challenge); see also id. at
4 (describing veto power as one of the ways executive gives effect to constitutional values).
19. In the hearings on the nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court, for
example, substantial attention was given to his views on substantive due process. See, e.g.,
PAUL R. DIMOND, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL CHOICE-THE ROLE OF PROVISIONAL

REVIEW IN ADEMIOCRACY 4 (1989) (noting that the Senate "participat[ed] in [the] process of
judicial choice in constitutional adjudication by rejecting the President's nomination on the
merits of Robert Bork's judicial philosophy").
20. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE CoURTS, AND HUmAN RIGHTS:
AN INTRODUCTION INTO THE LEGITIMPCY OF CONsTITUTIoNAL POLICYMAKING BY THE

JUDICIARY 135 (1982) (suggesting that Congress's power to remove jurisdiction encourages
a "dialectical process of constitutional growth"). But cf. Brest, Congress as Constitutional
Decisionmaker,supranote 16, at 103 n.148 (describing jurisdiction stripping as "a peculiar
wayto carry on any sort of dialogue").
21. See DIIOND, supra note 19, at 11 (noting that "subsequent courts have in many...
instances eroded, distinguished, ignored, or directly overruled previous rulings in response
to ... the reactions of the people and the political process over time"); FISHER & DEVINS,
supra note 14, at 10 ("[The elected branches] participate before the courts decide and they
participate afterwards as well... The process is circular, turning back on itself again and

again until society is satisfied with the outcome."); OWEN J. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE
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There is, however, a more immediate and important way in
which an all-or-nothing, court-dominated conception of the Marbury
power misdescribes our constitutional regime. Often the Court
directly engages nonjudicial officials in a shared elaboration of
constitutional rights. It does so through the use of doctrines that
focus on whether nonjuicial actors have taken an appropriately
close and sensitive look at policy judgments that threaten
important constitutional values. In many of these cases, the Court
in effect "remands" constitutionally controversial programs to the
political branches-inviting a more studied consideration of the
program than attended its initial adoption, and leaving open the
possibility that the readopted program will be upheld against
constitutional attack.2 2 By employing doctrines of this kind, the
Court steers attention away from what a traditionalist would
identify as the central elements of the usual constitutional case: the
nature of the right infringed, the degree of infringement, and the
available justifications for the state's action.2 3 . Instead, when a
CONSTITUTION 61 (1951) (discussing judicial revisions of constitutional doctrine in the postNew Deal period: "Looking back, it is difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the
popularurge for uniform standards throughout the country."). See generallyBarryFriedman,
DialogueandJudicial Reuiew, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 643-48 (1993) (discussing challenges to
judicial "finality"). In a similar vein, constitutional historians have remarked that the
realistic range of permissible constitutional decisions is delimited by social mores that find
expression in the actions of political branches. See, e.g., Michael J. Kiarman, Brown,
Originalism,and ConstitutionalTheory: A Response to ProfessorMcConnell, 81 VA. L. REV.
1881, 1933 (1995) (arguing, for example, that "it is implausible to believe that either Plessy
or Korematsu.. . could have come out the other way, given the background context of the
decisions"). On a related point, see Calabresi, supra note 13, at 82 n.6:
As Alexander Bickel long ago suggested, even a [hard-and-fast] judicial decision
is by no means the end of the process of constitutional lawmaking....
Amendments, both formal and informal, can alter the Constitution and reject
almost any "right" the courts have asserted. .. . De facto or informal
amendment can occur in a variety of interestingly complex ways.... Many
philosophers and judges dedicated to fundamental rights fail to consider the
significance of constitutional amendability for their theories.
The leading theorist on altering the Constitution at critical "constitutional moments," outside
the textually specified amendment process, is Professor Bruce Ackerman. See BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
22. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 13, at 107 (noting that structural review "seeks to
raise an issue that involves putative fundamental rights above the level of ordinary politics
by having courts impose on legislatures the requirement of an open and thoughtful second
look").
23. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) ("A court considering a
challenge to a state election law must weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted
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question arises as to whether a government rule offends some
particular substantive constitutional value (like free speech, free
exercise, or federalism), the Court focuses its inquiry on the
policymaker's use of quality-enhancing processes and structures
(like explanatory findings, preenactment studies, or sunset
limitations) in deciding whether a constitutional violation has
occurred.2 4 More and more, the modern Court has safeguarded
substantive constitutional values by focusing, not only on the what
of government policymaking, but also on the how."5
The Court's structural doctrines range from the familiar
vagueness rule to the little noticed judicial practice of disregarding
statutory justifications no longer relied on by the state.2 " Through
the use of these and many other process-centered rules, the Court
initiates a dialogue with and among nonjudicial actors, often
deferring to decisions of political branches on how to resolve
constitutional issues, so long as those decisions bear the earmarks
of deliberation and care. These doctrines thus maybe called"rightsdriven rules of deliberation and dialogue" or "structural safeguards
of substantive rights." 7 In the interest of brevity, I refer to them in
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff
seeks to vindicate' against'the precise interests put forward by the State asjustifications for
the burdenimposedbyits rule,' taking into consideration'the extenttowhichthose interests
make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights.'). Of course, structural rules differ even
more fundamentally from judicial tools of analysis that do not involve any apparent judicial
balancing at all-most notably, the method of deriving case-deciding principles exclusively
from historic practice ormaterials focused on the Framers' very specific understandings. See,
e.g., Carmellv. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620 (2000) (drawing on detailed historical analysis to hold
that the Ex Post Facto Clause bars laws that lessen the amount ofproof necessary to convict
a defendant of a particular crime).
24. See, e.g., LAURENCEH. TRIBE,AMERCANCONSTITUTIONALLAW § 17-3, at 1682 (2ded.
1988) (stating that due-process-of-lawmaking inquiries concern "who promulgated the
provision, to what ends, and in what manner");Mark V. Tushnet, LegalRealism, Structural
Review, and Prophecy, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 809, 816 (1983) ("Structural review, in all the
areas in which it appears, involves paying attention to the decisionmaker rather than to the
decision.").
25. See, e.g., BICKEL, supranote 6, at 233 ("[P]rocedural decisions for the most part point
to infirmities that are curable. They deal with the 'how' of governmental action, whereas
substantive decisions go to ends, dealing with the 'what.-); TRIBE, supra note 24, § 17-2, at
1682 (noting that the Court's expressions of "principled concerns with the link between
political process and legal outcome" have been "surfacing with mounting frequency in the
cases").
26. See infra notes 501-15, 908-19 and accompanying text.
27. Other observers have referred to these sorts of rules as involving "structural due
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this Article simply (and synonymously) as "second-look" or

"structural" doctrines or rules.

Gregory v. Ashcroft2" provides a useful example. In Gregory,the
issue was whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) applied to state judges. The Court said it did not because
Congress had not clearly expressed its intention to interfere with a
state's choice of its key decision makers in this way.29 In other
words, the Court subjected Congress to a structural rule. Under this
rule, if Congress is going to threaten a set of constitutionally
recognized substantive interests-namely, "states' rights" (and,
more particularly, the "right" of a state's citizenry to fashionits own
system of selecting important government officials)-then Congress
must jump through ajudicially constructed "how"hoop by declaring
its intention to do so with crystal clarity.
In an important sense, the Gregory rule focuses on the means of
government action. This fact suggests that the rule may be merely
one component or exemplification ofthe "judicial scrutiny ofmeansends relationships" that pervades our constitutional law. 0 The
Gregory rule, however, does not assess the propriety of legislative
means in anything like the way courts assess those means in
process," Laurence H. Tribe, StructuralDue Process,10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269 (1975),
or "the due process of lawmaking," Hans A. Linde, Due ProcessofLawmaking, 55 NEB. L.
REV. 197, 199 (1976). A coupling of these rules with the textual rubric "due process,"
however, creates two avoidable risks. First, it threatens to mislead courts (and others) about
the doctrinal source of these rules, which do not necessarily spring from the Constitution's
Due Process Clauses. (For a lengthy discussion of the source of these rules, see infra Part
XIV.) Second, and in part because the due process label may misidentify the main taproot of
these rides, that label invites unnecessary confusion about and unjustified criticism of
structural doctrines. See Jonathan C. Carlson & Alan D. Smith, Comment, The Emerging
ConstitutionalJurisprudenceof Justice Stevens, 46 U. CHt. L. REV. 155, 218 n.355 (1978)
(noting that Professor Tribe uses"due process of lawmaking" more expansively than others);
Philip P. Frickey, The Foolon the Hilk CongressionalFindings,ConstitutionalAdjudication,
and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 695, 720 n.130 (1996) (noting that
author uses the phrase "due process of lawmaking" in "a broader sense" than Justice Linde
used it). Mainly for these reasons, I eschew due process sloganeering in favor of the
nomenclature set forth in the text.
28. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
29. See infra notes 179-88 and accompanying text.
30. GERALD GUNTHER&KATHLEENM. SUtLzVAN, CONSTrrUTIONALLAW 108 n.2 (13th ed.
1997); see also Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:In Search of
Evolving Doctrineon a Changing Court:A Model for a Newer EqualProtection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 43 (1972) ("That judicial review of legislative means is justified is one of the most
pervasive themes articulated in our constitutional jurisprudence.").
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applying standard forms ofrational-relation, intermediate, or strict
scrutiny.3 The reason why is that Gregory'srule of clarity does not
concern the proper fit between a challenged rule's substantive
content and the specific goals that underlie that very rule. 2 The
Court in Gregory, for example, did not ask whether Congress's
inclusion of state judges in the statutory proscription on age
discrimination would render the act unduly overinclusive with
respect to its objective of countering stereotypical or irrational
biases.33 Rather, the sort of rule involved in Gregory focuses on the
special risk that government actions pose to identified substantive
constitutional values and, in light of that risk, how carefully, in
terms of procedures, the policymaker acted in taking the challenged
action. Attention thus centers on such matters as how unmistakably the law-giver expressed itself, how painstakingly and
dispassionately it proceeded, and how pointedly it invited objection
to its proposed action by potential opposition groups.
For this reason, the rules we address bear a kinship to rules
of procedural due process -- rules, for example, that require a
chance to be heard," an impartial decision maker," or a statement
of reasons for government action."7 But the rules we- consider
do not, like ordinary procedural due process rules, focus on fair,
well-informed and dignity-respecting decision making in the
31. For a discussion ofthese differing levels of review in the equal protection context, see
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985). It merits
emphasis that invalidation of laws pursuant to means/ends rules often leads to legislative
reprises. Thus, means/ends rules-like true structural rules-have a dialogic quality. I
develop this point in discussing so-called "quasi-structural rules," infra notes 982-97 and
accompanying text.
32. Fit-related questions include: Is the government's policy rationally related to the
government's objective? Is the classification used by the government excessively
overinclusive or underinclusive in light of the program's purposes? Or, does the challenged
rule embody the least restrictive (or a "narrowly tailored" or a "reasonable" alternative) for
achieving permissible program goals? See generally infra notes 995-98 and accompanying
text. A classic treatment is Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof
the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949).
33. Such aninquirypays heedto the resultthat Congress has wrought and, in particular,
to whether the outcome of Congress's action is too sweeping, too narrow, or unjustifiable in
light of alternative approaches. See infra notes 997-98 and accompanying text.
34. See generally TRIBE, supranote 24, §§ 10-7 to 10-17.
35. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
36. See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
37. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S.
1 (1979).
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adjudication of individual disputes."8 The matters addressed here
instead concern the structural features ofhow broad policy is made.
In this respect, the rules that concern us resemble the processcentered aspects of "hard-look" review-linked closely to the
Administrative Procedure Act's prohibition on "arbitrary and
capricious" actionP9 -that courts sometimes use to test the legality
of agency rulemaking. ° As with structural constitutional rules,
these "hard-look" principles take account of such matters as
"detailed explanations," the invited "participation in the regulatory
process [of] a wide range of affected groups" and the focused
consideration by rulemakers of purportedly "reasonable alternatives."41 Hard-look rules differ from true structural rules,
however, in three major ways. First, the hard-look rules of administrative law seem wholly, or at least largely, statutory in origin.42
Second, hard-look rules limit only the power of agencies, whereas
the constitutional rules we consider cover all policymaking officials,
including the Congress, the President, and state legislatures.
Finally, hard-look review in administrative law tends to foster
deliberation across the board in agency rulemaking proceedings;
structural rules of constitutional law, in contrast, respond in
particularized ways to particularly important substantive constitutional values.
38. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915)
(suggesting that right-to-be-heard procedural due process protections do not attach to broad
legislative actions); TRIBE, supra note 24, § 10-19, at 767 n.45 (noting "the dichotomy
between adjudicatory and representational processes" for procedural due process purposes).
39. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983);
SidneyA. Shapiro & RichardE. Levy, HeightenedScrutiny ofthe FourthBranch. Separation
ofPowers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions,1987 DUKE L.J.
387, 427 (observing that '[t]he Court apparently derived the [hard-look doctrine's]
requirement ofadequate reasons from the arbitrary and capricious standard ofreview under
section 706 of the APA"; also arguing, however, that doctrine is more properly founded on
constitutional separation-of-powers concerns).
40. See infra note 450 and accompanying text.
41. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 61
(1985). See generally Stephen Breyer, JudicialReview of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADmIN. L. REV. 363, 383 (1986) (noting that "hard-look" principles require "the agency [to]
examine all relevant evidence, to explain its decisions in detail, to justify departures from
past practices, and to consider all reasonable alternatives"; also noting the "substantive
impact" of this"set ofproceduralprinciples"); MerrickB. Garland,DeregulationandJudicial
Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1985).
42. See supra note 39.
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Gregory concerns one important sort of structural rule: namely,
a rule of clarity. For two separate reasons, however, Gregory does
not stand alone. First, the Gregory rule exemplifies a wide array of
clarity doctrines that protect not only "states' rights," but, in
varying ways and in varying contexts, all sorts of substantive
constitutional values.4" Second, and more important, these many
rules of clarity are themselves only one part of a rich tapestry of
structural doctrines. A full listing of these rules-each of which we
will study in due course-is as follows:
1. Rules of Clarity;
2. Form-Based Deliberation Rules;
3. Proper-Findings-and-Study Requirements;
4. Representation-Reinforcing Structural Rules;
5. Time-Driven Second-Look Doctrines;
6. Thoughtful-Treatment-of-the-Area Rules;
7. Constitutional Common Law and Common-Law-Like Rules;
8. Proper-Purpose Requirements; and
9. Constitutional "Who" Rules.
All these rules are structural in a pure sense for they share with
the rule of Gregory four features that serve to engage political
officials directly in constitutional decision making. First, each of
these rules operates to safeguard some identifiable substantive
constitutional value." (In Gregory,for example, the Court protected
the substantive constitutional value of federalism.) Second, each
idle facilitates a judicial "remand" of a challenged program for
reevaluation by nonjudicial government policymakers.' (In
Gregory, for example, the Court remanded the ADEA back to
Congress for a reconsideration of whether it should cover state
judges.) Third, each of these rules authorizes 'the political actor to
whom the remand is made to overturn the judicially effected result
by putting back in place a program that is actually or functionally
identical to the program the Court has provisionally rejected. (After
Gregory, for example, it remained open to Congress to pass new
legislation that afforded state judges the protections of the ADEA.)
Finally, under each true structural rule, the judicially dictated
43. See infra Part III.
44. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,457-64 (1991).
45. See i& at 467-70.
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result may be "reversed" only if the policymaking process complies
with judicially stipulated structural mandates. (Following Gregory,
for example, Congress could extend the ADEA to state judges only
if it made that policy choice unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute itself.)4 6 A central message of this Article is that
numerous constitutional doctrines are marked by each of these four
characteristics. All of these doctrines thus invite a deep collaboration between judicial and nonjudicial authorities in the
elaboration of constitutional law.
Apart from our nine types of "pure" structural rules, there are
other doctrines-like specialized First Amendment burden-of-proof
rules and Fourth and Fifth Amendment rules of vigorous de novo
appellate review-that do not satisfy each of these four criteria, but
that nonetheless protect identifiable substantive rights or values
in structurally minded ways.4 7 I describe these rules as "quasistructural" in character and will consider them in due course.
There is much to say about the nature, function, and legitimacy
of all these doctrines and how they fit together. For now, however,
it suffices to observe that their operation reflects three "big picture"
notions that depart from common conceptions of the Marbury
power.
First, structural rules reflect the work of Justices who do not see
the elaboration of constitutional commands as a mechanistic task.
In the eyes of many laypersons, and even many lawyers,
constitutional interpretation involves little more than asking
whether a particular government action contravenes a fixed
linguistic command." Constitutional law, however, does not really
46. Of course, structural rules do not take hold solely through the actual "remand" of a
policy pronouncement for a "second look" by the political branches. Sometimes, politically
accountable officials anticipate the applicability and operation of such rules-for example,
by enacting a statute that burdens state autonomy, in the first instance, with the requisite
level of deliberation-enhancing clarity. In such circumstances, the Court need not and does
not send back the program for a more sensitive evaluation of the challenged policy;, instead
it defers to the sensitive evaluation that already has occurred. For this reason, the rules we
study do not have only a reactive function; like other rules, they also have an instrumentalist
quality that operates to channel the making of public policy into preferred, constitutionally
sensitive forms.
47. See infra notes 962-70 and accompanying text. See generally infra Part XII.
48. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936) (stating that the Court's task
"[w]hen an act of Congress is appropriately challenged . .. as not conforming to the
constitutional mandate" is "to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the
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work this way, in part because changing conditions require the
adaptation of textual dictates,4 9 because the text often interacts in
complex ways with other interpretive tools, 50 and because some
rights do not emanate from any particular piece of the text at all. 5 '
The elaboration of constitutional doctrine is also more complex than
simplified depictions of the Marburypower suggest, because rights,
whatever their source, seldom operate as freestanding "trumps" on
government action. 2 Instead, they operate as embodiments of
enduring values that the Court must balance against competing
interests said tojustifywhat the government has done.5" Structural
rules contribute to the subtlety ofthe interpretive task because they
draw into the decisional calculus such variables as the policymaker's specialized capacities, its level of cautiousness, and its
evidenced attentiveness to constitutional concerns. 4 In short, a
court receptive to structural rules, as our modem Supreme Court
surely has been, is willing to think of constitutional law as
adaptive, multifaceted, and responsive to complex, real-world

conditions. 55
statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former").
49. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (applying Fourth Amendment to
electronic surveillance).
50. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819) (asserting that,
with regard to a Constitution, "only its great outlines should be marked"). See generally
WILLIAMA. KAPLIN, THE CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 25 (1992) ("The
drafters ... may have made deliberate use of language's open texture, using vague words
with no precise and fixed meaning, so as to allow future interpreters a range of discretion in
attributing specific meanings to words in unforeseen circumstances.").
51. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (applying Eleventh Amendmenttype immunity to all federal actions against a state brought by citizens even though the
Amendment, by its terms, covers only suits brought "by citizens of another State or by
citizens or subjects of any foreign state" (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI)).
52. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., IndividualRights and the Powers of Government,27 GA.
L. REV. 343 (1993) [hereinafter Fallon, IndividualRights]; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
FurtherRestrictionson Rights and Interests:.AReply, 27 GA. L. REV. 489 (1993) [hereinafter
Fallon, FurtherRestrictions].
53. See Fallon, IndividualRights, supranote 52, at 390 (arguing that it is a mistake to
"assume that rights are independent of governmental powers" and that "courts must
pervasively engage in the balancing of interests").
54. See supranotes 29-33 and accompanying text.
55. See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 79 (emphasizing that judicial review is "a subtle and
complex process"); see also TRIBE, supra note 24, § 17-1, at 1676 (noting that "structural
norms through which a substantive value is best preserved may be expected to vary over
time and from one setting to the next").
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Second, the use of structural rules involves a vision of
constitutional law that is, in contrast to the traditional Marbury
model, deeply collaborative in nature. The Court, in other words,
does not see itself as acting alone in the constitutional law
business.56 To be sure, it remains "emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 7 Moreover,
in many cases the Court will safeguard constitutional values by
issuing all-or-nothing declarations that certain state actions are off
limits.5" In other cases, however, the Court stands ready to share
the elaboration of constitutional values with other agents of
government, precisely because "say[ing] what the law is" demands
this accommodation.59 In Gregory, for example, the Court invoked
a constitutionally grounded rule of statutory draftsmanship to
reject a plausible view of the scope of a federal program in light of
deep concerns about state autonomy.60 But precisely because the
Court took a drafting-based approach to the case, rather than an
on-or-off approach, the result it reached was dialogue-generating.
In effect, the Court invited Congress to reconsider whether to
subject state judges to the federal age discrimination law (and thus
to override a constitutionally inspired ruling of the Court) by acting
61
in an explicit (and thus a more thoughtful and cautious) manner.
Through the issuance of this invitation, the implementation of
constitutional values in the federalism area became a responsibility
shared, in a concrete way, between Congress and the Court.62

56. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
57. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
58. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
59. To be sure, there are deep normative questions about whether collaboratively
involving other branches in charting the contours of constitutional rights is inherently
consistent with the judicial law-declaring function as both traditionally and properly
understood. I touch on these and many other normative matters later in this Article.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
61. Of course, the Court did not foreclose the use of an on-or-off rule to invalidate
Congress's action if it later unambiguously extended the ADEA to state judges. But, even
while leaving open the possibility that such a result might be reached later on, the Court's

action unmistakably involved an invitation to dialogue. In particular, in deciding whether
to apply an on-or-off rule to "off" any revised and more expansive statute, the Court (at a
minimum) would have to pay heed to the justifications a more focused Congress had brought
to the Court's attention.
62. For a sophisticated and extended defense of deeply involving persons other than
judges in the process of making constitutional judgments, see Tushnet, supra note 24.
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Third, as surely as structural rules involve power sharing, they
also involve a measure of temperance and self-control. Discussions
ofjudicial restraint are fraught with difficulty because ofinevitable
disagreements about operative baselines. To the strident critic of
"states' rights," for example, Gregory hardly qualifies as an exercise
of judicial self-abnegation; instead, in such a critic's eyes, the
Court's action entailed an interventionist distortion of a sweeping
federal antidiscrimination law to vindicate narrow-minded values
of localism in the face of heinous class-based bias. In one sense,
however, rules that protect constitutional values in a structural
way are always more restrained than rules that protect those
values with hard-and-fast prohibitions. This is so because the
results that structural rules dictate are never fixed and unbending.
In Gregory, for example, the Court did not block Congress from
affording state judges the protections of federal age discrimination
law; indeed, the Court invited Congress to reach that very outcome
by rewriting its statute in clear terms. 3 It is the inherently
provisional character of such a structural decision that reveals its
compatibility with restraintist themes in our constitutional
tradition. 4
We operate always in a world of ideas given to us by those who
went before. This is especially true in law. Sometimes legal
concepts ofgreat consequence are recognized in watershed moments
of history.65 Sometimes such concepts are openly contested over
time, with one side or another temporarily holding sway, until a
dominant consensus of opinion emerges.6" And sometimes legal
63. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464-70 (1991).
64. There is much more to say about whether structural rules are, all things considered,

restraintist in character. In particular, one might argue that structural rules are not
restraintist on two separate grounds. First, one might claim that the overall effect of such
rules will be to induce the Court to question the permissibility of government action in many
cases where the Court would hesitate to intervene if it could draw upon only an on-or-off
rule. Second, one might argue that the nature of structural rules makes them highly invasive
of legislative prerogatives because, by definition, they impinge on the legislature's choice of
its own internal processes of policymaking. These critiques of structural rules, and other
critiques as well, most assuredly merit further focused attention. For a brief discussion of 10
separate critiques, see infra notes 1085-1104 and accompanying text.

65. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66. An illustration is provided by the so-called dormant Commerce Clause. Throughout
the early decades of the Republic there was a deep and recurring debate within the Court
about whether the Commerce Clause limits state authority in the absence of affirmative
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concepts of surpassing importance steal upon us. They wield
influence without bold notice. They build and grow, often from
humble origins, through subtle forms of recognition and elaboration. They creep toward significance, not because of human
deviousness, but because their validity is first felt, rather than
declared, or because their scope of operation, though initially
narrow, becomes expansive over time.
So it is, perhaps, with the idea considered in these pages. The
idea is that the proper elaboration of substantive constitutional
values bears a relationship, sometimes quite intimate, to the
structuralmechanisms through which government policy is made.
The idea, more particularly, is that oftentimes the significance of
policymaking structures is so dominant that, by acting with an
adequate measure of care, political-branch decision makers can
render constitutional a policy choice otherwise subject to judicial
invalidation.
It would be wrong in the extreme to say that this point has
never been made before. Other commentators-most notably
Alexander Bickel,67 Laurence Tribe,68 and Guido Calabresi 6 9-- have
congressional authority. See, e.g., The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847). In Cooley
v. Boardof Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), however, the Supreme Court held that
the Commerce Clause in and ofitselfdoes impose some limits, and the Court has consistently
adhered to that position ever since.
67. See BIcKEL, supranote 6.

68. See TRIBE, supranote 24, §§ 17-1 to 17-3; Tribe, supra note 27, at 269 ("The central
purpose of this Article is to suggest a third category of constitutional limitation; a category
that focuses neither on the substantive content of policies already chosen nor on the
proceduraldevices selected for enforcing those policies, but rather on the structuresthrough
which policiesare bothformed andapplied, andformed in the very processofbeing applied.");
see also TRIBE, supra note 24, § 17-1, at 1673 (asserting that structural review seeks to
advance "human freedom not through any one characteristic structure of choice but through
that combinationofstructures that seems best suited to those ends in a particularcontext").
Dean Wellington, partly in collaboration with Professor Bickel, also has cast light on this
subject, see Alexander M. Bickel &Harry H. Wellington, LegislativePurposeandthe Judicial
Process:The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957); Wellington, supranote 8, as have
two other distinguished former law deans, Terrence Sandalow and Judge Guido Calabresi,
see Calabresi, supra note 13; Sandalow, supranote 13. In addition, the literature contains
a number oftreatments ofparticular types of structural rules. See, e.g., Frickey, supranote
27 (discussing federalism-based congressional findings requirements).
69. See Calabresi, supra note 13, at 83 (emphasizing the role of "Type IIIjudicial review,"
which"gives courts the power to send back for reconsideration any governmental action that
arguably violates some fundamental right whenever that action seems either the product of
undue haste on the part of the decisionmakers or the product of what I refer to as 'hiding').
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In a particularly illuminating passage, Judge Calabresi writes:
Legislatures often act hastily or thoughtlessly with respect to fundamental
rights because ofpanic or crises orbecause, more often, they are simplypressed
for time. At other times, they hide infringements of rights through vague
language or give no thought to the reach of the language they have used. At
still other times, they delegate to bureaucrats who are not accountable to the
people and who therefore cannot be trusted with the protection of rights.
Legislatures also often shirk responsibility by failing to repeal old laws that
have come-either through growth in rights or through change in the effect of
the old laws-to violate entitlements that would be deemed fundamental if the
issue were truly addressed today. All the above cases are instances of a
breakdown of accountability that affects fundamental rights, and thus could be
called failures of "constitutional accountability." The two most general
categories of such breakdown are "haste or thoughtlessness" and "hiding."
The Bickellian approach to judicial review is based on the notion that, even
ifmajoritarian legislatures are generally more trustworthy and less dangerous
than courts as the definers and bulwarks of fundamental rights, when there is
haste or hiding we cannot rely only on legislators to protect such rights. When
there is hiding, neither the people nor their representatives are genuinely
speaking; whenthere is haste, they may be speaking, but without the attention
required for the protection of rights.
Id. at 103-04; see also Richard Neely, Obsolete Statutes, StructuralDue Process, and the
Power ofCourtsto Demanda Second Legislative Look, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 271,277-78 (1982):
[1f we can find a respectable constitutional theory that does not preclude
legislative reenactment, but requires only a second legislative look, the courts
will not be required to perform constitutional legerdemain. Not only that, but
the new constitutional theory will have developed within the common law
tradition of case-responsive adjudication, so that itwill itselfbe an incremental,
entirely expected, and largelywelcomed, change inthe existing legal landscape.
The theory that accomplishes this purpose is "structural due process." Id. Other noteworthy
efforts to propose something like a large-scale theory of structural decision making appear
inthe work of Professor Conkle, see Daniel 0. Conkle, NonoriginalistConstitutionalRights
and the Problem ofJudicialFinality, 13 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 9, 37 (1985) (proposing that
Supreme Court "abandon the doctrine ofjudicial finality in selected individual rights cases"),
and Professor Dimond, see DIMOND, supra note 19, at 14-15 (advocating broad congressional
power to overturn Supreme Court's constitutional rulings except when (1) these rulings rest
on the "relatively few substantive values" protected against "federal encroachment," mainly
by the Bill ofRights; or (2) the congressional action does not comport with judicially imposed
"restraints on the process of national lawmaking"); Paul R. Dimond, ProvisionalReview: An
ExploratoryEssay on an AlternativeForm ofJudicialReview, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 201
(1985); see also Burt Neuborne, JudicialReview and SeparationofPowersin Franceand the
United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 365 n.9 (1982) ("Both Tribe and Linde advocate
substantive as well as what Tribe calls 'structural due process' based review .... The
combination theory asserts that sometimes courts must make substantive decisions and at
other times the proper judicial function is merely to insure that some decision is made by an
appropriate governmental body."). Structuralist approaches have also been advanced for
dealing with particular fields ofconstitutional law. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum,Rethinking
ConstitutionalFederalism,74 TEX L. REV. 795, 814 (1996):
[My suggestion is that... it is inappropriate for Congress to disrupt the
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reflected extensively on the nature of structural review. What has
not previously been offered, however, is anything like a unitary
treatment of the many different ways that this idea has taken a
practical hold. A comprehensive and systematic elaboration of
structural rules is what I offer here. More specifically, after further
defining the nature of structural review in Part II, I consider in
Parts III through XII each of the nine categories of structural rules
identified earlier, as well as a number of so-called "quasi-structural"
rules. I also offer most pointedly in Parts XIII and XIV, but also at
other stages along the way, an introduction to a systematic
evaluation of the legitimacy and wisdom of structural review. In
particular, Part XIII identifies ten arguments that may be made
against structural rules (for example, that they are inherently
unprincipled, surreptiously activist, and unduly invasive of
legislative prerogatives), and then also identifies ten arguments
that may be made on their behalf (for example, that they wisely
encourage lawmaker care, conserve judicial capital, and alert
political decision makers to their own constitutional responsibilities). Part XIV follows up on this discussion by considering
in detail the most basic critique of structural rules: namely, that
their use is illegitimate because such use is unsupported by
constitutional text and tradition. In rebuffing this challenge, this
Article suggests, among other things, that structural rules comport
with long-accepted process-centered themes in constitutional law
and with the Framers' own embrace of the value of "deliberative
democracy."
Why do all this?
One reason already has been suggested. If we are dealing here
with a powerful, but subtle, force in constitutional decision making,
then there is a need to learn what we can about it. Central to
the rule of law is the notion that judicial decision making must
be marked by reason, integrity, and consistency. Yet, each of these
desiderata is undermined by resort to ill-defined doctrines that
encourage haphazard and idiosyncratic application. The very
generalbalance offederal-state powers without deliberating seriously about the
need and merits of so doing, and without having reasonable grounds for its
decision. This understanding of the federalism constraint ... charts a third
course between viewing federalism either as requiring areas of exclusive state
power or as having no constitutional status at all.
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concept of having rules of law requires that we know, to some
meaningful degree, what those rules are. For this reason alone, an
effort to catalogue structural rules is a worthy enterprise.
Second, this enterprise is designed to counter a common
misperception. Even those who have focused attention on structural
rules tend to view their application as out of the ordinary.7" As we
soon shall see, however, this sense of things is incorrect. Indeed, the
principal inspiration for this Article was the felt need first to
explore, and then to document, the too-long overlooked prominence
of structural decision making.
Third, a well-informed awareness of structural rules will
inevitably be of importance to lawyers and judges as they grapple
with concrete cases. In the work-a-day world, rules are tools of
advocacy and decision. Rules that are not recognized, however,
cannot be used at all, and rules that are only dimly understood
cannot realize anything approaching their full potential. This
Article, then, seeks to arm those who read it with new ways of
thinking and arguing about real-world cases.
Finally, this Article seeks to set the table for further thought and
writing in this important field. Many questions about structural
rules cry out for attention. Why have roughly nine or so separate
types of structural rules emerged? How are these different rules
related? How are they different? Are they legitimate? Are they
wise? Are some structural rules more legitimate or wise than
others? How, if at all, should these rules be refined? Are there asyet-unrecognized structural rules that courts should endorse? Are
there existing rules the Court should reconsider? This Article says
much about these questions, but, far more important, it lays the
groundwork for further and deeper reflection about them.7 '
70. See, e.g., infra note 854 and accompanying text.
71. I also note that this Article could have been written in many different ways. One
beguiling possibility was to shorten and condense the "descriptive" materials in Parts III XII and to devote the bulk of the pages to the "normative" questions introduced in its final
two parts. I rejected this approach, however, for two reasons that seem to me
overwhelmingly powerful. First, it would not have worked to offer in one place both a
comprehensive study of the nature and types of structural rules and a comprehensive
treatment of their appropriateness. Each subject is sufficiently large that it deserves a fullscale article of its own. Second, at this point in time, a detailed treatment of the nature and
types of structural review presents the more pressing need. The reason why is that, just as
we must walk before we can run, any fruitful normative inquiry directed at structural
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Others, I am sure, will find things to criticize in my treatment of
structural doctrines. That, however, is as it should be, for increased
dialogue on this heretofore little-explored subject is exactly what I
seek to promote. I am particularly aware, and also excited, that
others may challenge my proposed typology of structural rules. In
the end, however, the essential message of this Article does not
depend on precisely which rules should so count. Rather, the
message is that, however the counting is done, doctrines that
safeguard substantive rights in a structural way now occupy a large
and prospering territory in our constitutional law.
I. THE NATURE OF STRUCTURAL RULES

To understand what structural rules are, it is useful to consider
what they are not. Structural rules are not what we might call
substantive rules; in other words, structural rules are not rules
that foreclose to the government a substantive policy choice. In
National League of Cities v. Usery,"2 for example, the Court held
that constitutional values of federalism foreclosed Congress from
regulating "States qua States""3 with respect to "integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions."74 This "on-or-off'
principle flatlyprecluded Congress from, among other things, fixing
a minimum wage for key state employees, such as firefighters,
hospital workers, and law enforcement personnel.75 It did not
matter how carefully Congress spoke, how pure its purpose was,
how many hearings it held, how many times it passed the statute,
how long it took, how many findings it made, or how pointedly it
promised to reconsider in the near future what it had done.76 In
decision making must proceed from a thorough understanding of how structural rules now
actually operate in our law. It bears repeating in this regard that other commentators have
touched on subjects considered in these pages. But their tendency, wholly understandable
given the enormity of this topic, has been to focus on one or another individual category of
structural rules. What has not been done before, and what I attempt to do here, is to
catalogue in a comprehensive and organized manner the many different styles ofstructural
review.
72. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
73. Id. at 847.
74. Id. at 852.
75. See id. at 850.
76. See, e.g., Sandalow, supranote 13, at 1184-85:
T]raditional constitutional analysis generally regards the decisionmaking
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other words, the way in which Congress acted did not matter in
applying the NationalLeague of Cities rule. What alone mattered
was the result of Congress's action. If that result invaded the
"integral operations"77 of the states, the action was unconstitutional. The Court would ask no further questions, and its decision
could be displaced only by way of a full-scale constitutional
amendment. 78
In Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority,79 the
Court overruled National League of Cities, and six years later it
handed down Gregory."° Gregory, like National League of Cities,
protects constitutional values of federalism, but (as we have seen)
it does so in an entirely different way. To be sure, the Court in
Gregory focused on the substantive result worked by Congress's
program when it declared that that program threatened state
control over a "political function . .. intimately related to the
process of democratic self-government. 8 That substantive finding,
however, did not lead the Court to declare that application of the
process that precedes governmental action as irrelevant to the action's validity.
This indifference to process is manifested, first, by a failure to take into account
where in the hierarchy of government an allegedly invalid decision was made.
...The lack of concern for process is revealed also by the courts' frequent
failure to consider whether enactment of allegedly invalid legislation was
preceded by legislative consideration of the controlling issues.
77. See NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
78. See Dimond, supranote 69, at 213 (describingNationalLeagueof Cities as involving
the "final arbiter" mode of judicial review); see also Nichol, supra note 15, at 1135
([Clonstitutional interpretations are typically thought impervious to statutory revision.").
To be sure, the NationalLeague of Cities rule was developed in later cases in the direction
of stating something of an open-ended balancing test. See D. Bruce LaPierre, Political
Accountability in the National Political Process-TheAlternative to Judicial Review of
FederalismIssues, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 597 (1985) (claiming that "most read [National
League of Cities] to invite a balancing test"); Deborah Jones Merritt, The GuaranteeClause
and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 1, 13 (1988)
("Subsequent opinions incorporated Justice Blackmun's 'balancing approach' into the
National League of Cities formula. The Court never spelled out, however, what types of
federal needs might outweigh the interest in state sovereignty or how this balance should
be struck."). This refinement, however, did not alter the basic substantivecharacter of the
rule. This was so because, as with other traditional balancing tests, the reformulated
NationalLeagueof Cities approach still focused on the substance of the congressional action
and its underlyingjustifications, rather than the processes by which that rule was adopted.
See supranotes 30-33 and accompanying text.
79. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
80. Fora description anddiscussion of Gregory,see supratext accompanyingnotes 28-29.
81. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 462 (1991).
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ADEA to state judges was flatly unconstitutional. Rather, it moved
the Court to ask and answer a purely structuralquestion: whether
Congress had expressed an intention to regulate state selection of
judges with sufficient clarity. In Gregory,unlike inNationalLeague
of Cities, the outcome thus turned on the way that Congress had
made policy. In addition, the Court in Gregory signaled that
Congress could (at least quite possibly) override the Court's decision
to exempt state judges from the ADEA by way of ordinary (albeit
carefully drafted) legislation, without the need for a full-blown
constitutional amendment." These contrasts between National
League of Cities and Gregoryillustrate the key differences between
structural and nonstructural constitutional rules.
Structural rules, as that term is used here, must be distinguished
from four concepts often invoked in constitutional talk about
lawmaking "structures" or "processes." First, the rules we study do
not include those rules that elaborate the Constitution's separation
of powers-that is, the basic "structures" of the national govern4 in
ment. 3 We will not consider, for example, INS v. Chadha,"
which the Court invalidated congressional use of the "legislative
veto" to override executive action at the national level. It is true
that Chadhaoutlawed a particular decision-making structure and
that it did so, in part, "to protect liberty."' Unlike the cases we
consider, however, Chadhaserved to safeguard liberty interests in
a highly indirect and generalized way. The rule of that decision did
not derive from the First Amendment Free Speech Clause, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, or the equal
protection principle of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Thus, Chadha, as well as each of the many pure separation-of-

82. Again, this is not to say that a congressional extension of the ADEA to state judges
would have been held constitutional. The important point is that the Court at least left that
possibility open.
83. See TRIBE, supra note 24, §§ 2-1 to 5-24.
84. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
85. Id. at 950.
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powers cases it resembles,"5 does not fall within our study of
7
structural safeguards of substantive rights."
Second, although this Article focuses on lawmaking processes, its
point of focus is not the "process-centered" mode of judicial review
espoused by John Hart Ely. In his great work, Democracy and
Distrust:A Theory of JudicialReview,"8 Professor Ely advocated a
theory of constitutional interpretation concerned with "process in
a broader sense-with the process by which the laws that govern
society are made."8 9 This Article has much to do with this subject;
indeed all of Part VI is devoted to elaborating the second-look
features of Professor Ely's representation-reinforcement mode of
judicial review. This work, however, addresses the subject of
lawmaking processes in a way that differs greatly from the
approach of Professor Ely. To begin with, it is not the object of this
Article to expound a "theory of judicial review"; rather this Article
investigates only one strain, albeit an important strain, of
constitutional methodology. This Article also does not dwell on
those cases that most fascinated Professor Ely: the voting cases90
(like Reynolds v. Sims9 1 ) and cases that concern "what majorities do
to... religious, national, and racial minorities"2 (like Brown v.

86. See, e.g., Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991) (invalidating transfer of D.C.-area airports from
federal to state authority because the transfer was conditioned on granting executive power
to nine members of Congress with veto power over authority action); Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating provision of balanced budget law that impermissibly vested
executive authority in government official subject to congressional control); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (invalidatingPresident's seizure ofnation's
steel mills because it constituted impermissible executive branch lawmaking); Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down portion of National
Industrial Recovery Act based on Congress's unlawful delegation of its legislative powers);
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (same).
87. Even if this distinction between separation-of-powers and nonseparation-of-powers
cases fails to ring true, there is enough to be said about structural separation-of-powers rules
to leave discussion of them to another time and place. See generally TRIBE, supranote 24, §
17-3, at 1682 n.3 (separating out separation-of-powers cases from discussion of structural
rules because those cases do not focus on "the substance of whatever law is ultimately
produced").
88. JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACYAND DismusT. ATHIEORYOFJUDICIALREvIEw (1980).
89. Id. at 74.
90. See id. at 116-25.
91. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
92. ELY, supranote 88, at 76.
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BoardofEducation9g). These cases are of great significance, and we
visit some ofthem along our way. Of no less interest to us, however,
are other classes of cases--cases that involve matters like
federalism,9 4 the dormant Commerce Clause,9 5 and nonpolitical
speech.9 6 To put too big a point in too small a phrase, Professor Ely
focused on process values essentially to the exclusion of substantive
values.9 7 Here, in contrast, we take as a given that substantive
constitutional values exist and explore how the Court has given
those values meaning by taking the measure of lawmaking
processes. 98 For these reasons and others, there are many points of
difference between this Article and the work of Professor Ely,
despite a deeply shared concern about constitutional restraints on
how policy is made.9
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See infra notes 351-90 and accompanying text.
See infranotes 674-82 and accompanying text.
See infranotes 326-42 and accompanying text.
See Dimond, supranote 69, at 205:
Ely argues that the Court should interpret only those constitutional values that
reinforce the ability of legislative and executive institutions to represent fairly
the majority will. Under this interpretation, the Court acts as a final arbiter of
key constitutional provisions concerning due process, universal suffrage, fair
apportionment, and prohibition of we-they defects in the legislative process to
insure that representative institutions work.
Dimond, supra note 69, at 205; see also Neuborne, supranote 69, at 366 ("As John Hart Ely
has demonstrated, an expansive conception ofprocess can support exercises ofjudicial review
that go beyond remand to outright prohibition.").
98. Ofcourse, many commentators have vigorously questioned Professor Ely's approach.
See, e.g., Calabresi, supranote 13, at 84 n.9 ("The general problem with the legal process
approach [of Ely] is that it presumes that such questions can be answered without an
underlying substantive theory of rights.... Without a theory of rights--a theory outlining
what they are, where they come from, and how they are defined-it is impossible to know
what institutions are best suited to articulate and defend them."); see also Dimond, supra
note 69, at 205 ("[Ely's] restriction on the Court's power to render decisions ignores
many... substantive provisions of the Constitution."). See generallyRonald Dworkin, The
ForumofPrinciple,56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469,470 (1981) (arguing that the Court cannot review
legislative actions-without making substantive political decisions); Laurence H. Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistenceof Process-BasedConstitutionalTheories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980)
(same). It is not among my goals to enter into this debate. Rather, I focus on other matters.
In particular, I characterize as substantive some rights Professor Ely probably would call
process-based (for example, rights of political speech). In doing so, however, I do not question
the premises of Professor Ely; I simply investigate whether courts protect these rights
(however others might be characterized) through the use ofdeliberation-enhancing structural
rules.
99. It bears emphasis (as Judge Calabresi has already pointed out) that Professor Ely's
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There is a third type of "structures-related" analysis that this
Article does not address. A decade before Professor Ely's book
appeared, Professor Charles Black published his own important
work, Structure andRelationship in ConstitutionalLaw. 0 In that
book, Professor Black argued that judges had overemphasized the
role of "the particular textual passage"'0 ' and undervalued "the
structures and relationships created by the Constitution."1 2 As
surely as this Article is not about Professor Ely's "process-centered"
theory, it also is not about Professor Black's "structural" interpretive approach. By way of illustration, Professor Black claimed
that Crandallv. Nevada,1°' which held that a state may not tax
travelers who exit its borders, reflected deep "structural" postulates
about the proper relation of citizen, nation, and state. 04 Crandall,
however, involved precisely the sort of hard-and-fast constitutional
restriction that cases like Gregory eschew; under Crandall,states
may not tax exiting travelers-and that is all there is to it.
Crandallthus established a substantive rule, rather than a secondlook doctrine. It concerned a "structural" doctrine only in the sense
discrimination-centered process-based approach is not at all inconsistent with a recognition
of structural safeguards. See Calabresi, supra note 13, at 84 n.9 (noting that "[t]here is
nothing particularlynew" about the distinction between "fundamental rights and the judicial
enforcement of those rights" and describing the legal process school, of which Ely is a
"distinguished member," as asking "which institutions are best suited to do which job").
Indeed, some rules advocated by Professor Ely are structural. See infra notes 461-64 and
accompanying text. Moreover, it is quite possible for courts to use structural rules to
vindicate the representation-reinforcing rights deemed central by Professor Ely-for
example, the right ofhistorically disenfranchised groups to be free of "we-they" oppression.
See, e.g., infranotes 758-69,789-96 and accompanying text (discussing proper-purpose rules
in race and sex discrimination cases). This point helps clarify our nomenclature. Thus, when
we speak of structural protections of substantive rights, we do not limit ourselves to the
purportedly thin band of"ultimate value" rights Professor Ely finds in our Constitution. See
ELY, supranote 88, at 96-97 (discussing Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and Double
Jeopardy Clause). Rather, our use of the terms "substantive rights" or "substantive values"
embraces all forms of constitutional desiderata apart from the separation of powers per se.
It is, for example, entirely sensible to speak of structural protection ofpolitical-participation
or political-association rights. The key for our purposes, then, is not whether the right at
issue is representation-reinforcing; the key is whether there is some right, whatever its ilk,
that the Court has chosen to safeguard in a dialogue-centered structural way.
100. CHARLEs L. BLACK, JP., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(1969).
101. Id. at 7.
102.. Id.
103. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
104. See BLACK, supra note 100, at 16.
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that its rule of decision derived from the Framers' set-up-that is
their structuring,of the relationships at the root of our federal,
republican system. This Article, in contrast, concerns those rules
that are "structural" in the very different sense that they take
account of the structures or procedures actually used in the
making of10a5particular government policy subject to constitutional
challenge.

Fourth and finally, any foray into the subject of deliberationenhancing rules must take account of the work of Professor Cass
Sunstein and particularly his book, One Case at a Time: Judicial
0 6 Professor Sunstein's thesis is
Minimalism on the Supreme Court."
that the modern Court typically ought to, and in fact often does,
"promote more democracy and more deliberation"' 7 by issuing
constitutional rulings marked by a "decisional minimalism."'08 It
should come as no surprise that, in developing this thesis, Professor
Sunstein looks at some of the second-look cases that will occupy our
attention.' 9 (After all, what rulings could be more minimalist than
ones that do not definitively decide a substantive constitutional
issue but instead return it to the political branches for a more
thoughtful consideration?)
Even so, the purpose and coverage of this Article differs greatly
from the purpose and coverage of Professor Sunstein's illuminating
book. One reason why is that Professor Sunstein directs attention
to all decisions that are "narrow" in content and "shallow" in
reasoning.11 A case that catches his eye, for example, is Romer v.
105. See also TRIBE, supra note 24, § 17-1, at 1677 n.17 (noting, in discussing structural
rules, that "Professor Black's search for elements 'inherent in our form of government...

is distinctly more Platonic in cast than the core of what is contemplated here"). Rhetoric
about "structural"reasoning has been used in other, and very different, contexts as well. For
example, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,448 U.S. 555 (1980), Justice Brennan
argued for a free-press right to attend criminal trials on the ground that "the First
Amendment... has a structuralrole to play in securing and fostering our republican system
of self-government." Id. at 587. This Article concerns structures used by the government
itself for making policy choices; it thus does not, despite the importance of the subject, focus
on the instrumentalist purposes ofvarious rules in protecting free and well-informed political
speech.
106. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999).
107. Id. at 4.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 32-36.
110. See id. at 10-14.
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Evans.' What is important from Professor Sunstein's perspective
is that the Court in Romer "spoke narrowly and said nothing about
the range of possible cases involving discrimination against
homosexuals, such as exclusion from the military, or aban on samesex marriage."" What is important for our purposes, however,
is that the Court in Romer did, in traditional Marbury fashion,
invalidate a state prohibition on affording gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals the protection of antidiscrimination laws. The Court may
not have dealt with gays in the armed forces or supplied a broad
theoretical framework for assessing when government may subject
homosexuals to disparate treatment. But on the subject at hand,
whether narrow or not, the Court issued a flat-out on-or-off ruling.
This Article, however, does not concern on-or-off rulings. It also
does not consider such matters as "the general question of
constitutional method,"" "philosophical ambition in law,"" 4 or "a
well-functioning liberal polity's 'core' [commitments].""' Put
another way, this Article differs from Professor Sunstein's book
because it treats (from a very different angle and in much greater
detail) one of a large variety subjects over which his musings about
minimalism range.
To understand fully the distinctions between Chadha, Sims,
Brown, Crandall,and Romer and the structural safeguards that
concern us, we must elaborate just what those safeguards are. We
turn to that subject in the ensuing parts of this Article by
identifying and evaluating nine different sets of structural
doctrines.
JI. RULES OF CLARITY
Constitutionally driven rules of clarity, exemplified by Gregory,
are many in number and varied in form. One way in which these
rules differ from each other concerns the degree of clarity with
111. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 106, at 137-62.
112. SUNSTEIN, supranote 106, at 10.
113. Id. at 9.
114. Id. at 247.
115. Id. at 63. It also merits mention that the structural rules we consider need notbe, as
minimalist theory might suggest, "incompletely theorized," see id. at 245; indeed, one reason
for gathering these rules together in this one place is to begin to see whether some greater
measure of theoretical unity might be brought to them.

1604

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1575

which they require lawmakers to speak.11 6 In particular, although
the Supreme Court has not described its work quite this way, there
is much accuracy in saying that there are three basic categories of
constitutionally driven clarity rules: (1) clear-statement rules; (2)
super-clear-statement rules; and (3) extra-super-clear-statement
rules." 7 All of the rules within each of these categories safeguard
substantive constitutional values in a structural way.
A. Clear-StatementRules
The first constitutionally driven rule of clarity is the most
familiar and widely invoked. It is a "cardinal principle,"" 8 the
Supreme Court has decreed, that "where an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent
116. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw:
ClearStatement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992)
(distinguishing "clear statement" and "super-strong clear statement rules"). It has been
stated with accuracy that"[clourts and writers have often been ambiguous in their treatment
of the rule of express legislative action vis-A-vis the doctrine of strict construction." Charles
F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, JudicialReview of Indian Treaty Abrogation: 'As Long
as Water Flows orGrassGrows Upon the Earth--HowLong a Time Is That?,63 CAL. L. REV.
601, 645-46 (1975). In this Article, I do not attempt to deal with this ambiguity in a
significant way. I do, however, mean to group under the label "clear-statement rules" all
rules of statutory interpretation designed to advance constitutional values, whether those
rules are referred to as presumptions, rules ofinterpretation, or whatever. I reserve the more
limiting label "super-clear-statement rules" for doctrines that unstintingly demand a high
level of clarity in the statutory text itself. See infra notes 179-224 and accompanying text; cf
Eskridge & Frickey, supra,at 597 ('[C]ilear statement rules'... can only be rebutted by clear
statutory text.").
117. The Supreme Court itself has used the term "clear-statement rule." See, e.g.,
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57 n.9 (1996). The term"super-clear-statement rule"
is (to the best of my knowledge) one of my own making, though it is analytically akin to the
term "super-strong clear-statement rule" used by Professors Eskridge and Frickey. See
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 116, at 597 (NSuper-strongclear statement rules... require
a clearer, more explicit statement from Congress inthe text of the statute, without reference
to legislative history, than prior clear statement rules have required."). The term "extrasuper-clear-statement rule" is also my own and is designed to describe a clear-statement rule
so powerful that it operates even when the reviewing court cannot use an ambiguityresolving rule of statutory construction to advance a constitutional purpose. See infra notes
225-80 and accompanying text.
118. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961) (quoting
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
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of Congress."11 9 Sometimes called "the avoidance principle" 2 0 or the
"doctrine of 'constitutional doubt," 21 this rule has2 found its way
into every nook and cranny of constitutional law.2
119. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988). For some other treatments of this rule, see WILIAMN. ESKEIDGE, JR.,
DYNAMIC STATUTORYINTERPRETATION 285-97 (1994); HENRYJ. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 21112 (1967); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORI 284-85 (1985);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTERTHE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE
163-68 (1990) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, AFTERTHE RIGHTS REVOLUTION]; William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007 (1989) [hereinafter
Eskridge, Public Values]; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 116, at 593; see also Lisa A.
Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1011-27 (1994)
(summarizing various doctrines by which the Court purports to avoid constitutional
questions including"serious constitutional doubts" doctrine); LisaA. KloppenbergAvoiding
Serious ConstitutionalDoubts: The Supreme Court's Constructionof Statutes RaisingFree
Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1996) (discussing "serious constitutional doubts"
doctrine with reference to free speech cases); Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the
RegulatoryState, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 468-69 (1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interpreting].
A lengthy treatment of the avoidance principle appears in Matthew D. Adler, Judicial
Restraintin the AdministrativeState:Beyond the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 145 U. PA.
L. REV. 759, 835-39, 859-74 (1997).
120. Sunstein, Interpreting,supranote 119, at 468-69.
121. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,237 (1998).
122. There are hundreds of cases in which the avoidance principle has been stated and
applied. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 1911 (2000) (applying avoidance
principle to eschew construction of federal arson statute that makes it applicable to burning
of homes that, among other things, receive power or gas by way of interstate transmission
lines); VermontAgencyofNaturalRes. v. United Statesex rel. Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858,1870
(2000) (finding conclusion that federal qui tam statute does not apply to actions against
states is "buttressed" because there is a "serious doubt" about whether such an application
would be constitutional); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1999) (interpreting
federal carjacking statute to require jury determination as to penalty-heightening matter of
victim's "serious bodily injury [or]
death" because otherwise "the statute would be open to
constitutional doubt in light ofa series of cases over the past quarter century, dealing with
due process and the guarantee of trial byjury"); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513
U.S. 64 (1994) (free speech); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 170 (1992)
(federalism); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575 (free expression and association);
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (right to travel); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574,599 n.24 (1983) (equal protection); United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459
U.S. 70, 82 (1982) (taking of property); St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South
Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 788 (1981) (free exercise); United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 33-34
(1980) (discrimination against nonmarital children); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682
(1979) (due process); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (free exercise);
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (free speech); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87
U.S. 590, 619, 630 (1874) (federalism); see also ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIc STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION, supra note 119, at 326-27 (listing at length Rehnquist Court's clearstatement rulings based on individual rights). It is possible that resort to the avoidance
principle has varied somewhat over time. See Eskridge & Frickey, supranote 116, at 596-97
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2 The issue in that case was
Illustrative is Kent v. Dulles."
whether the Secretary of State, under the authority of the
President, could promulgate and invoke a regulation that barred
the issuance of passports to Communist Party members. The
Secretary claimed this power based on: (1) a statute that said that

"[t]he Secretary of State may grant and issue passports ... under

such rules as the President shall designate";'U (2) another statute
that added that citizens could not leave the country "except as...
provided by the President" during a presidential declaration of
emergency (which declaration was then in place);'ns and (3) "a
large body of precedents . . .that the issuance of passports is 'a
26

discretionary act' on the part of the Secretary of State."
Attentive to the obvious, the Court noted that "the power of the
Secretary of State over the issuance of passports is expressed in
broad terms."2 7 The Court also observed, however, that the statutes
could be read to grant discretion to deny passports only in those two
situations in which such a power historically had been used: times
of war and instances of alleged unlawful behavior."2 Citing the
avoidance principle, the Court opted for this narrower interpretation. Because "[freedom to travel is... an important aspect
(asserting that "the Court in the 1980s became somewhat more reluctant to apply
constitutional rules to prohibit state and federal legislative action, but somewhat more stingy

about interpreting federal statutes, often basing its analysis upon constitutional concerns").
The long-term power of the avoidance principle, however, has been well documented in an
empirical study by Nicholas Zeppos. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political
Decisionmakers and the Preferred Scope of JudicialReview, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 296, 309
(1993). Zeppos studied 55 years of Supreme Court cases, concluding with the 1991-92 Term,
and found that: "Inthis time period, the Court invalidated 69 acts of Congress. Significantly,
however, on 86 occasions the Court invoked a constitutional value to interpret a statute
narrowly." Id. As stated by Professor Adler, the Zeppos study "demonstrates, dramatically,
the extent to which the Supreme Court relies upon constitutional criteria in interpreting
statutes rather than invalidating statutes." Adler, supranote 119, at 809 n.132. Indeed, the
Court recently collected cases that had applied the doctrine in 1830, 1909, 1924,1929,1932,
1961, and 1979. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 133-34 (1998)
(Stevens, J., concurring); see also United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (1805)
(stating that "where fundamental principles are overthrown... the legislative intention
must be expressed with irresistible clearness").
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

357 U.S. 116 (1958).
Id. at 123.
Id. at 122 n.4.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 127.
See id. at 122, 127.

20011

CONSTITUTION OF COLLABORATION

1607

'
of the citizen's 'liberty,""
the Court would "not readily infer that
Congress gave the Secretary of State unbridled discretion to grant
or withhold it." 30 The Court summarized its position in the closing
passage of its opinion:

Wewouldbe faced with important constitutional questions were
we to hold that Congress... had given the Secretary authority
to withhold passports to citizens because of their beliefs or
associations. Congress has made no such provision in explicit
terms; and absent one, the Secretary may not employ that
standard to restrict the citizens' right of free movement.13'
What values does the avoidance principle serve? Often, it
advances that goal of statutory construction widely viewed as most
salient: the goal of implementing the underlying intentions of the
law's creators."3 2 The thought is that it is safe to assume that
government policymakers prefer, whenever possible, to steer wide
of constitutional danger areas. 33 Given this premise, the avoidance
principle puts in place a sensible ambiguity-resolving rule. So it is
because the principle corresponds to a (probable) drafter mind-set
that is hospitable to our nation's founding document rather than a
(not-so-probable)
mind-set that is unheedful of constitutional
4
concerns.

13

129. Id. at 127.
130. Id. at 129.
131. Id. at 130.
132. See United States v. N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50,53 (1942) ("The
question here, as in any problem of statutory construction, is the intention of the enacting
body."); 73 A. JUR. 2D Statutes§ 145 (1974) (asserting that "the primary rule of construction
of statutes is to ascertain and declare the intention of the legislature, and to carry such
intention into effect to the fullest degree" citations omitted)).
133. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (stating that "[tihis canon is
followed out of respect for Congress, which we assume legislates in the light ofconstitutional
limitations"); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,319 (1957) (asserting that "we should not
assume Congress chose to disregard a constitutional danger zone so clearly marked"); FTC
v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-07 (1924); see also Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 239-40 (1999) (quoting Rust formulation). See generally Brogan v. United States,
522 U.S. 398, 406 (1998) (recognizing existence of "background principles of assumed
legislative intent").
134. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 (1944) ("We must assume that the Chief
Executive and members of Congress, as well as the courts, are sensitive to and respectful of
the liberties of the citizen."); Eskridge, Public Values, supra note 119, at 1020-21 ("Public
values analysis suggests more substantive rationales for the [avoidance doctrine]: The Court
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Insofar as the avoidance principle works this way, it has a
backward-looking quality centered on reconstructing the policymakers' aims. The rule, however, also serves forward-looking,
instrumentalist ends, as revealed by the oft-cited concurring
opinion in Ashwander v. TVA."3 5 There, Justice Brandeis grouped
the interpretive preference for avoiding constitutional difficulties
together with such purely jurisdictional doctrines as those that
require dismissal of collusive or unripe constitutional actions.3 6
All of these rules, Justice Brandeis recognized, seek to empower the
Court by disempowering it. 3 ' By reserving constitutional
intervention to instances of the most pressing urgency, the Court
minim zes potentially power-sapping confrontations with coordinate
branches, portrays itself as temperate in character, conserves
judicial capital, and, through all
this, solidifies its claim to exercise
8
the power of judicial review.3
There is, however, a more plainly structural purpose that lies
behind the rule of interpreting statutes to sidestep constitutional
inquiries. From this perspective, whenever the Court invokes the
avoidance principle, it initiates a constitutional colloquy with the
legislative branch.3 9 In effect, the Court says to Congress:

should assume that Congress is sensitive to constitutional concerns.. . ."). Notably, the
Court's longstanding acceptance ofthe avoidance principle, see supra note 122, reinforces the
likelihood that its application serves to advance underlying legislative designs. This is the
case, because, as stated by Professor Eskridge: "[Tihese clear statement rules and
presumptions are longstanding doctrines of which Congress ought to be aware. Not only can
Congress overrule an erroneous public values interpretation ofa statute, but it is on notice
when it writes statutes that these principles will be applied." Eskridge, Public Values, supra
note 119, at 1065.
135. 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
136. See id. at 345-48.
137. See id. at 345-46; see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503 (1961) (pluralityopinion)
(noting that the Court's role is "restricted by its very responsibility"); BICKFL, supranote 6,
at 70-71 (explaining that Justice Brandeis viewed "techniques... for staying the Court's
hand" as "most important... because they make possible performance of the Court's grand
function as proclaimer and protector of [enduring] goals").
138. See generallyAlmendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,238 (1993) (asserting
that avoidance doctrine "seeks in part to minimize disagreement between the Branches").
139. See Bickel & Wellington, supra note 68, at 34 (noting that "[tihe point... is to ask
Congress for sober reconsideration, leaving to Congress the last word"); Samuel Estreicher,
JudicialNullification:Guido Calabresi'sUncommon Common Law for a Statutory Age, 57
N.Y.U. L.REV. 1126, 1152-53 (1982) (describing avoidance principle as a device whereby "the
legislature [is] brought into the constitutional lawmaking process").
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A broad interpretation of your legislative work may be quite
plausible, or even the most linguistically appealing one. That
interpretation, however, would threaten the constitutional
rights we have identified as important in this opinion. As a
result, we will protect those rights by interpreting your
intentions narrowly. At the same time, we invite you to clarify
your intentions with an explicit statement if you truly desire, on
further reflection, to be more intrusive. If you do so clarify your
intentions, we then will consider and resolve all constitutional
issues. But we will not address those issues until you act with
the sort of clarity that shows you have thought hard about
whether you really want to endanger the constitutional values
we have shown to be at stake.'40
Put another way, by demanding specificity, the Court forces
Congress, if it is in fact inclined to override the statutory ruling
the Court has embraced, to proceed in a cautious and deliberative mode. 4 ' In addition, the Court pointedly identifies the
140. For a similarpronouncement by the Supreme Court itself,see Greene v. McElroy,360
U.S. 474, 507 (1959) (asserting that lawmaking choices that threaten constitutional
values-here, the right to cross examine witnesses in connection with a discharge based on
political association-"'must be made explicitly not only to assure that individuals are not
deprived of cherished rights under procedures not actually authorized, ... but also because
explicit action, especially in areas of doubtful constitutionality, requires careful and
purposeful consideration by those responsible for enacting and implementing our laws"); see
also Bickel & Wellington, supranote 68, at 31 ('The rule that a statute is to be interpreted
so as to avoid constitutional doubts is another commonly applied canon of statutory
construction that serves... the function of remanding legislation to Congress for a new
look."). It has been noted that:
The rule of express legislative action has significant corollary benefits. For
example, requiring a specific statement by the legislature should discourage
future litigation by making the factual and legal situation clearer....
Furthermore, by requiring an explicit legislative statement, the rule will not
"enlis[t] too heavily the private social and economic views ofjudges." Thus the
rule of express legislative action focuses the decisionmaking process on
Congress, where it properly belongs, and not on the courts.
Wilkinson & Volkman, supranote 116, at 654 (citations omitted).
141. See, e.g., SUNsTEIN, AFTERTHE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supranote 119, at 457 ("Clearstatement principles force Congress expressly to deliberate on an issue and unambiguously
to set forth its will.... ."); Calabresi, supra note 13, at 120 (noting that the "traditional
principle that statutes should be interpreted strictly to avoid a constitutional issue.., rests
on the notion that judges should not attribute to the legislature an intention to impinge on
fundamental rights unless the legislature has carefully considered the issue and clearly
expressed its intention"); Linde, supranote 27, at 230 n.83 (citing the "argument... that
policies of major importance or touching sensitive rights should be required to be made only
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constitutional values that are at risk, so that legislators will have
reason to take focused account of those values as they engage in the
cost-benefit analysis that inevitably marks the lawmaking
process.14 2 In sum, the doctrine of substantial doubt operates as a
structural protection of those constitutional interests that give rise
to the substantial question.'4
There are many rules of statutory construction, apart from this
avoidance principle, that safeguard substantive constitutional
rights in similarly structural ways.t For example, in Felker v.
Turpin,45 the Court refused to find in a statute that was aimed at
curbing "successive petitions" a contraction of the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction over habeas corpus actions under section 14 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789.14 In reaching this result, the Court did
not cite the interpretive avoidance rule; instead it pointed to its
well-aged decision in Ex ParteYerger.'47 As explained by the Court,
by explicit legislative enactments, so as to assure that they represent the deliberate decision
of the politically responsible legislature"); William V.Luneburg, JusticeRehnquist,Statutory
Interpretation,thePoliciesofClearStatement, andFederalJurisdiction,58 IND. L.J. 211,220
(1982) ("Forcing Congress to directly and expressly address an issue will assure that it does
so 'in a form which tends to focus its public responsibility for the action.' Congress is thus
given the opportunity for 'sober second thought' which can occur in a context in which all
affected interests will at least have an opportunity to have their say."); Wilkinson &
Volknan, supra note 116, at 652-55 (emphasizing deliberation-enhancing quality of clearstatement rules; relying substantially on the work of Professors Saks and Jaffe).
142. See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 188 ("[TIhe Court can.. . see to it that the political
judgment of necessity is undertaken with awareness of the principle on which it impinges.
... The Court can explain the principle that is in play and praise it, and thus also guard its
integrity."); Eskridge, Public Values, supranote 119, at 1020-21 (noting that "by narrowly
construing statutes venturing close to the constitutional periphery, the Court can signal its
concerns to Congress"); Estreicher, supranote 139, at 1152-53 (emphasizing role ofavoidance
doctrine in ensuring "that the statute, if reenacted, reflects a conscious legislative
determination focusing on the court's concerns").
143. See Bickel& Wellington, supra note 68, at 34-35 (suggestingthatthe clear-statement
rule protects constitutional values by targeting legal issues that are "close to, but not quite,
constitutional ones").
144. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 116, at 598 (noting that "[a] good many of the
substantive canons of statutory construction are directly inspired by the Constitution"); see
also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse,97
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 44-45 (1997) (observing that even judges engaged in a "legal search for
original understanding" tend to "observe canons of construction... that render statutes
consistent with constitutional values").
145. 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
146. See id. at 660-61, 664. Actually, the case involved the statutory successor of section
14. See id. at 659 (discussing Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385).
147. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868).
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"we declined to find a repeal of § 14... by implication then" and
"we decline to find a similar repeal... by implication now."'48 In
effect, the Supreme Court, by adopting a clear-statement doctrine
with respect to the removal of its jurisdiction to hear habeas
appeals, vindicated in a structural way the array of substantive
cohistitutional rights routinely invoked in habeas litigation. In
particular, it gave protection to those rights by ensuring that their
champions could get a hearing in the nation's highest Court. It
simultaneously suggested, however, that Congress might remove or
reduce that protection if it acted with a high level of deliberationenhancing explicitness.
Both the rule ofinterpretation that disfavors removal of Supreme
Court habeas jurisdiction and the rule of avoiding substantial
constitutional questions safeguard a broad range of constitutional
rights; indeed, the avoidance principle safeguards every constitutional right there is." Other constitutionally driven clearstatement rules take a more targeted form. Courts often interpret
statutes, for example, to preserve "vested rights,"150 thus protecting
interests in, or closely tied to, property and contractual entitlements grounded in the Fifth Amendment and Article I, Section 9.
The Court's antipathy toward "retroactive" application of new
statutes serves, in an even broader way, to safeguard these same
148. Felker, 518 U.S. at 661.
149. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. There are other interpretive rules
that fit this mold. Perhaps the most important is the doctrine "that where Congress intends
to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear." Webster
v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,603 (1988); see also Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.,
120 S. Ct. 1084,1110 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that this "presumption favors
not merely judicial review 'at some point,' but preenforcement judicial review"); Bowen v.
Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986) (noting 'serious
constitutional question! that would arise" upon denial of"a judicial forum for constitutional
claims" presentedby agency action; citing "strongpresumption" Congress did not intend such
a result). But see Shalala, 120 S. Ct. at 1097 (majority opinion) (responding that "any such
presumption must be far weaker than a presumption against preclusion of all review").
150. See 73 AM. JUP.2D Statutes § 349 (1974) ("Because every law that takes away or
impairs vested rights under existing laws is generally reprehensible, dangerous, unjust, and
oppressive, such retroactive laws have not been looked upon with favor, so that courts are
loath to give a statute such effect. To the contrary, a prospective interpretation of statutes
affecting substantive rights is favored" (citations omitted)); see also Winfreev. Northern Pac.
Ry.Co., 227 U.S. 296,301 (1913) (notingthat it is an"almost universal rule that statutes are
addressed to the future, not to the past" and that they "should not be held to affect what has
happened unless, indeed, explicit words be used, or by clear implication that construction be
required").
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interests.' In a very different field of law, the Court has said that
Congress may override judicial rulings under the dormant
Commerce Clause only byway of "unambiguous" action. 51 2 With this
rule, the Court has safeguarded in a structural way the longrecognized constitutional value ofmaintaining a borderless national
market.

153

Professors Eskridge and Frickey have distilled from the cases
another constitutionally inspired interpretive norm that favors
so-called "Carolene groups. "1M
" According to these commentators,
151. See, e.g., Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 358 (1999) (noting that retroactivity inquiry
is properly"guided by familiar considerations offair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled
expectations' (quoting Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,270 (1994))). In a similar
vein the Court has hesitated to apply new components of criminal laws retroactively in light
of the radiations of the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clauses. See Johnson v. United States,
120 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2000) (noting that "[tlhe Ex Post Facto Clause raises to the
constitutional level one of the most basic presumptions of our law: legislation, especially of
the criminal sort, is not to be applied retroactively"; thus interpreting statute to preclude
retroactive imposition of new sanctions upon revocation of supervised release '[a]bsent a
clear statement of that intent" regardless of the permissibility of such a statutory alteration
under the Ex Post Facto Clause itself). Another clear-statement rule, which concerns
criminal law and might be said to implement due-process-based constitutional values in a
structural way, is the familiar"rule of lenity"-i.e., the principle that "when choice has to be
made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate,
before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in
language that is clear and definite." United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S.
218, 221-22 (1952). See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 116, at 600 (noting that rule
rests "upon such due process values as providing fair notice and constraining prosecutorial
discretion"); Luneburg, supra note 141, at 217 ("The traditional disposition to strictly
construe criminal statutes is an example of the operation of a policy of clear statement in the
service of the constitutional value offair notice."). For another example of a constitutionally
inspired interpretive approach applied in the criminal-law context, see Castillo v. United
States, 120 S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (2000) (reading reference to use or carrying of machine gun in
relation to violent crime as element of offense, rather than as a sentencing factor, in part
because of"preference for traditional jury determination of so important a factual matter"
as one that results in a thirty-year mandatory sentence).
152. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986); accord, e.g., New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 171 (1992) (stating that abrogation of dormant Commerce Clause rule
demands "an expression of the 'uambiguous intent! of Congress"); Wyoming v. Oklahoma,
502 U.S. 437,458 (1992) (same).
153. See infra notes 674-76 and accompanying text.
154. See Eskridge & Frickey, supranote 116, at 602 (noting that this canon has not been
"stated as such in general terms by the Court"); see also Eskridge, PublicValues, supranote
119, at 1032 (suggesting that"inspiration" for statutory interpretations that protect "discrete
and insular minorities" is "the special equal protection scrutiny applied by the Court to
statutes that adversely affect Carolene groups"); Sunstein, Interpreting,supra note 119, at
473 ("Aggressive construction of ambiguous statutes designed to protect disadvantaged
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courts have used this rule to protect (even in the absence of
substantial constitutional questions) "discrete and insular
minorities" 5' and other groups that have a special claim for judicial
157
solicitude. These groups include African Americans,156 aliens,
women,"5 8 and persons with disabilities. 159 A prominent exemplification of this tendency lies in the variety of clear-statement rules
used to protect the "weak and defenseless people" who make up our
nation's long-oppressed Native American tribes. 160 The most
groups provides a way for courts to protect the constitutional norm of equal protection in a
less intrusive manner.").
155. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
156. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 116, at 612 (asserting, for example, that "Bob
Jones University v. United States... is a powerful application of the Carotene canon");
Sunstein,Interpreting,supranote 119, at 484 (asserting that "courts have often aggressively
construed statutes forbidding discrimination on the basis of race").
157. See, e.g., INS v. Cardozo-Fonseco, 480 U.S. 421,449 (1987) (citing"the longstanding
principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the
alien). See generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 116, at 602 (discussing the Court's
willingness to liberally construe statutes to protect Carolene groups). Illustrative, perhaps,
is United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1956), in which the Court narrowly construed
a statute that required sworn statements by aliens against whom deportation orders were
outstanding. In explaining the case, Bickel and Wellington noted that "[t]he Court was
dealing with... persons who are not represented in the political process and to whose rights
the Court might well be particularly alert." Bickel & Wellington, supra note 68, at 32; see
also Luneburg, supra note 141, at 222 n.65 (1982) (noting this reading of Witkovich).
158. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 116, at 614 (claiming that, while the Rehnquist
Court has cut back on construing statutes to protect racial minorities, it "has continued to
apply the Carolenecanonfavoringwomeninworkplace situations"); Eskridge, PublicValues,
supra note 119, at 1033 (arguing that Carolene-groupsinterpretive principle has operated
in "cases in which general duties created by federal law appear to clashwith private or public
efforts to compensate blacks and women for unique disadvantages they suffer or have
suffered").
159. See Sunstein, Interpreting,supra note 119, at 484 (arguing that "[a] number of
decisions reflect generous interpretations of statutes protecting the disabled").
160. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973)
(holding that "[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless
people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith"
(quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930))). See generally Eskridge & Frickey,
supranote 116, at 610 (discussing the Burger Court's use of the canon to prohibit individual
state attempts to regulate Indian territory). Many cases apply this principle in particular
contexts. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 194 n.5
(1999) (noting that "treaties are to be interpreted liberally in favor of... Indians... and
treaty ambiguities to be resolved in their favor"); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 524
U.S. 1044 (1998) (holding that "clear and plain" indication ofCongressional intent required
for congressionaldiminishment ofreservationboundaries); Cass County, Minnesotav. Leech
Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 110 (1998) (holding that states may not tax
Indian reservation land unless "Congress has authorized such taxation" and "made its
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prominent clear-statement rules tied to specific constitutional

values, however, do not involve the protection of individual
interests in liberty and equality. Instead, they involve judicial
preservation of so-called "states' rights."
The core principle reaches back a half-century to Rice v. SantaFe
Elevator Corp., 1in which the Court confronted a preemption claim
based on congressional action with regard to grain elevators, a
"field which the States have traditionally occupied."162 In such an
area, theCourt"start [s] with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal63Act
unless that was the clearand manifest purpose of Congress."'

intention to do so unmistakably clear") (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v.
Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-39 (1986) (requiring "clear and plain" evidence of Congressional
intention to abrogate Indian treaty rights to hunt bald eagles); White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980) ("Ambiguities in federal law have been construed
generously in order to comport with... traditional notions of [tribal] sovereignty and with
the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence."); McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 170-71
(noting presumption that "State laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an
Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall
apply" (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAWS 845 (1958))). See
generally Eskridge, Public Values, supranote 119, at 1047-48 (discussing the presumption
that favors tribal authority). Professor Sunstein refers to the principle that holding "that
statutes and treaties should, in the face of ambiguity, be construed favorably to Indian
tribes." Sunstein, Interpreting, supra note 119, at 460. Referring to this interpretive
principle, he explains: "There is no reason to think that this notion will tend accurately to
describe congressional intent in particular cases. It is instead ajudge-made rule responding
to obvious disparities in bargaining power and to inequitable treatment of Native Americans
by the nation in the past." Id.; see also id. at 483 (citing Indian-law canon as "the most
conspicuous example" of judicial tendency to "resolve interpretive doubts in favor of
disadvantaged groups"); Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 116, at 617-20 (noting trend in
courts to interpret ambiguous treaties in favor of Indian rights).
161. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
162. Id. at 230.
163. Id. (emphasis added).
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Flying the flag of federalism, the Court has reiterated this principle
in many cases 6 ' and given it a broad application.'6 5
Federalism concerns also have prompted the development of
a specialized clear-statement rule for federal criminal laws. In
United States v. Bass,'6 6 the Court confronted a criminal statute
that targets the convicted felon "who receives, possesses, or
67
transports in commerce or affecting commerce... any firearm."
Emphasizing the disjunctive character of this clause, the
government argued that the statute's prohibitions on receiving and
possessing a firearm (as opposed to transporting one) applied
168
without regard to the gun's connection to interstate commerce.
Rejecting this interpretation, the Court reasoned: "Because its
sanctions are criminal and because, under the Government's
broader reading, the statute would mark a major inroad into a
domain traditionally left to the States, we refuse to adopt the broad
reading in the absence of a clearer direction from Congress." 169 The
Court added:
[UMnless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be
deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance.
... In traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting
the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures

164. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135, 1147-48 (2000); BFP v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994); English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72,79 (1990);
Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174,183-85 (1988); Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer
Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 503 (1988); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 634
(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256-58 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Corm'n, 461 U.S. 190,220-23 (1983); Rayv. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435
U.S. 151, 157 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,,525 (1977). As stated by
Professor Sunstein "Inthe system of American public law, the basic assumption is that
states have authority to regulate their own citizens and territory. This assumption justifies
an interpretive principle requiring a clear statement before judges will find federal
preemption of state law." Sunstein, Interpreting,supra note 119, at 469.
165. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992) (giving express
preemption provision "a narrow reading" in light of Rice presumption); id. at 532-33
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).
166. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
167. Id. at 337 n.1 (quoting then-existing 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)).
168. See id. at 339-42.
169. Id. at 339.
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that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into
issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision. 7 '
It bears emphasizing that the Rice and Bass rules involve
something more than a specialized adaptation of the avoidance
principle.' 7 ' Indeed, at least since the demise of NationalLeague of
Cities,72 there has been no freestanding constitutional prohibition
on the sort of congressional forays into "traditional" areas of state
regulation that Rice and Bass concerned. 7 3 Rather, as the Court
made clear when it overruled National League of Cities in the
Garcia case, safeguards against undue encroachment by the
national government principally inhere in "the composition of the

170. Id. at 349. The Court has taken a Bass-like approach to federal criminal statutes in
a variety ofcases. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1904, 1912 (2000) (applying
Bass principle to read federal arson statute as inapplicable to the burning of a private
residence not used for commercial purposes); id. at 1912-13 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(agreeing thatBass principle applies and noting principle's "kinship [to] our well-established
presumption against federal pre-emption of state law"); Fischer v. United States, 120 S. Ct.
1780, 1788 (2000) (rejecting broad construction of term "benefits" under federal antifraud
statute in part because a contrary result"would turn almost every act offraud or bribery into
a federal offense, upsetting the proper federal balance"); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350, 360 (1987) (reading federal mail fraud statute not to reach assignment of state's
insurance business to agency required to make kickbacks where scheme results in no loss
to state; noting aversion to any national "setting [of) standards of... good government for
local and state officials"; adding that: "IfCongress desires to go firther, it must speak more
clearly than it has"); United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396,400 (1973) (holding Hobbs Act
prohibition on extortion inapplicable to use of violence in labor disputes to obtain union
objectives); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811-12 (1971) (viewing Travel Act as not
reaching illegal gambling operation); see also Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47 (1986)
(refusing to find state restitution obligations imposed on state criminal defendants
dischargeable in bankruptcy; relying on "-thefundamentalpolicy against federal interference
with state criminal prosecutions' (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971))); cf.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,124 (1942) ("That an activity is of local character may help
in a doubtful case to determine whether Congress intended to reach it.").
171. See, e.g., Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 120 S. Ct.
1858, 1870 (2000) (invoking separately avoidance principle, on the one hand, and Gregory
and Bass, on the other, in refusing to read federal qui tam statute to authorize actions
against state defendants).
172. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
173. Indeed, the specialized protection of "traditional" state activities under theNational
League of Cities rule was among the features of that rule most vigorously criticized and
repudiated in Garcia.See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,545-47
(1985).
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in large part to protect
Federal Government," which "was designed 174
the States from overreaching by Congress."
Against this backdrop, the Rice andBass rules are defensible on
the ground that they help ensure that the national political process
in fact does the job Garciaassigned to it. Confronted with a clearstatement rule, Congress cannot finesse its way through tough
questions of federalism by "resorting to ambiguity." 175 Instead, if
Congress is to interfere with historic state prerogatives, it must do
so self-consciously, thereby facilitating the operation of the built-in
by the
political restraints that guard against undue tampering
1 76
national legislature with core state regulatory authority.
174. Id. at 550-51.
175. TRIBE, supra note 27, at 317; accord,e.g., Calvin R. Massey, Etiquette Tips: Some
Implicationsof ProcessFederalism,"18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 175,191 (1994) ([Tlo give
the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguitywould evade the
very procedure for law-making on which Garciarelied to protect states' interests.' (quoting
TRIBE, supra note 24, at 480)); see also Luneburg, supranote 141, at 216-17 (notingthat'lack
of clarity may be traceable to the unwillingness of the legislature to confront squarely the
matter at issue").
176. See, e.g., TRIBE, supranote 24, § 6-25, at 479-80 (asserting that "reluctance to infer
preemption in ambiguous cases... furtherfs] the spirit of Garciaby requiring that decisions
restricting state sovereigntybe made in a deliberate manner by Congress"); Calabresi, supra
note 13, at 119 (arguing that "the 'modem American Doctrine which refuses to impute to
Congress the casual intention to make vast and far-reaching changes... in the federal
balance,' can be seen as a judicial device for forcing caution and consideration in legislation
that affects fundamental structural rights" citation omitted)); Eskridge,Public Values, supra
note 119, at 1025 (citing variety of Supreme Court cases for proposition that "the rule against
preemption of traditional state functions is often the occasion for the Court to protect
important local values from inadvertent federal interference"); Massey, supra note 175, at
177 ("The net result [of Garcia] is the emergence of a hybrid form of federalism, neither
completely political nor wholly legal. Rather, the emerging 'process federalism' is one
characterized by a willingness to let Congress impose its will upon the states so long as that
impositionis performedin aprocedurallyrestrained fashion."); PaulE. McGreal, TheFlawed'
Economics of the DormantCommerce Clause,39 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1191, 1283-84 (1998)
("For the political process to ensure protection of state interests, Congress must be aware
that its legislation might affect the states. A clear statement rule looks for evidence of
congressional deliberation on the face of the statute to prevent unthinking or incidental
encroachment on states and their laws."). Notably, this line ofanalysis has recently appeared
in two opinions (joined, in total, by five Justices) written by Justice Stevens. See Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co., 120 S. Ct. 1913,1939 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reasoning
that Rice clear-statement rule interacts with "the structural safeguards inherent in the
normal operation of the legislative process . .. to defend state interests from undue
infringement" (citing Garciaand Gregory)); Kimelv. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631,
652 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Federalism concerns do make it appropriate for
Congress to speak clearly when it regulates state action. But when it does so, as it has in
these cases, we can safely presume that the burdens the statute imposes on the sovereignty
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In short, the rules of clarity set forth in Rice and Bass seem to
serve two discernible purposes beyond vindicating a presumed
congressional intent. First, they vindicate federalism interests in an
important constitutional field where few on-or-off restraints (at
least as a historical matter) have limited action by Congressnamely, the field of localized commerce-affecting behavior engaged
in by private parties.177 Second, these rules reinforce the underlying
rationale for placing no such restraints on congressional action in
the first instance. By focusing congressional attention on the costs
to federalism threatened by particularly intrusive forms of proposed
federal legislation, these rules of clarity tend to ensure that only
well-identified interests of the highest 178national urgency will
override strong claims of state autonomy.

of the several states were taken into account during the deliberative process leading to the
enactment of the measure.").
177. See LaPierre, supra note 78, at 579 (noting that Garcia "held that because the
national political process adequatelyprotects the states' role in the federal system, the power
ofjudicial review to limit national incursions on state autonomy should be exercised only in
rare circumstances"). Of course, more recent cases show that the Court has not wholly
abandoned the federalism field. Thus, in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and
United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000), the Court struck down federal statutes on
the ground that they fell outside ofCongress's Commerce Clause power. See infranotes 35175 and accompanying text. Similarly, inNew York v. UnitedStates, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), the Court held that Congress could not coerce
state legislatures or state law enforcement officials to enact or to implement federal
regulations. In light of these and other decisions (particularly in the Eleventh Amendment
field), it is open to question whether any underenforced-constitutional-norm rationale for the
Rice andBass rules continues to carry much persuasive force. But cf. Bill Swinford & Eric
' N. Waltenburg, The Supreme Courtand the States:DoLopez and PrintzRepresentaBroader
Pro-State Movement?, 14 J.L. & POL. 319, 331 (1998) (suggesting probable "narrowness" of
Lopez).
178. See TRIBE, supra note 24, § 5-8, at 317 (stating that the Rice/Bass rule is "an
important complement to the political check on congressional exercise of the commerce
power" because it keeps Congress "from resorting to ambiguity as a cloak for its failure to
accommodate the competing interests bearing on the federal-state balance"). Notably,
Professors Eskridge and Frickey have criticized the Rehnquist Court's strong use of clearstatement rules to protect federalism interests, by arguing that those interests are not
deserving of the distinctively aggressive judicial protection they have received. See Eskridge
& Frickey, supra note 116, at 642-44. Professors Eskridge and Frickey do not dispute,
however, that structural rules of clarity-in contexts where they do properly apply-in fact
work to safeguard constitutional values by encouraging dialogue and deliberation. See id. at
646.
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B. Super-Clear-StatementRules
Some rules of clarity pack an added punch. So it is with one
doctrine we already have encountered: the rule of Gregory v.
Ashcroft.17 9 That case addressed whether the ADEA barred the
imposition of mandatory retirement rules for state judges."' In
resolving this question in favor of state autonomy, the Court
unabashedly endorsed a "plain statement rule."1 81 Given the threat
the ADEA presented to "an authority that lies at 'the heart of
representative government,"1 8 2 the Court declared that "we must
be absolutelycertainthat Congress intended such an exercise" of its
legislative powers.18
179. 501 U.S. 452 (1991); see also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
180. See Gregory, 501 U.S. 452.
181. Id. at 461, 464, 470.
182. Id. at 463.
183. Id. at 464 (emphasis added). To what other state activities does the Gregory principle
extend? See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 120 S. Ct. 1913, 1940 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguingforheightened presumption ofnonpreemption when agency, ratherthan
congressional action, is at issue; noting, for example, that"[uinlike Congress, administrative
agencies are clearly not designed to represent the interests of the states"); Pennsylvania
Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,209 (assuming, without deciding, that Gregory
"govern[s] application of the ADA to the administration of state prisons" in that
"management of state prisons, like establishing the qualifications of state government
officials, is a traditional and essential State function"); see also Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting
the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation:A Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84
MiNN.L. REV. 199,211 (1999) (suggesting that Court in the BFP case extended the Gregory
canon, "which itself applied only to protect state governments ...to federal preemption of
core aspects of the local police power regulating private citizens, such as the state property
laws"; adding that this extension was a great surprise and that "[blecause neither the
Gregory canon, nor its BFP offspring was an 'established' canon, it is inescapable that the
creation of both canons was judicial lawmaking"). As observed by Professors Eskridge and
Frickey.
Gregory itselfprovides little guidance on when to apply the super-strong canon,
referring itone time or anotherto "areas traditionally regulated by the States,"
state decisions of"the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity," "authority
that lies at the heart of representative government'" and intrusion on "state
governmental functions."
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 116, at 634 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452
(1991)). Eskridge and Frickey also have expressed uncertainty about the extent to which the
Gregoryprinciple limits exercises of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement
powers, as opposed to exercises of the commerce power. See id. at 635 n.206; see also id. at
643 (noting that the Court did not cite the Gregory principle in applying Voting Rights Act
to election of state judges in Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991), even though that case
was decided on the same day as Gregory).
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There can be no doubt that the Court in Gregory (and in other
rule-of-clarity cases we soon shall discuss) has taken a "similar
approach" to Rice and Bass.. 4 in an effort to enhance deliberation
in the federalism field.115 Indeed, quoting from Bass, the Court in
Gregory explicitly stated that its purpose in requiring clarity was
to ensure "that the legislature has in fact faced ...

the critical

matters involved."'86 Does it follow that the clear-statement rule of
Gregory operates in exactly the same manner as the rule of Rice
and Bass?
Apparently it does not, because the Court in Gregoryemphasized
that Congress had to make its intentions so "'unmistakablyclear in
the language of the statute""87 that "it must be plain to anyone
readingthe Act that it covers judges."' This mandate of textual
explicitness seems to mark a departure from more garden-variety
rules of clarity."5 9 Even in the face of Rice, for example, the Court
184. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461 (quoting Willv. Michigan Dep'tof State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 65 (1989)).
185. As stated by Professor Frickey:
The clear-statement requirement adopted in Gregory is a forthright judicial
effort to influence congressional processes. Most obviously, the approach
attempts to force Congress to draft statutes clearly. More subtly, it essentially
seeks not just to force the objection based on the invasion of state sovereignty
onto the congressional agenda, but also to highlight it. The assumption must
be that the Gregory canon of interpretation will lead to more thorough and
thoughtful congressional deliberations concerning whether invasions of state
sovereignty are justified, and is not simply a way to prevent wholly inadvertent
intrusions on state authority.
Frickey, supra note 27, at 722; see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 116, at 597 ("ITihe
Court may have a legitimate role in forcing the political process to pay attention to the
[federalism] values at stake, and super-strong clear statement rules are a practical way for
the Court to focus legislative attention on these values."); Massey, supranote 175, at 212
("The plain statement rule of Gregory attempts to [protect state interests] by making sure
that Congress is aware of federalism concerns when it enacts legislation impinging upon the

States.").
186. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461 (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 65).
187. Id. at 460 (emphasis added) (quoting Will, 491 at 65 (quotingAtascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,242 (1985))).
188. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
189. To declare the existence of this distinction is somewhat risky because the Court itself
has not fleshed out in any detail the precise level of clarity each of these different rules
demands. To understand how Gregorymay differ from more orthodox clarity rules, however,
it may be worth contrasting it with a clarity rule the Court has described with some level of
explicitness-namely, the rule of Chevron OilCo. v. NaturalResourcesDefense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under that rule, courts are to reject an agency's construction of a statute
the agency has been charged to administer when that construction is "contrary to clear
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has found "implied" (as opposed to "express") preemption of state
legislation,19 including through Congress's "occupying the field."'91
The Court also has said that preemption may occur when state law
"stands as an obstacle" to accomplishment of the aims of Congress,
thus signaling that the revealed purposes of a law may generate
preemption whatever the clarity of the actual statutory text.192 In
congressional intent." Id. at 843 n.9. Courts, however, are to determine the clarity of
congressional intent by "employing traditionaltools of statutory construction"-not only by
looking to statutory text. Id. (emphasis added). Other illustrative clear-statement rules that
stand in contrastwith the text-focused rule of Gregory are suggested byMuscarello v. United
States, 524 U.S. 125,138 (1998) (emphasizing that"[t]he simple existence of some statutory
ambiguity, however, is not sufficient to warrant application" ofthe rule oflenity and that the
rule applies only if there is "grievous ambiguity or uncertainty" after "seizing everything
from which aid may be derived" with regard to the statute's meaning (citations omitted)),
Bryan u. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 393 (1976) (stating that, under canon concerning
statutes that terminate Native American immunities, congressional intent must "be
expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and
legislative history" (quotingMattzv. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481,504-05 (1973), and West v. Gibson,
527 U.S. 212,222 (1999) (concluding that, even"if we must apply a specially strict standard
[ofinterpretation to find a waiver ofsovereign immunity,] ... the statutory language, taken
together with statutory purposes, history, and the absence of any convincing reason for
denying the EEOC the relevantpower, produce evidence ofawaiver that satisfies the stricter
standard)). Cf West, 527, at 228 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("To the extent the majority relies
on legislative history and other extratextual sources, it contradicts our precedents and sets
us on a new course, for before today it was well settled that'[a] statute's legislative history
cannot supply a waiver that does not appear clearly in any statutory text."' (quoting Lane v.
Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996))).
190. See, e.g., Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280,287-89 (1995) (holding that, even
where federal statute's express preemption clause does not reach challenged state law,
implied preemption by that statute might be found). See generally GuNTHER & SuLLivAN,
supranote 30, at 342.
191. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See generally TRIBE, supranote 24, § 627.
192. See Hines,312 U.S. at 67. These forms of implied preemption have been recognized
by the Court in a variety of cases. See, e.g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 120 S. Ct.
1913, 1927 (2000) (finding state tort law auto-airbag cause of action preempted, in light of
lack ofneed for a"formal agency statement ofpre-emptive intent as aprerequisite"to conflict
preemption based on frustration of congressional purpose, at least where "notice and
comment rulemaking" has occurred; indicating that "clear evidence of a conflict," but not a
"specific statement ofpreemptive intent," is required); Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt.
Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) ("Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at
least two types ofimpliedpre-emption: field pre-emption... and conflict pre-emption, where
'compliance withboth federal and state regulations is aphysical impossibility,' orwhere state
law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress." (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963))); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); see also Gardbaum,
supra note 65, at 828 (arguing for rejection of existing doctrine that recognizes implied
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Bass itself, the Court examined not only the criminal statute's
phrasing, but also its legislative history,19 3 and inquired only
whether Congress had "convey[ed] its purpose clearly"19 ' (in
contrast to having used "clear language"'95 ) to the effect that it was
regulating guns that had not crossed state lines.'9 6 Given these
contrasts, Gregory seems to embody not merely a clear-statement
rule, but a super-clear-statement rule that ratchets up the
Rice/Bass explicitness requirement to
an even higher level in a
197
specialized set of states' rights cases.
Is this raising of the explicitness requirement defensible?
Defenders of Gregory will argue it is on the ground that that case
involved state interests of a distinctly high order. Few matters,
preemption because of preference for textual explicitness).
193. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 341-47 (1971).
194. Id. at 349.
195. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,460 (1991) (quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of
State Police, 491 U.S 58,65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
242 (1985))).
196. Notably, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), makes it clear that the
clear-statement rule of Gregory is something different from the rule of avoiding substantial
constitutional questions. See id. at 170 (identifying avoidance doctrine and Gregoryas giving
rise to "two reasons" for interpreting federal law as providing incentives, rather than
mandates, to the States); see alsoPennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206
(1998) (separately analyzing Gregory and avoidance-principle issues). Of course,
sometimes--as in the New York case itself-each of the two rules may work to push the
Court away from an outcome that threatens particularly strong federalism concerns.
197. CompareEskridge & Frickey,supranote 116, at 611-12 (citingGregoryrule as among
'super-strong clear statement rules,' which establish very strong presumptions ofstatutory
meaning that can be rebutted only through unambiguous statutory text targeted at the
specific problem"), with id. at 638 ("clear statement rules... require rebuttal on the face of,
or by implication from, the statute itself' (emphasis added)). At the same time, it is
important not to overstate the differing levels of clarity required by Gregory and Bass, for
ambiguity exists in the case law (and indeed in Gregory itself) on this point. For example, in
Salinas u. UnitedStates, 522 U.S. 52 (1997), the Court suggested that a close relation exists
between the rules of Gregory and ofMcNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), which
relied on Bass to construe a federal criminal statute narrowly because Congress had not
"spoken in clear and definite language." McNally, 483 U.S. at 360; see Salinas, 522 U.S. at
60 (citing the "plain-statement requirement articulated in Gregory andMcNally"). Unlike in
Bass, however, the government's rejected statutory interpretation in McNally concerned the
prosecutable activities of a state's own legislative officials. Indeed, in rejecting the broader
reading of the statute, the Court in McNally expressed particular reservations about
"involv[ing] the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government
for local and state officials." McNally, 483 U.S. at 360. In any event, nothing in Salinas or
McNally suggests that the Court in Gregory was stating a rule of clarity equivalent to the
seemingly more modest rule of clarity set forth in Rice.
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after all, bear more closely upon a state's authority to define itself
than the identification of who may discharge its most basic
governing responsibilities. 9 ' The Court focused on this feature of
state autonomy when it emphasized in Gregory that the case
concerned not only "traditionally sensitive areas," 9 9 but a "political
function"2 °° at "the heart of representative government."2' It is
settled doctrine that judicial scrutiny intensifies in equalprotection, substantive-due-process and free-expression cases as
constitutional concerns become more acute. 0 2 Gregory suggests
that the Court will resort to a kindred sort of clear-statement
"heightened scrutiny" when confronted with what it perceives to be
a particularly grave congressional threat to "states' rights."
198. Notably, the Court in Gregory made little resort to authority to substantiate this
assertion. There is, however, a significant body of precedent that supports the claim. See
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (Black, J., announcing judgment of the Court
in an opinion expressing his own views) ("No function is more essential to the separate and
independent existence of the States and their governments than the power to determine
within the limits ofthe Constitution the qualifications of their own voters for state, county,
and municipal offices and the nature of their own machinery for filling local public offices.");
Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 570-71 (1900) ("It is obviously essential to the
independence of the States, and to their peace and tranquility, that their power to prescribe
the qualifications of their own officers ... should be exclusive, and free from external
interference, except so far as plainly provided by the Constitution of the United States."); In
re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891) (describing as "the distinguishing feature" of a
republican form of government "the right of the people to choose their own officers for
governmental administration, and pass their own laws"); Merritt, supra note 78, at 50-55
(collecting cases); see also Lance v. Plummer, 384 U.S. 929,932 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (questioning federal court's power to order dismissal oflocal sheriff
as sanction for violating injunction in light of federalism-engendered "authority ofa State to
conduct its governmental operations by agents responsible to the people of the State");
Cintron-Garcia v. Romero-Barcelo, 671 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1982) (suggesting that the
Guarantee Clause supports "allowing the states themselves to decide whether, and when, to
fill interim vacancies"). See generally Massey, supranote 175, at 192 ([Tihe authority of the
people of the States to determine the qualifications of their government officials may be
inviolate' from congressional invasion via the Commerce Clause" (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S.
at 464)); Merritt, supranote 78, at 41 (asserting that "states should have the power to control
the procedures by which their government officials are selected").
199. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461 (quoting Willv. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
65 (1989) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,349 (1971))).
200. Id. at 462.
201. Id. at 463; see Massey, supra note 175, at 192-93 (suggesting that "the plain
statement rule" of Gregory "only operates when the substance ofthe congressional action is
one which bites into the core of state sovereignty").
202. See, e.g., GUNTHER & SULLIvAN, supra note 30, at 629-32 (discussing tiers of equal
protection review).
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The Court's recent Eleventh Amendment cases point in the same
direction. "° InAtascaderoState Hospitalv. Scanlon,0 4 the plaintiff
argued that Congress had abrogated state sovereign immunity for
purposes of suits under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. On behalf of
a five-Justice majority, Justice Powell responded:
In making this argument, respondent relies on the pre- and
post-enactment legislative history of the Act and inferences
from general statutory language. To reach respondent's
conclusion, we would have to temper the requirement... that
Congress unequivocally express its intention to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment bar to suits against the States in federal
court.... We decline to do so, and affirm that Congress may

abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from
suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably
clearin the languageof the statute. 5
In embracing this super-clear-statement rule, Justice Powell relied
on "[the fundamental nature of the interests implicated by the
Eleventh Amendment."" 6 He also cited the danger that those
interests might otherwise be underenforced because "[federal]
courts themselves must decide whether their own jurisdiction has
been expanded" when they rule on Eleventh Amendment abrogation
issues. 0 7 In other words, because federal judges would see it to be
203. See Frickey, supra note 27, at 721 (noting that "Gregory apparently borrowed its
approach [from cases] interpretingfederal statutes arguably abrogating the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity to suit").
204. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
205. Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
206. Id. Atascadero also held that state relinquishments (as opposed to congressional
abrogations) of Eleventh Amendment immunity must be embodied in"an unequivocalwaiver
specifically applicable to federal-court jurisdiction." Id. at 241. As Justice Brennan observed
in dissent, this specialized and "stringent" constitutional rule of interpretation is in tension
with the general principle that "a federal court ... should attempt to construe the state law
... as a state courtwould."Id. at 253 n.5. In essence, the majority adopted a clear-statement
rule with regard to state waiver-just as it had adopted a clear-statement rule with regard
to congressional abrogation-to advance substantive constitutional interests in maintaining
a vital federal system.
207. Id. at 243. That these considerations led to adoption of a super-clear-statement rule
is itself super-clear. See, e.g., Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197,204
(1991) ("Congressional intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunitymust be expressed
in the text of the statute; the Court will not look to legislative history in making its
inquiry."); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 476 (1987)
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in their own self-interest to expand federal court jurisdiction, those
judges might well overreach in interpreting federal legislation to
negate state immunity from federal-court suit. As a result, the
Court adopted a structural rule to safeguard Eleventh Amendment
values in a context where the threat to those values seemed
particularly acute.208
In dissent, Justice Brennan signaled his agreement that the
Court should shape Eleventh Amendment abrogation rules to
safeguard substantive constitutional interests. In his view, how20 9
ever, Atascadero's "special rules of statutory draftsmanship"
(pluralityopinion) (stating that "general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind
of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment" (quoting
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,246 (1985))).
208. See George D. Brown, State Sovereignty underthe Burger Court-Howthe Eleventh
Amendment Survived theDeathofthe Tent&-Some BroaderImplicationsofAtascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 GEO. L.J. 363, 390 (1985) (reasoning that Atascadero provides
"judicialoversight of the legislative process to ensure that Congress has considered the
states' interests"). Notably, the Courthas adopted a related, federalism-driven rule to control
congressional invasion of state interests by way of conditional spending programs.
Purportedly relying on principles of contract law, the Court has held that federal spending
conditions, to be effective, must be stated unambiguously. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17(1981); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 172
(1992); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (disallowing section 1983 suit under federal
statute based on spending power pursuant to Pennhurst unambiguousness rule; quoting
case's "contract" reasoning); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987); New York
Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405,413-14 (1973) (requiring "clear manifestation
of intention" to condition state access to federal grant program). The Court's contract law
reasoning is shaky because it is not at all clear that there is a clear-statement rule in
contract law with respect to contractual offers. (In fact, courts interpret and enforce
ambiguous contracts on a daily basis.) The better justification for this clear-statement rule
appears to be the same one that underlies the Coures other structural federalism decisions:
namely, that added clarity will heighten congressional understanding of and attentiveness
to the interference with state autonomy threatened by the federal program. See Eskridge &
Frickey, supranote 116, at 621 ("South Dakota v. Dole quoted the Pennhurstcanon, and in
context this clear statement rule seems to be the only meaningful constraint. Thus, judicial
aggressiveness at the interpretive level correlates with judicial deference at the
constitutional level."). The Court also applied theAtascadero super-clear-statement rule in
Will v. MichiganDepartment of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), when it concluded that a
state is not a "person" subject to suit under the basic civil rights enforcement statute, 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The Court noted that Will might be deemed distinguishable fromAtascadero
because Atascadero, unlike Will, "was an Eleventh Amendment case." Id. But cf.Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (later holding that immunity from suit recognized in Eleventh
Amendment context extends to suits, like Will, brought in state court). Citing Rice and
quoting Bass, however, the Court emphasized that "a similar approach" to the one in
Atascadero had been taken "in other contexts." Will, 491 U.S. at 65.
209. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 253 n.3.

1626

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1575

undermined "essential constitutional values protecting the freedom
of our people" by forcing "federal courts to protect States that
violate federal law."2 ' Like the majority, Justice Brennan, by
drawing on the Amendment's text and history, considered whether
the federalism values embodied in the Eleventh Amendment
justified an unmistakable-clarity approach. He argued, however,
that the majority had vastly overstated the strength of the stateautonomy interests at issue in the case.2 1 In sum, in Atascadero
both the majority and the dissent focused on whether substantive
constitutional values warranted adoption of a structuralrule of
clarity. 1 2 Their differing resolutions of that issue reflected a
difference of opinion about which constitutional values to emphasize.21 3
Atascadero may be one of those cases in which it turns out that
timing was everything. So it is because, inAtascaderoitself, Justice
Brennan stood on shaky ground in bemoaning the majority's
purported subversion of "essential constitutional values."2 ' The
Rehabilitation Act, after all, was not a part of the Constitution, and
other abrogation cases of that time period, like Atascadero,
concerned enforcement of federal statutes, rather than constitutional rights. 1 5
210. Id. at 258.
211. See id. at 258-302.
212. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234.
213. See id. An interesting contrast to Atascaderois provided byHutto v. Filmney, 437 U.S.
678 (1978). In Finney, the Court-by way of a majority opinion authored by Justice
Brennan-interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to authorize the recovery ofattorneys' fees from state
treasuries in section 1983 actions. The state had argued that "Congress must enact express
statutory language making the States liable if it wishes to abrogate their immunity." Id. at
694. Justice Brennan, however, deemed any requirement of "an extraordinarily explicit
statutory mandate" inapplicable in a case (like Finney)that involved "expenses incurred in
litigation seeking only prospective relief," rather than "retroactive liability for prelitigation
conduct." Id. at 695. Citing the "values of federalism served by the Eleventh Amendment,"
Justice Powell wrote in dissent that he favored requiring "statutory language sufficiently
clearto alert everyvoting Member of Congress ofthe constitutional implications ofparticular
legislation." Id. at 705. The majority in Finney, while eschewing a super-clear-statement
rule, emphasized that there were "plainindications of legislative intent" to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment defense. Id. at 694 (emphasis added). See, e.g., id. (referring to, among
other things, Congress's rejection of"at least two attempts to amend th6 Act and immunize
state and local governments from awards").
214. Atascadero,472 U.S. at 258.
215. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987)
(Jones Act); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)
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In the wake of Atascadero, however, two developments have
radically altered the lay of this juridical landscape. First, in
216 the Court held that
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
Congress, regardless of the clarity with which it speaks, may never
deprive states of their sovereign immunity as part of a legislative
program it passes pursuant to its core Article I powers; rather,
Congress may subject states to suit in enforcing only the
217
constitutionalprotections afforded by the Civil War Amendments.
Second, in City of Boerne V. Flores, 215 the Court held that, in
enforcing those Amendments, Congress may not expansively create
new rights;219 rather, it may give protection against only those
affronts that courts have found or can find, through established
processes of judicial interpretation, to violate the Amendments'
substantive guaranteesYo As a result of these twin developments,
the Atascadero super-clarity rule no longer operates in the sort of
case thatAtascaderoitself presented-namely, a case that involves
enforcement against a state of a congressionally created right of
action. Rather, theAtascaderorule now operates as a restriction on
only those attempted congressional abrogations of immunity that
target true, judicially cognizable constitutionalviolations. It follows
that Justice Brennan's "essential constitutional values" critiquealthough perhaps overdrawn in Atascadero itself-has a powerful
resonance today.
It is doubtful that the current Court will rush to overturn
Atascadero's super-clear-statement rule in light of these postAtascaderodevelopments.2 ' After all, the rule continues to serve its
purpose of sharply focusing legislators' attention on congressional
threats to Eleventh Amendment values, 222 particularly the value of
(Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act).
216. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).

217. See id. at 59, 65-66.
218. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
219. Id. at 532.
220. See Id. at 532-33. The Court, moreover, has reaffirmed and vigorously applied the
Flores principle in later cases. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000);
Florida Prepaid PostsecondaryEduc. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 666 (1999);
Florida Prepaid PostsecondaryEduc. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
221. See, e.g., KMiel, 120 S. Ct. 640 (applyingAtascaderosuper-clear-statement rule in

case alleging only a Fourteenth Amendment-based abrogation).
222. See generally BICKEL, supranote 6, at 181-82:
Legislators are likely to be more acutely aware of just what they are being
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state fiscal autonomy repeatedly trumpeted in the Court's recent
federalism decisions .2The argument for reconsideration, however,
is hardly frivolous. In particular, if the Court crafts a structural
rule to take substantive constitutional values into account, it must
pay heed to all such values, not only those values enshrined in the
Eleventh (or any other particular) Amendment.2 24 Because the
asked to do if the language of a bill clearly defines what is aimed at than if the
language is relatively broad, although its concrete application is clarified in
debate or is defined post facto by the Court on the basis of what was common
knowledge at the time of enactment and may therefore fairly be imputed to the
legislators.
223. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,749 (1999). Ofcourse, recognizingthe deliberationheighteningfunctionoftheAtascadero rule carries with it important analytical consequences
for concrete cases. In Kimel, for example, Justice Thomas rejected the majority's conclusion
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) abrogated state immunity with
adequate clarity where it incorporated by reference a provision of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) that abrogated state sovereign immunity for purposes ofthat Act. See Kimel, 120
S. Ct. at 655. He reasoned that the "provision simply does not reveal Congress' attention to
the augmented liability and diminished sovereignty concomitant to an abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity" in the ADEA context. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
Justice Thomas rejected in particular the majority's willingness to find a "clear statement
by incorporation" of the FLSA enforcement provision into the ADEA because the relevant
section of the FLSA had been amended to abrogate state sovereign immunity only after its
incorporation into the ADEA. Id. As Justice Thomas explained:
Where Congress amends an Act whose provisions are incorporated by other
Acts, the bill under consideration does not necessarily mention the
incorporating references in those other Acts, and so fails to inspire confidence
that Congress has deliberated on the consequences of the amendment for the
other Acts .... And, given the purpose of the clear statement rule to "assur[e]
that the legislature has in fact faced" the issue ofabrogation,... I am unwilling
to indulge the fiction that Congress, when it amended [the FLSA provision],
recognized the consequences for a separate Act (the ADEA) that incorporates
the amended provision.
Id. at 655-56. The majority, however, rejected Justice Thomas's analysis because Congress
had amended the FLSA provision as part of the very same act that also had amended the
ADEA to extend its substantive restrictions to the states. In these circumstances, the
majority concluded, it is "more than clear that Congress understood the consequences of its
actions." Id. at 642.
224. Without putting the point quite this way, Professor Sunstein made the same
observation in critiquing the spending-power clear-statement rule set forth in the Pennhurst
case. See supranote 119. As he explained:
The Court decided Pennhurst on the basis of an interpretive norm derived
from the constitutional background, not from the statute at issue.
For reasons explored above, federalism principles are .properly invoked, at
least in ordinary settings, to require a clear statement from Congress for the
imposition of significant duties on the states.... But two considerations
suggest that Pennhurstwas incorrectly decided.
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Atascadero rule, in the wake of Seminole Tribe and Flores, will
operate to foreclose judicial recourse against states only for actual
and otherwise remediable constitutional violations, it may well be
seen to subvert, more than to serve, the Constitution's paramount
substantive goals. And if that is so, there is every reason to say that
this rule should not endure.
C. Extra-Super-Clear-StatementRules
Clear-statement and super-clear-statement rules operate when
both ambiguity and constitutional difficulty inhere in a legal text.
Confronted with such cases, a court can skirt the constitutional
problem by reading the statute in the way that makes the difficulty
go away. What if,however, a court cannot interpret its way around
the constitutional challenge because it cannot invoke a rule fairly
characterizable as one of statutory construction? Is there still room
to insist that, at least in acutely sensitive areas, the lawmaker
must employ a greater measure of clarity before a court will address
and resolve the "substantive" constitutional issue at hand?
In a sense, the vagueness doctrine recognizes such a judicial
power. The settled rule is that federal courts lack authority to reject
definitive state court interpretations of state statutes. 225 Thus, in
cases that present challenges to convictions under state statutes, a
court cannot afford a petitioner relief on the ground that the state
statute, properly interpreted, does not apply. By invoking the
constitutional vagueness doctrine, however, a court can achieve the
same result. In effect, a court can (and occasionally does) say to a
state: "We concede that you may prosecute the conduct engaged in
by this individual and that your statute, as properly interpreted,
First, a constitutional norm calls for aggressive construction of statutes
involving the developmentally disabled....
Second, federalism principles have much less force in cases in which
Congress attempts to protect a traditionally disadvantaged group from state
political processes. The ordinary presumption in favor of state autonomy is
countered by the fourteenth amendment-a self-conscious limitation on state
power. Invocation of principles of state autonomy in the context of a socially
subordinated group-to justify a narrow reading of a statute enacted on its
behalf-is positively perverse in light of constitutional structure and history.
Sunstein, Interpreting,supranote 119, at 501.
225. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
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does proscribe that conduct. We are throwing out the conviction,
however, because the statute, as it stands, is too indeterminate. In
other words, you may regulate this conduct, but only with a statute
that identifies with deliberation-enhancing clarity just what
conduct is, and is not, proscribed." In this way the vagueness
doctrine serves much the same deliberation-enhancing purpose with
regard to state statutes that constitutionally driven rules of
statutory interpretation serve with respect to federal laws.22
May federal courts employ other clarity-driven techniques to deal
with constitutionally problematic state statutes? At least according
to Justice O'Connor's dispositive concurring opinion in Thompson
v. Oklahoma,22 they sometimes may. The issue in Thompson was
whether the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause blocked
Oklahoma from executing a person, properly tried as an adult as a
matter of state law, who had committed a capital murder at the age
of fifteen. Four justices, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, concluded
that the Clause proscribed the execution of so young an offender in
light of now-settled "evolving standards ofdecency."22 Four justices,
in an opinion by Justice Scalia, concluded that the Clause did not
bar the execution because nineteen states authorized prosecution
of fifteen-year-old offenders as adults, with the consequence that
they became statutorily eligible for the death penalty. 29 In other
words, eight justices were prepared to decide the case on the basis
of an on-or-off rule, with four justices deeming the rule to be "on,"
and four others deeming it "off."' °
In her decisive opinion, Justice O'Connor chose a different
pathway through the case. Gravitating toward, though not quite
embracing, Justice Stevens's analysis of the "evolving standards"
226. See BICKEL, supranote 6, at 201 (emphasizing close relationship between statutory
interpretations driven by constitutional concerns and invocations of the vagueness and
nondelegation doctrines). The vagueness rule embodies a number of structuralfeatures, and
for this reason I focus on it in more detail later in this article. See infra notes 908-19 and
accompanying text.
227. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
228. Id. at 821 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
229. See id. at 859-78.
230. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text. We shall see in due course that
describing the Eighth Amendment's evolving-standards principle as an on-or-off rule is an
oversimplification. See infra notes 561-78 and accompanying text. For now, however, the
description is apt for purposes of contrasting the opinions of Justices Stevens and Scalia from
the more obviously and explicitly structural approach of Justice O'Connor.
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issue, Justice O'Connor asserted that "a national consensus
forbidding the execution of any person for a crime committed before
the age of 16 very likely does exist."23 ' Justice O'Connor, however,
wanted "better evidence" on this subject' 2 and detected "narrower
grounds" for ruling in favor of the inmate."3 Her concededly
"unusual" approach 4 to "this unique situation" emanated from
what she saw as the Court's distinctively structural death penalty
case law.
Justice O'Connor first noted that "[almong the most important
and consistent themes in this Court's death penalty jurisprudence
is the need for special care and deliberation in decisions that may
lead to the imposition of that sanction."3 ' She added that "[tihe
restrictions that we have required under the Eighth Amendment
affect... legislatures," as well as "sentencing authorities." 7 Then,
in the critical passage of her opinion, Justice O'Connor explained:
Oklahoma has enacted a statute that authorizes capital
punishment for murder, without setting any minimum age at
which the commission of murder may lead to the imposition of
that penalty. The State has also, but quite separately, provided
that 15-year-old murder defendants may be treated as adults in
some circumstances. Because it proceeded in this manner, there
is a considerable risk that the Oklahoma Legislature either did
not realize that its actions would have the effect of rendering
15-year-old defendants death eligible or did not give the
question the serious consideration that would have been
reflected in 8the explicit choice of some minimum age for death
eligibility.2

She continued:

231. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 848-49 (emphasis added).
232. See id. at 849.

233. See id.
234. See id. at 858.

235. Id. at 857.
236. Id. at 856.
237. Id.;see also Greggv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,195 (1976) (plurality opinion) (suggesting
need, in the death penalty context, for a "carefully drafted statute").

238. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857.
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Were it clear that no national consensus forbids the imposition
ofcapital punishment for crimes committed before the age of 16,
the implicit nature of the Oklahoma Legislature's decision
would not be constitutionally problematic. In the peculiar
circumstances we face today, however, the Oklahoma statutes
have presented this Court with a result that is of very dubious
constitutionality, and they have done so without the earmarks
of careful consideration that we have required for other kinds
of decisions leading to the death penalty. In this unique
situation, I am prepared to conclude that petitioner and others
who were below the age of 16 at the time of their offense may
not be executed under the authority of a capital punishment
statute that specifies no minimum age at which the commission
of a capital crime can lead to the offender's execution."
Put in simpler terms, Justice O'Connor concluded that, although
Oklahoma statutory law, which the Supreme Court could not
reinterpret,2 40 subjected fifteen-year-old murderers to capital
punishment, the level of clarity with which the state legislature had
spoken was not sufficient for Eighth Amendment purposes. For
Justice O'Connor, the Amendment required more "careful consideration" and "serious reflection" than Oklahoma lawmakers had
given this grave matter.2 41 If a state legislature were in fact going
to subject fifteen year olds to the death penalty, it was necessary,
at a minimum, that it pass a law that specifically provided for that
result.2 4 2
Justice O'Connor's opinion was not happily received by Justice
Scalia. He complained that it put in place "the loose cannon of a
brand new principle"2 43 that wrongly intruded on "the process of
legislation."2" Such an approach, he added, could equally well
justify "imposing a requirement that the death penalty for felons
239. Id. at 857-58.
240. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982) (reaffirming that "the
construction that a state court gives a state statute is not a matter subject to our review").
241. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 856-57.
242. See State v. Stone, 535 So. 2d 362, 364-65 (La. 1988) (disallowing death penalty for
fifteen-year-old offender because "[t]here is no evidence that the Louisiana legislature made
the type ofconscious, deliberate decision to impose the death penalty on those under the age
of sixteen that Justice O'Connor found to be constitutionally mandated").
243. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 877.
244. Id.
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under 16 be adopted by a two-thirds vote of each house of the state
legislature, or by referendum, or by bills printed in 10-point
type." 5 Justice Scalia was particularly critical of Justice
O'Connor's claim that she was taking a "narrower approach" than
the majority to the case.' As he explained:
I know of no authority whatever for our specifying the precise
form that state legislation must take, as opposed to its
constitutionally required content. We have in the past
studiously avoided that sort of interference in the States'
legislative processes, the heart of their sovereignty... Thus,
while the concurrence purports to be adopting an approach
more respectful of States' rights than the plurality, in principle
it seems to me much more disdainful. 247
There is much to say about Justice Scalia's potent critique of
Justice O'Connor's structural approach to the Thompson case. For
now, however, it suffices to note that much of his criticism applies
to structural rules in general. The rules of Gregory andAtascadero,
for example, very much concern "the precise form that ... legis-

lation must take" to reach a legislatively desired end.' And we
soon shall see that many other rules, because they are structural in
nature, focus on "the States' legislative processes."249 The point is
that Justice Scalia's critique must be assessed in light of the
broader message of this Article: that the Court, in a wide variety of
contexts, has protected substantive constitutional interests through
the use of process-centered structural rules.
To say these things is not to say that cases like Gregory and
Atascadero controlled the Thompson case. After all, both Gregory
and Atascadero involved federal statutes subject to federal-court
interpretation.1 0 Justice O'Connor's approach to Thompson, in
contrast, inspired unease precisely because it overrode the meaning
245. Id. at 875-76.
246. See id. at 877.
247. Id. at 876-77.
248. Id.; see, e.g., Frickey, supra note 27, at 722 (noting that Gregory embodies "a
forthright judicial effort to influence congressional processes").
249. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 877. The rules that govern state armative action programs
are illustrative. See infra notes 392-414 and accompanying text.
250. See supranotes 179-215 and accompanying text.
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of state legislation that was no longer open to interpretation on the
ground of ambiguity.Y This observation does not wholly undermine
Justice O'Connor's analysis in Thompson because constitutional
rulings often override authoritatively interpreted state statutes. 52
It may help explain, however, why courts have not routinely
53
embraced extra-super-clear-statement rules.Y
Even so, Justice O'Connor's approach to Thompson is not an
isolated developmentY 4 Realist commentators, for example, long
251. See supranote 240 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 6, 9-13 and accompanying text.
253. There is another important point to be made in response to the argument that
Thompson is readily distinguishable from Gregory and Atascadero because those cases
involve mere statutory interpretation. The thought that underlies that argument is that
courts must and do engage in statutory interpretation of ambiguous statutes all the time.
Thus, the sort of exercise involved in Gregory and Atascadero falls comfortably within our
judicial traditions (while the sort of exercise engaged in by Justice O'Connor in Thompson,
it may be said, does not). There is, however, a conspicuously weak link in this chain of
reasoning. Gregory and Atascadero involve a mode of"statutory interpretation" that is so
unusual, so nonhistoric and so distinctively constitutional that it would seem to fall outside
our ordinary interpretive traditions. This is the case because traditional statutory
interpretation draws on a variety of sources (including, for example, underlying legislative
purpose, interpretive canons, legislative history, and the like). Under Gregory and
Atascadero,however, all traditional tools of interpretation are jettisoned; courts-in these
unique and distinctively constitutional contexts-focus myopically on the statutory text and,
even then, must find in it an extraordinarily high level of explicitness.
Put differently, Gregory andAtascadero do not involve statutory interpretation as that
process is ordinarily conceived, but instead demand a stark departure from it. In effect, those
cases require-in contravention of basic norms of statutory interpretation-an override of
the unambiguous meaning of statutes as unambiguousness is ordinarily determined. Viewed
in this light, the Court's approach to Gregory andAtascaderocannot be defended as "mere"
statutory interpretation and, in fact, is not far removed from Justice O'Connor's approach
to Thompson.
A possible response to this argument is that our tradition of statutory interpretation does
recognize a judicial prerogative to override even "the plain and unambiguous meaning of
statutory language" in "rare and exceptional circumstances." Salinas v. United States, 522
U.S. 52,58 (1997) (quoting Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129,135 (1991)); accord, e.g., Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). But even if such a
prerogative exists, the authorities indicate that it may be exercised only to effectuate "the
most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions' in the legislative history," Salinas,522
U.S. at 57 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675,680 (1985)), or perhaps "to avoid
absurd or glaringly unjust results," Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 450 (1932). Such
conditions, however, do not underlie the principles of Gregory andAtascadero;after all, those
principles ignore (ratherthan implement) legislative history, and the exercise offederal court
jurisdiction over federal claims (including age discrimination claims brought by state judges)
can hardly be viewed as either "absurd" or "unjust."
254. Nor has Justice O'Connor's opinion gone without praise. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d
716, 739 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (citing "[tihe powerful and telling,
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have asserted that the Court sometimes uses the vehicle of
statutory construction to advance constitutional (and other) values
in the face of congressional pronouncements that are not genuinely
subject to interpretive dispute.255 Indeed, Professor Bickel suggested
that this description fairly fit the Court's application of the
avoidance principle in Kent v. Dulles.256 Even more to the point, a
Ninth Circuit panel drew on Thompson itself to forge an extrasuper-clear-statement rule outside the death penalty context before
encountering a reversal of its ruling by a sharply divided en banc
court.
In Jones v. Bates,257 the court dealt with the adoption by
California voters of Proposition 140, which stated that "[n]o [state]
concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor in Thompson"), rev'd, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793
(1997).
255. See, e.g., Adler, supranote 119, at 836 ("CatholicBishop lies at the very boundaries
of the Avoidance Canon. The opinion was controversial at the time it was decided and
remains controversial today because the otherwise proper interpretation of the Labor Act
that the Avoidance Canon defeated was not open to reasonable disagreement, as a matter
of ordinary English: a parochial school is still an employer, in ordinary English. Eskridge,
Public Values, supra note 119, at 1066 (criticizing Catholic Bishop as a case where "public
values" were wronglyinvoked"to trump a clear text and supportive legislative history," and
thus as "inconsistent with legislative supremacy"). It may be that constitutional concerns
drove the Court to take a similar approach in Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 450, in which it
superimposed an entrapment defense on a seemingly clear criminal statute so as to
implement "public policy" and avoid a "glaringly unjust result."
256. 357 U.S. 116 (1958); see also supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text. Thus, in
Professor Bickers view, Kent involved "a step beyond holding Congress to its responsibility
for a policy decision that it has failed to make-altogether or with sufficient particularity."
Rather, "[tihis was remanding to Congress for a second look-not for the necessary initial
decision, but for orderly, deliberate, explicit, and formal reconsideration of a decision
previouslymade, but made back-handedly, off-handedly, less explicitlythan is desirable with
respect to an issue of such grave importance." BICKEL, supranote 6, at 165-66; see also id.
at 201 (describing imputation to Congress of statutory meaning embraced in Kent as
"fictive"); Calabresi, supra note 13, at 120 n.131 (reading Kent as a case in which a
constitutionally dubious result was most likely intended). From this perspective, Kent seems
to have involved much more than the usual use of the avoidance principle as a means of
construing an ambiguous statute. Regardless, the case illustrates well the thesis advanced
here: that the Court has gravitated toward structural rules to protect strong constitutional
values by fostering legislative attentiveness and care and has done so through the use of
rules that demand various levels ofexplicitness. See BICKEL, supranote 6, at 181 (describing
Kent as a case "that, on particularly sensitive and intractable issues, demanded not merely
that there be a deliberate exertion of legislative authority, but that it be explicit and thus
more acutely responsible than usual").
257. 127 F.3d 839, rev'd en banc, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1021
(1998).
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Senator may serve more than 2 terms" and "[no member of the
Assembly may serve more than 3 terms. " " The issue was whether
the approval of this initiative, by way of a statewide popular vote
unaccompanied by legislative action, constitutionally effected a
lifetime (as opposed to a one-term) ban on the reelection of state
25 9
legislators who had served the designated number of ters.
Before the Jones case reached the Ninth Circuit, the state courts
had held that the initiative, properly interpreted as a matter of
state law, imposed a lifetime exclusion; 2 0 thus, just as in Thompson
(and unlike in Gregory and Atascadero), the federal circuit court
confronted a law it could not reshape by way of an ambiguity-driven
interpretative rule.2 1' Faced with this situation, the circuit court
panel nonetheless ruled that the new law, to the extent it barred
reelection for life, was unconstitutional on clarity-based grounds.2 62
At the root of the court's analysis was its conclusion that
Proposition 140 "did not clearly inform [voters] that they were being
asked to adopt a lifetime ban."263 The panel emphasized that a
similar lack of particularity would not prove fatal to most state
policy reforms; rather, two special factors rendered a specific
reference to a lifetime ban a constitutional necessity in this case.
First, the reform effected by Proposition 140 came by way of a voter
initiative.2 6 4 Echoing concerns expressed in literature going back to
the Federalist Papers, the panel viewed with heightened skepticism
"direct ballot measures" because they "lack the kinds of critical,
deliberative filters that the Framers contemplated."2 65
258. Id. at 845.
259. See id. at 845-46.
260. See id. at 846.
261. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
262. As stated by Judge Fletcher in her dissent from the en banc opinion, "theprocessthat
produced Proposition 140 was infirm." Jones, 131 F.3d at 873 (emphasis added).
263. Id. at 856 (emphasis added in part).

264. See id. at 857.
265. Id. at 859. As the panel stated:
Before aninitiative becomes law, no committee meetings are held; no legislative

analysts study the law; no floor debates occur;, no separate representative
bodies vote on the bill; no reconciliation conferences are held; no amendments
are drafted; no executive officialwields a veto power and reviews the law under
that authority; and it is farmore difficult for the people to "reconvene" to amend

or clarify the law if a court interprets it contrary to the voters' intent. The
public also generally lacks legal or legislative expertise-or even a duty (as
legislators have under Article VI) to support the Constitution. It lacks the
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Second, according to the panel, Proposition 140 merited special
scrutiny because it endangered "fundamental rights," namely, the
rights to seek elective office and to vote for candidates of one's
choice."' Pointing to these substantive values, the Court limited its
holding to "instances like this, in which the measure raises serious
constitutional questions" about "fundamental, constitutional rights,
such as voting rights."26 ' In short, the panel in Jones embraced a
structural rule of extra-super clarity to safeguard what the panel
saw as distinctly important, and seriously threatened, substantive
constitutional values.
It is a matter of no little consequence (particularly to officeholders in California) that the en banc court rejected the panels
disposition of the Jones case.2 69 In doing so, however, the en banc
majority did not broadly question the use of structural rules.
Rather, the majority "[a] ssum[ed], without deciding, that a federal
court may determine whether a state has given adequate notice
to its voters in connection with a statewide initiative ballot measure dealing with term limits." 2 0 In the case at hand, however,
the en banc court found no substantive constitutional interests
were infringed by the term-limit rule" and further declared that

abilityto collect and to study information that is utilized routinelybylegislative
bodies.
Id. at 860 (citations omitted). In other words, the Court embraced a sort of structural "who"
rule under which a policy, in this context, could be properly put in place through ordinary
legislative processes, but not by way of direct voter action. For a systematic treatment of
constitutional "who" rules, see infra Part Xl.
266. See Jones, 131 F.3d at 857.
267. Id. at 860-61.
268. At least one commentator has voiced support for the decision of the panel in Jones.
See MarciA. Hamilton, Buried Voices, DominantThemes: JusticeHansLinde and the Move
to Structural Constitutional Interpretation, 35 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 167, 179 (1999)
("Unfortunately, this judicial attack on public initiatives was overturned. . .
269. See supranote 257-58 and accompanying text.
270. Jones, 131 F.3d at 846. In a separate concurring opinion, Judge O'Scanlain
expressed the view that no such power exists in the federaljudiciary, see id. at 852-55, even
when "an initiative affects a 'fundamental right' and ... when said initiative imposes a
'severe' limitation on that right." Id. at 853 n.4. No other judge of the court, however, joined
this opinion, while two judges specifically found that a constitutional notice violation had
occurred. Moreover, even Judge O'Scannlain did not dismiss the precedential force of Justice
O'Connor's opinionin Thompson, emphasizing instead the ruling's distinguishable character
because of its "limitation... to death penalty cases." Id. at 853 n.5.
271. See id. at 846-47.
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California "provided sufficient notice making it clear that
Proposition 140 required lifetime bans." 72
What is one to make of Thompson and Jones? In particular, do
the sorts of extra-super-clear-statement rules identified in these
cases have a future in our law?27 The answer to this question will
depend in part on how courts come to conceptualize more orthodox
clear-statement and super-clear-statement rules. If judges view
those rules as garden-variety rules of statutory constructionaimed primarily at distilling a lawgiver's intent-then they offer
limited precedential support for extra-super-clear-statement
principles. 4 After all, extra-super-clear-statement rules operate
only when subconstitutional meaning is settled; 5 indeed, it is that
very fact that induces application ofthe extra-super-clear-statement
label.27 6 If,
however, courts perceive cases like Kent, Gregory, and
Atascadero as embodying rules that are (or are largely) constitutional in nature,2" those courts may be more receptive to the
272. Id. at 846.
273. For a post-Jones decision that focuses on the special features of death penalty cases
and Justice O'Connor's approach to Thompson, see Harrisv. Wright, 93 F.3d 581 (9th Cir.
1996). In his dissent in Harris,Judge Pregerson invoked a Thompsonesque approach in
advocating habeas corpus relief for a prisoner given a mandatory life sentence, without
possibility of parole, for engaging in a capital offense when fifteen years old. The majority
rejected this contention, however, on the following logic:
[Tihere's no evidence of a consensus against mandatory life without parole for
fifteen-year-olds and we don't subject life imprisonment without parole to the
same searching scrutiny we apply to capital punishment.... Where the
question isn't life or death, the Constitution doesn't require the state to prove
its legislature contemplated each specific application of clearly phrased, general
laws.
Id. at 585. See generally Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993) ("In capital cases, we
have required additional protections because of the nature of the penalty at stake.");
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) ("Death, in its finality, differs more
from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two.").
274. Compare Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 206 (1991)
(suggesting that Gregory and related authority "describe the plain statement rule as 'a rule
of statutory construction.. .,' rather than as a rule of constitutional law"), with id. at 207
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The clear statement rule is not a mere canon of statutory
interpretation. Instead, it derives from the Constitution itself.").
275. See supranotes 240-52 and accompanying text.
276. See supranote 253 and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., EEOCv. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,262-63 (1991) ("Clear statement
rules operate less to reveal actual congressional intent than to shield important values from
an insufficiently stronglegislative intent to displace then."); POSNER, supranote 119, at 285
(characterizing, but criticizing, avoidance principle as creating a "judge-made 'penumbra"
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sort of unambiguously constitutional deliberation-enhancing rule
embraced by Justice O'Connor in Thompson.2 78 We already have
seen reasons for conceptualizing the rules that require clear or
super-clear statements as distinctively constitutional in character,279 and there are other reasons too." 0 It also will aid the cause
around the Constitution's own terms); Frickey, supra note 27, at 722 ("Gregory is an
approach for implementing Garcia'sprocedural focus, rather than'some interpretive end in
itself....").
278. This sentence raises a question that is at once deeply important and almost surreally
abstract: What does it mean to say that doctrines typically conceived of as rules of statutory
interpretation "are (or are essentially or largely) constitutional in nature"? At a minimum,
a rule's constitutional pedigree is clear if Congress can displace that rule only by way of
constitutional amendment. Could Congress, for example, repeal by statute the interpretive
principle ofconstitutional doubt invoked in cases like Kent v. Dulles?And, even if Congress
could, could it also repeal by statute the federalism-driven clear-statement rules applied in
cases like Rice andBass?Perhaps it could not. It has been suggested, after all, that the Court
recognized theRice andBass rules inpartto compensate for the erstwhile underenforcement
of federalism values. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text. Yet, if these rules in
fact reflect an effort to give minimum protection to otherwise underenforced constitutional
commands, it is hard to see how Congress, consistent with those commands, can jettison
those rules. There is, on top of this, a more basic point. Whether the Rice and Bass rules are
congressionally reversible, any acknowledgment that they spring from efforts to compensate
for the underenforcement of constitutional norms necessarily would reveal that they have
constitutional origins. Put another way, even reversible rules of interpretation can
compensate-albeit less aggressively than nonreversible ones-for a perceived
underenforcement of substantive guaranties. It is the derivation of the rule from the
substantive guaranty-rather than its nonreversibility-that establishes its constitutional
character.
In sum, the structural rules of clarity established in Rice and Bass have their origins in
the Constitution. No obvious reason exists to say that rules of super clarity (like the ones
applied in Gregory and Atascadero) are any less sturdily founded upon substantive
constitutional values. And if both ordinary clear-statement and super-clear-statement rules
are fairly said to derive from the Constitution, it hardly seems illogical to say that extrasuper-clear statement rules are derivable from the Constitution too.
279. See supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text. See generally Eskridge & Frickey,
supranote 116, at 597 ("What the Court is doing is creating a domain of'quasi-constitutional
law' in certain areas: Judicial review does not prevent Congress from legislating, butjudicial
interpretation of the resulting legislation requires an extraordinarily specific statement on
the face ofthe statute for Congress to limit the states .... ."). That these rules have more of
an implement-constitutional-values than find-the-intent-of-the-legislature function is
suggested by sources cited in supra notes 255-56.
280. Consider, for example, Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989). There, the Court
applied the super-strong Atascadero rule to a federal statute designed to protect the
handicapped, which was adopted a decade beforeAtascadero was handed down. As observed
by Professors Eskridge and Frickey- "[Ulnder the Supreme Court's prevailing Eleventh
Amendment precedent in 1975, when Congress adopted the statute, the jurisdictional
language covering actions against the states plus the specific legislative history were
probably enough to rebut the presumption against congressional abrogation of the states'
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of extra-super-clear-statement rules if we can identify in the case
law other doctrines that cause constitutionality to turn on the form
that state law pronouncements take. We turn now to one set of
cases that involve doctrines of this kind.
III. FORM-BASED DELIBERATION RULES
A shared feature of clear, super-clear, and extra-super-clearstatement rules is apparent upon reflection: each type of rule steers
lawmakers toward placing a sharper focus on the consequences, and
especially the constitutionally relevant consequences, of proposed
governmental action. Rules of clarity, however, do not provide the
sole means of fighting off legislative casualness in the service of
safeguarding constitutional values. Judges may foster a salutary
deliberativeness by insisting that certain forms of legislative
policymaking be deployed.
Consider the dormant Commerce Clause. From its earliest days,
this bedrock constitutional principle has outlawed state taxes that
favor intrastate over interstate business activity. 1 At the same
time, the Court has signaled its willingness to uphold state-created
monetary subsidies for local businesses that have precisely the
same economic effect. 2 How can this be?
Eleventh Amendment immunity

....

Eskridge & Frickey, supranote 116, at 638-39. The

Court, however, paid no heed to this then-existing legislative backdrop in distilling the thenexisting legislature's intent. Instead, it mechanically applied the thereafter-adopted
Atascadero rule in the same retroactive way itwould apply any other constitutional doctrine.
Professors Eskridge and Frickey see in Dellmuth "a certain judicial haughtiness and
uncooperativeness that is surely inconsistent with the humble due process of lawmaking
rationale." Id. at 638. 1 am not so sure. Assuming that Eleventh Amendment values in fact
justified the structural protection of those values enshrined inAtascadero, it seems fair to
say that those values are no less implicated by a congressional exposure ofthe states to suit
in 1975 than in 1995. In other words, if the purpose ofAtascaderois to force a high level of
deliberativeness, rather than to discover true congressional intent, the ruling in Delmuth
seems entirely consistent with the Atascadero case. For another case that arguably reflects
the same sort of nunc pro tune approach of Dellmuth, see Vermont Agency of NaturalRes.
v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000). In that case, Justice Stevens in
dissent specifically complained that the Court's refusal to read the federal qui tam statute
to cover actions against states rested on postenactment authorities, apparently including the
Court's clear-statement decision in Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65
(1989). See Vermont Agency ofNaturalRes., 120 S. Ct. at 1876 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
281. See generally TRIBE, supra note 24, § 6-17 (discussing state discriminatory taxes
forbidden by the Commerce Clause).
282. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 592-93 (1997)
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Several explanations exist, but the core rationale is that the form
of the state's action may act as a structural brake on (or stimulus
to) the invasion of constitutional interests in fostering a borderless
economy. 283 From this perspective, there is every reason for courts
to countenance subsidies more readily than targeted tax breaks.
"Why? Because... government decisions about subsidies are more
likely to provoke public critique and to generate periodic
reevaluation than economically comparable decisions about tax
policy." 4 This is the case because a "subsidy involves the direct
transfer of public monies" and thus is "subject to heightened
political visibility."' In addition, "[t]axlaws are generally effective
until repealed," 6 while "subsidies... routinely show up-and are
subject to recurring evaluation-as expense items in perennially
controversial state budget bills." 7 In the same vein, "a variety of
psychological reasons.., suggest that citizens may well be more
inclined to look the other way when legislators enact a tax break
than when they adopt an affirmative monetary subsidy with
comparable economic effects."288 In short, "for many
reasons-focusing on visibility, intelligibility, self-limitation and

(distinguishing monetary subsidies in holding that a Maine tax exemption violated the
dormant Commerce Clause); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,278 (1988) (holding
that an Ohio statute impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce in violation
of the Commerce Clause in part because it provided tax relief, rather than a monetary
subsidy. See generallyDan T. Coenen & Walter Hellerstein, Suspect Linkage: The Interplay
of State Taxing and Spending Measures in the Application of Constitutional
AntidiscriminationRules, 95 MIcH. L. REV.2167,2216 (1997) (noting economic equivalence
of tax breaks and subsidies).
283. See generallyDan T. Coenen,BusinessSubsidiesandtheDormantCommerce Clause,
107 YALE L.J. 965, 984-94 (1998) (discussing form-based differences between outright
subsidization and the grant of tax breaks); Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce
ClauseRestraintson StateBusiness DevelopmentIncentives, 81 CORNELLL. REv. 789,846-47
(1996) (noting support for the differential treatment of discriminatory tax breaks and
subsidies in Supreme Court precedent).
284. Coenen, supra note 283, at 999; accord Pelican Chapter, Associated Builders &
Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards, 901 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (M.D. La. 1995) (distinguishing
subsidy programs in holding that a Louisiana tax exemption program discriminated against
interstate commerce in violation ofthe Commerce Clause), affd, 128 F.3d 910 (5th Cir. 1997).
285. PelicanChapter,901 F. Supp. at 1137.
286. Id.
287. Coenen, supranote 283, at 988.
288. Id. at 992.
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impermanence-subsidies pose less of a threat to dormant
Commerce Clause values than discriminatory tax breaks. " "
The Court considered the role of form-based deliberation rules in
a constitutional setting far removed from the dormant Commerce
Clause when it expounded on criminal-jury-trial and burden-ofproof rights in Apprendi v. New Jersey.2 90 That case concerned a
state "hate crimes" law that authorized increased punishment for
any criminal offense when the trial judge found, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that it had been committed "with a purpose to
intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race,
29
color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity."
The Court concluded that this sentence-enhancement provision
violated defendants' constitutional rights. At least as a rule, the
Court reasoned, an adjudicative finding that supported a sentence
greater than the statutory maximum punishment for the
underlying crime itself (in this case, second-degree firearm
possession for an unlawful purpose, which carried a punishment of
five-to-ten years imprisonment) had to be assigned to a jury and
made beyond a reasonable doubt.292 Because the New Jersey hate
crime enhancement law authorized an additional ten years of
imprisonment, and actually resulted in the imposition of a twelveyear term in Mr. Apprendi's case, the statute as applied offended
this constitutional principle." s
Four dissenters vigorously rejected this outcome as being based
on "meaningless formalism."' 94 They reasoned that, consistent with
the majority's reasoning, states could keep in place judge-made
preponderance-of-the-evidence enhancements by simply expanding
the possible maximum punishment for each underlying offense. For
example:
First, New Jersey could prescribe, in the weapons possession
statute itself, a range of 5 to 20 years' imprisonmenit for one
289. Id. at 1002. See generally BORIS I. BITrER, BrrrKER ON THE REGULATION OF
INTERsTATEANDFOREIGN COMMERCE § 6.06[G], at 6-78 to 6-79 (1999) (discussing subsidy/tax-

break distinction).
290. 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
291. Id. at 2351 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000)).
292. See id. at 2363.
293. See id.
294. See id. at 2389 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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who commits that criminal offense. Second, New Jersey could
provide that only those defendants convicted under the statute
who are found by a judge, by a preponderance of the evidence,
to have acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual on the
basis of race may receive a sentence greater than 10 years'
imprisonment.25
Moreover, even if the majority's principle would not tolerate such
a transparent evasion,
New Jersey could cure its sentencing scheme, and achieve
virtually the same results, by drafting its weapons possession
statute in the following manner: First, New Jersey could
prescribe, in the weapons possession statute itself, a range of 5
to 20 years' imprisonment for one who commits that criminal
offense. Second, New Jersey could provide that a defendant
convicted under the statute whom a judge finds, by a
preponderance ofthe evidence, not to have acted with a purpose
to intimidate an individual on the basis of race may receive a
sentence no greater than 10 years' imprisonment. 8
According to the dissenters, a constitutional rule that tolerated
such a hypothetical statute, while simultaneously invalidating the
enhancement provision at issue in Apprendi, reflected "pure
formalism,"29 7 the glorification of "approved phrasing,"29 and the
endorsement of "a meaningless and formalistic difference in
2 99
draing... criminal statutes."
Respondingto the dissenters' form-over-substance argument, the
majority focused squarely on the importance of "structural
democratic constraints."0 0 First, according to the majority, the
dissent's proposed alternative would require a state legislature "to
revise its entire criminal code""0 ' if it wished to render sentence
enhancements as broadly applicable as the New Jersey statute
295. Id.
296. Id. at 2390.
297. See id. at 2391.
298. See id. at 2390 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227,267 (1999)).

299. Id.
300. Id. at 2363 n.16.

301. Id.
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challenged in Apprendi had made them. Second, the dissent's
supposedly equivalent statutory proposals would openly "expose
every defendant convicted of, for example, weapons possession, to
a maximum sentence exceeding that which is, in the legislature's
judgment, generally proportional to the crime."0 2 According to the
majority:
This is as it should be. Our rule ensures that a State is obliged
"to make its choices concerning the substantive content of its
criminal laws with full awareness ofthe consequence, unable to
mask substantive policy choices" of exposing all who are
convicted to the maximum sentence it provides. So exposed,
"[tihe political check on potentially harsh legislative action is
then more likely to operate."03
The crux of this reasoning is that statutory form matters. Where
the dissenters saw only opportunities for evasion, the majority
detected opportunities to focus the legislative mind. Faced with an
innovation that threatened to extend many prison terms based on
fact findings made neither by ajury nor beyond a reasonable doubt,
the Court deemed it critical that, at the least, the legislature focus
painstakingly on what it was about to do. The Court in Apprendi
thus remanded the matter of hate crime legislation to the New
Jersey legislature3 s ' In taking this action, the Court said in effect:
If in fact you wish to insist on abrogation of the ordinary jury-trial
and burden-of-proof rules, you must demonstrate your consciousness of the trade-offs you are making by legislating in a form that
is meticulous and attentive. " 5
302. Id.
303. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Pattersonv. New York, 432 U.S. 197,228-29 n.13
(1977)).
304. See id.
305. Another area in which the form of government action seems to matter to the Court
is the area of state aid to religious schools. In particular, the Court has detected, even in the
context of ostensibly neutral programs, 'special Establishment Clause dangers' when money
is given to religious schools or entities directly rather than... indirectly"-with "indirectly"
meaning, for example, by way of cash grants or tax relief afforded to students or their
families. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2546 (2000) (plurality opinion) (citing
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995)); Rosenberger
v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819,846-47 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
accord Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2566 (O'Connor, J., concurring). One explanation for this
seemingly formal distinction has been suggested by Justice Thomas: "The reason for such
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A preference for channeling policymaking into rights-sensitive
decision-making forms may also help explain constitutional rules
typically understood in nonstructural terms."0 6 For example, in
New York v. United States,0 7 the Court outlawed the national
government's direct enlistment of state officials to administer
national programs, while recognizing that Congress could achieve
the same end by conditioning federal grants on state administration of federal programs. 3'0 In defending this mandatedregulation/conditional-spending distinction, the majority reasoned
that giving states the option to take or not to take federal monies
30 9
adequately protects constitutional interests in state autonomy.
Others have noted, however, that states often have no real choice
concern is not that formper se is bad, but that [direct-cash payments] create special risks
that governmental aid will have the effect of advancing religion (or, even more, a purpose of
doing so)." Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2546 n.8; see also id. at 2585 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting
that "risk of diversion [to religious education] is obviously high when aid in the form of
government funds makes its way into the coffers of religious organizations"). Justice
Thomas's focus on "purpose" suggests that the form based direct-payment/indirect-payment
distinction may well have structural roots. Put differently, the anticash payment rule might
be a sort ofprophylaxis against government creation of those programs that, even though
superficially neutral, are most likely to reflect a process infected by the illicit purpose of
supportingreligious instruction. For alengthydiscussion ofmore orthodoxpurpose-centered
rules, see infra PartX.
306. Along these lines, scholars have raised the question of whether certain ways of
allocating political power (for example, requiring "supermajority support to enact
legislation") may be preferable to others (for example, assigning "disproportional numbers
... to districts") because they are less "obscure" and"more likely to be continually revisited."
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ETAL., THE LAW OFDEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL
PROCESS 14 (1998). As Professors Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes note:
Perhaps voting rules embed these special protections in a more visible, and
hence more publicly accountable, form. Unlike obscure features of institutional
design, these kind of voting rules announce their presence each and every time
policy is being made. Some political theorists have argued that the basic
principles on which political power is organized must satisfy the condition of
publicity: they must be capable of being publicly articulated and accepted. See
JOHNRAwIs,ATHEORYOFJUsTIcE 133,177-83 (1971). Can a case be made that
minority preferences in voting rules satisfy this requirement better than
disproportional numbers of voters allocated to districts? That the voting rule
preference is more likely to be continually revisited than the latter?
Id.
307. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
308. See id. at 166-69, 171-72; see also id. at 208 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that "a
similar measure" to the invalidated take-title provision would survive if Congress stipulated
that"moneys collected in the surcharge... be withheld or disbursed depending on a State's
willingness to take title").
309. See id. at 185.
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but to participate in conditional spending programs, so that this
explanation may lack persuasive force. 1 ° To the extent the freechoice rationale of New York is shaky, it becomes necessary to ask
whether there is some other basis for distinguishing conditionalspending programs from outright congressional mandates that
states implement federal programs.
One possibility is that the distinction drawn in New York finds
support in a form-centered rationale-a rationale that focuses not
on the choice faced by states in deciding whether to participate in
the program, but on the choice faced by Congress in deciding to
implement the program in the first instance. On this view, every
congressionally adopted conditional-spending program, whatever
the potential for genuine opt-outs by states, involves actual,
measurable, and annually budgeted costs. 311 These visible costs,
310. See LynnA. Baker, ConditionalSpendingAfterLopez,95 CoLUM. L.REV. 1911,193539 (1995) (discussing why the courts should presume invalid those offers of federal funds to
the states which, if accepted, regulate them in ways that Congress could not directly
mandate); La Pierre, supra note 78, at 594-95 ("The notion that state participation in
national spending programs is voluntary is nothing more than a legal fiction."); D. Bruce La
Pierre, The PoliticalSafeguardsof FederalismRedux: IntergovernmentalImmunity and the
States asAgents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779 (1982) (same); Massey, supranote 175,
at 220 ("If it was ever true, as a practical matter, that states could simply reject federal
money if they disliked the regulatory conditions attached, that is certainly not the reality of
today."); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, ConditionalSpending: Federalism'sTrojan
Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 100-01 (discussing Congress's ability to achieve state
compliance with a particular legislative end through the use of conditions attached to
spending grants); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudenceof
FederalismAfter Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REv. 341, 418 (noting that "while emphasis on the
consent given by the states to the various conditions in federal grants... may comport quite
well with the idea of state sovereignty, the states' consent is often likely to be free in a rather
Pickwickian sense"); William Van Alstyne, "ThirtyPieces of Silver"for the Rights of Your
People:IrresistibleOffersReconsideredasaMatterofStateConstitutionalLaw,16HARv.J.L.
& PuB. POLY. 303, 310 (1993) (noting the "practical inability of states and of local
government to withhold their participation in the federal spending program"). This falsechoice criticism may be answered in part by the Court's suggestion in South Dakotav. Dole,
483 U.S. 203 (1987), that "the financial inducement offered by Congress [must not] be so
coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.'" Id. at 211 (quoting
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). But this pronouncement remains
ambiguous, particularly since it was not included with the Court's enumerated listing of four
specific restraints on the conditional spending power. See id. at 207-08. In any event, this
limitation (if indeed it is a limitation) has never been invoked by the Court and was
specifically found inapplicable in South Dakotav. Dole itself. See id. at 211-12.
311. See Merritt, supra note 78, at 17 (distinguishing programs under which "Congress
has.., forced state and local governments to administer national programs at state expense"
from programs that do not permit "Congress to escape fiscal accountability for its actions");
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just like the visible costs of local-business-aiding subsidies,"1
provide a built-in disincentive for the adoption of congressional
spending programs absent strong justifications."' 3 Indeed, the
Court's rulings in this area create a direct correlation between the
degree of the threat to autonomous state decision making and the
disincentive to congressional intervention. So it is because the
greater the pressure Congress wishes to place on states to sacrifice
their autonomy, the more Congress must pay.
Does the actual-and-visible-cost rationale for distinguishing
congressional conditional-spending and mandated-regulation
programs find support in anything more than the speculations of
academic observers? The Court's decision in Printz v. United
States 14 suggests that it does. In Printz, the Court held that the
anticommandeering principle of New York3" covers congressional
conscription of state executive officials as well as state legislatures."6 In referring to the conditional-spending cases, however,
the Court in Printz did not carry on about the choices such
programs afford to states. Instead, the Court worried that the
"power of the Federal Government would be augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress into its service--and at no
cost to itself-the police officers of the 50 states.""1 The implication
of this passage seems clear enough. The Court is prepared to
tolerate congressional tampering with traditional state choices to
pursue national goals, even to the point of drawing state officials

cf Calabresi, supranote 13, at 149 (stating that "most laws that discriminate are passed by
well-meaning people who favor a given result as long as they do not have to pay for it").
312. See supranotes 281-89 and accompanying text.
313. See Roderick M. Hills, The PoliticalEconomy of CooperativeFederalism:Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and "DualSovereignty"Doesn't,96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 865 (1996)
(claiming that "the federal government, burdened by deficits and public impatience with
additional federal taxes ...cannot offer unlimited bribes to nonfederal governments in
return for unlimited cooperation"); La Pierre, supra note 78, at 648 n.378 (1985) ("With
respect to grant conditions, Congress is politically accountable because the expenditure is
supported by taxes levied on the national electorate."); La Pierre, supra note 310, at 1004
(same).
314. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
315. See supra notes 307-09 and accompanying text.
316. See Printz,117 S.Ct. at 2383-84.
317. Id. at 2378 (emphasis added).
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into the implementation of federal regulatory programs, but only if
Congress is prepared "to put its money where its mouth is." 18
This form-centered view of the mandated-regulation/conditionalspending distinction may find reinforcement in a doctrine long
embodied in our private law: the bedrock requirement of contractual consideration. An underlying purpose of the consideration
rule, after all, is to promote caution and reflection as parties
undertake important transactions. 19 The idea is that the very
process of engaging in a bargained-for exchange, by forcing the
formulation and proposal of a genuine trade, typically will stir the
mind to carefully consider the costs and benefits of the
contemplated action. 20 In light of this dynamic, so well recognized
in our private law, it may not be surprising that the Court has
crafted a public law rule by which Congress may not conscript state
regulators with unfunded mandates. Instead, the Court has said
that Congress must use the bargain-based tool of funded offers,
318. It merits emphasis that the form-based deliberation rule inherent in the Court/s
conditional-spending cases may not qualify as a "pure" structural rule. See supranote 44 and
accompanying text. This is the case because the Court's preference for conditional spending
programs over outright regulation of the states in the federalism area differs from its
preference for subsidies over tax breaks in the dormant Commerce Clause area. This
difference exists because outright subsidies do not involve additional actual costs when
compared to tax breaks, at least ifone accepts the basic tax-expenditure theory. See Coenen,
supranote 283, at 985-87. In contrast, the conditional-spending approach forces Congress to
incur substantial actual costs that Congress's simple, direct regulation of state behavior
would not require. In short, whereas the subsidy/tax-break distinction involves a pure
difference as to form, the conditional-spending/direct-regulation distinction involves
differences of both form and substance. For this reason, we might describe the conditionalspending rule as quasi-structural in nature. See infra notes 930-31 and accompanying text.
I discuss it here, nonetheless, because its relationship to purely formal rules seems to me
both clear and telling and because (on the theory suggested here) it has a clear relation to
fostering the sort of legislative caution and attentiveness that mark all structural doctrines.
319. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799-800
(1941) (discussing "cautionary" function of consideration); Stanley D. Henderson, Promises
Grounded in the Past: The Idea of Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Contracts, 57 VA. L.
REV. 1115, 1160 (1971) ("Consideration doctrine declares many promises unenforceable
because the maker's deliberations are thought to be inadequate to impress upon him the
seriousness of the transaction.").
320. See Fuller, supra note 319, at 816 n.27 ("In Bilateral Contracts [inconsiderateness]
...
is supposed to be prevented by the mutuality: each party contracting for his own
pecuniary advantage; contemplating a quid pro quo; and therefore, being in that
circumspective frame ofimind which a man who is only thinking of such advantage naturally
assumes." (quoting John Austin, Fragments-On Contracts, in 2 LECTURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE 939, 940 (4th ed. 1873) (alterations in original)).
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thereby raising the odds that Congress will move slowly and
consider thoughtfully the trade-offs its action entails. 21 In short,
while permitting Congress to enlist state officials to administer
federal programs, the Court has insisted, in effect if not by design,
that that enlistment may occur only through use of a deliberationenhancing regulatory form. 22
Judicial use of form-constraining constitutional rules also jibes
with the modern Court's recurrent emphasis of the norm of
democratic accountability."s In keeping with this value, the Court
in a number of recent cases has channeled the pursuit of
government goals into forms that facilitate the intelligibility of
government policy, the likelihood of public scrutiny, and the
opportunity for voter response."s Inthese cases, however, the Court
has not sought simply to foster accountability for its own sake;
rather, following the lead of its other structural decisions, the Court
has tied its efforts to enhance accountability to the advancement 3of
substantive values that have a special constitutional significance. 2
321. See supranote 318 and accompanying text.
322. The same rationale also may help explain the Courtfs endorsement of the so-called
"cooperative federalism" technique, by which Congress may give states the choice between
administering federal programs or having state regulations preempted by federal rules. See
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,167-69 (1992) (discussing "cooperative federalism"
technique). After all, conditional preemption, just like conditional spending, involves the
formulation of a congressional offer which the state is given the opportunity to accept or
reject.
323. See Coenen, supranote 283, at 998-99.
324. We alreadyhave seen, for example, thatthe subsidy/tax-break distinction in dormant
Commerce Clause cases reflects these sorts of concerns. See supra notes 281-89 and
accompanying text. The Court also used accountability-centered reasoning in New York v.
UnitedStates, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). See id. at 168 (reasoning that "the accountability of both
state and federal officials [would be] diminished" by recognition of a congressional power to
conscript state lawmakers to implement federal regulatory programs).
325. InNew York v. UnitedStates, for example, the Court invoked accountability logic in
vindicating constitutional values of federalism. See supranotes 307.13 and accompanying
text. In similar fashion, accountability concerns supported the critical concurring opinion
(written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justice O'Connor) in Lopez v. United States, 514
U.S. 549 (1995). As stated by Justice Kennedy: "Were the Federal Government to take over
the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern... [a] resultant inability to hold
either branch of the government answerable to the citizens [would be] dangerous ..... Id.
at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Both Lopez and New York reflect what we might call the
principle of unblurred decision-making authority, the essential idea is that democratic
processes work best when the electorate can clearly identify whom to hold responsible for
particular policy choices within the vast and confusing structures of our far-flung
government. This principle also received attention in Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748
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One important set of accountability-centered cases involves
commercial speech.3 26 In 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island,2 7 for
example, the Court confronted the question whether a state could
discourage use of "vice' products,"3 28 such as cigarettes, alcohol, or
casino services, by banning truthful advertising about them even
while declining to proscribe their use. The state attempted to justify
such a ban by arguing, among other things, that the greater power
to outlaw the consumption of vice products altogether carried with
it the lesser power to prohibit sale-generating advertising about
them.3 29 The Court, however, refused to uphold such advertising
bans, focusing squarely on the connection between this form of
regulation and accountable government decision making.
In a nutshell, the Court concluded that "a State's regulation
of the sale of goods differs in kind from a State's regulation of
accurateinformation about those goods."330 First and foremost, this
distinction reflected the First Amendment's textual focus on
protecting "speech" and "the press."' 1 By its terms, the Court
reasoned, the Amendment does not cover exchange behavior, but
very much does concern truthful communications, including communications embodied in commercial ads. 3 2 The Court, however,
supplemented its reliance on the First Amendment's text with an
express invocation of the value of democratic accountability.
(1996). See id. at 758 ("The clear assignment of power to a branch ... allows the citizen to
know who may be called to answer for making, or not making, those delicate and necessary
decisions essential to governance.); cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S.
Ct. 1291, 1330-31 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (advocating judicial acceptance of FDA's
assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over cigarettes in part because "the very importance of
the decision taken here, as well as its attendant publicity, means that the public is likely to
be aware of it and to hold [the elected President and politically elected officials who support
his policy in this area] politically accountable" and because "public scrutiny.... will take
place whether it is the Congress or the Executive Branch that makes the relevant decision").
326. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 n.9 (1980) (expressing concern about the governments choice of regulatory means that
"could screen from public view the underlying governmental policy"); id. at 575 (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (attacking regulatory techniques that cause "the State's policy choices [to be]
insulated from the visibility and scrutiny that direct regulation would entail").
327. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
328. See id. at 508.
329. See id. at 511.
330. Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
331. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
332. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 512.
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Talking the talk of form-based structural rules, the Court reasoned
that advertising bans unwisely"shield the State's anti-gambling [or
other vice-countering policies] from the public scrutiny that more
direct, nonspeech regulation would draw." 3 '
The Court's terse foray into accountability logic leaves behind an
important question: How is it that advertising bans, more than
other forms of vice-reducing regulation, unwisely "shield" the
formation of government policy from "public scrutiny"? The answer
to this question is that truthful-advertising restrictions create a
potential accountability deficit in three separate ways.
First, government discouragement of vice activity by way of
advertising restrictions is, or at least appears to be, largely cost
free. In contrast, more direct regulatory strategies for discouraging
vice product use-such as raising taxes on such products or
implementing a state funded anti-vice information campaign
-carry with them very visible and readily measurable costs for the
taxpaying public. As a result, these forms of regulation are likely to
focus the legislative and public mind on the appropriateness of
government intervention more pointedly than does a speech ban.
Put another way, the channeling rule adopted in 44 Liquormart
tends to ensure that the state will not too readily restrict protected
speech to pursue a state goal of restricting vice-product use that a
more deliberate and reflective
lawmaking process might not deem
334
worth pursuing at all.
A second accountability problem created by the rule challenged
in 44 Liquormart arises because such a rule obfuscates the
underlying policy objective the legislature purports to be pursuing.
Professor Sunstein explained why this is so in a concededly
333. Id. at 509.
334. Justice Scalia made much the same argument-albeit in avery different context-in
Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988). Addressing a Fifth Amendment takings claim not
considered by the majority, he attacked a rent control scheme tied to individual tenant need
because, in his view, it amounted to a government-imposed "welfare program privately
funded by those landlords who happen to have 'hardship' tenants." Id. at 22 (Scalia, J.,
concurringinpart and dissenting in part). Noting the value of"intelligent" democratic action,
see id. at 23, Justice Scalia criticized the rent control regulation because it can "be achieved
'off budget" with relative invisibility and thus relative immunity from normal democratic
processes." Id. at 22. He emphasized in particular that "voters might well see other, more
pressing social priorities" if funds for this purpose were to come directly from "the municipal
treasury" because "both economic effects and competing priorities [would become] more
evident." Id. at 22-23.
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"controversial account" 35 of the Court's contraceptive decisions. 3 6
As he explained:
Sometimes the Court effectively "remands" issues for fresh
deliberation. Many of the modern privacy cases involving sexual
autonomy can be understood accordingly. In these cases, the
state defended laws restricting availability of contraception by
reference to the goal of preventing premarital or extramarital
activity. The Court did not deny that the state has a legitimate
interest in preventing nonmarital sexual activity. We do not say
that a law directly punishing such activity is unconstitutional.
But, the state may not attempt to promote the underlying
interest through the indirect means of preventing contraception.
If the state is genuinely interested in preventing nonmarital
sexual relations, it must pursue that policy in a way that
receives meaningful democratic scrutiny and reflects actual
democratic approval of the underlying judgment of policy and
principle-through the criminal sanction. 3
The same sort of accountability-driven "unacceptable means"
analysis33 supports the Court's ruling in 44 Liquormart.Tracking
the reasoning of Professor Sunstein, a state that wishes to counter
vice activity should pursue that goal in a "direct," rather than an
"indirect," way so as to ensure that its "underlying judgment of
policy" receives "meaningful democratic scrutiny and... actual
democratic approval." 39 This same logic may also help to explain
other controversial decisions of the Court, including its recent
335. See Cass R. Sunstein, Public Deliberation,Affirmative Action, and the Supreme
Court, 84 CAL. L. REV.1179, 1185 (1996).
336. See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
337. Sunstein, supra note 335, at 1184 (citations omitted). Wrapping up this discussion,
Professor Sunstein added:
The more indirect and discriminatory route of preventing contraception is an
unacceptable means of pursuing the relevant end. Because ofits indirection, a
ban on contraceptives does not accurately reflect a democratic judgment against
extramarital relations. In fact, no such judgment followed the Courts cases
because the public was unwilling to use the criminal sanction to punish
extramarital relations directly.
Id.
338. See id.

339. Id.
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vindication of the interests of gays and lesbians in Romer v.
Evans.40
Finally, the Court's channeling of vice regulation away from
truthful advertising bans tends to foster democratic accountability
because those bans block the flow of information about the very
policy choice the government has made. If, for example, a state
legislature permits casino gambling-but broadly prohibits advertising about it-citizens will not receive information of value in
assessing whether it is wise as a matter of public policy to legalize
gambling activities. Useful information obtainable from advertising
includes such matters as how widespread casino gambling is:
whether it is on the rise, where it is occurring, what forms it is
taking, what other activities are associated with it, and the like.
Put more bluntly, by barring advertising, a legislature can partially,
and perhaps largely, remove from "visibility and scrutiny" the social
costs created by its underlying choice to permit the vice activity. 41
It is for this reason (and not for the reason that well-informed
shopping is important to self-government) that the Court in 44
Liquormart could fairly describe its form-centered analysis as
comporting with"the essential role tlat the free flow of information
plays in a democratic society." 42

340. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In particular, this "unacceptable means" style of analysis might
help to explain the Courtfs otherwise largely unexplained rejection of Justice Scalia's
morality-based dissent in Romer. Justice Scalia, inRomer,defended Colorado's generalized
restriction on the adoption of antidiscrimination protections for homosexuals on the ground
it was a measured exercise of the state's far broader power to ban homosexual conduct
altogether. See id. at 64041 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986)). On the reasoning of 44 Liquormartand Professor Sunstein, however, Justice
Scalia's approach may be flawed even if his premise about the existence of a broad
prohibitive power is embraced. According to this reasoning, if government means to place
sanctions on homosexual behavior per se, it must not "hide" what it is doing byway of using
such indirect means as controlling the ability of homosexuals to secure antidiscrimination
protectionwith respectto employment and other activities that are available to other groups.
Instead, on this view, government must directly ban the undesired act, thus heightening the
visibility of the policy objective it is trying to achieve.
341. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 575
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
342. 44 Liquormartv. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,512 (1996). See generallyVirginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)
(noting value of commercial speech in "the formation of intelligent opinions as to how [the
free enterprise] system ought to be regulated or altered").
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In some respects, the subsidy/tax-break distinction recognized by
the dormant Commerce Clause cases differs from the truthfuladvertising/sale-regulation distinction recognized in 44 Liquormart.
For example, substituting a subsidy for a tax break may have no
actual economic effect on anyone; substituting a casino gambling
tax for an advertising ban, however, would significantly reallocate
benefits and costs.' 43 Even so, these cases are marked by similarities that are, from a structural perspective, highly important. In
both contexts, the state legislature seeks to advance a goal that
the Court stands ready to tolerate (in the advertising cases, the
discouragement of vice; in the subsidy cases, the encouragement
of local industry). In both contexts, the state may pursue its goal
only if it proceeds in a particular judicially endorsed form (in the
dormant Commerce Clause cases, byway of outright cash subsidies;
in the vice cases, by way of nonspeech-based regulation). And
in both contexts, the preferred form of policymaking holds an
advantage over the alternative because it enhances the operation
of political processes in a manner that is sensitive to substantive
constitutional values (inthe subsidy cases, free-trade values; in the
advertising cases, free-speech values). For these reasons, even
though the rule of 44 Liquormart may fail to qualify as a pure
structural doctrine,3 " its structural dimensions are unmistakable.345 Through use of this rule, the Court channels government
343. Another distinction is that it is the legislative end involved in the subsidy/tax-break
cases-that is, the end of favoring local commerce-that constitutes the weak link in the
legislature's action. (After all, it is not a problem as a general matter for government to dole
out cash or offer tax relief. Government does these things all the time.) In contrast, in cases
like 44 Liquormart, the constitutional difficulty arises from the legislature's choice of
means-that is, because the government pursues a concededly permissible goal of vice
reduction through the vehicle of restricting speech. It is hard to understand, however, how
this distinction might carry with it a critical analytical significance.
344. See supra note 343.
345. In particular, the structural dimensions ofthe 44Liquormartrule are more apparent
and significant than the structural dimensions of other and more typical means-centered
doctrines. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. This is so because those other
doctrines focus (in a highly content-conscious way) on the substantive fit between a
regulation and its underlying purposes. This is not the nature of the means-centered rule of
44 Liquormart.Indeed, there will be aperfectsubstantivefit between an advertising ban and
the legislature's goal ofvice-reduction if the ban in fact reduces vice to exactly the degree the
state legislature desires. A perfect fit, however, would not save the advertising ban
challenged in 44 Liquormart,because the problem with the ban lies in its nature.Largely for
structural, accountability-related reasons, the Court has declared that such a ban simply is
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decision making in a constitutionally sensitive substantive area into
a form designed to enhance democratic deliberation and dialogue.
IV. PROPER-FINDINGS-AND-STUDY RULES
Clear-statement and form-based structural rules create conditions that tend to heighten policymaker care in the making of
choices that threaten constitutional values. There is, however,
another way to bring about accentuated legislative or agency
attentiveness: namely, by requiring direct evidence of such
attentiveness in the policymaking process. This direct evidence
might come in the form of a legislative finding that the
decisionmaking body has actually confronted and resolved the
relevant constitutional question. 4 6 Alternatively, a court might look
for explicit subsidiary findings-about, for example, the lack of less
restrictive alternatives-that support the lawmaker's assertions of
constitutionality. 4 7 Or a court might examine, even in the absence
of any express findings, whether a meaningful study of key
constitutional concerns took place in the legislative process. 48 In
fact, courts have paid heed to explicit or implicit findings in three
key areas of constitutional law: (1) in making the case for
congressional power to legislate in ways that impinge on historic
state prerogatives; (2) in documenting remedial justifications for
government action that threatens individual constitutional rights;
not a proper form of regulation. It is for this reason that we have paused to consider 44
Liquormart(and related matters) in this Part, rather than as part of our discussion ofless
obviously structural fit-centered means rules. See infra notes 990-1005 and accompanying
text (discussing "quasi-structural" character of fit-related means rules).
346. See infra note 434.
347. See infra notes 408-23 and accompanying text.
348. For a recent discussion of this subject in the administrative context, see Geier v.
AmericanHondaMotor Co., 120 S. Ct. 1913,1941-42 (2000) (Stevens, J.dissenting) (faulting
agency for purporting to preempt state tort law-thus creating tension with federalism
principles-by way of an "informal effort" founded largely on representations of its policies
in litigation, rather than by way of "formal notice-and-comment rulemaking"). Of course,
legislative findings-whether explicit or implicit-may be of greatly differing quality. See,
e.g., Frickey, supranote 27, at 720 (distinguishing "the presence of formal congressional
findings--which, after all, may be trumped-up or mere boilerplate" from "the development
of a sound factual basis" for legislation and noting that Court is "unlikely" to take as much
account of the former as the latter); Gardbaum, supra note 69, at 822 (noting that "there is
a distinction between exercising judgment on [an] issue and resorting to incantation in the

legislative text").
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and (3) in revealing the requisite means/end fit for nonremedial
legislation subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. A look at each of
these fields of law reveals a deep judicial uncertainty-approaching,
one might even say, a judicial schizophrenia-about the wisdom
and legitimacy of proper-findings-and-study rules.
A. CongressionalPowers
The Court has consistently declared that Congress need not
"make particularized findings in order to legislate." 4 9 As with many
sweeping claims, however, this pronouncement masks important
subtleties, for some cases signal that congressional findings do play
a role in legitimating congressional assertions of lawmaking
authority. ° In particular, the Court has indicated that findings
may be important in validating congressional overrides of state
autonomy under both the Article I Commerce Clause and section
349. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971); see, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294,299 (1964) (observing that "no formal findings were made, which of course are
not necessary"); see alsoUnited States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,179(1980)
(noting that "this Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons for
enacting a statute.); Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 451 (1937) (stating that "Ithere
is no principle of constitutional law which nullifies action taken by a legislature, otherwise
competent, in the absence of a special investigation," that "the legislature ... is presumed
to know the needs of the people of the State," and that "[w]hether or not special inquiries
should be made is a matter for the legislative discretion"); Pacific States Box & Basket Co.
v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935) (rejecting argument that agency-promulgated rule was
"void because the administrative body made no special findings of fact"); Palladio, Inc. v.
Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (reasoning that "there is no constitutional
requirement that the legislature conduct hearings and build a record when it passes a law"),
affd, 440 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1971); cf. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,243-44 n.18 (1983)
("[Tihe ... constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the
power which it undertakes to exercise." (quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138,
144(1948))). See generally Linde, supranote 27, at 226 ("Legislatures must follow some form
of rational fact-finding, like courts and agencies, only in the rare cases when they adjudicate
individual rights, as in contempt and impeachment and probably when expelling a member,
but not when they legislate." (citation omitted)); Sandalow, supranote 13, at 1184-85 (noting
"the courts' frequent failure to consider whether enactment of allegedly invalid legislation
was preceded by legislative consideration of the controlling issues").
350. Of course, this is not to say that proper legislative findings negate all constitutional
problems. As was said long ago: "It is clear that the legislative finding as to the fact upon
which the validity of the legislation depends cannot be allowed to be binding upon the courts,
since this would furnish a simple means of preventing judicial review of such legislation .... ." Henry Wolf Bikl6, JudicialDetermination of Questions of Fact Affecting the
ConstitutionalValidity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6, 19 (1924).
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five of the Fourteenth Amendment. We consider each grant of
power in turn.
1. The Commerce Power
United States v. Lopez351 involved a prosecution pursuant to a
federal statute that barred possession of a firearm within 1000 feet
of a school.352 The defendant, convicted at trial, appealed on the
ground that the statute exceeded Congress's authority to "regulate
S.

.Commerce

among the several states."353 Taking a purely

structural approach to the case, the Fifth Circuit had overturned
the conviction in reliance on the fact that [nleither the act itself
nor its legislative history reflect any Congressional determination
that the possession denounced by section 922(q) is in any way
related to interstate commerce or its regulation." 54 As that court
explained:
Courts cannot properly perform their duty to determine ifthere
is any rational basis for a Congressional finding if neither the
legislative history nor .the statute itself reveals any such
relevant finding. And, in such a situation there is nothing to
indicate that Congress itself consciously fixed, as opposed to
simply disregarded, the boundary line between the commerce
power and the reserved power of the states. Indeed, as in this
case, there is no substantial indication that the commerce
power was even invoked.355
351. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
352. See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702(b)(1), 104 Stat.
4845 (1991) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25)-(27) (definitions), § 924(a)(4) (penalties), and
codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1999) (prohibition)).
353. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
354. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1366 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 514 U.S. 549 (1995);
see Frickey, supra note 27, at 703 (observing that "the Fifth Circuit made much ofthe role
offormal orinformal congressional findings in supporting exercises ofthe commerce power").
This style of analysis had previously been suggested by Professor Bogen, who argued that:
"[Wihere the relationship of the law to interstate commerce is not readily apparent, the
Court should require Congress to relate the law to its impact on interstate transactions. This
could assist in focusing Congressional concern on the proper issues." David S. Bogen, The
Hunting of the Shark: An Inquiry into the Limits of Congressional Power Under the
Commerce Clause, 8 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 187, 198 (1972).
355. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1363-64. The Court added: "Whether with adequate Congressional
findings or legislative history, national legislation of similar scope could be sustained, we
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While agreeing that the Act exceeded Congress's authority, the
Supreme Court put to one side the lower-court's analysis and
emphasized instead that its prior broad constructions of the
commerce power had all involved "regulations of activities that
arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction." 5 6
Having thus distinguished its earlier decisions, the Court nonetheless turned to the subject ofcongressional findings and observed:
Although as part of our independent evaluation of
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of course
consider legislative findings, and indeed even congressional
committee findings, regarding effect on interstate commerce,
the Government concedes that "[nleither the statute nor its
legislative history contain[s] express congressional findings
regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun
possession in a school zone." We agree with the Government
that Congress normally is not required to make formal findings
as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate
commerce. But to the extent that congressional findings would
enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity
in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even
though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye,
they are lacking here. 57
The Court went on to reject the government's effort to defend the
legislation based on congressional studies made in connection with
previously enacted gun laws. In so doing, the Court explained:
The Government argues that Congress has accumulated
institutional expertise regarding the regulation of firearms
through previous enactments. We agree, however, with the
Fifth Circuit that importation of previous findings to justify §
922(q) is especially inappropriate here because the "prior
federal enactments or Congressional findings [do not] speak to
the subject matter of section 922(q) or its relationship to
interstate commerce. Indeed, section 922(q) plows thoroughly

leave for another day." Id. at 1368.
356. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
357. Id. at 562-63 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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new ground and represents a sharp break with the longstanding pattern of federal firearms legislation."38

Faced with these passages, many Court watchers noted that
thoughtful legislative studies might prove critical in future cases
that concern borderline exercises of the commerce power.35 9 In
358. Id. at 563 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Notably, following the initial
challenge to its school zones gun law in the lower courts, Congress had amended the law by
making findings in support of its invocation of the commerce power. As explained by
Professor Frickey, however, "[Tihe congressional rescue effort failed. The Solicitor General
did not contend that these later findings could operate nunc pro tunc, instead making the
more defensible argument that the post hoc findings simply added evidence to support the
rational basis for a nexus with commerce." Frickey, supra note 27, at 704-05. These
developments leave open the questionwhetherpostenactment findings should be deemed the
equivalent ofcontemporaneous findings in any circumstances.
359. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 335, at 1194 n.73 (noting that Lopez "turned on a set
offactors," including "the absence of clear findings from Congress"). This findings-oriented
view ofLopez supports the notion that earlier commerce power cases at least obliquely had
suggested the relevance of congressional findings. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 278-79 (1981) (noting "extended hearings" in Congress,
"vast amounts of testimony and documentary evidence," and "years of the most thorough
legislative consideration"); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-55 (1971) (stating that
"[e]xtortionate credit transactions, though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of
Congress affect interstate commerce," and holding that"[the findings of Congress are quite
adequate on that ground"); Katzenbachv. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,304 (1964) (declaring that
absence of "formal findings ... is not fatal ... for the evidence presented at [congressional]
hearings fully indicated the nature and effect of the burdens on commerce"); Heart ofAtlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964) (reaching same conclusion as in Perez
and Katzenbach with regard to "evidence that discrimination by hotels and motels impedes
interstate travel"); Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 10 (1923) (noting that detailed
supportive findings had been made "after many years of investigation and examination of
witnesses, including the advocates of regulation and those opposed, and men intimately
advised in respect to the grain markets of the country"); see also Palmore v. United States,
411 U.S. 389, 409 (1973) (upholding congressional establishment of non-Article HI court
system for the District of Columbia pursuant to Article I powers in part because "Congress,
after careful consideration, determined that it preferred, and had the power to utilize, a local
court system staffed by judges without lifetime tenure").
For further discussions ofthe presence of findings inPerez, seeLopez, 2 F.3d at 1362 n.41
(stating that "the opinion as a whole shows extensive consideration of and reliance on not
only the evidence before Congress and the legislative history, but also the formal
Congressional findings, which the Court had already observed were 'quite adequate' to
sustain the act") and Frickey, supranote 27, at 713 (stating that "Perezdoes suggest ... that
procedural regularity and formal findings have some role to play in assessing the efficacy of
an exercise ofcongressional commerce power"). See generallyLopez, 2 F.3d at 1362 (claiming
that "the Supreme Court has consistently deferred to Congressional findings [of substantial
effect on interstate commerce], beth formal findings in the legislation itself and findings that
can be inferred from committee reports, testimony before Congress, or statutory terms
expressly providing for some nexus to interstate commerce").
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Lopez, after all, the Court had conceded only that formal findings
are not "normally . .. required,"3 0 had pointedly encouraged
Congress to offer revelatory findings when no substantial effect on
commerce "was visible to the naked eye," 6 ' and had dismissed
Congress's "previous findings" only because they did not "'speak to
the subject matter of section 922(q) or its relationship to interstate
commerce." 2 Not surprisingly, in his dissenting opinion, Justice
Souter noted the possibility that, under the majority's reasoning,
the making of congressional findings "could in principle have
affected the fate of the statute here." 6 3 In short, the Court's
significant but oblique focus on the absence of legislative findings

360. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (emphasis added).
361. Id. at 563.
362. Id. (quoting Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1366); see Hamilton, supra note 268, at 173 (noting
Court's "emphasis on congressional responsibility"); Robert F. Nagel, The Future of
Federalism,46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 652 (1996) ("The Court strongly suggests ...that
Congress could regulate guns at schools if it would only make some factual findings or link
its regulation to the movement of something across state lines."); see also Stephen
Christopher Likes, Casenote, An Utter Disregardfor Precedent:Misconstruing Commerce
Clause Precedent in United States v. Lopez, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 811, 855 (1996) (noting,
but questioning, Court's conclusion that "the lack of congressional findings was
detrimental").
363. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 614 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 608-09 (asking if
"[flurther glosses on rationality review ... may be in the offing" such as inquiries into
whether "the congressional statute... contain[s] explicit factual findings supporting the
otherwise implicit determination that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate
commerce"); Frickey, supra note 27, at 707 (observing that "as Justice Souter noted in his
dissent, the Court did not clearly repudiate the proposition that formal findings might have
tipped the scales in the case"). See generally Gardbaum, supra note 69, at 797 & n.13
("[Lopez] can perhaps be interpreted as holding only... that this particular attempt by
Congress to regulate the field failed, without saying anything more general that would
automatically disqualify all subsequent attempts .... One way of interpreting the Court's
opinion in this manner is to focus on what it said about the absence of congressional
findings."). Justice Souterwent on to criticize the attention paid by the Court to the absence
of findings in Lopez, arguing that "i]f... the Court were to make the existence of explicit
congressional findings dispositive in some close or difficult cases something other than
rationality review would be afoot." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 613 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice
Souter also observed, however, that findings are not "pointless" because they"may... have
great value in telling courts what to look for, in establishing at least one frame of reference
for review, and in citing to factual authority." Id. at 614. In a separate dissent, Justice Breyer
suggested that judicial reliance on congressional findings "would seem particularly
unfortunate" because it "would appear to elevate form over substance." Id. at 617-18 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). He also noted, however, that "the absence of findings, at most, deprives a
statute of the benefit of some extra leeway" and that "[tihis extra deference, in principle,
might change the result in a close case." Id. at 617.
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in Lopez created much uncertainty about what role the presence of
findings would have in assessing future commerce power cases.
In Morrison v. United States,3 14 the Court answered one
important findings-related issue left behind by Lopez. Morrison
concerned Congress's power under the Commerce Clause to create
a private right of action for gender-motivated assaults. In contrast
to the situation in Lopez, Congress had made "numerous findings"
that such assaults greatly affect the national economy-by, for
example, discouraging travel, causingmissed work days, generating
hospital costs, and reducing the consumption of goods and
services." For the same five-Justice majority that had crystallized
in Lopez, however, these findings were not enough. Because
Congress had sought to regulate wholly "noneconomic, violent
criminal conduct" 6 ' based solely on a 'costs of crime' and 'national
productivity" rationale,"6 7 even the most elaborate studies were
beside the point."'
At the same time, the Court in Morrison declined to "adopt a
categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic
6 9 and went no further than to say that "the existence of
activity""
congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the
constitutionality ofCommerce Clause legislation." 70 These passages
stand tellingly together with the Court's quotation of its key
findings-related language from Lopez"7 1 and its reiteration that the
absence offindings was among the "significant considerations [that]
contributed to our decision" in that case. 7 ' Viewed as a whole, these
364. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

See id. at 1752.
Id. at 1754.
Id. at 1751.
See id. at 1752-54.
Id. at 1751.
Id. at 1752 (emphasis added).
See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1749. Also of no little significance is the fact that the four

dissenters in Morrison were prepared to distinguish Lopez, at least in part, because of "the
mountain of data assembled by Congress... showing the effects of violence against women
on interstate commerce." Id. at 1760 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1777 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (distinguishing Morrison from Lopez based on congressional fact finding).
Sounding not all that much different from the majority in both Lopez and Morrison,Justice
Souter noted that: "Any explicit findings that Congress chooses to make, though not
dispositive of the question of [the] rationality [of its commerce power judgment], may
advance judicial review by identifying factual authority on which Congress relied." Id. at
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materials suggest that congressional findings may still prove
critical in future commerce power disputes. 73 In particular, as one
1760 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer, in a portion of his dissenting opinion joined by
Justice Stevens but, interestingly, not joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, seemed ready
to go further-perhaps even much further-in givingweight to structural conisiderations. He
noted that "[clommentators . . . have suggested that the thoroughness of legislative
procedures-e.g., whether Congress took a 'hard look'-might sometimes make a
determinative difference in a Commerce Clause case." Id. at 1778 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
While recognizingthat such a process-oriented approach would pose difficulties-particularly
because it "might itself intrude upon congressional prerogatives and embody difficult
definitional problems" as to precisely what processes were adequate-Justice Breyer viewed
those drawbacks as "less serious than those embodied inthe majority's" noneconomic activity
test. Id. at 1778. Given "that the law in this area is unstable," Justice Breyer concluded:
that time and experience may demonstrate both the unworkability of the
majority's rules and the superiority of Congress' own procedural approach-in
which case the law may evolve towards a rule that, in certain difficult
Commerce Clause cases, takes account of the thoroughness with which
Congress has considered the federalism issue.
Id.
373. Post-Lopez lowercourt decisions, which commonlyhave lookedhard at congressional
findings, lend credence to this view. See, e.g., United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338,1350 (7th
Cir. 1997) ("Section 1955 stands in sharp contrast to the Gun-Free School Zones Act ....
Congress supported the statute with extensive findings outlining the significant impact
large-scale, illegal gambling operations can have on interstate commerce. Congress found
that illegal gambling fills the coffers of organized crime, which in turn has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce."); United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1212 (5th Cir.
1997) ("If we do not readily perceive a clear connection to interstate commerce, we may
nevertheless uphold the statute if the nexus is satisfactorily explained by congressional
findings or the legislative history."); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1269 n.5 (11th
Cir. 1997) ("Because we find adequate support for the enactment of § 922(o) without
reference to any legislative findings, we need not determine the proper role of such prior
findings in conducting Commerce Clause review."), vacatedinparton reh'gonothergrounds,
133 F.3d 1412 (1998); United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997, 999 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)
(Higginbotham, J.) ("[Tihe court [in Lopez] did give weight to the absence of congressionally
identified ties between the regulation and the commerce power .... Giving weight to the
absence of congressional findings lies in the middle ground between an intrusive absolute
insistence upon legislative findings and traditional rational basis inquiry."); id. at 1010
(Jones, J.) (favoring invalidation of federal machine gun prohibition because "itis supported
neither by a jurisdictional nexus requirement nor by salvaging legislative findings"); id. at
1010 n.12 (stating that "the absence bf such data mirrors the situation before the Court in
Lopez and reinforces the consistency between these two cases"); id. at 1015-16 ("If Congress
had made findings explaining the connection of mere intrastate possession of machineguns
[sic] to interstate commerce,... § 922(o) might be vindicated under the second Lopez prong.
These features are lacking.... [Section] 922(o) was inserted into FOPA with virtually no
discussion of its content and with absolutely no discussion of its place in the broad scheme
of federal firearms regulations."); United States v. McKinney, 98 F.3d 974, 979 (7th Cir.
1996) ("The Schoolyard Statute is part of [a statutory scheme that] sets out a number of
congressional findings and declarations which pertain to the entire chapter and to federal
regulations of controlled substances in the United States."); id. at 980 ("The same findings
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that authorize the federal government to regulate all commerce in controlled substances
support its authority to regulate a subset of commerce in controlled substances."); United
States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370,374 (9th Cir. 1996) ("The presence of Congressional findings in
support ofthe Controlled Substances Act distiguishes this case from the situation presented
to the Court in Lopez."); United States v. Kim, 94 F.3d 1247,1250 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[Unlike
the Gun Act, Congress made specific findings concerning the effect that drug trade has on
interstate commerce .... Based on these findings and the ample judicial recognition that an
interstate market for illegal drugs exists, every circuit that has considered a Commerce
Clause challenge to § 841(aXl) after Lopez has upheld the provision's constitutionality.");
United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1450 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Unlike § 922(q)... § 1955
contains reams of legislative historical information to guide the courts."); United States v.
Kenney, 91 F.3d 884,890-91(7th Cir. 1996) ("[U]nlike § 922(q), § 922(o) is not a statute that
'plows thoroughly new ground and represents a sharp break with the longstanding pattern
of federal firearms legislation,' and thus the lengthy legislative history of federal firearms
regulation does 'speak to the subject matter of' § 922(o) .... In light of these findings and
enactments, the 1986 addition of § 922(o) was not novel but incremental, merely preventing
further growth in the number ofmachine guns in private hands as an exercise ofthe historic
federal interest in the regulation of machine guns. As such, and quite unlike § 922(q),
deference to Congress's accumulated institutional expertise is appropriate."); see also United
States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781, 785 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding federal machine gun law
in part because "Congressional findings indicate that intrastate possession, distribution and
sale of firearms directly and injuriously affects the introduction of them into other states to
the injury of the public health and welfare"); United States v. McMasters, 90 F.3d 1394,1398
(8th Cir. 1996) (noting that in Lopez "Congress had made no legislative findings that the
activity ... affected interstate commerce," while "the legislative history of § 844(i) reflects
Congress's concern that it not exceed its Commerce Clause authority, and Congress's
determinationthat the statutewas necessaryto protect interstate commerce"); United States
v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 683 (7th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing Lopez in upholding Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act because "Congress made no findings relevant to its Commerce
Clause power in enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act," whereas "Congress's findings
[with respect to the FACE Act] reveal that there exists a substantial interstate market for
reproductive health services"); United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453,1475 (10th Cir. 1995)
("Congress had made no express findings regarding the effect on interstate commerce of
possessing a gun in a school zone. In contrast, the conduct regulated by the Drug Act clearly
implicates interstate commerce, and Congress made explicit findings explainingthe conduct's
'substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce.'" (citations omitted)), later decision
at 131 F.3d 153 (1997) (unpublished table decision); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105,
1112 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that in Lopez "the Court noted that Congress had made no
express findings that the prohibited possession substantially affected interstate commerce
.... In passing the Drug Act, Congress made detailed findings that intrastate manufacture,
distribution, and possession of controlled substances, as a class of activities, 'have a
substantial and direct effect' upon interstate drug trafficking"); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d
1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1995) (notingthat in Lopez "no express legislative findings were made
regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone" whereas
"extensive legislative findings support Congress' conclusion that the Access Act regulates
activity which substantially affects interstate commerce"); Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317,
1326 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (upholding Driver's Privacy Protection Act based on congressional
findings that release of driver information fosters direct marketing nationwide), rev'd on
other grounds,171 F.3d 1281(11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Riley, 985 F. Supp. 405,407-
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moves away from paradigmatic state police power cases that
involve local schools (as in Lopez) and local violence (as in
08 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("In making such determinations, courts consider legislative and
congressional committee findings regarding the activity's effect on interstate commerce....
In light of [the extensive] congressional commentary, I find that Congress has determined
that Section 1959 prohibits conduct that, when viewed in the aggregate, has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce."); United States v. Glidden Co., 3 F. Supp. 2d 823, 842 (N.D.
Ohio 1997) ("CERCLA's legislative history does not contain any specific findings regarding
the effect that the improper disposal of hazardous waste has on interstate commerce. It does,
however, contain broad findings that provide a rational basis on which to conclude that the
improper disposal of hazardous waste substantially affects interstate commerce."), rev'd in
part,affd inpart, United States v. Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2000); Anisimov v.
Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 535 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("Finally, do congressional findings matter or
should a court treat them as it would any other argument made in favor of a statute's
constitutionality? ... [T]his Court is not alone in its uncertainty concerning how the
Supreme Court will approach [such] issues when it considers future challenges to
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause."); Seatonv. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188,
1192 (E.D. Tenn. 1997) (explaining that in Lopez "the Act was not precipitated by any
legislative investigation into the effects the regulated activity may have on interstate
commerce" and that "VAWA, unlike the Act in Lopez, contains extensive congressional
findings into the impact of violence on interstate commerce"); United States v. NL Indus.,
936 F. Supp. 545, 560 (S.D. IMI.1996) (noting Court's focus on findings in Lopez); id. at 562
(upholding hazardous waste law because "[hiaving considered the express findings of
Congress and the legislative history.... the Court cannot say that Congress did not have a
rational basis on which to conclude that the improper disposal of hazardous waste
substantially affects interstate commerce"); United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 312
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (upholding Child Support RecoveryAct, inpart because"Congress supported
enactment of the CSRA, unlike the School Zones Act, with significant statistical findings");
United States v. Lowe, 924 F. Supp. 318, 319 (D. Mass. 1996) (noting that in contrast to
statute in Lopez, "the legislative history ofthe carjacking statute is replete with findings as
to the economic effect of car theft on interstate commerce); United States v. Smith, 920 F.
Supp. 245, 247 (D. Me. 1996) (stating that unlike "the statutory scheme of the Gun Act at
issue in Lopez, Congress has made specific findings within the Drug Act that local drug
traffic affects interstate commerce"); United States v. McMillan, 946 F. Supp. 1254, 1262
(S.D. Miss. 1995) ("When the Supreme Court decided Lopez, the Court had no congressional
data, statistics and findings justifying Congress' reliance on the Commerce Clause ....
[While] in enacting FACE, Congress rationally concluded, based on an extensive legislative
record, that the regulated activity of abortion protesting affected interstate commerce.");
United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (invalidating Child Support
Recovery Act and noting that "a court may consider legislative factfinding as an aid in
evaluating whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding a federal criminal statute
substantially affects interstate commerce"), rev'd, 108 F.3d 28 (1997); United States v.
Kremetis, 903 F. Supp. 250, 252 (D.N.H. 1995) ("In passing the Drug Act, Congress made
detailed findings that intrastate manufacture, distribution, and possession of controlled
substances, as a class of activities, "have a substantial and direct affect" upon interstate drug
trafficking and that effective control of the interstate problems requires the regulation of
both intrastate and interstate activities.... This Court, as well as other courts, has relied
upon these findings in concluding that Congress may regulate intrastate drug activities
under the Commerce Clause.'" (quoting Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1112)).
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Morrison)-to environmental regulations, drug laws and even
certain forms of weapons-possession restrictions 7 4 -there remains
much room to argue that congressional findings have significance
in assessing whether congressional action offends constitutional
interests in state autonomy.
It may go too far to say that Lopez andMorrisonestablish a nowfixed proper-findings rule. It is undeniable, however, that those
decisions have an important structural dimension. This is so
because, in both cases, the Court pointedly admonished Congress
to identify and document the underlying sources of its claimed
constitutional authority to act. At the very least, this rhetoric
advances the goals of structural decision making by encouraging
focused attention in congressional deliberations on the most basic
constitutional issue that any effort to exercise the national legislative power presents." 5
2. The FourteenthAmendment Enforcement Power
Close on the heels of Lopez, the Court encountered another
federalism-based challenge to a major piece of national legislation.
At issue in City of Boerne v. Flores78 was the constitutionality of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) 77 RFRA in
effect sought to overturn the principle of Employment Division,
Departmentof Human Resources v. Smith,"8 which had exempted
from free-exercise challenge generally applicable criminal laws, no
374. See supranote 373.
375. See Frickey, supranote 27, at 720 ("At a minimum, after Lopez, a prudent Congress
mightwish to follow [this] model when exercising its commerce power articulate the judicial
standard (the subject of the statute must have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce)
and then document the satisfaction ofthat standard through facts developed in hearings and
other legislative methods."); see also Gardbaum, supra note 69, at 800 (advocating a
"constitutional requirement, which in certain respects is similar in function to the statutorily
derived 'hard look' doctrine that courts apply in their review of administrative
decisionmaking"); Calvin R. Massey, The Too ofFederalism,20 HARv. J.L. &PUB. PoLY 887,
901 (1997) ("Because the post-1937 Courthas deferred to congressional judgment concerning
the scope of the commerce power, . . . [wihen Congress regulates an activity that
'substantially affects' interstate commerce, afterLopez it had best declare the reasons for its
conclusion.").
376. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
377. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994).
378. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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matter how substantially they burdened religious liberty, so long as
they were enacted free of an intent to disadvantage particular
religious sects or practices." 9 In particular, RFRA specified that
courts should, notwithstanding Smith and in conformance with a
number of pre-Smith cases, strictly scrutinize generally applicable
laws whenever they substantially burdened in effect the
challenger's free exercise of religion.8 0
Congress sought to justify RFRA (insofar as it applied to the
states) as a proper exercise of its power to "enforce," under section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment, the free-exercise right protected
against state abridgment by section one of that Amendment. 8 ' In
responding to this assertion of legislative power, the Court initially
held that section five authorizes only "measures that remedy or
prevent unconstitutional actions," rather than "measures that make
a substantive change in the governing [constitutional] law." 38 2 The
central question thus became whether RFRA could be viewed as
"prevent[ing] and remed[ying] laws which are enacted with the
unconstitutional object of targeting religious beliefs and practices"
-that is, the sort of laws deemed unconstitutional under the
narrowed view of the Free Exercise Clause set forth in Smith
3 8 3 In examining whether
itself.
such a "remedial or preventive
object" could be attributed to RFRA,8 4 the Court first noted that
Congress, in enacting earlier voting rights protections under its
enforcement powers, had identified extensive Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendment violations to which its vote protection
legislation responded. The Court then turned to the legislative
proceedings that produced RFRA and explained:
379. See id. at 884-85. The consequence inthe Smith case itselfwas that the Court found
no problem with Oregon's application of a general drug use prohibition to Native Americans
who used peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, in a profoundly serious religious ceremony.
380. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 529-35.
381. See id. at 516. On the subject of incorporation, see generally TRIBE, supra note 24,
§ 5-14.
382. Flores, 521 U.S. at 519.
383. Id. at 529. Of course, the exact contours of the Fourteenth Amendment's remedyingor-preventing power remain to be mapped. See, e.g., Oregon Short Line R.R. Co. v.
Department of Revenue Or., 139 F.3d 1259, 1267 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding the Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act as properly enforcing the Equal Protection Clause
by barring tax discrimination against railroads even though it reaches some discrimination
not barred by the Clause itself).
384. Flores, 521 U.S. at 532.
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In contrast to the record which confronted Congress and the
Judiciary in the voting rights cases, RFRA's legislative record
lacks examples ofmodern instances of generally applicable laws
passed because of religious bigotry.... Rather, the emphasis of
the hearings was on laws of general applicability which place
incidental burdens on religion. Much of the discussion centered
upon... zoning regulations and historic preservation laws (like
the one at issue here), which, as an incident of their normal
operation, have adverse effects on churches and synagogues....
It is difficult to maintain that they are examples of legislation
enacted or enforced due to animus or hostility to the burdened
religious practices or that they indicate some widespread
pattern of religious discrimination in this country. Congress'
concern was with the incidental burdens imposed, not the object
or purpose of the legislation.385

385. Id. at 530-31. In referring to the voting rights cases, the Court cited its seminal
decision in South Carolinav. Katzenbach,383 U.S. 301 (1966). See Flores,521U.S. at 532-33.
There the Court directly focused on the quality and content of the "voluminous legislative
history ofthe Act." Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309. As the Court stated in that case:
The constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be judged
with reference to the historical experience which it reflects. Before enacting the
measure, Congress explored with great care the problem of racial
discrimination in voting....
Two points emerge vividly from the voluminous legislative history of the Act
contained in the committee hearings and floor debates. First: Congress felt
itselfconfronted by an insidious and pervasive evil which hadbeen perpetuated
in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of
the Constitution. Second: Congress concluded that the unsuccessful remedies
which it had prescribed in the past would have to be replaced by sterner and
more elaborate measures in order to satisfy the clear commands of the
Fifteenth Amendment.
Id. at 308-09; see id. at 328 ("Congress had found that case-by-case litigation was inadequate
to combat widespread and persistent discrimination in voting, because of the inordinate
amount of time and energy required to overcome the obstructionist tactics invariably
encountered in these lawsuits."). See generally Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An
Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislativeMotive, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95, 116
n.109 (citing enforcement-power decisions in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), and
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), for the proposition that "Congress may enact
legislation responsive to its own findings that state decisionmakers have acted out of
impermissible motives").
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This review led the Court to conclude, with regard to the allimportant question ofCongress's remedial authority, that there was
a "lack of support in the legislative record." 6
Having offered these observations, the Court disclaimed a design
to focus fixedly on legislati;e findings in resolving section five
issues:
Judicial deference, in most cases, is based not on the state of the
legislative record Congress compiles but "on due regard for the
decision of the body constitutionally appointed to decide."... As
a general matter, it is for Congress
to determine the method by
87
which it will reach a decision.
386. Flores,521 U.S. at 531. The Court carried forward this findings-centered mode of
analysis in FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), by exploring in great detail whether Congress had properly
documented the need to remedy Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violations
by subjecting states to suit in patent actions. See id. at 637-48; see also Kimel v. Florida Bd.
of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 648-49 (2000) (noting that, in deciding whether legislation is
properly remedial under section five, "fone means by which we have made such a
determination... is by examining the legislative record containing the reasons for Congress'
action"; finding no adequate justification for abrogation of state immunity from suit under
the ADEA because, while "Congress found substantial age discrimination in the private
sector," it "never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less any
discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation"; and noting, in
particular, that "Congress made no such findings with respect to the States" and that
supposed evidence of remediable discrimination "consists almost entirely of isolated
sentences clipped from floor debates and legislative reports"). Indeed, the Court in Florida
Prepaidseemed to supplement the basic findings-and-study-centered analysis of Flores by
adopting an additional findings-centered rule. The Court suggested that (in contrast to its
usual practice, see supra note 349 and accompanying text), it would not consider a possible
remedial justification for the exercise of the Fourteenth Amendment power (here, the need
to remedy uncompensated takings by states rendered unconstitutional by incorporation of
the Fifth Amendment into the Fourteenth) unless Congress itselfhad evidenced an intention
to rely on that justification in the course of its legislative proceedings. See FloridaPrepaid,
527 U.S. at 642 n.7.
387. Flores,521 U.S. at 531-32. The Court in FloridaPrepaid,as in Flores,backtracked
to some extent from its extended inquiry into the adequacy of Congress's justificatory
findings. As the Court observed in that case: "Though the lack of support in the legislative
record is not determinative,... identifying the targeted constitutional wrong or evil is still
a critical part of our § 5 calculus...."Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646. The Court continued
by observing that "[h]ere, the record at best offers scant support for Congress' conclusion that
States were depriving patent owners ofproperty without due process." Id. In Kimel, its most
recent section five case, the Court sounded a similarly ambivalent view. According to the
Court:
A review of the ADEA's legislative record as a whole, then, reveals that
Congress had virtually no reason to believe that state and local governments
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As in Lopez, however, the Court couched this disclaimer in lessthan-universal terms, declaring it operative only "[a]s a general
matter" and "in most cases.""'8 Given both this qualifying language
and the Court's actual focus on congressional findings in Flores,one
is left by that case with much the same impression inspired by
Lopez. In close cases, a careful study by Congress may well prove
decisive in resolving whether legislation "contradicts vital
principles necessary to maintain... the federal balance." 8 9
At the very least, the Court's opinions in Lopez, Morrison, and
Flores send signals -that simultaneously suggest an attentive
and dismissive attitude toward congressional findings. In this
environment, future rulings may break either way. Will the courts
pay heed to congressional findings---giving them great or some or
little weight---or will they ignore such findings altogether? While
the answer to this question remains unclear, it may well hinge on
the Court's developing attitude toward structural rules as a general
matter. Given the Court's recurring willingness to use such rules in
a variety of contexts, there is reason to think that, at least in some
cases, the presence or absence of deliberated-upon findings will
count in deciding whether Congress has exceeded its enumerated
constitutional powers.390
were unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of
age. Although that lack of support is not determinative of the § 5 inquiry,
[Flores], Congress' failure to uncover any significant pattern ofunconstitutional
discrimination here confirms that Congress had no reason to believe that broad
prophylactic legislation was necessary in this field.
Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 649-50.
388. Flores,521 U.S. at 531-32.
389. Id. at 536; see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 669 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (objecting to validation of § 4(e) of the 1965 Voting Rights Act under section five
power because "[tihere is simply no legislative record supporting such hypothesized
discrimination of the sort we have hitherto insisted upon"). Indeed, it has been argued by
counsel for the challengers of RFRAinFores that, wholly apart fromfederalism-based limits
on the section five power, a lack ofpower-justifying findings supports invalidation of RFRA
as applied to the federalgovernment itself. See Marci A. Hamilton, City ofBoerne v. Flores:
A Landmarkfor StructuralAnalysis,39 Wm. & MARYL. REv. 699,720 (1998) ("As applied to
federal law, RFRA should not be upheld, if for no other reason than to send a message to
Congress that when a law is unusual and the enumerated power issue is opaque, Congress
is constitutionally obligated to provide at least a modicum of explanation of what power it
believed itself to be engaging.").
390. See Frickey, supra note 27, at 722 (arguing that, given Gregory's use of structural
means to advance federalismvalues, "otherjudiciallyconstructedmeans maybe forthcoming
as well" and that "[o]ne obvious candidate is a requirement offormal congressional findings
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B. Remedial FindingsRules
In exercising the section five power after Flores,Congress must
act much like a court, seeking to document how its remedial action
addresses identifiable constitutional wrongs.3 9 ' Remedial policymaking, however, is neither limited to exercises of the section five
power nor the exclusive province of the national Congress. Indeed,
rules concerning remedial policymaking occupy much of the central
battleground of modern equal protection law: the battleground of
3 92
affirmative action.
The Court's most recent affirmative action decisions make it
plain that race-conscious government programs (apart from those
adopted in the educational setting) typically will survive only if they
remedy unlawful past or continuing discrimination. 9 3 Moreover,
from the days of the Court's very first decision on the merits
concerning a nonjudicially crafted affirmative action programRegents of the University of Californiav. Bakke 31 4 --shifting sets of
Justices have signaled in a variety of settings that findings made in
connection with a remedial program's adoption may well prove
dispositive of its constitutionality. 9 5
in certain situations"); see also Congress,the Court,andthe Constitution:HearingBefore the
Subcomm. on the Constitutionof the House Comm. on the Judiciary,105th Cong. 68 (1998)
(statement of Neal Devins, Goodrich Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School)
[hereinafter Devins Testimony] (observing that "Boerne acknowledged Congress's power to
engage the Court in constitutional dialogues").
391. See supranotes 376-90 and accompanying text.
392. For an overview ofconstitutional restraints on race-conscious affirmative action, see
generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.10 (5th ed.
1995).
393. As noted in the text, the Court has not held that the only justification for all
affirmative action programs is the remediation of past discrimination. As noted by Justice
O'Connor in Wygant v. JacksonBoard ofEducation, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), "a state interest in
the promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the
context of higher education, to support the use of racial considerations in furthering that
interest." Id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supranote 392,
§ 14.10(b)(2), at 725 (noting that "it is difficult to believe" that Justice O'Connor's later
opinions reject this view).
394. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
395. One explanation why findings matter in this context has been suggested by Mark S.
Kende, Comment, Principles of Competence: The Ability of Public Institutions to Adopt
RemedialAffirmative Action Plans,53 U. CHI. L. REV. 581 (1986). Kende writes:
[Elven if findings provide less than conclusive proofofa past violation, they still
may be an important indicator of the institution's motive ....
The process of
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In Bakke itself, the issue was whether a medical school's raceconscious admissions program offended the Equal Protection
Clause. Such a program, Justice Powell observed in his decisive
opinion in the case, could not pass muster on a remedial theory "in
the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of
constitutional or statutory violations."3 96 The Board of Regents,
Justice Powell continued, "does not purport to have made.., such
findings."3 9 7 Thus, the program could not be sustained on the
a compelling state interest in remediating
ground that it addressed
8
39

past discrimination.

interpreting facts and weighing evidence will often cause the institution to
deliberate and discuss whether discrimination has occurred, so a court can
afford to be less suspicious that the body's motive was impermissible.
... [Slince the ultimate question is whether the institution's motive was
remedialat the time it adoptedtheplan,contemporaneous findings are farmore
reliable than those made during later litigation. Hence, a court need not test
the accuracy ofcontemporaneous findings with the same vigor it would give to
non-contemporaneous findings.
Id. at 601-02.
396. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
397. Id. at 309.
398. See id. at 310. Turning to the argument that the challenged plan was no different in
substance from disparate-impact based remedies under Title VII, Justice Powell again
focused on the importance of findings. He wrote:
[Tihe presumption in Griggs-thatdisparate impact without any showing of
business justification established the existence of discrimination in'violation of
the statute-was based on legislative determinations, wholly absent here, that
past discrimination had handicappedvarious minority groups to such an extent
that disparate impact could be traced to identifiable instances of past
discrimination .... Thus, Title VII principles support the proposition that
findings of identified discrimination must precede the fashioning of remedial
measures embodying racial classifications.
Id. at 308-09 n.44; see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 498 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (reiterating that inBakke, "the Regents failed both [constitutional] requirements
... [because] they made no findings of past discrimination"). Justice Powell, according to
Professor Tribe, was "responsive to a sense that, if such quotas are to be imposed at all, they
should be imposed in a more deliberate and cautious manner and by a more broadly
accountable body than was the case in Bakke." Laurence H. Tribe, Perspectiveson Bakke:
Equal Protection,ProceduralFairness,or StructuralJustice?, 92 HARV. L. REV. 864, 877
(1978).
With regard to Justice Powell's treatment of the proper policymaking body, see infranotes
842-48 and accompanying text. See also Kende, supra note 395, which argues that
constitutionality turns on
two distinct aspects ofcompetence: the authorityof the institution to adopt an
affirmative action plan, and the findings of fact made by the institution which
indicate past violations of the antidiscrimination laws. When both aspects of
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In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 99 the Court-in contrast to Bakke
-found that Congress had made sufficient findings to justify a
race-based set aside program for local public works projects. The
plurality in Fullilove (consisting of Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White and Powell) emphasized that "Congress had
abundant evidence from which it could conclude that ...
[government] procurement practices... perpetuated the effects
of prior discrimination," including "direct evidence . . . that [a]
pattern of disadvantage and discrimination existed with respect to
state and local construction contracting."40 0 In these circumstances,
it made no difference that "theAct recitesno preambulary'findings'
on the subject." 4 1' The key was that "Congress reasonably
determined" that there was a need to remedy past discrimination
in light of the "data" and "evidence" before it. 4 2 In his separate
concurrence in Fullilove, Justice Powell reiterated that there was
no need to "treat Congress as if it were a lower federal court" so as
to force it "to find facts." 40 3 At the same time, Justice Powell
emphasized that it was insufficient in a case like Fullilove for a
court merely to "perceive a basis' for legislative action."4" 4 Instead,
there had to be "a reasonable congressionalfinding of discrimination,"40 56even if that finding was revealed only in "the legislative
40
history."
competence are present, it is likely that the institutional decision to adopt a
race-conscious plan furthers a sufficiently compelling purpose and was not
motivated by an impermissible desire to benefit one group more than another
solely on the basis of race.
Id. at 582.
399. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
400. Id. at 477-78.
461. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 502 (Powell, J., concurring).
404. Id. at 503 n.4.
405. Id. (emphasis added).
406. Id. at 503; see also id. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring) (asserting that "the
governmental body that attempts to impose arace-conscious remedy... must make findings
that demonstrate the existence of illegal discrimination"). In a highly structural dissenting
opinion (indeed, one ofthe most explicitly structural opinions everpenned), Justice Stevens
took issue with the majority's assertion that an adequate congressional investigation had
been made. In his view, Congress had given only "perfunctory consideration" to "an
unprecedented policy decision of profound constitutional importance." Id. at 550 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). In particular, Justice Stevens argued that the innovative and starkly racebased character of the law was "not even mentioned in the statement of purpose of the Act
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The Court has continued to stress the importance of legislative
findings in its more recent afrmative action rulings. 4 7 Most
notably, in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 4 °8 a five-Justice
majority relied on the lack of proper remedy-based findings to strike
down a thirty percent set-aside for minority firms in the award
or in the Reports" of either chamber or made "the subject of any testimony or inquiry in any
legislative hearing."Id. at 549-50. Justice Stevens stated unabashedly that he saw"no reason
why the character of [congressional] procedures may not be considered relevant to the
decision whether the legislative product has caused a deprivation of liberty or property
without due process of law.' Id. at 550; see Kende, supra note 395, at 588 (stating that "in
Justice Stevens' view, even authorized institutions must show that they carefully considered
their decision to adopt a race-conscious plan").
In interesting contrast to his position in Fullilove, Justice Stevens dissented in a later
affirmative action case on the ground thatthere was "not a shred ofevidence [that suggested]
any procedural unfairness in the adoption of the agreement." Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 318 (1986); see also Drew S. Days, M, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 46970 (1987) (suggesting that"[wihen Congress has taken the extraordinary step of adopting an
explicit racial classification, as it didin [Fullilove], the Court has the responsibility to assure
itself that the decision was reasoned and deliberate... not because Congress lacks the
constitutional power to enact such legislation, but because it may have enacted legislation
without proper attention to the degree that its actions may threaten 'values of permanent
significance' in our society" (quoting Bickel & Wellington, supranote 68, at 27)).
407. In particular, the plurality in Wygant (discussed supra note 393) stated that: "[A]
public employer.., must ensure that, before it embarks on an affirmative-action program,
it has convincing evidence that remedial action is warranted. That is, it must have sufficient
evidence to justify the conclusion that there has been prior discrimination." Wygant, 476 U.S.
at 277. InAdarandConstructors,Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the Court reiterated this
passage from Wygant with seeming approval. See id. at 220-21; see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at
313,318 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that affimative action agreement between school
and union should have been upheld regardless of formal findings, in part because "the
procedures for adopting th[e] provision were scrupulously fair"). Justice O'Connor, in a
separate concurring opinion in Wygant, flatly rejected "a requirement that public employers
make findings that they have engaged in illegal discrimination before they engage in
affirmative action programs." Id. at 290 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). Such a
requirement, she reasoned, "would severely undermine public employers' incentive to meet
voluntarily their civil rights obligations." Id.; see also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 520 n.4
(Marshall, J., concurring) (rejecting the view that "Congress must make particularized
findings that past violations.., have a current effect"). The clear target ofJustice O'Connor's
concern, however, was any requirement that formal findings of an actual violation had to be
made. Consistent with her joining the portion ofthe plurality opinion quoted at the outset
of the footnote, Justice O'Connor stated that "sufficient evidence" to justify a remedial
program must be mustered by the'government "before it embarks on an affirmative action
program." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277. Indeed, inher own separate concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connor went on to note that a remediation-based race-conscious hiring plan could be
implemented only if "the Board had a firm basis for concluding that remedial action was
appropriate." Id. at 293 (emphasis added).
408. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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of a city's construction work. The Court in particular found
unimpressive five predicate "facts" that the Richmond City Council
had relied on in enacting the set-aside program, concluding that
they offered "nothing approaching a prima facie case of a
constitutional or statutory violation by anyone in the Richmond
construction industry."" 9 The Court spoke forcefully of the need for
"[p1roper findings""0 of remediable discrimination, made "with the
particularity required by the Fourteenth Amendment."4 1 ' Even
more importantly, the Court signaled that such findings must
predate adoption of the program. As stated by the Court: "While the
States and their subdivisions may take remedial action when they
possess evidence that their own spending practices are exacerbating
a pattern of prior discrimination, they must identify that discrimination, public or private, with some specificity before they may use
race-conscious relief."4 '
The Court's affirmative action decisions have left in their wake
a host of doctrinal uncertainties." 3 In particular, none of the cases
spells out definitively when or how remedy-supporting findings
must be made. The Court's recurring references to findings,
however, suggest that they do-and will continue to-play a role in
the affirmative action context. 14 And to the extent this is true, the
Court's affirmative action jurisprudence is structural, for the
validity of any challenged program turns not solely on its content,
but on its demonstrated responsiveness to remediable discrimi409. Id. at 500 (emphasis omitted).
410. See id. at 510.
411. Id. at 492.
412. Id. at 504 (emphasis added); see also id. at 520 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part)
(noting that the "legislative record" suggests affirmative action plan was not genuinely
remedial).
413. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 335, at 1185 ("It is easy to be skeptical about the
Supreme Court's affirmative action cases. From the standpoint of the rule of law, the cases
are truly a mess.").
414. This assertion also finds support in rulings of lower courts that have considered the
presence or absence of contemporaneous findings in the affirmative action context. See, e.g.,
Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1575 & n.15 (5th Cir. 1984) (Wisdom, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing "findings of law enforcement studies
that public cooperation with and support of the police force are enhanced by minority
representation that is reflective of [a] community"); In re Sherbrooke Sodding Co., 17 F.
Supp. 2d 1026,1034 (D. Minn.1998) (noting "paucity" of congressional fact-finding); Price v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 604 P.2d 1365, 1369-70 (Cal. 1980) (discussing findings of civil service
commission regarding county's past hiring practices that supported its remedial order).
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nation consciously identified and considered by those who put that
program in place.
C. NonremedialFindingsRules
Remediation-driven findings-and-study rules direct attention
to legislative ends because their central function is to force
policymakers to identify the specific wrongs their programs seek to
rectify." Legislative ends, as we soon will see, are also the focus of
the separate set of structural rules that concern the legitimacy of
legislative motives." 6 But structural rules-including legislative
findings-and-study rules-may target legislative means as well.
This point is illustrated pointedly by the Court's Internet freespeech decision in Reno v. ACLU. 17 That case concerned the
constitutionality of federal legislation that broadly prohibited
transmission on the Internet of nonobscene, and thus constitutionally protected, "indecent" speech." In the opening section of
its opinion, the Court emphasized the importance of the First
Amendment interests threatened by the challenged enactment.
Because the law both employed a stark form of content
discrimination and had "unprecedented" prohibitive effects in that
it covered all Internet communications,419 it was properly subject
to "the most stringent review."420 Undertaking this exacting
means/ends appraisal, the Court in effect conceded the legitimacy
of the congressional goal. The Court acknowledged: "'[Tihere is a
compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological
well-being of minors,' which extend[s] to shielding them from
indecent messages that are not obscene ... "

421

Having found no

problem with'this legislative end, the Court shifted attention to
legislative means, asking whether the program "has been carefully

415. See supranotes 393-98 and accompanying text.
416. See infra Part X.

417. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
418. See id. at 849.
419. See id. at 877.
420. Id. at 868.
421. Id. at 869 (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989)); see also id. at 875 (noting that Court has "repeatedly recognized the governmental
interest in protecting children from harmful material").

1676

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1575

tailored to the congressional goal."4 2 2 As we have seen, although
less-restrictive-alternative rules have an important second-look
quality, they typically are more substantive than structural in
nature because they focus attention on the content (and particularly
the overinclusive or underinclusive content) of the challenged
4
law. 2
In considering the less-restrictive-alternative issue in Reno v.
ACLU, however, the Court took an openly structuralturn. As it
explained:
The breadth of this content-based restriction of speech imposes
an especially heavy burden on the Government to explain why
a less restrictive provision would not be as effective as the CDA.
It has not done so. The arguments in this Court have referred
to possible alternatives such as requiring that indecent
material be "tagged" in a way that facilitates parental control
of material coming into their homes, making exceptions for
messages with artistic or educational value, providing some
tolerance for parental choice, and regulating some portions of
the Internet-such as commercial web sites-differently from
others, such as chat rooms. Particularly in the light of the
422. Id. at 871.
423. At the same time, certain forms of less-restrictive, alternative-based
rulings--particularly when they touch complex and shifting regulatory fields-have a very
pure second-look cast. For example, in UnitedStates v. Playboy Entertainment,Inc., 120 S.
Ct. 1878 (2000), the Court invalidated a statute that required cable operators to fully block,
or limit to late-night hours, sexually oriented programming. The Court reasoned that the
government had failed to show: (1) that so-called "signalbleed"from partially blocked signals
was actually creating a "real problem" of children viewing sexually oriented programming
during daytime hours; and (2) that the less restrictive alternative of customer-requested
blocking would not solve any problems that in fact did exist. See id. at 1891. The Court
emphasized that the government has the burden of proof as to both issues and that the
record in the case was devoid of useful evidence offered by the government on each question.
The key point to be made about Playboy Entertainment is that its burden-of-proof-driven
style of analysis leaves it open for Congress to fill the evidentiary void left behind by the
government's lawyers. Thus, if Congress reenacted precisely the same statute struck down
in Playboy Entertainment-afterusing its distinctively powerful investigatory tools to
demonstrate the need for such a law based onthe sort of sound "surveys and field tests" that
government lawyers had not presented-there can be little doubt that it could render valid
what was invalid before. See id. (noting that "nearbarren legislative record" generated when
statute was enacted offered "no support" for the government's litigating position). In this
sense, means/ends invalidations-and particularly invalidations based on a judicial sense
that workable less restrictive alternatives seem to be available--often have a structurally
pure, though largely hidden, remand-to-the-legislature dimension.
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absence of any detailed findings by the Congress, or even
hearings addressingthe special problems of the CDA, we are
persuaded that the CDA is not narrowly tailored if that
requirement has any meaning at all."
By employing this findings-centered style of means analysis, the
Court injected an important structural dimension into First
Amendment law. The Court said, in effect, that it was unprepared
to recognize the implausibility of less speech-restrictive alternatives
for protecting children when Congress had not even first studied
the matter itself. Nor can the Court's embrace of this approach be
dismissed as aberrational, for a decade earlier the Court used
exactly the same technique in invalidating a no-less-prominent act
of Congress.
In the so-called dial-a-porn case, Sable Communications of
4 25 the Court considered whether
California, Inc. v. F.C.C.,
Congress's "total ban on indecent commercial telephone communications is justified because nothing less could prevent children
from gaining access to such messages."42 6 In rejecting the
government's argument to this effect, the Court first emphasized
that "[t]he FCC, after lengthy proceedings," had found that less
restrictive alternatives (including credit card use or access code
requirements) would satisfactorily address the problem.4 27 The
Court then turned to the government's entreaties that, notwithstanding the agency's views, the Court should defer to
Congress's later reevaluation and repudiation of these regulatory
alternatives. In rejecting this contention, the Court employed
strictly structural reasoning. "IT]he congressional record," the Court
said, "contains no legislative findings that would justify us in
concluding that there is no constitutionally acceptable less
restrictive means, short of a total ban, to achieve the Government's
interest in protecting minors."4" The Court was particularly
troubled that, with regard to regulatory alternatives, it could find
nothing in the legislative materials except "conclusory statements
424. Reno, 521 U.S. at 879 (emphasis added).

425. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
426. Id. at 128.

427. Id.
428. Id. at 129 (emphasis added).
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during the debates"4 29 and that "the congressional record . . .
contains no evidence as to how effective or ineffective the FCC's
most recent regulations were or might prove to be." 3 ° The Court
concluded its assessment of the legislature's choice of means by
observing:
The bill that was enacted.. . was introduced on the floor; nor
was there a committee report on the bill from which the
language of the enacted bill was taken. No Congressman or
Senator purported to present a considered judgment with
respect to how often or to what extent minors could or would
circumvent the rules and have access... :For all we know from
this record, the FCC's technological approach to restricting diala-porn messages to adults who seek them would be extremely
effective, and only a few of the most enterprising and
disobedient young people would manage to secure access to such
messages.43 '

429. Id.
430. Id. at 130.
431. Id. The Court added:
On the other hand, in the hearings on H.R. 1786, the Committee heard
testimony from the FCC and other witnesses that the FCC rules would be
effective and should be tried out in practice. Furthermore, at the conclusion of
the hearing, the Chairman of the Subcommittee suggested consultationlooking
toward "drafting a piece of legislation that will pass constitutional muster,
while at the same time providing for the practical relief which families and
groups are looking for."... The bill never emerged from Committee.
Id. (footnote omitted). Interestingly, Justice Scalia-writing only for himself-sought to
minimize the majority's structural reasoning in a separate concurring opinion. He wrote:
In joining Part IV, I do so with the understanding that its examination of the
legislative history... is merely meant to establish that no more there than

anywhere else can data be found demonstrating the infeasibility of alternative
means to provide (given the nature of this material) adequate protection of
minors. I do not understand the Court to suggest that such data must have
been before Congress in order for the law to be valid. Even though "[n]o
Congressman or Senator purported to present a considered judgment" on
infeasibility,... the law would be valid if infeasibility was true. Neither due
process nor the First Amendment requires legislation to be supported by
committee reports, floor debates, or even consideration, but only by a vote.
Id. at 133 (Scalia, J., concurring) (alteration in original). It bears reiterating that no member
of the Court-each of whom joined the relevant portion of Justice White's majority
opinion-elected to join Justice Scalia's concurrence or to issue a like-minded disclaimer.
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Given this reasoning, it is not surprising that the Court in Reno v.
ACLU concluded that "[tihe lack of legislative attention to the
statute at issue in Sable suggests [a] parallel with this case."43 2
In cases that involve the most pressing substantive constitutional
values, the Court has said that the government program must be
"carefully tailored" to the government's ends."3 In both Sable
Communications and Reno v. ACLU, the Court applied this
mandate in a literal-and thus structural-way by genuinely
examining whether the lawmaking process was in fact marked with
carefulness. This style of reasoning suggests that the Court may be
receptive to structural analysis-including structural means
analysis-in other heightened-scrutiny cases, and the cases seem
to bear this inference out. Indeed, in each of the following settings,
the Court has signaled at least some measure of willingness to give
weight to policymaker findings: (1) cases that involve sex (and
perhaps a fortiori race) discrimination; ' (2) cases that involve
432. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,875 n.41 (1997).
433. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (emphasis added) (discussing
ameliorative statutes designed to compensate for previous sex discrimination).
434. As to discrimination on the basis of sex, see United States v. Virginia,518 U.S. 515,
535 (1996) (rejecting educational-diversityjustificationfor state operation ofall-male military
school because there was no evidence the state acted "with a view to diversifying, by its
categorical exclusion of women); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730
n.16 (1982) (noting that 'itihe state has provided no evidence whatever that the Mississippi
Legislature has ever attempted to justify its differing treatment of men and women seeking
nurses' training"); id. at 726 (also noting that underlying purpose of heightened scrutiny in
sex discrimination cases is to generate "reasoned analysis" by policymakers who consider
such rules); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (stating that "customary deference
accorded the judgments of Congress is certainly appropriate when, as here, Congress
specifically considered the question of the Acts constitutionality"); Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (upholding Social Security retirement benefits scheme that favored
women over men because itwas "deliberately enacted to compensate for particular economic
disabilities suffered by women); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 222-23 & n.9 (1977)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting Social SecurityAct discrimination between nondependent
widows and widowers because "Congress never focused its attention on the question"
whether the law was justifiable in terms ofadministrative savings or compensating for past
wrongs: "Perhaps an actual, considered legislative choice would be sufficient to allow this
statute to be upheld, but that is a question I would reserve until such a choice has been
made"). For structure-centered observations on some of these cases, see Frickey, supranote
27, at 724 ("In upholding the exclusion of women from the selective service in Rostker v.
Goldberg, the Court stressed that the Congress had recently 'carefully considered and
debated' the alternatives."); id. at 725 ("Bystressingthe absence ofappropriate congressional
support as a factor negating constitutionality, Goldfarb is the equal-protection analogue to
Lopez."); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword:Leaving Things
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discrimination against legal aliens by the federal government (and
perhaps a fortiori by the states);. 5 (3) cases that involve allegedly
Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REV. 4, 75-76 (1996) ("Virginia is linked with Kent insofar as it
requires a current legislative judgment-here, that same-sex education is necessary to
promote educational diversity.... Ifthe state reached its decision deliberatively and without
infection from stereotypes about gender roles, and the decision promoted rather than
undermined equal opportunity, the Court might uphold the program."). The Supreme Court
uses clearly structural reasoning in the context of discrimination based on race or ethnicity.
See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 551 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing
willingness to invalidate federal legislation "that would be subject to strict scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause" when "classification was not adequately preceded by a
consideration of less drastic alternatives or adequately explained by a statement of
legislative purpose"); Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 97-98 (1977)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that Congress's failure to include one group of Native
Americans in reparations award was unconstitutionally discriminatory because it was "the
consequence of a legislative accident,perhaps caused by nothing more than the unfortunate
fact that Congress is too busy to do all of its work as carefully as it should"); see also David
A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of ProphylacticRules, 55 U. CM. L. REV. 190, 201 (1988) (stating
"it is a commonplace that a legislative judgment that a statute is constitutional is generally
entitled to some deference from a court, especially when that judgment is made after detailed
consideration of the constitutional question).
435. In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), the Court rejected the Civil
Service Commission's administrative-convenience rationale for excluding all aliens from all
civil service jobs. In doing so, the Court wrote:
The Civil Service Commission, like other administrative agencies, has an
obligation to perform its responsibilities with some degree ofexpertise, and to
make known the reasons for its important decisions. There is nothing in the
record before us, or in matter of which we may properly take judicial notice, to
indicate that the Commission actually made any considered evaluation of the
relative desirability of a simple exclusionary rule on the one hand, or the value
to the service of enlarging the pool of eligible employees on the other.
Id. at 115; see also id. at 103 (first noting that "it may reasonably be presumed that the
asserted interest was the actual predicate for the rule" when the rule-promulgating agency
is responsible for protecting that interest, but then adding that "[t]hat presumption would,
of course, be fortified by an appropriate statement of reasons identifying that relevant
interest"). See generally Sunstein, supra note 41, at 67 n.172 (citing Mow Sun Wong and
affirmative action cases as reflecting "general requirements of deliberation... in cases
concerning intrusions on constitutionally sensitive interests").
For the use of findings-related structural reasoning in other equal protection contexts, see
New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 609-10 n.15 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that flat ban on methadone users as city transit authority workers
violates equal protection: "Some weight should also be given to the history of the rule ....
Petitioners admit that it was not the result of a reasoned policy decision and stipulated that
theyhad never studied the ability of those on methadone maintenance to perform petitioners'
jobs .... These factors... point to a conclusion of invidious discrimination), and Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 674 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("T]he legislatures which
enacted these statutes have been fully exposed to the arguments... as to why these
residence requirements are unwise, and have rejected them. This is not, therefore, an
instance in which legislatures have acted without mature deliberation."); Able v. United
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unconstitutional regulatory takings;3 6 (4) cases that involve claims
that ostensible content discrimination is justified by the "secondary
effects" of sexually explicit speech; 43 7 and (5) other free-speech cases
States, 155 F.3d 628, 632 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting, in upholding "don't ask, don't tell" policy
challenged by gay service members, that court must "give great deference to Congressional
judgments in matters affecting the military," especially "where, as here, the challenged
restriction was the result ofexhaustive inquiry by Congress in hearings, committee and floor
debate"); Quill v. Vacto, 80 F.3d 716, 741 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (rejecting
state's distinction between "active' assisted suicide [and] 'passive' behavior" because "New
York has never enacted a law based on a reasoned defense of the difference"), rev'd, 521 U.S.
793 (1997); see also Frickey, supra note 27, at 729 ("Treating the [lack-of-legislativefactfinding] concerns animating Lopez as constitutionally cognizable should mean that they
are generalizable to analogous situations, such as some equal protection cases.").
436. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), the Court
upheld state legislation that barred coal mining that causes the subsidence of buildings
despite the Court's earlier invalidation of closely similar legislation inPennsylvania CoalCo.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 473-74.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, noted that, unlike in Pennsylvania Coal, the
Pennsylvania legislature had based the modem legislation "on detailed findings," id. at 474,
and that the "[lWegislature specifically found that important public interests are served by
enforcing [the] policy." Id. at 485; see also id. at 486 n.14 (noting that "[tihe legislature...
set forth rather detailed findings about the dangers of subsidence and the need for
legislation"). Based on these findings, the Court determined that the new act, unlike the old,
"is designed to accomplish a number of widely varying interests" as to which (again, unlike
with respect to the old act) no "alternative methods" of accomplishment were identifiable. Id.
at 486.
437. In City ofRenton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986), the Supreme
Court upheld a city's zoning restrictions on businesses engaged in sexually oriented
expression, pointing to the city's reliance on studies of the matter in other communities. The
majority, however, did not require the city "to conduct new studies or produce evidence
independent of that already generated by other cities." Id. at 51. Agreeing with the court of
appeals, the dissenting Justices would have required more careful and community-specific
findings to justify the city's use of a secondary-effects rationale. See id. at 60-62 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); id. at 60 ("The City Council conducted no studies, and heard no expert
testimony, on how the protected uses would be affected by the presence of an adult movie
theater, and never considered whether residents' concerns could be met by'restrictions that
are less intrusive on protected forms ofexpression.'. . . As a result, any findings' regarding
'secondary effects' caused by adult movie theaters, or the need to adopt specific locational
requirements to combat such effects, were not 'fndings' at all, but purely speculative
conclusions.").
FollowingRenton, some lower courts have focused on the presence or absence of findings
with regard to secondary effects. See, eg., Artistic Entertainment, Inc. v. City of Warner
Robins, No. 97-00195-5-CV-3-HL, slip op. at 14 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 1998) (noting that,
although City had referenced studies in enacting the ordinance, the "application of these
studies to the City of Warner Robins is oflimited value"), rev'd inpart,vacatedin part, 157
F.3d 907 (1998) (unpublished table decision); Goldrushflv. City ofMarietta, 482 S.E.2d 347,
355 (Ga. 1997) ("Before enacting [such] an ordinance ... a legislative body is required to
consider specific evidence of the undesirable secondary effects."). In the Supreme Court's
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In light of these parallel examples, there is room to

most recent nude dancing decision, a plurality of the Court seemed to follow the approach
ofRenton by requiring some, but not much, legislative investigation of secondary effects. See
City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 120 S. Ct. 1382, 1395 (2000) (plurality opinion) (stating that in
order to justify secondary-effects-based ban as to nude dancing, "the city need not 'conduct
new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities'...
'so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant!"
(quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52) (emphasis added)).
Justice Souter's view of findings in this context is particularly interesting. In the earlier
Barnes case, Justice Souter had minimized the relevance of legislative findings. See Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,583-85 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring). Shortly thereafter,
this dismissive treatment of findings drew a vigorous critique from Guido Calabresi. See
Calabresi, supra note 13, at 112 n.94 ("In Barnes, Justice Souter voted to uphold a law
prohibiting nude dancing based on the strength ofthe evidence presented inRenton-hedid
so even though the state legislature that enacted the regulation in Barnes had not even
referred to the sort of 'secondary effects' held subject to regulation inRenton. Justice Souter
thus deferred to a hypothetical legislative rationale based on a study conducted in another
state. This approach is as careless as that used by Justice Black inKorematsu. . . ." (citations

omitted)). In City of Erie, Justice Souter retreated from his Barnes concurrence, but
simultaneously issued uncertain signals about his current view of the role of legislative
findings in this context. Thus, Justice Souter observed at one point in his separate City of
Erie opinion that an "evidentiary basis may be borrowed from the records made by other
governments ifthe experience elsewhere is germane to the measure under consideration and
actually relied upon." Id. at 1404 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added). He added that "the city councilors who enacted Erie's ordinance are in a
position to look to the facts of their own community's experience as well as experiences
elsewhere." Id. at 1404 n.3. Having focused on defects in the Erie City Council's actual
lawmaking process, see id. at 1402-05, however, Justice Souter went on to find that the
"record" was inadequate in demonstrating a suitable remediation ofsecondary effects, see id.
at 1405, and therefore advocated a "remand" of the case to give Erie the chance to develop
the logic of its regulatory program in the lower courts. See id. at 1406. It remains unclear (at
least in my mind) whether (in Justice Souter's mind) post hoc proofin court ofa law's efficacy
in countering secondary effects is adequate to establish a law's constitutionality even when
the lawmaking body itself focused on such constitutional concerns very little or not at all.
438. See Columbia Brbad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,102-03 (1973)
("[Wihen we face a complex problem with many hard questions ... we do well to pay careful
attention to how the other branches of Government have addressed the same problem";
therefore "we must afford great weight to the decisions of Congress," especially in dealing
with an "industry [that] is dynamic in terms of technological change"); see also Walters v.
National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330-31 & n.12 (1985) (rejecting due
process and First Amendment Challenge to $10 limit on amount payable to attorney who
represents claimant for service-connected Veterans Administration death or disability
benefits in part because argument is weak that the need for an attorney is great in such
matters; noting that "[w]hen Congress makes findings on essentially factual issues such as
these, those findings are of course entitled to a great deal of deference"; but also noting that
"we need non rely" on the findings here because "they are entirely consistent" with the record
in the case); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 70-71 n.19 (1983) (noting that
Congress, in revising century-old legislation crafted byAnthony Comstock "retained without
any real discussion the ban on unsolicited advertisements" of contraceptives); Moserv. FCC,
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wonder whether the Court now stands ready to apply some version
46F.Sd970, 974 (9thCir. 1995) (overturning district courts invalidation of ban on automated
phone calls while stating that "Congress made extensive findings" and that "[tihe district
court did not give sufficient weight to [those] findings").
Of particular note are the Court's two separate opinions that deal with the
constitutionality of the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992: Turner
BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (TurnerI), and TurnerBroadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (TurnerR) (affirming lower court decision after
remand in Turner1). In these cases, the Court faced complex predictive judgments about the
possible demise of broadcast television stations unless a congressional must-carry
requirement imposed on cable operators was sustained against First Amendment attack. In
initially remanding the case for further study by the district court, Justice Kennedy focused
on whether the must-carry rule was "narrowly tailored" to guard against broadcasters'
ruination, while emphasizing that"Congress is not obligated... to make a record of the type
that an administrativeagency or court does to accommodate judicial review" with respect to
such a question. Turnerl, 512 U.S. at 666; see also id.at 670-71 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(agreeing that "Congress need not compile or restrict itself to a formal record in the manner
required of a judicial or administrative factfinder,"). At the same time, the Court described
the judicial task as ensuring that "Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on
substantial evidence," id. at 666, and directed the district court to consider both "the
predictive [and] historical evidence upon which Congress relied" and "additional evidence
[offered] to establish that the dropped or repositioned broadcasters would be at serious risk
offinancial difficultly." Id. at 667. In a separate concurrence, Justice Blackmun emphasized
"the paramount importance of according substantial deference to the predictive judgments
of Congress... particularly where, as here, that legislative body has compiled an extensive
record in the course of reaching its judgment." Id. at 669 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Similarly, Justice Stevens stressed that "findings by Congress, particularly those emerging
from such sustained deliberations, merit special respect from this Court."Id. at 671 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
Following remand, and the return ofthe case to the high Court, it upheld the challenged
statute. Justice Kennedy's opinion again asserted that "in the realm of First Amendment
questions... Congress must base its conclusions upon substantial evidence," Turnerl1, 520
U.S. at 196, and said that the question is whether the legislative conclusion was reasonable
and supported by substantial evidence in the recordbefore Congress."Id. at 211 (empahsis
added). The Court went on to find this standard satisfied in light ofthe expansive supportive
record that Congress had in fact assembled. See id. at 196; see also Turner1, 512 U.S. at 646
(citing Congress's "unusually detailed statutory findings"). See generally William E. Lee,
ManipulatingLegislative Facts:The Supreme Court and the FirstAmendment, 72 TUL. L.
Rzv. 1261, 1315 (1998) ("The dominant theme of Justice Kennedy's Turner H opinion is
judicial deference to Congress's judgment about complex communications issues.").
Arguably, the role ofcongressional findings was diminished by the Court's recent decision
in United States v. Playboy EntertainmentGroup, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1878 (2000). In that case,
after all, the Court stated-in striking down a content-based speech ban-that the "question
is whether an actual problem has been proven in this case." Id. at 1891 (emphasis added).
The Court nowhere suggested, however, that proof at trial stood alone as relevant to making
the "actual problem ... in this case" determination. Id. Indeed, in finding an insufficiency
in this regard the Court noted-along with trial-proof shortcomings-that"[n]o support for
the restriction can he found in the near barren legislative record relevant to this provision."
Id.
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of the analysis deployed in Sable Communications and Reno v.
ACLU to a spectrum of individual-rights special-scrutiny cases4 39
-at least where the highest levels of judicial attentiveness are
brought to bear.' 0 The embrace of structural rules in many other
contexts lends support to the plausibility of such an approach." 1 To
be sure, it remains to be seen where all of this will lead." 2 At the
439. For one case that concerned the relevance ofmeans-based findings outside the First
Amendment context, see Middendorfv.Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976). In Middendorf,a majority
of the Court held that neither the Sixth Amendment right to counsel nor the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause required representation by counsel in military summary
court-martial proceedings, which are designed to cover 'relatively minor offenses under a
simple form ofprocedure.'" Id. at 32 (quoting MANUAL FOR CoURTS-MARTiAL I 79A (1969)).
The majority reasoned in part that this regime was justified by the special demands of
"military necessity," see id. at 44, noting that Congress had refused to abolish summary
courts martials in 1956 and 1968. See id. at 44-45 n.21. The Court asserted in a footnote that
"Congress has considered the matter in some depth." Id. In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined
by Justice Brennan, attacked the majority's reasoning on means-centeredfindings-and-study
grounds. According to Justice Marshalh
[Tihere is no evidence offered of any detailed congressional consideration ofthe
specific question of the feasibility of providing counsel at summary courtsmartial. And, more importantly, there is no indication that Congress made a
judgment that military necessity requires the denial ofthe constitutional right
to counsel to summary court-martial defendants.
Id. at 68 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted in particular that Congress had
not even been in a position to make proper findings in 1956 or 1968 because the Court's
seminal right to counsel decision, Argersingerv. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), was not handed
down until 1972. See Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 68. In short, for Justice Marshall, the
government's defense of its practice was insufficient because "there is simply no indication
that Congress ever made a clear determination'that 'military necessity' precludes applying
the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel to summary court-martial proceedings." Id.
440. See City of Erie, 120 S.Ct. 1396 (noting that in decision that upheld draft-cardburning statute "[tihere was no study documenting instances ofdraft card mutilation or the
actual effect of such mutilation on the Government's asserted efficiency interests," but
distinguishing "a case involving conduct" from "a case involving actual regulation of First
Amendment expression"); id. at 1403 n.1 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring) (suggestingthe"need
for evidence maybe especially acute when a regulation is content based on its face.., rather
than a time, place or manner restriction").
441. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 27, at 697-98 (concluding "that the [findings-centered]
approach taken in Lopez may be a plausible technique to encourage appropriate
congressional procedures and consideration, but in principle cannot be cabined short of
having applications outside the review ofcommerce-power exercises"); id. at 698 (suggesting
extension of Lopez findings principle in the service of "promoting legislative attention to
important but often undervalued constitutional interests"); id. at 728-29 ("When all is said
and done, the heightened concern about congressional fact-development and factfinding
suggested by Lopez could be a plausible technique for curbing legislative excess in
noneconomic cases in general.").
442. See, e.g.,Thomas H. Lee, Jr., Note, Baltimore Teachers Unionv. Mayor ofBaltimore:
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least, however, the Court's use of structural means analysis in two
of its highest profile free-expression decisions of the last dozen
years leaves little doubt that this style of analysis now constitutes
a significant feature. of our First Amendment law.
D. Pros and Cons of Proper-Findings-and-StudyRules
What is one to make of these proper-findings-and-study cases?
Such perceptive constitutional theorists as Professor Ely, Professor
Tushnet, and Justice Linde have greeted findings rules with a
healthy measure of skepticism." 3 The concerns of these and other
Does the Contract Clause Have Any Vitality in the Fourth Circuit?, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1633,
1646-50 (1994) (arguing that Court should take account oflegislative findings concerningless
restrictive alternatives in assessing alleged impairments of contract). In particular, many
questions about the proper nature of findings--assuming thatfindings are required-remain
to be asked and answered. For example, many questions about the significance of findings
in the First Amendment area are raised in Professor William Lee's recent article. See Lee,
supra note 438, at 1262 (discussing hypothetical television-viewing restriction: "Does the
presence of express legislative findings affect the constitutionality of this law? That is, must
a court accept the legislature's finding despite disagreement among scholars about
television's impact on children?"). Of course, a generalized willingness to apply structural
review in the individual-rights area does not mean that the Court should, or will, apply only
structural review. See, e.g., id. at 1281 ("[W]hat if these laws had been supported by express
legislative findings? For example, assume that the Ohio law had included an express finding
indicating that the identity of a political pamphlet's author is critical to an informed
electorate. Would this express finding have changed the outcome? Given the paramount
importance that the Court attached to an author's decision to remain anonymous, it seems
unlikely that this express finding would have mattered."). As the Court has made clear in
many cases:
That Congress' predictive judgments are entitled to substantial deference does
not mean . . . that they are insulated from meaningful judicial review
altogether. On the contrary, we have stressed in First Amendment cases that
the deference afforded to legislative findings does "not foreclose our
independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law."
TurnerI, 512 U.S. at 666 (quoting Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129
(1989)).
443. See ELY, supra note 88, at 129-30 (expressing skepticism "that a inethod of forcing
articulation of [legislative] purposes canbe developed thatwill be both workable and helpful
because historically"court-induced articulation ofpurposes"has proven"likelyto be so vague
or all-inclusive as to be peculiarly unhelpfu); id. at 128 (opining that insistence on "more
authoritative" articulated purposes-in the form of committee reports, for example-"would
likely result in a laundry list ofpurposes... or more likely a few so all-encompassing in their
generality that they could plausibly be used in every report the committee issues"); id. at 134
(concluding that while "ventilating legislative purposes is healthy... [and] critical to
representative government," whether "there is any effective way of getting our
representatives to set down their purposes in a form that will tell us anything we cannot
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critics focus on the potential make-work nature of stated findings;'
the threat such requirements pose to legislative flexibility;4 5 and
the unwisdom and dishonesty of requiring simplistic expressions
of public-regarding rationales when, in reality, legislators often act
in response to deeply subtle, widely varying, and purely political
motivations.' There is concern, too, about the difficulty of seplearn from the face of legislation" is open to "serious doubt"); Linde, supranote 27, at 231-32
(noting that "[uit is improbable that testimony" influences congressional votes for or against
a given piece of legislation and that official findings and purposes may be "wholly the work
of lawyers who [know] nothing about [the findings themselves]"); id. at 232 ("We have it on
the high authority of Justice Frankfurter that the truth or falsity of congressional findings
in a bill was immaterial, when the Court pushed aside the attack of the Communist party
on a veritable essay of findings that prefaced the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.");
see also MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE 210 (1988) (predicting that insistence on
articulation of reasons for a statute "would destroy the legislative process as we know it"
since "[m]uch legislation is adopted by... councils and ... legislatures, which keep quite
rudimentary records of what precedes formal enactment"; also warning that
"frequently-perhaps usually-there are no reasons for legislation except thattthe legislators
who voted for it thought that they would win votes by doing so or that this statute seemed
a fair compromise between contending political forces"; and concluding, as a result, that "it
seems unsound to develop structural review in this direction").
444. See DanielA. Farber& Philip P. Frickey, The JurisprudenceofPublicChoice, 65 TEE
L. REV. 873,919 n.256 (1987) ("The legislative deliberation model might require Congress not
only to compile an adequate record by having committee staffaggregate [a] diverse collection
of documents, but also to insert planned colloquies and other boilerplate language in
hearings."); Sunstein, supranote 41, at 76 ("The first criticism, substantive in nature, would
suggest that it is utopian to believe that representatives can be forced into the deliberative
Madisonian mold.... At most, it would produce 'boilerplate'-rationalizations designed to
placate the courts-rather than a genuine critical inquiry into issues of value and fact.");
Marcia Coyle,NewFederalismLitmus:Rulings,OralsShow Findingsby CongressKey Focus
of Justices,NAVLL.J., Jan. 24,2000, at Al, A10 (noting"skepticism in the legal community
about the weight the court should give to congressional findings," and adding that one
"lawyer who follows Congress closely" says findings "'don'tmean anything at all" because
" members just throw them in as part of the form they're given!").
445. See Farber & Frickey, supranote 444, at 920 n.257, 919 n.256 (citing "difficulties a
legislature [might] encounter in attempting to transform itselfinto a formal record-creating,
deliberative institution" and "potentially severe costs on legislative practice, including
rendering suspect any floor amendments that differed from the compiled legislative record
but nonetheless were required for political compromise").
446. As observed by Justice Linde:
Articulated reasons have their place in an agency's pursuit ofthe goals assigned
to it. Pursued into the legislative process, the hope for candor is more likely to
produce hypocrisy. Recitals of findings and purposes are the task of anonymous
draftsmen, committee staffs, and counsel for interested parties, not legislators.
Such recitals will be an attempt to provide whatever, under prevailing case law,
is expected to satisfy a court. Except for this purpose, a legislator has no reason
to care about them nor to debate their truth or relevance as long as he favors
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'arating out sufficiently and insufficiently studious lawmaking
efforts.' 47 In short, there is much to be said against these rules.
But there is also something to be said in their favor. To begin
with, the most ardent criticisms of these rules focus on proposals to
require highly formal findings. Proper-findings-and-study rules,
however, need not and should not take the form of formal-findings
rules.' In addition, structural theory does not dictate (as some
critiques seem to suppose) that proper-findings-and-study rules
must apply to all forms of legislation. Rather, as the authorities
considered here suggest, such rules may be reserved for vindicating
only those constitutional values-like powerful First Amendment
rights or underenforced norms of federalism-that may have a
distinctively meritorious claim of need for structural protection.4 4 9
Concerns about workability also seem overdrawn. It is said, for
example, that courts cannot distinguish adequate from inadequate
policymaking processes. But why is that? In the field of administrative law, for example, courts routinely assess the procedural
adequacy of policy formulation in applying the so-called "hard look"
doctrine." ° Indeed, some authorities suggest that the Constitution
itself mandates inquiries of this kind.'5 1 One wonders why, if courts
the bilL
Linde, supranote 27, at 231; see supranote 443.
447. See Lee, supranote 438, at 1263 ("Are findings that are the product of a methodical
legislative process, such as hearings, reports, and extensive floor debates, entitled to judicial
deference, while findings originating as floor amendments are discounted? Are implicit
findings treated differently than explicit findings?").
448. See supranote 339.
449. See supra text accompanying note 44.
450. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 41, at 61 ("The most important doctrinal innovation
in administrative law. .. is the hard-look doctrine.' In its current incarnation, the doctrine
contains four principal features. Agencies must give detailed explanations fortheir decisions;
justify departures from past practices; allow participation inthe regulatory process bya wide
range of affected groups; and consider reasonable alternatives, explaining why they were
rejected."). For some other treatments of this approach, see Richard B. Stewart, Vermont
Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure,91 HARV. L. REv. 1805, 1811-20
(1978); Emerson H. Tiller, ControllingPolicy by ControllingProcess:JudicialInfluence on
Regulatory DecisionMaking, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 114, 114-18 (1998).
451. See Sunstein, supra note 41, at 67 (stating that "courts have suggested that the'
Constitution independently requires that participation and explanation be available in
administrative rulemakingproceedings" (citing Burr v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 479
F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1973))); see also Shapiro & Levy, supra note 39, at 431 (arguing that
'judicial review of the reasons for an agency decision" emanate from constitutional
separation of powers, but not due process concerns); Stewart, supranote 450, at 1817 ("Ifthe
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can and should routinely review whether agencies have taken a
sufficiently hard look at competing interests in promulgating a
regulation, courts cannot consider whether legislative officials have
taken a minimally hard look in that narrow band of cases in which
the most vital constitutional interests are at stake. Most important,
proper-findings-and-study rules-ifthoughtfully applied-hold the
potential to do much good.45 2 Even the quickest perusal of The
Federalist Papers reveals that the Framers were driven at a
fundamental level byconcerns about legislative precipitousness and
passion.'
Proper-findings-and-study rules can counter these
tendencies by fostering-in at least some instances-a thoughtful
reevaluation and reshaping of policy proposals.4 " They do so by
court of appeals is prohibited from imposing procedural formalities not required by the APA,
where does the Supreme Court obtain the authority to impose a 'record' requirement that is
not found in the APA and that in some cases will obligate agencies to use procedures going
beyond APA minimums?").
452. See Farber & Frickey, supranote 444, at 919-20 &n.257 (offering arguments why "at
the constitutional margin, a record of careful legislative deliberationmight save an otherwise
unconstitutional statute"); Tribe, supra note 398, at 877 (observing that "whatever else its
legacy, at least Bakke's contribution to heightened awareness of process and structure as
independently significant dimensions of constitutional validity ought to be universally
welcomed").
453. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 63 (James Madison); see alsoA Citizen, CARLISLE
GAZETTE, Oct. 24,1787, quoted in I THE COMPLETE ANrn-FEDERAUST 61 (Herbert J. Storing
ed., 1981) ("Experience teaches us that individuals or simple bodies of men are liable to rash
and hasty decisions-to party influence and cabal.... ."). See generally Dan T. Coenen, Of
Pitcairn'sIsland and American ConstitutionalTheory, 38 WM. & MARYL. REV. 649 (1997)
(comparing the fall of Pitcaim's Island with antifederalist ideals). For an interesting
commentary on these problems in the context of modern-day America, see Calabresi, supra
note 13, at 122-23 ("The lack of strong party discipline and structures means that laws are
often patched together quickly toward the end of a legislative session. And the rootlessness
of our 'frontier immigrant society makes us particularly prone to fads, to demands for
conformism from'outsiders' (all of us at one point or another), and to the requirement that
we prove ourselves to be 120% American. These factors lead to bursts of haste and its
excesses when a fad or a passion arises.").
454. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 27, at 728-29 (arguing that, at least in noneconomic
cases, "heightened concern about congressional fact-development and fact-finding... could
be a plausible technique for curbing legislative excess" and "could promote a meaningful
dialogue between judiciary and legislature concerning just where the difficult-to-draw lines
should exist concerning important constitutional values"); Sandalow, supranote 13, at 1188
("Frequently, the issues that underlie a constitutional challenge to legislation have not been
noticed in the course of its enactment, perhaps because they were overlooked, perhaps
because the issues have become apparent only in particular applications of the legislation
that were not clearly anticipated. Even when such issues have been noticed, they may have
received only cursory examination, and then only in committee, for the attention of the
Congress may have been directed at other features of the legislation or, as must often occur,
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slowing down the policymaking process and by bringing into
sharper focus the potential costs of legislative action.
As we have seen, the cross-cutting arguments for and against
proper-findings-and-study rules are reflected in the existing mix of
Court decisions. Those decisions contain both rhetoric that suggests
a wariness of such rules and rhetoric that (at least in certain
contexts) seems to take their logic for granted.4" There is much
more to be said about the normative claims of proper-findings-andstudy rules. At least some proper-findings-and-study rules,
however, are already up and running. As a result, the key issue
that courts face today is not whether to embrace proper-findingsand-study rules. Rather, the most pressing questions concern when
to embrace these rules and what level ofpolicymaker deliberateness
they should be deemed to require.
V. REPRESENTATION-REINFORCING STRUCTURAL RULES

In the most famous footnote in constitutional law, Chief Justice
Stone wrote that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities."4 5 6 The point of this passage is that representative government cannot operate in its constitutionally
intended manner if it is marked by biases against, or the built-in

the legislation itself may have generated insufficient interest to elicit the full attention of
Congress."); see also Sunstein, supranote 335, at 1184 (praising "hard look doctrine" because
"the remand promotes better public deliberation by drawing attention to difficulties that had
not yet received adequate attention, and by helping to produce better processes of
deliberation for the future"); Wellington, supranote 8, at 490 ("[l]mpediments to the instant
gratification of majorities allow proposals for legislative change to be considered carefully.
This may be desirable even though the creation ofa particular majority itselfhas been timeconsuming. For it is surely the case that, in creating a majority for a proposal, proponents
may fail to examine fully the proposal's demerits."). There are also other values served by
proper-findings-and-study rules. See, e.g., Kende, supra note 395, at 611 (noting that a
"fndings requirement facilitates judicial review of the factual inferences that underlie a
government body's decision").
455. Cf. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 81-82 n.4 (1988) (noting, in support of a written
disquisition by counsel who claims a client's appeal is meritless, that it provides an
"inducement" for a"diligent review," cuts against "summary" action, and"can often shed new

light").
456. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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underrepresentation of, unfairly marginalized groups. 45 7 The
recognition of this reality has inspired an important working
principle of constitutional decision making: laws that disadvantage
such marginalized groups "call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry." 4 1 8 Because this style of "representationreinforcing" reasoning 5 9 focuses on "political processes" rather than
legislative outcomes, 6 0 it seems a likely source of process-centered
structural rules.
Professor Ely, the great champion of representation-reinforcement review, recognized the deep connection between process
theory and the "'second look' approach" that defines structural
review. 6 1 In particular, he suggested the doctrinal implications of
this connection in his discussion of the "case... of women, where
access was blocked in the past but can't responsibly be said to be so
any longer." 2 As he explained:
In cases of first-degree prejudice, or self-serving stereotyping
where the access of the disadvantaged group remains blocked,
the alternative of "remanding" the question to the political
processes for a "second look" would not be acceptable: we don't
give a case back to a rigged jury. Here, however, such a "second
look" approach seems to make sense. Technically the Court's
judgment would be the same in all situations of unallayed
suspiciousness: "due process of lawmaking" havingbeen denied,
the law that emerged would have to be declared unconstitutional. The difference would emerge in the event-unlikely,
precisely because access is no longer blocked-that the
legislature after such a declaration of unconstitutionality
457. See ELY, supranote 88, at 152-53.
458. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4; accord San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (noting that group's relegation to "a position of political
powerlessness" warrants "extraordinary protection from majoritarian political process").
459. See ELY, supra note 88, at 87.
460. See CaroleneProds., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. Notably, in footnote four the Court fixed its
focus on "political processes" in two separate passages-expressing concern about both
"legislation which restricts... political processes," and conditions that "curtail the operation
of... political processes." Id. at 152-53 n.4.
461. ELY, supra note 88, at 169.
462. Id. Of course, the underlying premise of Professor Ely-that full access to the
channels of government by women has become unblocked-is subject to dispute. The critical
point for present purposes is that, if such an unblocking has occurred, the Court's underlying
reasoning in CaroleneProductssupports adoption of a structural approach.
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reconsidered and repassed the same or a similar law. The fact
that due process of lawmaking was denied in 1908 or even in
1939 needn't imply that it was in 1982 as well, and
consequently the new law should be upheld as constitutional.'
Professor Ely's message is that laws invalidated on the basis of
their discriminatory treatment ofwomen should, at least ordinarily,
suffer no worse fate than being returned to the legislature for a
second look. Even more important, the Court has signaled a
receptiveness-or at least a possible receptiveness-to this
structural style of constitutional analysis in the sex discrimination

field. 64

463. Id. One might fairly ask, of course, why there is need for judicial invalidation of old
statutes that disadvantage women if women now can protect their own interests, including
securing the repeal of oppressive laws. Professor Ely answered this question in persuasive
fashion:
To put on the group affected the burden of using its recently unblocked access
to get the offending laws repealed would be to place in their path an additional
hurdle that the rest of us do not have to contend with in order to protect
ourselves-hardly an appropriate response to the realization that they have
been unfairly blocked in the past.
Id. at 169 n.*; see also id. at 103 (suggesting propriety ofjudicial intervention when elected
representatives are "clogging the channels of change"). In other words, Professor Ely's
concern is of a piece with the central concern of structurally minded analysts-namely, the
proper location ofthe burden of legislative inertia. As observed by Justice Neely:
Whenever we are confronted by an old statute, therefore, there is a force of
inertia that will keep that statute in effect indefinitely unless some organized
political constituency urges change. Even then, if an organized political
constituency fights the change, the odds are a hundred to one in favor of the
status quo (and those are literally the odds). According to Calabresi, the
institutional imperative of a legislature causes an entirely unprincipled
allocation of the burden of inertia.
Neely, supranote 69, at 275.
464. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980) (rejecting worker
compensation law's presumption of widow's, but not widower's, entitlement to dependent
benefits, and declining to embrace benign discrimination justification "simply by noting that
in 1925 the state legislature thought widows to be more in need of prompt help than men);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 215 (1977) (rejecting sex-based classification in Social
Security program adopted in 1939 because "[tlhere is every indication that ... 'the framers
of the Act legislated on the "then generally accepted assumption that a man is responsible
for the support ofhiswife and children."' (citingWiesenfeldv. Weinberger, 420 U.S. 636,644
(1975))). In Goldfarb, Justice Stevens steered a course particularly close to this line of
analysis. The case involved a SocialSecurity statute that distinguished between the payment
rights of widows and widowers. Surveying the legislative history, Justice Stevens had no
difficulty finding this distinction to be "the accidental by-product of a traditional way of
thinking about females,"430 U.S. at 223, and invalid for that reason. Recognizing that times
had changed, however, Justice Stevens held open the possibility that "this statute," see id.
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In Frontiero v. Richardson,46 5 Justice Powell orchestrated a
variation on Professor Ely's theme. The divisive issue in that case
was whether the Court should apply strict scrutiny to laws that
classify on the basis of sex. A razor-thin majority rejected this
position, with Justice Powell-joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun-writing the decisive opinion in the case.466
According to Justice Powell, it was of central importance that "[tihe
Equal Rights Amendment, which if adopted will resolve the
substance of this precise question, has been approved by Congress
and submitted for ratification by the States."467 This fact-together
with the susceptibility of the challenged legislation to invalidation
under already-existing precedents-led Justice Powell to chide the
four-Justice plurality for "reaching out" to address "unnecessarily"
the strict-scrutiny question "at the very time when state
legislatures ... are debating the proposed Amendment."' 8 This

reasoning suggests that Justice Powell desired to put off this
"far-reaching" and "sensitive" question for "future" consideration
only if and when that became necessary.469 But a representationreinforcing structural theme may also have lurked in Justice
Powell's analysis.
On this view, the obvious seriousness with which the ERA was
being taken in 1973 provided evidence that, by that time, women
and their political allies had come to wield significant influence
within our political system. It followed that the legislatures of the
nation, in effect, had reached the stage of inclusion assumed to exist

at 223 n.9, could be upheld if passed by a modem-day Congress for reasons free from
anything like "the 19th century presumption that females are inferior to males." Id. at 223;
see also infranotes 465-69 and accompanying text (discussing Frontierocase); infra notes
792-96 and accompanying text (discussing legislative-purpose inquiries in sex discrimination
cases).

465. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
466. See id. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring). A four-justice plurality made up of Justices
Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall asserted their willingness to apply strict scrutiny
in an opinion written by Justice Brennan. See id. at 688 (plurality opinion). Five
justices-including Justice. Stewart, id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring), and Justice
Rehnquist, id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), in addition to the signatories of Justice Powel's
opinion--declined to join the Brennan opinion.
467. Id. at 692.

468. Id.
469. Id.
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by Professor Ely when he published his book in 1982.470 From this
perspective, because previously entrenched interests had opened up
political processes to the protection of women, strict scrutiny of laws
that discriminated on the basis ofsexwas inappropriate unless and
until the ERA actually gained ratification. In other words, strict
judicial scrutiny of the law challenged in Frontiero(and other laws
that involved sex-based discrimination) might have been warranted
in times gone by. But strict scrutiny was not warranted under
modem conditions because the evidence suggested that the political
process problems that once justified strict scrutiny had been
rectified to a significant degree.
Structural representation-reinforcement reasoning surfaced in a
more explicit form-particularly in the opinions of Justice Clarkin the Court's early reapportionment decisions."' Justice Clark's
views, however, did not cany the day. Rather, in a series of
decisions, a majority of the Court eschewed evaluating the fairness
of apportionment processes in favor of insisting on apportionment
470. See supra note 463 and accompanying text.
471. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), for example, Justice Clark authored a
concurring opinion that reasoned that judicial intervention was proper because Tennessee
legislators had "riveted the present seats in the Assembly to their respective constituencies,
and by the votes of their incumbents a reapportionment ofanykind is prevented." Id. at 259.
In deriding this "legislative straight jacket," Justice Clark emphasized that the people of
Tennessee have "no initiative and referendum" procedure or other "practical opportunities
for exerting their political weight at the polls' to correct the existing 'invidious
discriminationm Id.; see also ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 306, at 134-35 (noting that
Justice Clark's analysis in Baker "resonates in the language of the Carolene Products
footnote]" and quoting Michael Klarman for the proposition that "[itis difficult to imagine
a more compelling case for judicial intervention on political process grounds than Baker"
(alteration in original)). Taking a similar approach, Justice Clark dissented when a majority
of the Court-in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713
(1964)-invalidated ageographical representation planfor one house ofColorado's bicameral
legislature that had been adopted in a statewide one-person-one-vote referendum. See id. at
741 (Clark, J., dissenting). Again focusing on process concerns, Justice Clark emphasized
that, in part due to Colorado's "initiative and referendum system," the "State Assembly has
been reapportioned eight times since 1881." Id. at 742. This fact indicated to Justice Clark
"the complete awareness of the people of Colorado to apportionment problems and their
continuing efforts to solve them" Id. Given the thus-evidenced proper operation of the
political system, Justice Clark saw no reason why "courts should... interfere." Id.; see also
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 639 (1969) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(rejecting majority's invalidation of school board election system, in part, because "[t]he
voting qualifications at issue have been promulgated, not by Union Free School District No.
15, but by the New York State Legislature, and the appellant is of course fully able to
participate in the election of... that body").
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outcomes that strictly reflected the principle of one-person-onevote.47 2 More recently, however, Justice Powell took a strongly
structural tack in casting the decisive fifth vote to sustain a
4 73
specialized voting-rights restriction in Ball v. James.
The
question in Ball was whether Arizona could use a one-acre-one-vote
system-rather than the typically mandated one-person-one-vote
system-in providing for the election of directors of a water
reclamation district. 74 In deciding to sustain the acreage-based
apportionment scheme, Justice Powell reasoned:
As this case illustrates, it may be difficult to decide when
experimentation and political compromise have resulted in an
impermissible delegation of those governmental powers that
generally affect all of the people to a body with a selective
electorate. But state legislatures, responsive to the interests of
all the people, normally are better qualified to make this
judgment than federal courts. Given the broad reforms effected
byReynolds v. Sims, we should expect that a legislature elected
on the rule of one person, one vote will be vigilant to prevent
undue concentration of power in the hands of undemocratic
bodies. The absence of just such a political safeguard was a

472. Most notably, a majority of the Court in Lucas specifically rejected Justice Clark's
structural analysis, reasoning that:
Manifestly, the fact that an apportionment plan is adopted in a popular
referendum is insufficient to sustain its constitutionality or to induce a court
of equity to refuse to act ... . A citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be
infringed simply because amajority ofthe people choose that it be. We hold that
the fact that a challenged legislative apportionment plan was approved by the
electorate is without federal constitutional significance, if the scheme adopted
fails to satisfy the basic requirements of [equal protection].
Lucas, 377 U.S. at 736-37.
473. 451 U.S. 355 (1981). Notably, Justice Ginsburg also has voiced some receptiveness
toward a structural representation-reinforcing view of at least some of the reapportionment
cases. See Ginsburg, supranote 1, at 1207-08 n. 143 ("The ultimate rationale to be given for
Baker v. Carr and its numerous progeny is that when political avenues for redressing
political problems become dead-end streets, some judicial intervention in the politics of the
people may be essential in order to have any effective politics. In Tennessee, [for example,]
at the time its legislative composition was challenged inBaker, there was a history of several
years ofunsuccessful state court litigation andunsuccessful efforts forcorrective legislation."
(alteration in original) (quoting ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOcRATIc REPRESENTATION:
RAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITIcs 8 (1968))).
474. See Ball, 451 U.S. at 360.
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major justification for the Court's role in requiring legislative
reapportionment.47 5
Justice Powell continued:
The Arizona Legislature recently has demonstrated its control
over the electoral processes of the District. It has reformed the
District to increase the political voice of the small householder
at the expense of the large landowner. This reform no doubt
reflects political and demographic changes in Arizona since the
District was established.4 76
The message of these passages is unmistakable. In Justice Powell's
view, if the challenged electoral scheme had been adopted and
retained by a pre-Reynolds v. Sims4 77 state legislature, it would
have been subject to a most serious process-centered challenge.
Arizona, however, had long since cleaned up its legislativeapportionment act, as evidenced by recent reforms that paid
heed to "the political voice of the small householder." 8 In these
circumstances, an otherwise questionable apportionment mechanism put in place by a properly apportioned legislature would
stand. Although the Arizona law would have been subject to
process-based attack in an earlier era, it should and would survive
constitutional challenge in the present day because, with the
passage of time, process-based problems had been cured." 9
The Court's most recent resort to structural representationreinforcing reasoning surfaced in Garcia v. San Antonio
0 In that case
MetropolitanTransitAuthority."
the Court overruled
its earlier holding in National League of Cities v. Usery,"1 which
had imposed significant substantive restraints on congressional
regulation of "States as States" 2 with respect to their "integral
475. Id. at 373 (citation omitted).
476. Id. at 374 (citation omitted).

477. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
478. Id.
479. It is noteworthy in this regard that, in finding no constitutional problem, Justice
Powell specifically cited to Justice Clark's concurring opinion inBaker.See id.at 373; see also
supranote 471 (quoting from, and discussing, Justice Clark's Baker concurrence).
480. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

481. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
482. Id. at 845.

1696

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1575

operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. " 4'S Any
federalism-based limit on congressional action, the Court concluded
in Garcia,"must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in
the national political process rather than to dictate 'a sacred
province of state autonomy.'" 4 14 Developing this process-centered
principle, the Court in South Carolinav. Baker 5 refused to invalidate a federal law that removed a federal income tax advantage for
holders of bearer bonds issued by South Carolina. The Court
reasoned that that state had not been "deprived of any right to
participate in the national political process" or "singled out in a way
that left it politically isolated and powerless."8 In short, "[w]here,
as here, the national politicalprocess did not operate in a defective
manner, the Tenth Amendment is not implicated.""'
While neither Garcianor South Carolina v. Baker details the
"extraordinary" process defects' that might lead to a federalismbased invalidation of congressional action, potentially fatal deficiencies are identifiable. What if, for example, a traditionally
favored group of states puts in place a procedural structure that
ensures their favored position will persist?4 89 What if a group of
states-particularly a small group--is seriously disadvantaged
because the legislative process in a particular field becomes
dominated by a powerful private interest group? 9 0 Or what if a
483. Id. at 852.
484. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554 (emphasis added) (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,
236 (1983)).
485. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).

486. Id. at 513.
487. Id.
488. See id. at 512.
489. Consider this hypotheticah The House develops a committee to oversee
appropriations for building new federal highways. Eligibility for membership on the
committee is determined by region, with the number of members from each region being set
in proportion to the existing number of miles of federal highways located within each region.
At first blush such a decision-making structure might seem sensible. However, under certain
conditions (depending, for example, on the definition of each region, the number of
representatives selected from each region, and the like), this system might effectively deny
particular states from securing much-needed highway funds. Indeed, such a system could
well generate the perverse result of "freezing out" the very states that most need more
highways precisely because they now contain the fewest highway miles.
490. Cf. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1963)
(finding a lack of Congressional intent to preempt state law in part because the federal
regulations in question have been drafted by a local trade group rather than by "impartial
experts" with a nationwide constituency). The chances of finding a process problem in this
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large body of legislators in fact "gang up" on one state by
disadvantaging its interests through use of unfair internal
procedures?91 In each of these instances, a process problem might
well lead to invalidation of substantive legislation. Precisely
because the problem is one of process, however, the legislation's
invalidation should not foreclose its successful reenactment. Rather,
removal of the process problem should free the Congress to put in
place a precisely identical law. Garciathus confirms the modern
Court's willingness to protect substantive constitutional values
(here, the substantive value of state autonomy) with processcentered structural rules.
A common theme runs through all these cases despite their
concerns with widely differing fields of law. From Frontieroto Ball
v. James to Garcia and South Carolinav. Baker, judicial concern
has focused on the "capture" of government processes by a powerful
group. Legislatures that operated in earlier times-particularly
before adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965-in fact reflected the social and political
dominance of white males. Many pre-Reynolds state legislatures in
fact had been captured by the electorates of rural counties. 9 ' And
while it may be a rare occurrence that a block of strong states
captures congressional processes in an unfair way, the structural
principle of Garcia speaks to the risk that on occasion such a
problem will arise.
Viewing the representation-reinforcement cases as involving
problems of capture helps to reveal their structural dimension.
After all, just as surely as government processes may be captured
by self-interested factions, they may become "uncaptured" as well.
If this sort of purification of a decision-making body occurs, there
is no good reason, on process grounds, to invalidate any rule it
generates, even if the same rule might have been subject to
situation would obviously increase if the dominant interest group carried significant clout
in most, but not all, states.
491. See, e.g., EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 802 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting in rejecting
Garcia/Bakerattack on application of Americans with Disabilities Act to state judges that
"[tihere is no suggestion that Congress surreptitiouslyenacted any legislationwithout notice
to the State of Vermonte).
492. See ISSACHAROFFETAL., supra note 306, at 135 (describing early reapportionment
cases, and process-based invalidations in general, as involvinginstances where "the political
process succumbed] to capture by a self-interested faction").
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invalidation at an earlier time. To follow Professor Ely's metaphor,
a defendant convicted by a "rigged jury" is entitled to a new trial.493
But if that new trial takes place before a jury that is not rigged, the
new jury's verdict should stand.
VI. TIME-DRIVEN SECoND-LOoK RULES

Theorists who are structurally minded plead the case of socalled "second-look" doctrines.494 We now have seen four separate
instances in which courts might, when confronted with rules that
raise particularly serious constitutional concerns, apply this style
of analysis: where legislative clarity is lacking;, where the form of
policymaking is suspect; where legislative findings or studies seem
inadequate; and where curable problems of inadequate representativeness have infected policymaking processes. There is a fifth
category of cases in which the claim of second-look rules seems selfevidently strong: cases that involve challenges to constitutionally
problematic statutes enacted in a bygone era. Robert Dahl and
other scholars have made the case that traditional exercises of the
Marbury power are often, if not typically, explicable by the passage
of time.495 But the linkage between the outdatedness of laws and
judicial intervention may be even closer in the field of structural
review. Courts, for example, sometimes "update statutes by construing them to reflect society's evolving values as they relate to the
Constitution." 9" This style of statutory interpretation is structural
493. See ELY, supra note 88, at 169 (quoted supra text accompanying note 463).

494. See, e.g., text accompanying note 461.
495. See generally Robert A. Dahl,Decision-Makingin a Democracy: The Supreme Court

as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (discussing the Court's countermajoritarian jurisprudence from a historical perspective). As stated by Professor Tushnet:
When [Dahl] examined Supreme Court decisions holding federal statutes
unconstitutional, he discovered that most often the Court invalidated statutes
enacted many years before its decision; the countermajoritarian thrust of the
decisions was weakened because the statutes might nothave retained majority
support when the Court acted.... Most of the time judicial review does little
more than ease the burden on those who wish to take obsolete statutes off the
books; they can turn to the courts instead of having to overcome legislative
inertia.
TUSHNET, supra note 24, at 197-98. Professor Tushnet also notes the political science

literature that updates Professor Dah's findings. See id. at 198 n.23.
496. Eskridge, supra note 119, at 1021. See generallyWest v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 218
(1999) ("Words in statutes can enlarge or contract their scope as other changes, in law or in
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because-just like with clear-statement rules-it invites the
legislature to reconsider the wisdom and scope of a prior enactment
in light of constitutional values viewed through the prism of current
conditions. 9 7
Some structural representation-reinforcement rules also have
a time-tied dimension. 9 ' For example, the second-look approach
to sex discrimination cases advocated by Professor Ely responds
to dramatically altered circumstances. In essence, Professor Ely
argues that courts should take a second-look approach to statutes
that classify on the basis of sex because a moral enlightenment
driven by the passage of time has reshaped political institutions in
a manner largely curative of process defects. This development in
turn requires a legislative reconsideration-but not necessarily the
permanent interment-of many old gender-based laws."9
An acceptance of this type of time-tied review raises a large, but
little-noticed, question in constitutional law. The question is this:
If the Court can use time-tied structural rules to protect groups
burdened by "suspect classifications," why should it not also make
use of such rules to safeguard "fundamental rights"? Other commentators-particularly Judge Guido Calabresi-have made the
case for judicially mandated legislative reconsideration of old laws
that impinge in new ways on important constitutional values.50 0 At
the world, require their application to new instances or make old applications
anachronistic."). According to Professor Sunstein: "The Courts decision in Bob Jones can be
understood in [this way]. Changing legislative and judicial developments had made racial
discrimination inconsistent with public policy' in the 1980's even if no such inconsistency
existed when the charitable deduction was first enacted." Sunstein, supranote 119, at 495
(discussing Bob Jones Uniu. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)). Accordingly, the Court
interpreted relevant statutes narrowlyto upholdthe denial of tax-exempt status to charitable
institutions that discriminate on the basis of race. See id. at 585-602.
497. See supra Part III.
498. See supra Part VI.
499. See supranotes 461-64 and accompanying text.
500. Judge Calabresi laid out this approach in his lengthy treatment of structural rules
in the HarvardLaw Review. See Calabresi, supranote 13, at 122 ("Checks and balances...
impede the repeal of old laws, including those that have over time come to violate
entitlements that philosopher-judges deem fundamental; and this survival of old laws is a
particularly important, if frequently unnoticed, form of hiding."). He later applied this
approach in his concurring opinion in the assisted-suicide case, Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716
(2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). There he reasoned that "the absence of a recent,
affirmative, lucid and unmistakable statement ofwhythe state wishes to interfere withwhat
has been held by the Supreme Court to be a significant individual right, dooms these
statutes." 80 F.3d at 741. Both the Harvard piece and the Quill opinion emanate to some
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least in its.explicit holdings, the Court has never endorsed this style
of review in a generalized way. At the same time, the Court has
given momentum to a variety of discrete structural techniques
designed to address outdatedness concerns.
In this area, as elsewhere, a resort to categories may oversimplify. There appears, however, to be at least five types of timetied rules that protect fundamental substantive values in a
structural way: (1) the no-longer-advanced-justification rule; (2) the
rule of desuetude; (3) remand-to-the-legislature rules triggered by
changed factual circumstances; (4) rules of interbranch dialogue
based on "evolving standards"; and (5) constitutional sunset rules.
We turn now to an examination of each of these time-tied structural
methodologies.
A The No-Longer-Advanced-JustificationRule
Laurence Tribe has focused attention on one rule that responds
to changed conditions in a structural way.5 0 ' According to Professor
Tribe, courts engaged in means/ends inquiries (at least in heightened scrutiny settings) should and do ignore legislative goals that
actually induced enactment of a challenged statute, if not pressed
as justifications for the statute by the state's representatives in
present-day litigation.0 ' Professor Tribe says this technique took
hold in Griswold v. Connecticut,5 3 or at least in Justice White's
extent from Judge Calabresi's earlier and more generalized study ofjudicial treatment of
outmoded statutes. See GUIDO CALABRESI,A COMMON LAW FORTHEAGE OF STATUTES (1982).

Professor Sunstein also has expressed some receptivity to fundamental-rights-driven
structural invalidations of old laws, including in the same right-to-die context considered by
Judge Calabresi in Quill. See Sunstein, supra note 434, at 95 ("A court might decide not to
invalidate any and all legislative efforts to interfere with private choice, but to say more
modestly that a state invoking old laws has not demonstrated an adequate reason to
interfere with a private choice of this kind-unless and until a recent legislature is able to
show that there is a sufficiently recent commitment to this effect to support fresh
legislation.").
501. See TREBE, supra note 24, § 16-32, at 1604-06; Tribe, supranote 27, at 298-303.
502. Tribe, supra note 27, at 299 & n.96. Of course, it is possible to take account of the
nonassertion of certain state interests in a variety ofways, including where the nonassertion
seems to have nothing to do with the passage of time. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct.
2480, 2508 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (faulting Court's majority because "in order to
sustain a statute, [it] has relied upon a governmental interest not only unasserted by the
State, but positively repudiated").
503. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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concurring opinion in that case. Griswold concerned the constitutionality of Connecticut's ban on contraceptive use, which
apparently had been propelled to adoption in 1879 by a moral
antipathy to nonreproductive-minded sexual intercourse. 0 4 Neither
the Court majority nor Justice White, however, gave this potential
justification for the law even the shortest shrift. The reason why,
according to Justice White, was that there lurked in the record
"no serious contention that Connecticut thinks this use of...
contraception immoral."0 5 .Put another way, there was no good
cause for the Court to invoke a morality-based justification to
uphold a controversial statute when the state itself declined to
defend the statute on that ground.
No less tellingly, in ClevelandBoard of Education v. LaFleur,"'
a majority of the Court sidestepped a no-longer-advanced-justification for a wholesale ban on teaching by women more than four
months pregnant. The Court noted that the policy, which had been
initiated in 1952, 511 "may have originally been [adopted] .... to

insulate schoolchildren from the sight of conspicuously pregnant
women," with the four-month cut-off date selected because "this was
when the teacher 'began to show." 8 The Court, however, brushed
aside this initially significant justification for the rule in assessing
the rule's constitutionality.0 9 It did so because the defendants had
not "contended in this Court" that this "outmoded7 way of thinking
supported the challenged policy in the present day.510

504. See id.at 527-29 & n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
505. Id. at 505 (White, J., concurring); see Tribe, supra note 27, at 299; cf.Poe v. Uliman,
367 U.S. 497, 545 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting in responding to a pre-Griswold
attack on the Connecticut contraception statute,that the state "asserts that... it considers
the practice of contraception immoral in itself').
506. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
507. See id. at 634.
508. Id. at 641 n.9.
509. The majority nonetheless signaled some skepticism about this rationale, describing
it as "less weighty" than interests in ensuring teacher competence and continuity of
instruction. See id.The Court further noted that the comments about "when the teacher
'began to show' suggested "thepossible role ofoutmoded taboos in the adoption ofthe rules."
Id.
510. Id.; see also id. at 651, 653 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that the defendant school
boards "[do] not advance ... today" the policy's original purpose of "keep[ing] visibly
pregnant teachers out of sight").
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Is the no-longer-advanced-justification-rule itself justifiable?
Common sense suggests that the answer to this question is "yes"for
the simple reason that courts should hesitate to second guess a
state's own thoughtful choice not to defend its own challenged law
on a potentially available ground. And at a deeper level, the rule
reflects both the significance of time's passage and a sensitivity to
judicial restraint. As Professor Tribe has explained: "Ifthe original
justification for a law has faded and the state can come up with no
other justification that substantially fits the law, then we can
perhaps describe a court which strikes the law down as more
acknowledging a change in social values than inventing one."-"'
One might quibble about whether this no-longer-advancedjustification rule involves a true second-look doctrine. Unlike other
second-look rules, after all, it does not-at least at first glanceentail a judicial remand to political authorities for a focused
reconsideration of the law at issue. Even so, the driving force
behind the rule is a second look: namely, the second look taken by
modern state authorities-typically, the state's governor or attorney
511. Tribe, supranote 27, at 299; see also id. at 316-17 ("It was inertia, then, rather than
real consensus that the Supreme Court displaced when it forced those entrenched
bureaucracies to abandon their automatic and comfortable reliance upon formal criteria
rooted in a morality that was no longer widely shared-maternity leave rules originating in
Victorian attitudes toward women, sex, and schools .... Much like legislatures that could
forestall their own reform byresisting reapportionment, institutions capable ofperpetuating
their habitual norms even after those norms have ceased to reflect anythinglike a consensus
make a weak case for judicial deference."). This approach also played a prominent role in one
of the early abortion cases. See Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 805 (D. Conn. 1972)
(Newman, J.) (invalidating Connecticut abortion law enacted in 1860 where original
justification was protection ofmaternal health, although government did not defend statute
on that ground; and conceding that, ordinarily, disappearance of original rationale did not
justify invalidation, but that judicial intervention was proper when law raised severe
constitutional doubts). One may also view Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), as using something like this mode of review. See id. at 219
(faulting majority for upholding state sodomy law only as applied to homosexuals when law,
as both originally enacted and as still written, applied to both heterosexuals and
homosexuals and Court advanced no defense of the law as applied to both groups); see also
Carlson & Smith, supranote 27, at 218 n.354 (stating that in McGinnisv. Royster, 410 U.S.
263, 270 (1973), the "Court... appeared to equate 'articulated' with'argued on appeal'"). See
generally Gunther, supranote 30 (considering propriety of"articulated rationale" approach
in a variety of contexts). But cf. Tribe, supra note 27, at 299 1.96 (noting that "Professor
Gunther's formulation... is somewhat ambiguous; he suggests that the only purposes to be
considered are those expressed or at least entertained by the enacting legislature... but at
some points he also suggests the only purposes to be considered are those argued by the
state's representatives in the lawsuit").
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general-called on in the context of modern-day litigation to
identify all plausible justifications invocable in support of the
challenged law.
Indeed the no-longer-advanced-justification rule embodies three
separate and significant structural features. First, it operates as a
temporally driven constitutional "who" rule, shifting decisional
authority from a long-gone state legislature to current state
actors who possess a greater competence to weigh the worthiness
of a law in light of present-day real-world conditions. 5" Second, the
rule collaboratively engages accountable political officials in the
constitutional lawmaking process. To be sure, state legislators are
not responsible for defending state laws challenged in constitutional
litigation.513 But state attorney generals and others who defend
such laws typically are politically accountable (as well as motivated
to advance all justifications that maybe offered with a straight face
in support of the rules they are employed to defend).514 Finally,
wholly apart from the deference it accords to state executive branch
advocates, the no-longer-advanced-justification rule does invite a
second legislative look. The mere fact that the state's lawyers
decline to invoke an original justification for a law does not mean
that the legislature must agree with that choice. If the law, thus
defended, is struck down, the legislature may reenact it, making
clear in the process that the law's original purpose continues to
have merit. Any such action would supply the statute with an
added justification--distinctively powerful precisely because of its
recent endorsement-to which courts would have to pay heed in the
context of any post-reenactment litigation.515

512. See infra Part XI; see also TRIBE, supra note 24, § 16-32, at 1684 ("[D]eclining to
uphold the enforcement ofa law on a theory that its enforcers are unwillingto espouse serves
a role analogous to the careful examination of actual enactment processes and purposes in
cases like Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong.... ."); infra notes 837-48 and accompanying text
(discussing that case).
513. But cf. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 1606 (suggesting that, at least sometimes, "a
legislature can defend its predecessors' enactments when the executive will not").
514. See ELY, supranote 88, at 126 ("The lawyer wants to win, and in order to do so is
likely to rely on any purpose that will help ...
515. See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 207.
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B. The Rule of Desuetude
In his famous treatment of "the passive virtues," 16 Alexander
Bickel did not touch on most of the structural rules we consider
here. He did, however, devote much attention to one rule, albeit
"not an everyday, familiar doctrine of Anglo-American law."517 "It
is," Professor Bickel explained, "the concept of desuetude" 5 1 -that
is, the notion that rules may become unenforceable by going
unenforced over an extended period of time.
Poe v. Ullman519 was an earlier attack on the contraceptive
statute at issue in Griswold v. Connecticut,520 and Professor Bickel
published The LeastDangerousBranch after the Court decided the
former case but before it decided the latter. Professor Bickel's book
does not reveal how he would have voted in Griswold. It offers
strong signals, however, that he would have drawn on the
desuetude concept to avoid the Court's controversial on-or-off
inquiry into substantive privacy rights. 2 ' In his plurality opinion
in Poe, Justice Frankfurter briefly alluded to desuetude as he voted
to dismiss on standing grounds a declaratory action brought by
doctors and patients.522 Professor Bickel was skeptical about a
jurisdictional dismissal of the Poe case.5" He, like Justice Harlan,
saw in Poe "a perfectly real, concrete, and fully developed controversy" in that "law-abiding" plaintiffs-notwithstanding a long
history ofnonenforcement-were in fact refraining from prescribing
and receiving contraceptives due to the statute's existence.52" The
proper question, Professor Bickel asserted, was not whether the
plaintiffs had standing, but "whether a statute that has never been
enforced and that has not been obeyed for three quarters of a
century may suddenly be resurrected and applied." 25 In Professor
516. The term "The Passive Virtues" provides the title of Chapter IVofBickel's The Least
DangerousBranch. See id. at 111.
517. Id. at 148.
518. Id.
519. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
520. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see supra notes 503-04 and accompanying text.
521. See BICKEL, supranote 6, at 143-56.
522. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 503-05.
523. See BICKEL, supranote 6, at 146-47.
524. Id. at 146.
525. Id. at 148.
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Bickel's view, there were many reasons for saying it could not be,
and these reasons revealed his gravitation toward a structural
approach to the case.
The essential problem, according to Professor Bickel, was that
"[w]hen the Connecticut anti-birth control statute was enacted, in
1879,... it was the product of very different political forces and a
very different climate of opinion.""2 The ensuing decision by
prosecutors not to enforce the statute revealed a "play of political
forces which.., could will no more than that the statute remain...
quiescent."5" More important, nonenforcement stripped the original
enactment of any claim of being "present legislative policy."5" This
was so because there was little, if any, reason for "legislative
reconsideration" in a setting where no persons were being subjected
to the law's punitive provisions.5 29 Thus, Professor Bickel opined,
an actual criminal prosecution of those involved in "use of contraceptives by a doctor's prescription" should fail "on the grounds of
desuetude."3 °
One salutary effect of such a ruling, he added, would be to
remove the Court from the necessity of definitively deciding (here,
on controversial constitutional privacy grounds) "issues on which
the political processes are in deadlock.""' Instead, such a ruling
would "turn the thrust of forces favoring and opposing the present
objectives of the statute toward the legislature, where the power of
at least initial decision properly belongs in our system."" 2 In short,
Professor Bickel wanted to force upon Connecticut lawmakers the
need to restudy-and, if then warranted, to reenact-the challenged
statute before it was used again. In keeping with other second-look
doctrines, application of the desuetude rule thus would shift the
"burden of inertia" to the present-day legislature.3 3
526. Id. at 147.
527. Id. at 154.
528. Id. at 152.
529. See id. at 152.
530. Id. at 154.
531. Id. at 146.
532. Id. at 148.
533. See supranote 463 and accompanying text. For other examples ofthe use ofthis sort
ofreasoning, see Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring), rev'd,
521 U.S. 793 (1997) (discussed infra note 558) andFranklinv. Hill,444 S.E.2d 778,783 (Ga.
1994) (Sears-Collins, J., concurring) (advocating application of a desuetude-based approach
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Is the structural desuetude doctrine that Professor Bickel
espoused part and parcel of our federal constitutional law?
Professor Bickel claimed that it is, or at least that it should be, by
"consanguinity" to the similarly structural and uncontroversial
vagueness doctrine.53 4 Professor Bickel also reasoned that inPoethe
doctrine in substance had taken hold.53 5 Because the concept of
desuetude has surfaced infrequently since Poe, one might conclude
that Professor Bickel's position on this matter has not won the
day.5 36 But the Supreme Court has never rejected the doctrine;
Professor Bickel did not prophesy its frequent embrace; and judges
do, from time to time, say that statutes may become unenforceable
because they have lain unexercised too long."3 7 To be sure, there are
to "forc[e] the General Assembly to reexamine the tort of seduction in view of modern day
concepts"). See generally Sunstein, supra note 434, at 39, 95 (noting that "[a] court might
invoke the doctrine of desuetude to require more in the way of accountability and
deliberation," and adding that the "principle has strong democratic foundations" because,
through authorized violation of a moribund law, citizens "are permitted to call democratic
attention to the space between the law as popularly conceived and approved and the law as
it exists on the books").
534. See BICKEL, supranote 6, at 149-52. Professor Gunther has noted Professor Bickel's
relation of the desuetude doctrine to the vagueness rule. See Gunther, supranote 30, at 19;
see also Committee on Legal Ethics v. Printz, 416 S.E.2d 720,724 (W. Va. 1992) (describing
doctrine of desuetude as "[cilosely akin to the doctrine of 'vagueness"). Notably, Professor
Bickel also observed that any "formal rejection of the [desuetude] doctrine" by the courts
would not necessarily betoken a failure to apply the doctrine's substance; rather, he
observed, courts often defang desuetude statutes through enthusiastic interpretation.
BICKEL, supra note 6, at 148-49.

535. See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 154; Calabresi, supra note 13, at 122 n.136 (referring to
Professor Bickel's view that "desuetude had been implicitly recognized by Justice
Frankfurter's majority opinion in Poe"); Gunther, supra note 30, at 19-20 (noting that
Professor Bickel claimed that "Poereally rests" on desuetude and describing this reading of
Poe as an "ingenious though not invulnerable reinterpretation7); see also Printz,416 S.E.2d
at 725 (citing Poe, in asserting that "[tihe United States Supreme Court has also recognized
the concept of desuetude").
536. See Estreicher, supranote 139, at 1132 n.14 (asserting that "Ithedoctrine that laws
might become inoperative through long-continued nonuse, while recognized in Scottish law,
has never taken root in the common law ofEngland or the United States" (citation omitted)).
537. See United States v. Elliot, 266 F. Supp. 318, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (noting that
"Supreme Court's consideration of [desuetude] has not resolved the question," but that
"Irlecent commentators... have found some vitality to the doctrine"); State v. Linares, 630
A.2d 1340, 1346 n.11 (Conn. App. 1993) (citingPrintzwith seeming approval but refusing to
address issue because not raised below); Printz,416 S.E.2d at 724-27 (applying doctrine to
invalidate application of state extortion law to lawyer who threatens criminal prosecution
as part of a negotiation over civil claims: "Although seldom used, desuetude is a widely
accepted legal concept"); see also Quill, 80 F.3d at 735 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (relying in
part on fact that the "enforcement of the laws themselves has fallen into virtual desuetude"
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few cases along these lines. But the dearth of cases is hardly
surprising when one recalls that desuetude-based attacks arise, by
definition, only with respect to statutes that are almost never
enforced.
Nor can the desuetude doctrine's distinctive constitutional
significance be gainsaid. The thrust of Professor Bickel's argument
is that the rule of desuetude (like the rule of vagueness) remediates
the constitutional vice of "erratic, prejudiced, discriminatory"
enforcement.' Even more importantly, as we have seen, the rule
in voting to invalidate certain applications of assisted-suicide laws on structural grounds);
Franklin, 444 S.E.2d at 781-83 (Sears-Collins, J., concurring) (arguing for invalidation of
seduction statute on basis of obsolescence in part because "the statute has largely fallen into
disuse"); Fort v. Fort, 425 N.E.2d 754, 759 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (assuming existence of
desuetude principle, but deemingit inapplicable on the facts). Cf. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE
NATURE AND SOURCES OFTHE LAW 123-31 & app. V (David Campbell & Philip Thomas eds.,
1997) (discussing desuetude in the civil and common law; identifying a few early American
uses of the doctrine). See generally Arthur E. Bonfield, The Abrogationof PenalStatutes by
Nonenforcement, 49 IOWAL. REV. 389, 391-93 & n.16, 409-10 (1964) (collecting early cases
and arguing that "desuetude is... [an] appropriate ...part of our judicially cognizable
jurisprudence" based on constitutional considerations); Linda Rodgers & William Rodgers,
Desuetudeas aDefense, 52 IOWAL. REV.1, 24,28 (1966) (agreeing"that it would be desirable
to allow a defense to a surprise conviction under an obsolete statute," but questioning
constitutional legitimacy of such a rule and thus advocating its legislative adoption).
Professor Sunstein has referred to the doctrine of desuetude as "largely implicit but still
vibrant." Sunstein, supranote 434, at8. He asserts that the Court's VMidecision, concerning
single-sex education "can... be understood as one of desuetude," id. at 96 n.488, and that
some assisted-suicide laws might be vulnerable on this ground, see id. at 93-95. See also Cass
R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123, 1156-59 (1997) (analyzing both the Quill
and VMI decisions under the theory of desuetude). He also has observed that:
Probably Hardwick should have been decided (if it was to be decided by the
Court at all) the other way and very narrowly-as a case involving the old and
nicely minimalist idea, with democratic foundations, of desuetude. A challenge
of this sort was not raised or passed on by the Court, and hence that challenge
could be accepted without overruling Hardwick's substantive due process
holding.
Sunstein, supranote 434, at 68 (footnotes omitted). For another treatment of desuetude by
Professor Sunstein, see SUNSTEIN, supranote 105, at 108-15. Robert Bork, who studiedunder
Professor Bickel, has written of long-unused laws:
There is a problem with laws like these. They are kept in the codebooks as
precatory statements, affirmations ofmoral principle. It is quite arguable that
this is an improper use of law, most particularly of criminal law, that statutes
should not be on the books if no one intends to enforce them. It has been
suggested that if anyone tried to enforce a law that had moldered in disuse for
many years, the statute should be declared void by reason of desuetude ....
ROBERT H. BORE,THE TEMTING oFAMEEICA 96 (1990).
538. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 151; accordPrintz,416 S.E.2d at 724 (statingthat"a law...
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that condemns desuetude (like the rule that condemns vagueness)
is driven by an effort to redirect authority from individual
prosecutors and jurors to more accountable, more deliberate, and
more representative legislative assemblies. 3 9 The rule of desuetude
(again like the rule of vagueness) thus brings into play Professor
Bickel's apt observation with respect to the full range of doctrines
of this kind:
When should the Court recall the legislature to its own policymaking function? Obviously, the answer must lie in the
importance of the decision left to the administrator or other
official. And this is a judgment that will naturally be affected
by the proximity of the area of delegated discretion to a
constitutional issue. The more fundamental the issue, the
nearer it is to principle, the more important it is that it be
decided in the first instance by the legislature.' °
It is noteworthy in this regard that in both Poe and the post-Poe
opinions, judges have directed the desuetude concept at laws that
distinctively threaten "fundamental" constitutional rights or groups
made the subject of "suspect classifications."541 In short, as with
other structural doctrines, the rule of desuetude protects significant substantive constitutional values by forcing studied attention
of those values in the context of a judicially insisted-upon reconsideration by nonjudicial authorities.

that has not given rise to a real prosecution in 20 years is unfair to the one person selectively
prosecuted under it"); Bonfield, supra note 537, at 412-14.
539. See supra notes 531-33 and accompanying text.
540. BICKEL, supranote 6, at 161.
541. Certainly, this was true of the concurring opinions in both Quill, 80"F.3d at 735
(Calabresi,J., concurring) (invoking structural reasoning to strike down assisted-suicide laws

that had "fallen into virtual desuetude" because this legislation "comes close to violating
fundamental substantive constitutional rights"), and Franklin,444 S.E.2d at 782 (SearsCollins, J., concurring) (expressing willingness to apply desuetude concept "in this case,
where the constitutionality of the statute is doubtful"on sex discrimination grounds); see also
Bonfield, supranote 537, at 415 ("T]he possibility shouldnotbe ignoredthattheuse ofthese

doctrines in this way and for this purpose may depend upon several extrinsic factors.
Significant weight might, for example, be given to the nature of the particular right
threatened....").
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C. Changed-FactsSecond-Look Doctrines
There is reason to wonder whether the no-longer-advancedjustification rule or the concept of desuetude does or can have much
practical importance. There is, however, another style of changedcircumstances decision making that holds the potential to work
significant real-world effects.
The root of this principle lies in United States v. Carolene
ProductsCo., 2 for there the Supreme Court identified the driving
thought: "ITlhe constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the
existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged by
showing... that those facts have ceased to exist."" The essential
point is that changed circumstances may transform a once-valid
enactment into one that can no longer find shelter in the
Constitution. But who should determine whether the circumstances
have so changed? And how definitively and permanently controlling
is a judicial judgment that a critical change has occurred? As the
Court often has recognized, factually laden empirical and predictive
5
decisions are best made by legislatures or agency experts. 4
Consequently, at least as a practical matter, judicial invalidations
on fact-based changed-circumstances grounds often will have a
provisional, second-look dimension.

542. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
543. Id. at 153. For another expression by the author of CaroleneProductsof essentially
the same thought, see Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L.
REV. 4,24 (1936) ("Action plainly unreasonable at one time and in one set of circumstances
maynotbe so in other times and conditions."). For a commentary that aggressively questions
the wisdom of changed-circumstances rules, see Linde, supranote 27, at 234-35 ("If a court
finds a law unconstitutional because facts have changed, this implies-using our premise
that the government must have failed a duty to follow the Constitution-that there is a
constitutional obligation to make new laws. But what laws, and when is the obligation
met?").
544. See, e.g., TurnerBroad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,665-66 (1994) ("Congress is
far better equipped than the judiciary to 'amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data'
bearing upon an issue [that is] complex and dynamic.... "); accord,e.g., Strauss, supranote
434, at 205 ("One of the principal justifications for rational basis review is that the
legislature is best able to assess the complex factual issues underlying social and economic
legislation; courts, lackingthe legislature's fact-finding capacities, are ill-equipped to secondguess its judgments."). For a seminal discussion of the subject, see Archibald Cox, The
Supreme Court,1965 Term-Foreword: ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotion of
Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 99-108 (1966).
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Illustrative of the point are cases that concern technological
advances. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,' for example, the
Court confronted a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to
Arizona's singularly restrictive train length law. The state sought
to justify the law by arguing that longer trains have more "slack
action" and thus create a greater risk of serious accidents. 5 6
Responding to this assertion, the Supreme Court emphasized that:
[oin comparison of the number of slack action accidents in
Arizona with those in Nevada, .wherethe length of trains is now
unregulated, the trial court found that with substantially the
same amount of traffic in each state the number of accidents
was relatively the same in longas in short train operations.54
In addition, "reduction of the length of trains ... tends to increase
the number of accidents because of the increase in the number of
trains" and "[tihe record lends support to the trial court's conclusion
that the train length limitation increased rather than diminished
the number of accidents.""' Faced with these facts, the Court
struck down the law, ruling that state safety interests were "so
slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national interest
in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which
seriously impede it."549
Lurking in the background of the case was the fact that Arizona's
train length law had been enacted more than thirty years earlier.5
Given this fact-and the intervening, uniform trend toward allowance of longer trains in all other states 5 5 -- there was every reason
to suppose that (as the trial court in fact found) the state's asserted
safety concerns no longer were well grounded." Moreover, the
apparent lack of a true safety justification supported a structural
intervention to make sure that the then-sitting legislature was
being "responsive to the people," rather than to the clamoring of a

545. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
546. See id. at 776.

547.
548.
549.
550.
551.
552.

Id. at 777.
Id. at 777-78.
Id. at 776.
See id. at 763.
See id. at 771, 774 n.4.
See supranote 548 and accompanying text.
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narrow interest group well positioned to block legislative reform.5
What if, however, following the Supreme Court's ruling, the Arizona
legislature had conducted extensive new hearings? And what if
those hearings had generated support for the state's claimed safety
justification based on, for example, new comparative studies of
train wrecks in Arizona and states other than Nevada? What if, in
short, Arizona had taken a "second look" at its train length law, had
found it defensible on accident reduction grounds, and therefore had
reenacted it without one whit of alteration? We cannot say for sure
how a renewed constitutional challenge to such a statute would
have fared. But the Court's oft-expressed willingness to defer to the
superior fact-finding capacities of legislative bodies suggests that
any challenge to the new train length law would have been
derailed.5 5 4 And if this is so, a ruling like the one in Southern
Pacificnecessarily embodies a structural remand-to-the-legislature

rule.

555

Time-tied changed-circumstances review is not limited to
train laws. This style of review has taken hold with respect to
6 abortion,5 57
laws concerning underground gas storage tanks,
553. See Calabresi, supranote 13, at 145 (notingthat "second-look doctrines are designed
to make legislatures and executives. . . responsive to the people"). Of course, the court's
attentiveness to changed circumstances is hardly a legal novelty. Courts, for example, are
closely attentive to the presence of changed circumstances in applying the doctrine of stare
decisis. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (I[Stare decisis is not an
inexorable command' [in]
the area of antitrust law, where there is a competing interest...
in recognizing and adapting to changed circumstances. . ." (citation omitted)).
554. See supranote 544 and accompanyingtext. The likelihood ofthis result is heightened
by the Court's longstanding deference to state judgments about public safety in the dormant
Commerce Clause context. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970).
555. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 364 (1992) (noting that in a
remand-to-the-legislature situation, the reenacted law may stand if its advocates "can
provide some more persuasive justification for it ...than the losing litigant had advanced
in the original court proceeding"); see also West Virginia ex rel. S.M.B. v. D.A.P., 284 S.E.2d
912, 915 (W. Va. 1981) (noting that "there is an argument to be made for striking this statute
founded in the evolving concept of structural due process which recognizes that statutes
which are entirely rational at the time they are enacted by the legislature may, by the
passage of decades, become irrationalwhen applied to an entirely changed social structure").
556. See Leathers v. City of Bums, 444 P.2d 1010, 1018 (Or. 1968) (finding ban on
underground tanks exceeding 3000 gallons unconstitutionalin light ofexpert testimony that
minimized present-day safety risks). As Justice Linde noted in commenting onLeathers:"No
one stopped to question the original validity of the ordinance under the conditions of 1949;
only the conditions at the date of trial were considered." Linde, supranote 27, at 218.
557. See Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 807-10 (D.Conn. 1972) (Newman, J.,
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assisted suicide,' sex discrimination,5 5 9 and other subjects as
well.560 By taking a changed-circumstances approach, courts in
concurring) (voting to strike down abortion law enacted in 1860 to protect health ofpregnant
women in light of modem circumstance that childbirth was more dangerous, but inviting
legislature to repass law on other grounds).
558. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 732, 735 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi,.J., concurring)
(noting,in voting to invalidate New York's assisted-suicide law, that: "[tihe statutes at issue
were born in another age," and that 'the bases of these statutes have been deeply eroded over
the last hundred and fiftyyears"; thus concluding- "Iwould therefore leave open the question
ofwhether, ifthe state of New York were to enact new laws prohibiting assisted suicide (laws
that either are less absolute in their application or are identical to those before us), such laws
would stand or fall."), rev'd, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
559. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Life Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980). Wengler struck
down a law that automatically provided workers' compensation death benefits to widows,
while requiring widowers to prove dependency. See id. at 151-52. The Court asserted that the
burden ofdefending this sex-based classification "is not carried simply by noting that in 1925
the state legislature thought widows to be more in need of prompt help thanmen." Id. at 151.
The Court noted that there may be "levels of administrative convenience that will justify
discriminations that are subject to heightened scrutiny" but faulted the state for offering no
"persuasive demonstration as to what the economic consequences to the State or to the
beneficiaries might be" if widows and widowers received equal treatment today. Id. at 152.
For another interesting changed-circumstances sex discrimination case, see Adkins v.
Children'sHosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923) (striking down minimum-wage law for women,
notwithstanding Court's validation of maximum-hour law for women in the earlier Muller
case: "[Tihe ancient inequality of the sexes, otherwise than physical, as suggested in the
Muller case... has continued with 'diminihing intensity.' In view of the great-not to say
revolutionary-changes which-have taken place since that utterance, in the contractual,
political and civil status of women, culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment, it is not
unreasonable to say that these differences have now come almost, if not quite, to the
vanishing point."). Adkins was overruled in West CoastHotel Co. v. Parrish,300 U.S. 379,
400 (1937), albeit not because of any intervening legislative findings that supported a greater
need forprotection ofwomen workers than men. For further discussion ofsex discriminationrelated changed-circumstance rules, see supra notes 498-99 and accompanying text
560. Indeed, in a curious twist, the very statute thi Court upheld in CaroleneProducts
was later invalidated under the changed-circumstances principle suggested by that case. See
supranotes 542-43. Thus, inMilnot Co. v. Richardson,350 F. Supp. 221 (S.D. 11. 1972), the
court struck down the Filled Milk Act as applied to the same milk product, called "Milnot,"
involved in CaroleneProducts.The court relied on the following changed circumstances: (1)
"through technical advancements since 1944," id. at 223, there exist "at least six other food
products now moving in interstate commere [that] have almost identical appearance and
consistency to milk," id. at 225; (2) thus, the "possibility of confusion ... which justified the
statute in 1944" no longer applied to Milnot, id.; (3) in 1944 "the presently accepted dangers
of'cholesterol' in animal fat were almost unknown," id. at 224 n.1; and (4) "there is a growing
trend of manufacture and sale of filled milk overseas, and... widespread use thereof by
American armed forces overseas," id. at 225. As a strict matter of theory, perhaps Congress
could not reenact the Filled Milk Act consistent with the Milnot decision because the court
in that case found the Act to be "devoid of rationality." Id. at 225. The court, however,
repeatedly noted the outdatedness of the Act, and it is hard to believe a new version of the
act would fail if Congress reenacted it following a new and careful study. For another
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effect say to state policymakers: "Show me!" The state may be
permitted to reinstitute a challenged program that has become
constitutionally suspect because it is well aged. The state may do
so, however, only if its policymakers can conclude-in the focused
context of a judicially compelled present-day reexamination-that
the program continues to serve a proper purpose in a changing
world.
D. Evolving-StandardsRules
In Southern Pacific, the Court in effect remanded a government
program to a particular state legislature for a determination
whether it wished to maintain that program in light of changed
factual conditions.561 In some cases, however, the Court uses its
structural remand power in a very different manner: it sends back
constitutionally sensitive policy decisions to society at large for a
thoughtful reconsideration of their continuing merit in light of
changing values.

illustration of a changed-circumstances approach, see Walters v. NationalAssociation of
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 367 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In this case, the
passage oftime, instead of providing support for the fee limitation, has effectively eroded the
one legitimate justification that formerly made the legislation rational."). Occasionally, the
passage of time may operate to bring a once-unconstitutional statute back from the dead.
This phenomenon is most likely to surface under doctrines that focus on a rule's current
effects. In Hunterv. Underwood,471 U.S. 222 (1985), for example, the Court confronted an
equal protection challenge to an Alabama law that disenfranchised persons who committed
crimes of "mnoral turpitude." See id. at 223. Because the law was adopted with the intent to
neutralize the African American vote, see generally infra notes 764-69 and accompanying
text, the Supreme Court struck it down. See id. at 233. In doing so, however, the Court noted
that the law continued to disenfranchise AfricanAmericans in disproportionate numbers, see
id. at 227, thus implying that the law would have been sustained if it had been found to
produce no continuing discriminatory impact. A case in which a court upheld a law under
simila conditions is Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527,529-30 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that
absent showing of present discriminatory effect, discriminatory motivation of Georgia
legislature in adopting Confederate battle flag as component of Georgia state flag is
irrelevant). For a discussion of Coleman, see infra notes 817-32 and accompanying text. See
also Gardbaum, supra note 69, at 800 (discussing preemption: "although at Time 1, a
reviewing court may find that the required congressional determination balancing relevant
national and state interests does not reasonably justify national or uniform regulation,
relevant circumstances and evidence may change to render the regulation reasonable at
Time 2").
561. See supranotes 545-49.
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The most famous illustration of this approach came in Furman
v. Georgia,"2 when the Court invalidated every death penalty
statute in the United States, relying on the "evolving standards of
decency" principle of the Eighth Amendment.56 In other words, the
Court intervened in a field of extreme importance and moral
sensitivity on the theory that changing values had rendered invalid
practices previously deemed constitutionally unassailable. At the
same time, the critical opinions in Furmantook pains to emphasize
that the Court's ruling extended only to the death penalty "as now
administered.""' By taking this approach, the Court in effect (and
almost surely by design) triggered a societywide plebiscite on the
continued legitimacy of capital punishment.565 Two separate components of
this judicial initiative rendered it highly structural in
566
nature.

First, by way of its decision in Furman, the Court threw the
burden of inertia with respect to the death penalty issue squarely
onto the backs of then-sitting state legislators.5 6 7 No longer could
562. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
563. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality opinion)); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) ( [O]ne of
the most important functions any jury can perform . . . is to maintain a link between
contemporary community values and the penal system-a link without which the
determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.' (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101)).
564. Furman, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring); see also id. at 302
(Brennan, J., concurring) (stating "there is no reason to believe that as currently
administered the punishment of death is necessary to deter the commission of capital
crimes"); id. at 304 (adding that there is "no substantial reason to believe that the
punishment of death, as currently administered, is necessary for the protection of society").
565. See id. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that "legislative bodies have been
given the opportunity, and indeed unavoidable responsibility, to make a thorough reevaluation of the entire subject of capital punishment").
566. There is in fact a third reason why the Court's ruling in Furmanqualifies as highly
structural. That reason, however, has little to do with the passage oftime, and we therefore
focus on it in discussing so-called "thoughtful treatment" rules. See infra notes 619-26 and
accompanying text.
567. The importance of shifting this burden has been described in forceful (if somewhat
hyperbolic) terms by Justice Neely:
A legislature is an organization designed to do nothing ....
Legislatures
were not designed to pass good laws but rather to prevent the passage of bad
laws.
The way legislators avoid ever having to say "no" personally, or being on
record as opposing any of the myriad self-serving schemes of their constituents,
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local lawmakers finesse the capital punishment debate by standing
by as dusty death penalty statutes did their dark work. 68 Rather,
for death penalty regimes to endure, they had to attract new
majorities in both houses of present-day legislative assemblies,
avoid blocking efforts by death penalty foes, evade potential
gubernatorial vetoes, and the like.569 It was also no small matter
that state death penalty statutes had to rise from the ashes of a fire
built on 0the sober moral judgment of the nation's highest
57
tribunal.

is to construct elaborate institutional machinery that says "no" automatically.
This machinery is known as the committee system, and when the committee
system is combined with the seniority system (through which certain members
ofthe 'leadership" determine the agendas of different committees) spectacular
nay-saying results can be achieved with almost every individual legislator
privately saying "yes." Thus a legislature is not a neutral, majoritarian body
that impartially studies all intelligent suggestions for law changes; rather, it
is a machine deliberately, intelligently, and efficiently designed to say "no"
unless some Herculean force kicks it in its institutional tail.
Neely, supra note 69, at 273-74.
568. Of course, the legislative tendency not to reexamine laws enacted in a past moral
climate is not unique to death penalty laws. As noted by Judge Calabresi:
The statute in Griswoldpresents a prime example ofhiding through the failure
to repeal old laws. When the Connecticut statute outlawing the use of
contraceptives was enacted in 1879, it was quite consistent with many state
laws and with the then-prevailing view ofrights in this country. Over the years,
however, attitudes changed, and the law came to be viewed by many as
violating fundamental rights. Still, one can sympathize... that it was hard to
find in the Constitution any [on-or-off] prohibition against such an
"uncommonly silly law." The problem was simply that the law, although
unwanted, unworkable, and incapable of reenactment, was politically hard to
repeal. It was easier for legislators to use checks and balances to duck the issue
than to vote one way or the other on it.
Calabresi, supranote 13, at 122 n.136 (citation omitted).
569. See supra note 553 and accompanying text.
570. See BURT, supranote 555, at 364 (noting that even temporizingjudicial invalidation
of a law will "alter the terms of... subsequent combat" because the constitutional claim "has
been given heightened piiblic visibility and moral sanction"); Eugene V. Rostow, The
DemocraticCharacterofJudicialReview, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 208 (1952) (calling Supreme
Court Justices "teachers in a vital national seminar"); see also BICEEL, supra note 6, at 26
("Their insulation and the marvelous mystery of time give courts the capacity to appeal to
men's better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have been forgotten in the
moment's hue and cry."); Dimond, supra note 69, at 239 (noting that"[tihe myth ofthe Court
as final arbiter does usually cause the people to reflect and their representatives to pause);
Steven L. Winter, Tennessee v. Garner and the DemocraticPracticeof JudicialReview, 14
N.Y.U. REv.L. & Soc. CHANGE 679, 690 (1986) (same).

1716

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1575

Second, by tying its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to national
moral standards, the Court in Furman required something more
than the sort of remand to a single legislature involved in Southern
Pacific.Why? Because if only a single state (Or three? Or five?) had
reenacted a death penalty statute, the argument would have been
powerful that the death penalty no longer comported with the
modern-day moral consensus required by the Eighth Amendment.5 7 '
Put another way, the Court in Furmandid not remand the issue of
capital punishment solely to the legislature of Georgia. It remanded
the issue to the nation as a whole and then awaited word from "We
the People" on where our "evolving standards" stood. What's more,
the Court listened when the nation's citizens, acting through their
representatives, broadly reendorsed the death penalty as an
appropriate punishment for aggravated murder.5 72
The ruling of Furmandoes not stand alone as a structural device
designed to take account of changing (or unchanging) social values.
Because the Court's entire EighthAmendment jurisprudence is tied
to "evolving standards"5 7 3 -and those standards are significantly
evidenced by the actions of state legislatures-other decisions under
that Amendment involve precisely the sort of dialogue between
judicial and nonjudicial actors that defines structural decision

571. See supra note 563 and accompanying text.
572. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976) (Stewart, J.) ("The petitioners in the
capital cases before the Court today renew the 'standards of decency' argument, but
developments during the four years since Furman have undercut substantially the
assumptions upon which their argument rested"; noting that the "legislative response to
Furman"provided a "marked indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for
murder"); ELY, supra note 88, at 65 ("Following Furman there was a virtual stampede of
state reenactments of the death penalty, and the clarity of that community reaction surely
had much to do with the Court's turnaround on the issue."); Winter, supranote 570, at 688
(stating that "the Gregg opinion is best understood as an affirmation, as a national value, of
'society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder' based on an assessment of the
normative expressions of a variety of democratic decision makers").
573. See supranote 563 and accompanying text.
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making.574 In Thompson v. Oklahoma,575 for example, a majority of
the Court refused to assume that nineteen states' generalized
subjection of certainjuveniles to adult criminal law regimes (which,
in turn, incorporated the death penalty) adequately evidenced a
societywide value judgment that fifteen-year-old murderers may
receive the ultimate punishment. 6 At the same time, a different
majority of the Court signaled that it would stay its hand if many
states expressed a specific intent to permit the execution of such
juveniles. 7 Thus, wholly apart from its clear-statement-based
remand to the Oklahoma legislature," 8 Thompson embodied a
generalized remand to the people as a whole. In short, Thompson
operated in much the same way as Furman,albeit with respect to
a more discrete Eighth Amendment question.
There are a number of constitutional rules, tied to our "legal
traditions... and practices," that embody the same sort of dialogic
focus on evolving morality that pervades the Eighth Amendment
cases.579 In Bowers v. Hardwick,580 for example, the Court drew on
this style of analysis in holding that Georgia's criminal proscription
of sodomy, as applied to homosexuals, comported with substantive
574. See Friedman, supra note 21, at 597 & 602 nn.119 & 120 (emphasizing Court's
turning "time and again to a head count of states" in applying constitutional provisions and
documenting the use of this technique in Eighth Amendment cases); see also Winter, supra
note 570, at 688-89 ("[Iln Coker v. Georgia,the Court recognized that'[the current judgment
with respect to the death penalty for rape... obviously weighs very heavily on the side of
rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman.. .,' and in fact
deferred to that judgment. In Enmund o. Florida,the Court noted and relied on '[slociety's
rejection of the death penalty for accomplice liability in felony murders...
575. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
576. This majority was formed by the four adherents to Justice Stevens's lead opinion and
Justice O'Connor. See supra notes 222-37 and accompanying text.
577. This majority was formed by the four adherents ofJustice Scalia's dissenting opinion
and Justice O'Connor. See id.
578. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
579. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,721 (1997) ("Our nation's history,
legal traditions, and practices . . . provide the crucial 'guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking,'... that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause."); see
also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,475 (1987) (upholding
coal mining subsidence law against Takings Clause attack despite invalidation in 1922 of
comparable prohibition in part because it reflected "the type of environmental concern that
has been the focus of so much federal, state, and local regulation in recent decades"); id. at
488 (noting that "circumstances may so change in time" as to convert a "purely private
concern' into a matter of"public' interest (quoting Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135,155 (1921))).
580. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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due process restraints.5 " Bowers differs from Furmanin a fundamental way: Because in Bowers the Court upheld the challenged
law, it neither shifted the burden of inertia to state legislatures to
reconsider their "ancient" sodomy bans5 2 nor otherwise mandated
a thoughtful revisitation of whether or how to regulate homosexual
intimacy. 53 Even so, a measure of structural-mindedness inhered
in Bowers's partial reliance on present-day patterns of legislative
regulation. 8 ' To put the matter in concrete terms, if after Bowers
the number of state sodomy statutes were to dwindle from twentyfour to four (Or six? Or eight?),585 the Court could no longer reason
that "the laws of ...

many States . . . still make such conduct

illegal."58 6 By thus linking its decision to the actual number of
operative legislative prohibitions, the Court effectively invited the

581. Notably, the Court ruled only on the substantive due process issue, and not on any
Eighth Amendment, Ninth Amendment, or Equal Protection issues the case might present.
See id. at 196 n.8.
582. See id. at 192.
583. Cf supra notes 567-70 and accompanying text.
584. For another, more recent illustration of this sort of structural reasoning in the
substantive due process context, see Washington, 521 U.S. at 710 ("We begin, as we do in all
due-process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices."); id.
at 716 ("Though deeply rooted, the States' assisted-suicide bans have in recent years been
reexamined and, generally, reaffirmed."); id. at 774-75 (Souter, J., concurring) ("Criminal
prohibitions on such assistance remainwidespread, as exemplified in the Washington statute
in question here."); see also Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2063 (2000) (plurality
opinion) (finding parental rights substantive due process violation in part based on state's
departure from the rule of "many other States... that courts may not award visitation
unless a parent has denied (orunreasonably denied) visitation to the concerned thirdparty");
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847-48 n.8 (1998) (suggesting that
compatibility ofexecutive action with "substantive due process" hinges on "anunderstanding
of traditional executive behavior, of contemporary practice, and of the standards of blame
generally applied to theme); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,554 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(noting, in voting to invalidate ban on married couple's use of contraceptives, "the utter
novelty of this enactment").
585. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-94 (noting that "today, 24 states and the District of
Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and
between consenting adults").
586. Id. at 190. In fact, since the Court's decision in Bowers the number of states with
sodomylaws potentially enforceable againsthomosexual conduct appears to have diminished
from 24 to 18, because laws have since been repealed or invalidated in state court litigation.
See American Civil Liberties Union Freedom Network, Lesbian & Gay Rights:Status ofU.S.
Sodomy Laws (2000), avaiableat http-/www.aclu.org.issueslgay/sodomy.html; National Gay
and Lesbian Task Force, Issues: Sodomy (2000), available at http'J/www.ngltf.org/
issuesfissue.cfm?issuelD=11.

20011

CONSTITUTION OF COLLABORATION

1719

nation's citizens, acting through their legislative representatives,
to participate in the process of constitutional law reform.5 8 7
Furman and Bowers show why constitutional rules that look to
nationwide patterns of legislation have a structural bent. And if
this is so, structural rules are widespread, for doctrines of this kind
are commonplace in our law. 8' In its seminal incorporation
decisions, for example, the Court adverted repeatedly to then-recent
patterns of legislative choice.5 89 In shaping the Fourth Amendment
law of "unreasonable" searches and seizures, the Court likewise has
consulted prevailing positions of state policymakers.5 90 When using
587. Cf. Conkle, supranote 69, at 34 ("Although developing societal beliefs concerning
homosexual rights remain uncertain, the evidence would suggest an emerging American
morality that would favorthe protection ofsuch rights."); id. at 34 n.106 ("In the last quarter
century ... some twenty-three state legislatures have decriminalized homosexual activity
conducted in private by consenting adults."). See generally Winter, supranote 570, at 684-85
("[I]f the Court is engaged in the explication of values, it makes very good sense to refer to
and be guided by the value judgments of other societal decision makers. A court should
recognize that law 'consists of the generally accepted social norms [to be] applied in the
decision of the cases, norms that are-contrary to the positivists' position-best seen as 'part
ofthelaw,' quite independent oftheirpromulgation through defined law makingprocedures.'
(quoting Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CH. L. REv. 14, 28 (1967))).
588. See generally Winter, supra note 570, at 686-92 (detailing Court's emphasis of
contemporary practices and values in incorporation, death penalty, stare decisis, and
statutory interpretation cases).
589. Inparticular, the Courtexplained that inincorpomtioncases the questionis whether
the right proposed for incorporation is "fundamental in the context of the criminal processes
maintained by the American States." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968).
Thus, "the existinglaws and practices in the Nation" bore heavily on incorporation questions.
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 70 (1970) (quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161); accord
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356,372 n.9 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Mitchell
v. United States, 526 U.S. 314,330 (1999) (explaining that "[pirinciples once unsettled can
find general and wide acceptance in the legal culture, and there can be little doubt that the
rule prohibiting an inference of guilt from a defendant's rightful silence has become an
essential feature of our legal tradition; relying in part on adoption of no-inference principle
by "some 44 states" prior to its incorporation in 1965); Winter, supra note 570, at 686
(discussing relevant cases, including Duncan, Baldwin, and Johnson, and describing the
incorporation process as "analmost explicit exercise in nose counting").
590. For example, in finding a constitutional violation in Paytonv. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 600 (1980), the Court observed that "only 24 of the 50 States currently sanction" the
challenged practice and that "there is an obvious declining trend." The Court defended this
style of reasoning as appropriate "when the constitutional standard is as amorphous as the
word 'reasonable,' and when custom and contemporary norms necessarily play such a large
role in the constitutional analysis." Id. at 600. Similarly, in Tennessee v. Garner,471 U.S. 1
(1985), the Court relied heavily on "sweeping change in the legal... context" reflected by
"prevailing rules in individual jurisdictions" in outlawing the use of deadly force to
apprehend nondangerous fleeing felons. Id. at 13, 15-16. The Court emphasized, in
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traditional means/ends analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court sometimes considers whether the challenged rule is wellentrenched or on the decline in other jurisdictions. 59 ' All these
particular, that"the long-term movement has been away from the rule" of the common law
that permitted using deadly force in such circumstances. Id. at 18. The Court also noted that
"[t]his trend is more evident.., when viewed in light of the policies adopted by the police
departments themselves," id. at 18, because "[olverall, only 7.5% of departmental and
municipal policies explicitly permit the use ofdeadly force against any felon; 86.8% explicitly
do not," id. at 19. See generally Winter, supra note 570, at 683-92 (providing detailed
treatment of evolving-standards aspect of the Garnercase). The Court has taken similar
approaches in other areas ofcriminalprocedure. See, e.g., Lillyv. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116,126
(1999) (plurality opinion) (noting this aspect of White and tying firmly rooted hearsay
exception principle to "[eistablished practice"); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 n.8
(1992) (holding that the spontaneous utterance rule constitutes a "firmly rooted" hearsay
exception, thus avoiding Confrontation Clause problems, in part because it has been accepted
"in nearly four-fifths of the States"); Marylandv. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,853 (1990) (noting that
"a significant majority of States have enacted [similar] statutes" in rejecting absolute Sixth
Amendment right to face-to-face confrontation); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,57-58 & 60
n.19 (1987) (relying on state practices regarding hypnotically refreshed testimony in finding
violation ofdefendants' right to testify on their own behalf); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,
689 (1986) (relying on "the statutory and decisional law of virtually every State in the
Nation" in finding that constitutional violation occurred when trial judge excluded evidence
on voluntariness of confession).
591. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (upholding
minimum wage law for women: "The adoption of similar requirements by many States
evidences a deepseated conviction both as to the presence of the evil and as to the means
adapted to check it."); supranote 579 (discussing Washington v. Glucksberg);see also Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,404-05 (1975) (noting, before turning to means/ends analysis, that"48
states impose [a durational residency requirement] as a condition for maintaining an action
for divorce"); ef. Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 120 S. Ct. '1022, 1027 (2000)
(invalidating under Due Process and Commerce Clauses state law limitation on deductibility
of interest expenses through unallocated attribution to "nonunitary"-and thus
nontaxable-corporate income; noting that "[n]o other taxing jurisdiction, whether federal
or state, has taken so absolute an approach"). This style of analysis also has surfaced in First
Amendment cases. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,375 (1995) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("A governmental practice that has become general throughout the United
States, and particularly one that has the validation of long, accepted usage, bears a strong
presumption of constitutionality."); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992) (relying in
part on "widespread and time-tested consensus" with regard to speech-restricted areas
around polling places to uphold prohibition on campaigning within 100 feet of voting
locations); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,749 (1982) (noting that the federal government
and 47 states had enacted statutes "specifically directed at the production of child
pornography"; that at least half of these jurisdictions did not require "that the materials
produced be legally obscene"; that 35 states and Congress had passed legislation prohibiting
the distribution of such materials; and that 20 states prohibited the distribution of material
depicting children engaged in sexual conduct without requiring that the material be legally
obscene); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,841 (1978) ("While not
dispositive, we note that more than 40 States having similar commissions have not found it
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doctrines involve our political representatives in the elaboration of
constitutional rights.592 All these doctrines involve the Court in a
constitutional dialogue with those representatives, and ultimately
with us.59 All of these doctrines belie the common notion that the
Marbury power is solely a tool for imposing judicial conceptions of
the Constitution on elected authorities.594 And all of these doctrines
thus have a structural dimension that emanates from the significance they attach to "evolving social values""' in applying
constitutional protections.
E. ConstitutionalSunset Rules
The four varieties of time-tied rules we have looked at so far
share a common bond. Each permits judicial invalidation of a law
rendered suspect by the passage oftime. There is, however, another
time-tied way in which courts can allocate the burden of legislative
inertia to foster a thoughtful reconsideration of constitutionally

necessary to enforce confidentiality by use of criminal sanctions against nonparticipants.").
592. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
593. See Winter, supra note 570, at 685 ("[C]ases like Garnerexemplify a process of
dialogue in the 'explication of basic shared values' that has become one of the major, though
not exclusive, modes of constitutional exposition."); see also Tribe, supra note 27, at 301
(observing that, through judges' use of a structural approach, "[tihe judiciary's most
important role becomes that of giving structure to the evolution, or rather participating in
the structure of the evolution, of social norms and understandings as they come to find
expression in the law").
594. See supranotes 7-8 and accompanying text. See generally Winter, supranote 570, at
685 ("Those at the top of the political organization may have the power to declare and require
adherence to societal norms-that is, to the law.' But the process requires dialogue because
the viability of those norms and the legitimacy of their enforcement depends to a very large
extent on the existence of a consensus-whether emerging or preexisting-amongst
society.").
595. Woodsonv. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,297 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.). Before leaving the field of"evolving standards" rules, it is worth noting three
related legal phenomena that share a structural character. First, the constitutional law of
obscenity is directly attached to "contemporary community standards." Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 21 (1973). Thus, that body of law-much like the rules noted in the
text-involves nonjudicial actors in the formulation ofconstitutional norms. Second, on a far
grander scale, the notion of evolving standards seems closely tied to the notion of
"constitutional moments" at which large societywide changes in belief systems precipitate
major shifts in constitutional doctrine. See ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 44-50 (suggesting
we have experienced two such moments since the original founding, in the wake of the Civil
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suspect policies. I refer to these doctrines as "constitutional sunset
rules."

We noted at the outset that the Framers adopted the
Constitution's basic requirements ofbicameralism and presentment
to foster reflective and cautious governmental policymaking as a
general matter.5 96 Likewise, as we now have seen, the Supreme
Court has crafted a variety of care-engendering policymaking
rules to vitalize in structural ways particular substantive
constitutional guarantees.5 9 7 The Framers and the Court, however,
are not the only sources of law that aim at encouraging the
thoughtful formulation of government policy. Legislators themselves sometimes put in place lawmaking structures that seek the

same end.

War and at the time of the New Deal). Third, and perhaps most deeply of all, one broad
philosophy of the proper judicial role-what is sometimes called "noninterpretivism--gives
much attention (at least in most of its manifestations) to evolving moral standards in the
broader society. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 6, at 236 (suggesting that Justices should
"extract 'fundamental presuppositions' . . . from the evolving morality of our tradition");
Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court,1978 Term-.Forward:The Formsof Justice,93 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 9 (1979) ("The task of the judge is to give meaning to constitutional values, and he
does that by working with the constitutional text, history, and social ideals."); Thomas C.
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,27 STAN. L. REV. 703,706 (1975) (discussing
the Coures "role as the expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair
treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not expressed as a matter ofpositive law
in the written Constitution," but rather derives from "contemporary moral and political
ideals"); Sandalow, supra note 13, at 1050 ("The entirety of [our] history, together with
current aspirations that are both shaped by it and shape the meaning derived from it, far
more than the intentions of the framers, determine what each generation finds in the
Constitution."); Tribe, supra note 27, at 317 n.138 (stating that "injustice inheres in any
process of decision that relies on fixed rules to limit important liberties whenever the values
codified by the rules have passed into a state of disintegration"). But cf. Neil K Komesar,
Taking Institutions Seriously:Introduction to a Strategy for ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 U.
Cm. L. REV. 366, 379 (1984) (arguing that "the judicial system is poorly placed to receive
information on the desires and preferences of the public or any given part ofit). I note that
most of these citations are drawn from Conkle, supra note 69, at 20 n.46. Professor Conkle
himself says that "the ultimate source of the Supreme CourVs decisional norms lies not in
a set of unchanging values constitutionalized by the framers, but rather in the evolutionary
development of societal thinking concerning issues that implicate individual rights." Id. at
25. Any notion ofthe judicial role centered on "evolutionary development of societal thinking"
would seem closely related (though on a more overarching scale) to the "evolving standards"
doctrines outlined in the text.
596. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
597. I say"as we now have seen" because all the judicial techniques we have discussed so
far concern these sorts of deliberation-enhancing rules.
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The most familiar rule of this sort is the so-called "sunset law." 598
For example, when Congress enacted the latest version of the
independent counsel statute, it specified that authority to make
appointments under it would lapse in 1999." 99 This feature of the
law carried with it a profound consequence because, in its absence,
the independent counsel statute (like most enactments) would have
persisted until affirmatively repealed.' 0 Due to its time lapse
provision, however, the independent counsel statute ran a different
course; like a setting sun, it slipped away into nothingness at the
designated transformative hour.
The sunsetting of a law by statute effects precisely the same sort
of change worked by judge-made structural constitutional rules.
Both sets of rules, after all, operate to shift the burden of inertia
onto the legislature by requiring it to act affirmatively if its
program is to endure. 0 1 In a similar vein, the sunset law-just like
judge-made structural devices-tends to inform and focus legislative deliberations. In particular, the sunsetting of a legislative
program makes it probable that that program will not persist
absent a continuing need for it under current circumstances, as
revealed by the program's actual and recent operation.0 2 For these
reasons, informed observers have celebrated sunset rules as friends
of thoughtful government 6 0 -a fact that suggests that a struc598. The term "sunset law" may be used in different ways. Sometimes it refers to an
overarching law that requires periodic reconsideration ofall, or large categories of, statutes
or administrative regulations. Here, in contrast, we use the term to include built-in time
limits attached to particular laws. See generally Bruce Adams, Sunset: A Proposalfor
Accountable Government, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 511 (1976) (analyzing use of the sunset device);
Dan R. Price, Sunset Legislation in the United States, 30 BAYLOR L. Rzv. 401 (1978)
(analyzing the history, effects, and values of sunset legislation).
599. See The Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, 28 U.S.C. § 599.
600. SeegenerallyMertonC. Bernstein, TheNLRB'sAdjudication-Rule MakingDilemma
Under the AdministrativeProcedureAct, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970).
We take for granted that statutes once enacted continue in force until a later
legislature takes affirmative actionby afresh majority to repeal or amend. Few
statutes other than appropriation measures are enacted for limited periods;
practically none expires with the legislature that enacted it despite the
sometimes tenuous majority that enacted it. Although that majority no longer
commands voter support, its law continues in force until a new coalition can be
mustered to enact a new statute.
Id. at 574-75 n.10; Linde, supra note 27, at 216 n.51 (quoting this passage).
601. See supranote 567 and accompanying text.
602. See Adams, supranote 598, at 514.
603. See, e.g., Price,supranote 598, at 418-19 ("Sunset is a genuine review and evaluation
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turally minded Supreme Court might be inclined to use this same
technique to safeguard important constitutional rights. In effect, if
not by design, the Court has done just that.
Constitutional sunset rules have taken hold, for example, in the
Court's application of the Contract Clause of Article I, section 9.
During the Great Depression, Minnesota adopted the Mortgage
Moratorium Law of 1933, which authorized judicial extensions of
redemption rights with respect to foreclosed-upon properties. The
1933 Act specifically provided, however, that its protections would
not operate beyond May 1, 1935. In Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell,60 4 the Court upheld this legislation against Contract

Clause attack. Finding that that clause "is not to be read with
literal exactness like a mathematical formula,"6" 5 the Court in effect
applied a balancing analysis that focused on a variety of considerations. Most significant to the Court, however, was the fact
that "[t]he legislation is temporary in operation."0 6 The Court's
focus on this factor clearly reflected substantive concerns. Because
the Minnesota law afforded only "temporary relief," ' its intrusiveness on the reliance and expectancy interests safeguarded by
the Contract Clause was diminished as a substantive matter. In
other words, the Act's temporary nature contributed to the "limited
character of the measure°--a logically relevant factor in any
substantive balancing analysis." 9
The Court's time-tied approach to the case, however, also carried
with it a structural dimension. By keying on the "temporary
restraint" 10 worked by the law, the Court in effect required the
state to conjoin similar contract-disrupting rules with the structural
safeguards that sunset laws put in place.61' Indeed, the Court in
Blaisdellacknowledged the possibility that Minnesota could revisit,
technique [that has] given legislators the reform tools theyneed."); see also CALABRESI, supra
note 500, at 61 (noting proposal "that all tax deductions be void if not reenacted every so
many years").
604. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
605. Id. at 428.
606. Id. at 447.
607. See id. at 439-40.
608. TRIBE, supranote 24, § 9-9, at 616.
609. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
610. See id.
611. See supra notes 602-03 and accompanying text.
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and with proper justification renew, its mortgage-moratorium law

in 1935. [T"he operation of the statute," however, "could not validly
outlast the emergency or be so extended as virtually to destroy the
contracts."
In later cases courts have confirmed that built-in
expiration dates may save laws from Contract Clause attack. 13
Constitutional sunset rules operate in other fields as well.614
The Court, for example, has noted the temporary nature of
congressional actions in assessing the constitutionality of remedial legislation enacted under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Likewise, the Court's opinions suggest that the
612. Blaisdell,290 U.S. at 447.
613. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,250 (1978) (noting, inter
alia,"permanent... change" affected by law in finding it distinguishable from "state laws
that in the past have survived challenge under the Contract Clause"); Baltimore Teachers
Union v. Mayor and City Council, 6 F.3d 1012, 1020 (4th Cir. 1993); Parsonese v. Midland
Nat'l Ins. Co., 706 A.2d 814,819 (Pa. 1998). Of course, this is not to say that a public purpose
sufficient to sustain contract-disrupting legislation can only "be addressed to an emergency
or temporary situation." Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S.
400,412 (1983). And it is also not to say that the incorporation of a sunset feature in a law
will inevitably immunize it from Contract Clause attack.
614. One area in which such a rule may operate already has been touched upon; the builtin "sunsetting" of appropriations measures helps justify the distinction between
discriminatory subsidies and tax breaks in the dormant Commerce Clause field. See, e.g.,
Coenen, supranote 283, at 988. See generallysupranote 289 and accompanying text (noting
this distinction). Justice Frankfurter also noted that sunset considerations might have
mattered in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,597 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (distinguishing President Truman's unlawful emergency seizure of nation's
steel mills from earlier seizures that "hadbeen only for a short, explicitly temporary period,
to be terminated automatically unless Congressional approval were given"). Another sunsetrelated practice that courts may use to involve nonjudicial actors in the elaboration of
constitutional rights involves judicial invitations to political branch officials to construct
constitutional remedies during a limited period of time. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515,525-26 (1996) (noting that circuit court had afforded state remedial flexibility
after invalidating all-male education at Virginia Military Institute and that circuit court had
found a proper remedy when state proposed to establish parallel all-female program at Mary
Baldwin College); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964) (stating
that "a court sitting as a court of equity might be justified in temporarily refraining from the
issuance of injunctive relief in an apportionment case in order to allow for resort to an
available political remedy, such as initiative and referendum"). This cautious approach to
judicial remediation inevitably involves political officials in constitutional lawmaking for the
simple reason that the nature and scope ofconstitutional rights are inextricably tied to the
remedies that violations ofthose rights ultimately bring. See generallyFriedman,supranote
15, at 735-36 ("Without an available and enforceable remedy, a right may be nothing more
than a nice idea. Any meaningful discussion of rights, therefore, must focus on remedies
available to implement the rights.").
615. See FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEduc. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
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temporary character of remedial affirmative action programs may
prove determinative of constitutionality. 1 6 The critical observer
might ask how on earth a race-based denial of a job becomes less of
an "equal protection" violation because undertaken pursuant to a
temporally defined program, rather than an open-ended law that is
repealable at any time. One answer to this question is that the
temporariness of an affirmative action program may help to reveal
a requisite remedial proportionality.6 1 For the structuralist,
however, an additional explanation is also available: A sunset
provision wisely forces the policymaker, in a not-too-distant time,
to reweigh the program's costs and benefits in light of its actual and
recent effects.6 18

627, 647 (1999) (finding remedial disproportionality in part because statute that subjects
states to patent suits, purportedlyto rectify due processviolations, operates "for an indefinite
duration"); compare City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 523-33 (1997) (noting Acts lack
of termination date or termination mechanism as one reason for finding that Act exceeded
section five power), with South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,334 (1966) (noting, in
sustaining exercise of section five power, that "Itihe Act suspends literacy tests and similar
devices for a period of five years from the last occurrence of substantial voting
discrimination");
616. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,276 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(disapproving remedies for past societal racial discrimination that are "timeless in their
ability to affect the future"); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 510 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (identifying "planned duration of remedy" as an important consideration in
upholding race-based contract set aside program).
617. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 533 (noting that "termination dates," while not invariably
required, "tend to ensure Congress' means are proportionate to ends legitimate under § 5");
see also City ofRichmondv. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,510 (1989) (observingthat specific findings
of past discrimination are necessary in part to assure citizens 'that the deviation from the
norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter").
618. See BURT, supranote 555, at 372-73 (advocating approach to affirmative action cases
that "would require particularistic, fact-based legislative inquiry in their initial formulation
and recurrently throughout their implementation); Lisa A. Chang, Remedial Purposeand
Affirmative Action: FalseLimits and Real Harms, 16 YALE L. & POLY REV. 59, 61 (1997)
(advocating "[r]equirements such as time limits and the equivalent of affirmative action
business plans" because they would "ensure containment, periodic political review, and
reassessment of race-conscious measures"); id. at 106 ("A time limit on affirmative action
programs, much like the regular review and enactment ofbudgets,would make the programs
subject to regular political review and support (or dismantling) and would prevent the
adoption and perpetuation of unexamined set-asides.").
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VII. THOUGHTFUL-TREATMENT-OF-THE-AREA RULES

In Part VII we saw that Furmanv. Georgia6 19 served substantive
Eighth Amendment values in two important structural ways. First,
it swept the decks clean of death penalty statutes, thus forcing
states-if they wished to retain such statutes-to affirmatively
reconsider and then to reenact them.620 Second, Furmanrequired
not just an individual state's reenactment of the death penalty, but
a broad social approval evidenced by a pattern of reenactments.62 '
Furman,however, also required something more: It mandated that,
if a state were going to succeed in enacting valid death penalty
legislation, that legislation had to reflect a thoughtfully structured
treatment of how and when the death penalty would be imposed.6"
State death penalty laws had to spell out a limited list of
aggravating factors. 6" The factors themselves had to be assigned a
meaningful and restrictive content.6 24 States were called on to put
in place arbitrariness-defeating procedures, such as rules that
require comparative evaluation of individual sentences by appellate
judges.6" The Supreme Court's insistence that states include such
features in any new death penalty statutes surely reflected the
substantive goal of fostering fair and equal treatment of individual
defendants.6" But it also served a structural end. In effect, the
Court told state legislatures something like this: We will permit you
to impose the death penalty only if we find you have passed
legislation that evidences a careful and systematic treatment of this
subject.
The Court has crafted "thoughtful-treatment-of-the-area" rules
in First Amendment, as well as Eighth Amendment, cases. Most
619. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
620. See supranotes 562-70 and accompanying text.
621. See supranotes 571-72 and accompanying text.
622. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
623. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,427-29 (1980).
624. See Id. at 428-29.
625. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204-06 (1976) (plurality opinion). But cf. Pulley
v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 51, 53 (1984) (declining to require appellate-court proportionality
determinations, while " [a ssuming that there could be a capital sentencing system so lacking
in other checks on arbitrariness that it would not pass constitutional muster without

comparative proportionality review").
626. See infra note 629 and accompanying text.
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notably, there are "many decisions... holding that a law subjecting
the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of
a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide
the licensing authority, is unconstitutional."62 These decisions
serve substantive ends in two ways. First, by forcing the adoption
of objective criteria, they reduce overall restraints on speech; a
licensor forced to apply "narrow... standards" is simply less able
to block speech than one who is given unfettered authority. Second,
objective standards mitigate the danger ofviewpoint discrimination
-that is, the risk of "encouraging some views and discouraging
others through ... arbitrary application.""~ Substantive concerns
about viewpoint discrimination-much like concerns about race
discrimination in capital sentencing62 9 -largely explain the Court's
0
insistence in these cases on discretion-limiting objective rules.6
But there is also a structural component to the constitutional
mandate of "narrow, objective, and definite standards." 3 ' A
requirement of such standards inherently ensures some measure of
care and deliberation in the lawmaking process itself. In effect,
these rules preclude the policymaker from acting at such a high
level of abstraction that no real policy is made at all. 2 Such rules
627. Shuttlesworthv. CityofBirmingham, 394U.S. 147,150-51(1969). Many cases apply

this principle. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355
U.S. 313 (1958); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558
(1948). In Niemotko u. Maryland, the Court explained that the "license requirement
constituted a prior restraint on freedom of speech... and, in the absence of narrowly drawn,
reasonable and definite standards for the officials to follow, must be invalid." 340 U.S. 268,
271 (1951).
628. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992).

629. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(explaining that "discretionary statutes are . . . pregnant with discrimination and
discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws
that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments").
630. See, e.g., ELY, supranote 88, at 177.

631. Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 151.
632. See id. The process-related dangers of standardless licensing were recently touched

on inArkansasEducationalTelevision Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998). There, a
public television broadcaster, operating with no preexisting standards, cited a candidate's
lack offinancial support as one factor that justified excluding him from a televised debate.
As Justice Stevens observed in dissent, however, "that factor might have provided an
independent reason for allowinghim to share a free forum with wealthier candidates"; thus,
in his view, rulemakers should have considered in advance (uninfluenced by the particular
content of any particular speaker's message) the roles to be played by this and other decisioninforming factors. Id. at 692 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Stevens's
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force lawmakers to reflect with some care about what policy, if any,
they wish to make. In turn, this process of reflection slows down the
lawmaking process and heightens the likelihood that attention will
focus on problems-including constitutional problems-that the
proposed program's implementation portends.
First Amendment thoughtful-treatment rules reach beyond the
licensing context. For example, in a bygone era, the Court invoked
thoughtful-treatment reasoning to give more deference to state laws
that targeted specific categories of speech than to the "generally
applicable" regulations the Court now seems to favor.6 33 The Court's
analysis has an unmistakable process-centered structural component: Rules that mandate
preapplication formulation of objective criteria facilitate thoughtful consideration of
competing considerations in an environment free of passion and backward-looking
rationalization. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729-30 (1971)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (recognizing a broad presidential power to preserve confidential
informationinthe fields offoreign affairs and national defense, but suggesting that this duty
must be discharged "through the promulgation and enforcement of executive regulations"
and that "in the cases before us we are asked neither to construe specific regulations nor to
apply specific laws"); see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 35 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (advocating a constitutional
requirement of stated parole criteria). For a suggestion that this sort of thoughtfultreatment-of-the-area rule might operate in the affirmative action area and, indeed, operate
there with respect to both public and private employers, see Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 634 (1987), in which the Court suggested that
sex-based hiring was permissible in part because the employer had in place an affirmative
action plan that guided hiring decisions. See also Chang, supranote 618, at 61 (suggesting
that adoption of "discrete measures" required by such plans "minimizes the risks associated
with affirmative action").
633. This point is made in Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
GovernmentalMotive in FirstAmendment Doctrine,63 U. CM. L. REV. 413 (1996).
If the law concerning direct and incidental restraints seems too obvious to
merit... discussion, consider as a preliminary matter that the distinction first
arose, and then operated for years, in a form converse to that of modern
doctrine. In Gitlow v. New York, the Court contrasted a statute directly
targeting certain forms of advocacy to a statute "prohibit[ing] certain acts
involving the danger of substantive evil, without any reference to language
itself." The Court noted that it had greater call to review an application of the
general statute to speech than to review an application ofthe targeted statute.
In the latter case, the Court seemed to reason, the legislaturealready had made
a considered judgment that the speech at issue posed the requisite danger, in
the former case, the legislature had made no such judgment, and might have
concluded to the contrary, had it ever considered the matter. The
unintentionality of the incidental restraint worked against it; the
purposefulness of the direct restraint worked in its favor. The end result was
a doctrine that treated the restriction of speech through a generally applicable
law as more, rather than less, problematic than the restriction of speech
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more enduring First Amendment vagueness rule calls for "careful
deliberation before [policymakers] substantially alter the legal
landscape" by forcing the expression of legal standards at a
meaningful, and thus thought-focusing, level of precision.1 4 Finally,
the Court on occasion has balked at applying highly generalized
disturbing-the-peace laws to particular forms of speech-related
activity that might be regulated under a more thoughtfully drawn
statute.6 35 In Garnerv. Louisiana,"6 for example, Justice Harlan
reasoned that it was impermissible to convict peaceful lunchcounter sit-in protestors, said to have created an imminent risk
of danger in the then rigidly segregated South, under a "general
and all-inclusive breach of the peace prohibition." 7 According to
Justice Harlan, the protected First Amendment character of the
defendant's activity justified prosecution, if at all, under "a statute
or clause 'narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct." 3
For Justice Harlan, in the peaceful sit-in context, thoughtfulthrough direct legislation.
Id. at 493 (footnotes omitted). Professor Kagan goes on to profess her preference for the
modern tendencythat reverses this set ofpresumptions infavor ofgenerally applicable rules.
See id.
634. See Wellington, supra note 8, at 491 (noting also that "these doctrines impose upon
law-makers duties of care" in drafting rules); see also TRIBE, supranote 24, § 17-2, at 1678
n.7 (noting the structural concern about a law "so general as to afford ... insufficiently
focused debate among its initial proponents and opponents"). See generally Waters v.
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion) (observing that "speech restrictions
must generally precisely define the speech they target"). In a similar vein, the Court has said
that the overbreadth doctrine tends to ensure that speech-prohibiting rules "represent a
consideredlegislativejudgmentthat a particular mode ofexpression has to give wayto other
compellingneeds of society."Broadrickv. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,611-12 (1973) (emphasis
added). In particular, the overbreadth doctrine serves this purpose by invalidating rules
drawn so uncarefully that they cover a substantial amount of protected speech. See id. at
612; see also Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 586 (1989) (reasoning that "[t]he
overbreadth doctrine serves to protect constitutionally legitimate speech not merely expost,
...but also ex ante, that is, when the legislature is contemplating what sort of statute to
enact"). See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 31-32
(discussing overbreadth and federal statutes). For invocation of a similar line of 'underbreadth" analysis inthe affirmative action area, see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,53839 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rejecting "slapdash" effort at affording race-based
reparations reflecting in essence a "random distribution to a favored few" to provide
"compensation for an injury shared by many").
635. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940).
636. 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
637. Id. at 202 (Harlan, J., concurring).
638. Id. (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311).
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treatment concerns demanded more than Louisiana had offered. As
he put it:
[S]ound constitutional principles demand of the state
legislature that it focus on the nature of the otherwise
"protected" conduct it is prohibiting, and that it then make a
legislative judgment as to whether that conduct presents so
clear and present a danger to the welfare of the community that
it may legitimately be criminally proscribed. 9
Another close encounter with thoughtful-treatment-of-the-area
rules, outside both the First Amendment and the Eighth
Amendment contexts, occurred in BMW of NorthAmerica, Inc. v.
Gore.' In the BMW case the Court recognized and applied a "gross
excessiveness" limit on punitive-damage awards derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."' The case involved
a $2 million punitive-damages judgment awarded for nondisclosure
of the presale repainting of an otherwise good new car.642 Five
Justices voted to overturn that judgment, with Justice Breyer filing
a critical concurring opinion." According to Justice Breyer, the
639. Id. at 203 (emphasis added). Such a focusedlegislative determination, Justice Harlan
made clear, would not be definitely binding on the Court. See id. Because such a
determination would be entitled to deference, however, see id. at 203 n.10, Justice Harlan
left open the question "whether Louisiana could by a specifically drawn statute
constitutionally proscribe conduct ofthe kind evinced in these two cases," id. at 204. In short,
Justice Harlan very clearly brought to the case a thoughtful-treatment remand-to-thelegislature approach. See also Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 969 (1983) (Brennan,
J., dissentingfrom denial ofcertiorari) (expressingconcernundervaguenessprinciples about
disciplining police officers for "cohabitation" under good-behavior rules set forth in highly
generalterms; "[bly demandingthat government articulate its aims with a reasonable degree
of clarity, the Due Process Clause ensures that state power will be exercised only on behalf
of policies reflecting a conscious choice among competing social values). For a line of
reasoning that bears at least some resemblance to that of Justice Harlan in Garner,see Hill
v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2496-97 (2000), a case in which the Court upheld a floating
buffer zone statute in part because of the "comprehensiveness ofthe statute," which covered
all medical facilities with a "bright-line prophylactic" eight-foot rule, rather than applying
open-ended rules "that focus exclusively on the individual impact of each instance of
behavior."

640. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
641. See id. at 568-86.
642. See id. at 562.
643. See Sunstein, supra note 434, at 81 (noting that "Justice Breyer's argument is...
different fromthe Court's"; "is notbestunderstood simplybyreference to excessiveness"; and
is related "both with the void-for-vagueness cases and with the constitutional attack on the
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essential problem in the case flowed from "the constitutional
importance of legal standards that provide 'reasonable constraints'
within which 'discretion is exercised." 6 " In finding that the BMW
case revealed a lack of such restraints, Justice Breyer emphasized
three facts:
1. "[The Alabama statute that permits punitive damages does
not itself contain a standard that readily distinguishes between
conduct warranting very small, and conduct warranting very
large, punitive damages awards." 5
2. "[Tihe state courts neither referred to, nor made any effort to
find... an economic theory... [that] might have provided a
significant constraint on arbitrary awards." 6
3. "[Tlhere are no other legislative enactments here that classify
awards and impose quantitative limits that would significantly
cabin the fairly unbounded discretion created by the absence of
constraining legal standards. "
In making these observations, Justice Breyer said to Alabama's
lawmakers in so many words: If you are going to authorize huge
punitive awards, you must do so with far less sloppy policymaking
than this. By requiring the promulgation, of substantive rules,
Justice Breyer thus imposed a structural demand: He would not
vote to uphold a sky-high punitive judgment unless the actions of
the state's lawmakers evidenced a serious effort to grapple with the
troubling constitutional complexities of punitive-damages policy.6"
death penalty in Furman").
644. BMW ofN.Am., 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring).
645. Id. at 588.
646. Id. at 592.
647. Id. at 595.
648. For a similar evaluation, see Sunstein, supranote 434, at 82. In Professor Sunstein's
view:
Justice Breyer's approach can be connected with many ofthe cases discussed
thus far, including Kent v. DuOW..... Most importantly, it requires state
officials to set out criteria on their own and is in that way democracy-forcing.
Like the void-for-vagueness doctrine, it is intended to catalyze and improve,
rather than to preempt, democratic processes.
See id.An interesting question is whether the punitive judgment inBMWwould have stood
if the state's largely open-ended substantive standards had applied, but the Alabama
legislature had enacted a damages cap that was higher than the award. Another question is
whether the BMW case would have gone the other way if Alabama had legislated with some
care in the general field of punitive damages while not altering the governing rules
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The Justices have made use of various styles of thoughtfultreatment reasoning in a number of constitutional settings.6 4 9
applicable to the BMW case itself (for example, by putting damage caps on certain classes of
claims,while not capping awards fortortious misrepresentation). Perhaps the result inBMW
would not have changed in these circumstances. After all, Justice Breyer's opinion focused
hard on the lack of constraints on discretion placed on the particular jury that had socked
BMW with the multimillion dollar punitive judgment. See id. at 81 (observing that "Justice
Breyer noted that the jury had not operated under a statute with standards distinguishing
among permissible punitive damage awards"). On the other hand, in striking down the
punitive award, Justice Breyer did note the lack of any "legislative enactments... that
classify awards and impose quantitative limits."BMWofN. Am., 517 U.S. at 595. Speaking
of cases that involve this sort of situation, Professor McCormack has observed:
When federal, state or local government has acted in a general field but has
left gaps in coverage, less intense scrutiny on a constitutional level may be
required in the gaps than would be mandated if there had been no action at all.
The judicial scrutiny in this instance may be called strict but still be less
intense in the sense of the Court's willingness to accept governmental
justifications. This result flows from the realization that the political process is
working to choose which problems should be solved first. For example, almost
identical cases dealing with local housing ordinances might be decided
differently under the same strict scrutiny rubric before and after federal
enactment of fair housing legislation. This for the reason that the Court would
rather rely on Congress to solve housing problems generally than use its own
limited devices under the Constitution.
Wayne McCormack, Race andPolitics in the Supreme Court:Bakke to Basics, 1979 UTAHL.
REV. 491,520. To Professor McCormack's thought maybe added the further observation that
"gaps in coverage" are often the result of an overarching substantive design, and not merely
ofan incrementalist "one-step-at-a-time" approach. In either event, Justice Breyer's approach
inBMWprovides atleast a startingpointfor advocating athoughtful-treatment-related style
of judicial review.
649. For example, Justice Powell emphasized in Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981), that
the Arizona legislature had actually taken steps "to increase the political voice of the small
householder" in the governance of the water reclamation districts whose directors were
selected on a challenged "one-acre, one-vote" basis. Id at 372-74 (Powell, J., concurring); see
supranotes 473-78 and accompanying text. Thus the demonstrated "will" ofthe legislature
to deal with the apportionment question-together with the absence of underlying fairrepresentation problems in the state legislature itself-was "decisive" for Justice Powell in
rejecting the constitutional attack. See Ball, 451 U.S. at 374. In contrast, in finding
Tennessee's apportionment of its state legislature constitutionally challengeable in Baker v.
Carr,the majority emphasized that the state had not engaged in reapportionment since
1901. 369 U.S. 186,186 (1962). Justice Clark, in a separate concurring opinion, reasoned that
"[t]he frequency and magnitude of the inequalities in the present districting admit of no
policy whatever." Id. at 254. In short, the districting system reflected the antithesis of a
thoughtful consideration ofthe area; it was instead the product ofa"legislative straitjacket."
Id. at 259. Justice Clark expressed the "Ripside" of this thought in his dissenting opinion in
Lucas v. Forty-FourthGeneralAssembly, when he advocated upholding an apportionment
of the Colorado legislature found by the majority to be unconstitutional: "As a result of the
action of the Legislature and the use of initiative and referendum, the State Assembly has
been reapportioned eight times since 1881. This indicates the complete awareness of the
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Moreover, the Court sometimes uses thoughtful-treatment reasoning in upholding challenged laws, as well as in striking them
down.6 50 In many contexts and in many ways the Justices thus seem
ready to reward policymaker attentiveness and to punish policymaker sloth. A thoughtful treatment of the area-as reflected in a
focused, overarching policymaking effort-may tip the scales
toward judicial validation of a government practice that otherwise
would be found to offend substantive constitutional values. 51
people of Colorado to apportionment problems and their continuing efforts to solve them."
377 U.S. 713, 742 (1964) (Clark, J., dissenting); ef. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 271 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (asserting that "in view of the attention the
political branches are currently giving the matter of affirmative action, I see no compelling
cause for the intervention the Court has made in this case"); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 685-86 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (refusing to read the Equal
Protection Clause to bar state poll taxes in part because Congress had recently passed, and
states had approved, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, which barred poll taxes onlyin federal
elections). Another area in which the Court seems to have paid heed to the presence or
absence of thoughtful legislative intervention concerns the availability of damages in socalled Bivens actions. See infra notes 715-30 and accompanying text. See generally Nichol,
supra note 15, at 1149 & 1153 n.203 (noting that the Court has permitted Congress to
preempt otherwise available constitutional remedies when its "inaction has not been
inadvertent" or where "the comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme" counsels against
supplementary remedies).
650. In Washington v. Glucksberg,for example, the Court declined to invalidate a state
law restricting access to assisted suicide, noting that "the States are currently engaged in
serious, thoughtful examinations ofphysician-assisted suicide and other similar issues." 521
U.S. 702, 719 (1997). There are also indications that the thoughtful and systematic
construction of a state taxing package might cause courts to reject otherwise valid taxdiscrimination claims by characterizing one tax as "compensatory" for another. See
Annenbergv. Commonwealth, Nos. 003,004 M.D. 1997,2000 WL 718216 (Pa. June 1, 2000)
(rejecting claim that stock clause of county-imposed personal property tax should be viewed
as compensatory in part because it was not included in an integrated, comprehensive taxing
scheme that treated both it and the capital and franchise taxes it allegedly equalized).
651. Notably, although this Article focuses on use of care-heightening structures by
government decision makers, constitutional doctrine might also take account of the use of
care-heightening structures by private actors. For example, the issue in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, was whether the Boy Scouts of America, on the basis of a claimed
constitutional right of expressive association, could deny assistant scoutmaster status to "an
avowed homosexual and gay rights activist" in violation of state antidiscrimination law. 120
S. Ct. 2446, 2449 (2000). The four-Justice bloc of dissenters rejected the Boy Scouts' claim
because its "policy statements failto establish any clear, consistent and unequivocal position
on homosexuality." Id. at2466 (Stevens, .. , dissenting). Rather, the dissenters concluded, the
record showed only a "mixture ofcontradictory positions" taken over the years, id. at 2465,
that reflected a "group... unable to identify its own stance with any clarity," id. at 2470. In
effect, the dissenters argued that a necessary minimum predicate to trumping state
antidiscrimination laws was an effort to "explain clearly and openly why the presence of
homosexuals would affect [the groups's] expressive activities." Id. at 2466; accordid. at 2479
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VIH. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAw AND COMMON-LAw-LIKE

RULES
Twenty-five years ago, Professor Henry Monaghan published his
seminal work on "constitutional common law."6 52 In that article,
Professor Monaghan argued that the Supreme Court had used and
should use common law rules to vindicate constitutional rights,
particularly in "protecting civil liberties."65 Professor Monaghan's
descriptive position-and even more so his normative view-have
engendered much discussion and debate.6"5 ' Today, however, few
(Souter, J., dissenting) (expressing the view that "no group can claim a right of expressive
association without identifying a clear position to be advocated over time in an unequivocal
way"). This structural approach-like the structural approaches identified throughout this
Article-raised the odds that the relevant decision makers' action would reflect serious
thought about an extremely important issue, a significant consensus among group members
as to that issue, and a thoughtful and informed choice by the group's leadership on the
memberships behalf.
652. Monaghan, supranote 17, at 3.
653. See id. at 18-19 (asserting that "the case law.., is at least highly suggestive of a
sizable body of constitutionally inspired implementing rules" and that "the desirability of
some such undertaking seems clear"); Henry P.Monaghan, ThirdPartyStanding,84 COLUm.
L. Rzv. 277, 314 n.199 (1984).
654. The major critique is Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the
Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117 (1978). Professor Monaghan
himself-citing the Schrock and Welsh critique-has itemized some key objections to the
recognition of constitutional common law:
Whatever its perceived advantages, a theory that posits a judicial competence
to fashion a constitutionally inspired common law of civil liberties must deal
adequately with . . . objections: development of such a body of law is

inconsistent with the original intent of the framers; the line between true
constitutional interpretation and constitutional common law is too
indeterminate to be useful; the existence of such judicial power is inconsistent
with the autonomy of the executive department in enforcing law as well as the
rightful independence of the states in the federal system.
Monaghan, supranote 653, at 315 n.201 (citation omitted). Professor Tribe, who considers
this matter in his treatise, seems ambivalent about constitutional common law. He praises
Professor Monaghan's effort "to find some place for Congress, and thus by implication for
other nonjudicial actors, in the process of constitutional interpretation." TRIBE, supra note
24, § 3-4, at 37. On the other hand, Professor Tribe worries that "the uncertain line" between
court-mandated constitutional law and constitutional common law "would complicate the
process of constitutional adjudication and would exacerbate the tension between Congress
and the Court" Id. Professor Tribe, on balance, seemed prepared to eschew the Monaghan
approach in favor of a capacious congressional power to use section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enforce constitutional rights. See id. The key difference between these two
approaches-a difference Professor Tribe does not discuss-lies inthe role thatconstitutional
common law (but not even the broadest section five power) can play in shifting the burden

1736

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1575

scholars would question that a body of doctrine at least loosely
655
describable as "constitutional common law" does in fact exist.
One way of thinking about these rules is that they are not
required so much as inspired by the Constitution.6 5 6 As a result,
they are modifiable by legislative authorities 65 7 and thus invite just
the sort of interbranch dialogue that structural rules envision.5 ' It
is important to recognize, however, that constitutional common law
rules are not all cut from the same cloth. Indeed, at least three
separate types of rules, reflecting different levels of resistance to
legislative alteration, seem to lurk in the cases. These rules might
be called: (1) reversible rules; (2) replaceable rules; and (3) rules
that are modestly reducible.

of inertia in favor of constitutional rights. See supranote 567 and accompanying text. In any
event, the Court now seems to have rejected the sort of broad section five power that
Professor Tribe endorsed. See supra notes 376-89 and accompanying text (discussing the
Flores case). Will this reshaping of constitutional space cause Professor Tribe to advocate a
broader role for constitutional common law? His strong inclination to involve nonjudicial
actors in the explication ofconstitutionalvalues-at least for "underenforced norms," TRIBE,
supranote 24, § 3-4, at 38-suggests that the answer to this question may well be "yes."
655. Even Professors Schrock and Welsh, while questioning the wisdom of this
development, have recognized the reality of constitutional common law. See Schrock &
Welsh, supra note 654, at 1117. As they observe:
Implicit in the Court's current treatment of the exclusionary rule-as well as
ofseveral rules outside the fourth amendment context-is a suggestion thatthe
Court has a general authority to impose on state courts and state officials rules
grounded not in the constitutional rights ofthe persons seeking to invoke them
but rather in a subconstitutional calculation of costs and benefits.
Id. at 1118; see also Turpin v. Malet, 579 F.2d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that "[t]he
development ofthe exclusionary rule and the required provision of Miranda warnings might
well be examples of'common law' development," which"invigorates the political process" by
opening a dialogue with Congress), vacatedsub nom. City ofWest Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S.
974(1978).
656. See Monaghan, supra note 653, at 314.
657. See, e.g., Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981) (noting a general
congressional power to overturn federal common law rules).
658. See Friedman, supra note 15, at 780 n.233 ("Professor Monaghan's theory of
constitutional common law promotes the Court's 'dialogue' with Congress...."); Monaghan,
supra note 17, at 27 (stating that constitutional common law "provides the Court with a
means for involving Congress in the continuing process of defining the content and
consequences of individual liberties").
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A- Reversible Rules
Our law recognizes many judicially crafted doctrines that
are-notwithstanding their constitutional origins-freely and fully
reversible by Congress. One such group of rules, to which Professor
Monaghan paid only scant attention,659 is rooted in the federal
courts' "supervisory authority."660 Drawing on this authority over
the years, the Supreme Court has applied to federal proceedings a
rich variety of rules protective of constitutional values66 that
Congress may overturn at its pleasure.6 2 For this reason, these
659. See Monaghan, supranote 17, at 38-40.
660. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943); Sara Sun Beale,
ReconsideringSupervisoryPower in CriminalCases. ConstitutionalandStatutory Limitson
the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUbt. L. REv. 1433 (1984); see also Bennett L.
Gershman, The New Prosecutors,53 U. PIrT. L. REV. 393, 431-35 (1992) (documenting recent
decline in the use of supervisory power); L. Douglas Harris, Note, SupervisoryPowerin the
United States Courts ofAppeals, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 642 (1978) (discussing the use of
supervisory power by the federal circuit courts).
661. See, e.g., Youngv. United States exreL Vuitton etFils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787,808 & n.19
(1987) (overturning on supervisory power grounds a criminal contempt conviction based on
violation ofan injunction that was prosecuted by the lawyer of the defendant's adversary in
the civil action; Court relied on "basic notions of fairness" and cited circuit court authority
that viewed the "appointment of interested prosecutor [as a] due process violation"); United
States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 n.7 (1975) (using supervisory power to order a new trial
because of an "evidentiary matter [having] grave constitutional overtones"); Grunewald v.
United States, 353 U.S. 391, 423-24 (1957) (noting that where an "evidentiary matter has
grave constitutional overtones... we feel justified in exercising this Court's supervisory
control to pass on such a question"); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (relying
on supervisory power to void an indictment handed down by a grand jury from which women
had been excluded); see also United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 46 (1992) (recognizing
supervisory authority to establish rules that are "a means of enforcing or vindicating"
constitutionalprohibitions); United Statesv. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499,505 (1983) (recognizing
that federal courts "may,within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required
by the Constitution"). See generally Monaghan, supra note 17, at 39 (citing cases and
asserting, for example, "that the McNabb-Mallory rule, promulgated in the name of the
Supreme Court's supervisory power, had substantial constitutional underpinnings").

662. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2332 (2000) (noting that
"Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside [supervisory rules]"); Carlisle
v. United States, 517 U.S. 416,428 (1996) (rejecting the federal courts' "'inherent power' to
act in contravention of applicable Rules"); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265 (1980)
(upholding statute overturningevidentiary standard for expatriation establishedby Supreme
Court because not constitutionally mandated); Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343,34548, 353 n.11 (1959) (upholding statute that recognized narrower duties of prosecutorial
disclosure than previously dictated by a Supreme Court decision); United States v. Pugh, 25
F.3d 669,675 (8thCir. 1994) (reading federal statute as overturningMcNabb.Malloryrule;
collecting other authorities); see also BICKEL, supranote 6, at 201 ("Procedural decisions in
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doctrines are not hard-and-fast; rather, they are structural in
nature.
The operation of supervisory rules is illustrated well by the
Supreme Court's actions in the wake of its seminal "dynamite
charge" decision inAllen v. UnitedStates."' The Court inAllen had
broadly upheld standard forms of instructions, delivered to
deadlocked juries in criminal cases, designed to push them toward
reaching a verdict.664 In the wake of Allen, however, the Court
outlawed charges that were unduly "coercive" as violative of dueprocess restraints. 665 This anticoercion rule was and is substantive,

rather than structural, because it flatly and irreversibly prohibits
a particular category of jury instructions in both state and federal
criminal trials.666 Also followingAllen, the Court held in Brasfield
v. United States667 that the risk of "improper influence" precluded

judicial inquiries into the numerical division of ajury after that jury
informed the judge it was unable to reach a verdict. 66 In later

decisions, however, courts made it clear that the Brasfieldrule-in
contrast to the on-or-off anticoercion rule itself-was not
constitutionally mandated. 669 Rather, the rule is "grounded in the
Court's supervisory power, " "" inapplicable to the states, 671 and
62
defeasible by Congress insofar as it operates in federal court.

Other similarly provisional rules-also connectable to constitutional
values--operate in various areas of criminal procedure.

the federal context need not be constitutional, because the Court may function as
administrative head of the federal court system, in the absence of a supervening Act of
Congress."); Lauren Robel, FracturedProcedure:The Civil JusticeReform Act of 1990, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1447,1478 (1994) (notingthat "Congress occasionallyrespondsto [supervisory]
decisions" and that "the Court has upheld congressional reversal ofits supervisory opinions").
663. 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
664. See id.
665. See Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965).
666. See id.
667. 272 U.S. 448 (1926).
668. Id. at 450.
669. See, e.g., Ellis v. Reed, 596 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1979).
670. 5 WAYNER. LAFAVE &JEROLDH. ISRAEL, CRIMINALPROCEDTRE § 24.9(2), at 597 (2d
ed. 1999).
671. See id. at 597-98. See generally Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 n.8 (1976) (noting
that supervisory power rulings are binding only in federal proceedings).
672. See supranote 662 and accompanying text.
673. See supranote 661.
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Another deeply constitutional doctrine that bears a little-noticed,
but very real, resemblance to these supervisory-power rules is the
so-called "dormant Commerce Clause." 74 In many cases the Court
has deployed this principle to protect constitutionally grounded
interests in maintaining a national free market by invalidating
state laws that block cross-border business transactions. 675 The
Court, however, has consistently decreed that Congress may
overturn dormant Commerce Clause rulings without resort to
constitutional amendment.676 Indeed, the Court has drawn on this
congressional-reversibility principle in shaping the substantive
contours of constitutional restraints on commerce-impeding state
regulations.
In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 7 the Court considered the
continuing vitality of National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Departmentof
Revenue,8 78 which had barred imposition of tax obligations on "a
vendor whose only contacts with the taxing State are by mail or
common carrier.'1 79 The Court in Quill reaffirmed the Bellas Hess
rule, but in doing so it relied solely and squarely on the dormant
Commerce Clause,680 rather than on the Due Process Clause (which,
on the prevailing view, generates rules reversible only by consti-

674. See generaUyBrIrKER, supranote 289, §§ 6.01 to 10.05; TRIBE, supranote 24, §§ 6-1
to 6-22.
675. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521-23 (1935) (describing
national-market purpose of dormant Commerce Clause rule).
676. See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472
U.S. 159, 174 (1985) ("When Congress so chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes

are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Commerce Clause."); Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (upholding South Carolina's discriminatory insurancepremiums tax because it was validated by congressional passage of the McCarran Act). See
generally BICKEL, supra note 6, at 230 (1957) ("Every decision forbidding this or that state

regulatory or taxingmeasure inthe name of the Commerce Clause is subject to congressional
reprise."). Notably, to authorize state legislation otherwise violative of the dormant
Commerce Clause, Congress must actin a structurally sensitive way by making its intention
"unmistakably clear." See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1986). For a discussion
detailing the forms and purposes of rules of clarity, see generally supra Part III.
677. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
678. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
679. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 311.
680. See id
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tutional amendment681 ). Even more important, the Court revealed
the structural, dialogue-centered nature of its ruling when it noted:
[In recent years Congress has considered legislation that would
"overrule" the Bellas Hess rule. Its decision not to [act] may, of
course, have been dictated by respect for our holding in Bellas
Hess that the Due Process Clause prohibits States from
imposing such taxes, but today we have put that problem to
rest. Accordingly, Congress is now free to decide whether, when,
and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order
concerns with a duty to collect use taxes."
Congressionally reversible rules drawn from the Constitution
have surfaced in other fields as well.68 3 For example, the Court long
681. I say "on the prevailing view" because of the important work of Professor William
Cohen that casts some doubt on this position. In a seminal article, Professor Cohen has
argued that:
Congress should be able to remove constitutional limits on state power if those
limits stem solely from divisions of power within the federal system. In other
words, Congress should be able to approve unconstitutional policy choices in
state laws when Congress is not constitutionally prohibited from directly
adopting the same policy itself.In appropriate circumstances, Congress should
be able to authorize the states to enact legislation that, in the absence of
congressional consent, would run afoul of the due process or equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment, deny the privileges and immunities of
citizens of other states in contravention of article IV, or impair the obligation
of contracts in violation of article I, section 10.
William Cohen, CongressionalPowerto Validate UnconstitutionalState Laws: A Forgotten
Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. Rzv. 387, 388 (1983). For example, in Professor
Cohen's view, Congress has the powerto override FourteenthAmendment due-process-based
state-tax-nexus rules because these "limits are inapplicable to federal regulation, and
therefore Congress should be able to remove them."Id. at 401. As noted elsewhere, Professor
Cohen's view would "structuralize" a variety of state-limiting constitutional rules by
rendering them repealable by Congress without the need for constitutional amendment. See
generally infra notes 894-97 and accompanying text.

682. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 318 (footnote omitted).
683. For example, the states-rights-driven abstention rule of Younger v. Harris,401 U.S.
37 (1971), appears to be congressionally reversible. See Massey, supra note 175, at 206
(likening the Younger rule to the dormant Commerce Clause because it is a "provisional
constitutional judgment of the courts"). The federalism-based prohibition on pursuing statetax recoveries in federal courts likewise has common law roots. See Fair Assessment in Real
Estate Assoc., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981); Luneburg, supra note 141, at 224 n.84,
249 n.267. The nationalism-driven tax immunity rules that flow from McCulloch v.
Maryland,17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), seem to be congressionally reversible. See Dimond,
supra note 69, at 212. And at least some constitutionally inspired rules in the criminal law
area-in addition to the supervisory rules already spelled out-may be subject to
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has relied on the special national responsibility for dealing with
Native American tribes-as well as the historic oppression of those
peoples-to generate a specialized body of doctrines that concerns
Native Americans. 6 4 Illustrative is Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v.
ManufacturingTechnologies,Inc., in which the Court reaffirmed a
line of rulings to the effect that Native American Nations enjoy a
broad immunity from suit in both state and federal court."s In
Kiowa Tribe, however, the Court also emphasized that this
presumptive immunity is reversible by Congress. As the Court put
the point: "Although the Court has taken the lead in drawing the
bounds of tribal immunity, Congress... can alter its limits through
explicit legislation."" 6 In a similar vein, the Court reaffirmed in
White MountainApache Tribe v. Brackerthat states, when acting
on their own, lack authority to govern conduct that occurs in socalled "Indian country."8 States may, however, regulate activity in
these locales when specifically authorized to do so by Congress."'
Other judicially developed Native-American-law doctrines operate
in much the same way. 9 These doctrines draw their inspiration
from constitutional values, 90 yet they openly invite review and
revision by the political branches of the national government.69 '
Thus, just like the Court's supervisory-authority and dormant
congressional eradication. See, e.g., Sorrellsv. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (overlaying
entrapment defense on federal criminal statute that made no mention of it).

684. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
685. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).

686. Id. at 759.
687. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
688. See id. at 151.

689. See WILLuIC. CANBYJR.,A

RicANINDiANLAWINANTrrsHELL35-46 (3d ed. 1998);

ROBERTN. CLINTONETAL., AMERIcAN INDIANLAw 162-63 (3d ed. 1991). In his Kwwa Tribe
dissent, Justice Stevens seemed bent on casting a cloud over the Court's creation of common
law rules in this area when he asserted that "[t]he fact that Congress may nullify or modify

the Court's grant of virtually unlimited tribal immunity does not justify the Court's
performance ofa legislative function." Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 764 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The majority rightly declined to embrace this reasoning as it is both question-begging and
antihistorical. The whole point of a common law power-the extensive existence of which
even Justice Stevens acknowledges in the Indian law field, see id.-is to allow courts to act
in the first instance. To say that courts in such cases are engaged in the performance of a
"legislative function" is thus wrong. So long as courts act within the ambit oftheirrecognized
common law powers, they are not, by definition, improperly performing a "legislative" task.
690. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 116, at 602 (describing Indian peoples as
among"discrete and insular minorities" properly afforded heightened protection by courts).
691. See supranotes 686-88 and accompanying text.
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Commerce Clause decisions, these components of our national law
protect substantive constitutional values in a structural way.69 2
It is a fair subject of debate whether the rules described here
fairly bear the label "common law." Professors Schrock and Welsh
have argued, for example, that it is an error to describe in
constitutional common law terms the Court's dormant Commerce
Clause decisions.69 Instead, those rulings embody, in the view of
these analysts, a principle required (not just inspired) by the
Constitution to the effect that the states are disqualified (in the
absence of congressional action) from regulating commerce in
certain ways.6 9' The argument of Professors Schrock and Welsh
might cause one to describe the congressionally reversible rules
collected here as no more than common-law-like in nature. Beyond
695
making this concession, however, I need not enter their debate,
for what is important for our purposes is that all of these doctrines
share the essential features of the other doctrines we looked at
earlier. They are judicially deployed devices that both protect
identifiable constitutional values and are subject to reversal by
legislative authorities without the need for a constitutional
amendment. All of these rules-whether or not properly characterized as "constitutional common law"--are accordingly structural
in nature.
B. ReplaceableRules
In the supervisory-power, dormant Commerce Clause, and
Native-American-law contexts, Congress may reject altogether
judicial vindications of constitutional values. Another, less692. Tracking the approach ofthese cases, some commentators have advocated takingthe
principle of congressional reversibility much further in an effort to deal with problems of
judicial legitimacy in the "substantive due process" area. See Conkle, supranote 69; Dimond,
supra note 69. From all appearances, these approaches-like that of Professor Cohen, see
supranote 681 and accompanying text, have fallen on deaf ears within the modem Court.

693. See Schrock & Welsh, supranote 654, at 1138-41.
694. See id.
695. This is not to say that the debate they are engaged in is essentially linguistic or
substantively unimportant. To the contrary, if they are right in suggesting that few or no
true constitutional common law rules exist, then the precedential base for using a common
law style of constitutional decision making is severely weakened. See Thomas W. Merrill, The
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI.L. REV. 1, 48-59 (1985) (arguing for a
narrow conception and use of the Court's constitutional common law power).
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provisional brand of constitutional common-law-like rule is
illustrated byMirandav. Arizona.696 InMiranda,the Court invoked
the Fifth Amendment to hold that police officers, in order to avoid
exclusion of custodial confessions, must supply suspects with a
litany of warnings: that they are entitled to remain silent; that
their statements may be used against them; that they have a right
to a lawyer; and that, if necessary, the state will supply one at no
cost. 6 97

After offering this enumeration, however, the Court went on to
declare: "The warnings required... in accordance with our opinion
today are, in the absence ofa fully effective equivalent,prerequisites
to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant." 698 The
Court added that:
[T'he Constitution does not require any specific code of
procedures for protecting the privilege against selfincrimination during custodial interrogation. Congress and the
States are free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege,
so long as they are fully as effective as those described above in
informing accused persons of their right of silence and in
affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it.6
Building on this thought, Professor Monaghan argued that a
state could jettison the Miranda rule altogether if it admitted into
evidence only those custodial statements made in the presence of
counsel."'0 This approach, he reasoned, would be permissible
696. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
697. See id. at 467-72.
698. Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
699. Id. at 490. A recently published law review article collects correspondence between
the Justices that suggests that Miranda's invitation for formulation of equally effective
safeguards was an important component of the Court's opinion, and that the record "leaves
no doubt that the principal authors of Mirandaconsidered its procedures the minimum
required by the Fifth Amendment." Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda,84 CORNELL
L. REV. 109,123-25 (1998) (emphasis added). For another case that seems to involve a similar
sort of potentially replaceable constitutional protection, see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
20 (1956) (plurality opinion) (noting that, despite right to meaningful appeal in state courts
for indigent defendants and requirement to supply transcript in the case at hand, state need
not "purchase a stenographer's transcript in every case where a defendant cannot buy it;"
rather, the state "may find other means of affording adequate and effective appellate
review").
700. See Monaghan, supranote 17, at 33-34.
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because it would give the accused a protection against police
coercion no less valuable than that afforded by the Miranda
warnings themselves.7 "' Others have suggested that the creation of
this sort of "replaceable" constitutional common law is a
commendable exercise of the Court's power to expound the
Constitution because it is at once both vigorous and restrained in
protecting constitutional values. It is vigorous in that it fixes a line
of constitutional protections that government officials may not
breach. It is restrained, however, in that, so long as officials operate
above that 70line,
they may freely experiment with alternative
2
approaches.

Many hard questions follow, however, from recognizing a broad
judicial authority to forge replaceable, common-law-like constitutional rules. Take the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
This rule, while laced with exceptions, 0 3 requires in general that all
evidence seized in violation of the amendment be excluded from
criminal trials. 70 ' The primary purpose of the rule, the Court often
has said, is to deter unconstitutional behavior by law enforcement
authorities in the investigation of crimes. 70 5 What if, however,
701. See id.; see also Strauss, supra note 434, at 201 ("The MirandaCourt's willingness
to consider legislative alternatives to the Mirandarules isno different in principle from [the]
traditional canon ofdeference [to congressional assessments ofconstitutionality]. It amounts
to a statement that the Court will consider carefully, and may defer to, a legislative effort to
strike the balance that the relevant constitutional and institutional concerns require.").
Drawing on the Supreme Court's sometimes cautious interpretation of Miranda beginning
in the 1970s, a few lower-court decisions suggested that (at least for purposes of federal
prosecutions) Miranda embodied the same sort of freely reversible rule reflected in the
Court's dormant Commerce Clause and Native-American-law cases. See, e.g., United States
v. Rivas-Lopez, 988 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Utah 1997). Reversing a Fourth Circuit decision to this
effect, the Court squarely rejected this view in Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326
(2000). Even in the wake of Dickerson, however, it remains true that Miranda embodies a
form of "common law" rule that, like other structural protections of substantive rights,
invites active participation by the political branches in the formulation of constitutional
safeguards. Indeed, the Court inDickersonspecifically reiterated Miranda's reference to the
potential development of "legislative solutions [that are] 'at least as effective in apprising
accused persons of their right ofsilence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise
it.'" Id. at 2334; see also Robert L. Burt, Mirandaand Title TH A MorganaticMarriage,1969
Sup. CT. Rv. 81.
702. See, e.g., Merrill, supranote 695, at 72.
703. See generally3 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supranote 670, §§ 9.1 to 10.6 (discussing the scope
and administration of the exclusionary rule).
704. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
705. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,486 (1976) (citing deterrence as the "primary
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Congress or a particular state decided to take a very different
approach to the problem of illegal searches? Assume, for example,
that Congress adopted the Couvt's existing exclusionary-rule
jurisprudence subject to these important qualifications:
1. In cases that involve violent crimes, the exclusionary rule
operates only when the government agent knowingly or
recklessly violates Fourth Amendment rights.' °)
2. In any case that results in a capital or life sentence, the
exclusionary rule may be invoked in federal collateral
proceedings whether or not the defendant had a fair
opportunity to seek exclusion at trial and on direct appeal.70 7
3. Any defendant who otherwise lacks "standing" may invoke
the exclusionary rule if government agents conducted a
search of a nondefendant's personal premises or property in
an effort to gather evidence against investigative targets
with actual
knowledge or reckless disregard of the search's
708
illegality.
Following the replaceable-rule model of Miranda, our hypothetical search-and-seizure-statute case presents two separate
questions. The first is whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule could be-like the Miranda warnings-replaced by
nonjudicial officials with safeguards that embody a "fully effective
equivalent."7" 9 Some authorities suggest it could be. In
PennsylvaniaBoardofProbationandParolev. Scott,7 1 for example,
justification for the exclusionary rule").
706. Of course, "knowingly or recklessly" could be defined in a variety of ways. The key
point is that the terms-byfocusing on awrongful state of mind-would in every case require
something quite more than a simple Fourth Amendment violation for the exclusionary rule
to take hold. Cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment by police acting in "good faith" reliance on a search
warrant issued by an independent judicial officer need not be excluded). Thus, this
modification, to the extent it applied, would disadvantage defendants and benefitprosecutors
and police.
707. This rule would modify, in a way helpful to certain defendants, the Courtes ruling in
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Whether the states acting alone (as opposed to acting
in conjunction with Congress) could bind the federal courts to such a "wholesale waiver" of
the Stone v. Powell rule presents a question well beyond the scope of this Article.
708. This rule would modify, in a way helpful to defendants, the Court's ruling in United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
709. See text accompanying note 699 (quoting Miranda).
710. 524 U.S. 357 (1998).
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the Court observed that the exclusionary
rule "is prudential rather
71
than constitutionallymandated."

1

Even assuming the exclusionary rule is replaceable, however, the
second and harder question concerns what sort of replacement rule
would suffice. With respect to this issue, there is a strong argument
that our hypothetical three-part exclusionary-rule statute would not
fill the constitutional bill. That statute, after all, differs in a
fundamental way from Professor Monaghan's rule-substitute for
Miranda.7" In particular, the Monaghan reformulation of custodialinterrogation safeguards puts in place an equivalent prophylactic
protection for each and every prospective criminal defendant. The
idea is that, for any person in custody, the actual presence of a
lawyer will provide (or is at least properly presumed to provide) no
less protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege than the mere
recitation of the Mirandawarnings.
In contrast, the three-part rule substitute for unconstitutional
searches reshuffles the entire deck of protections in the field of
Fourth Amendment law. As a result, moving from current law to
the three-part statutory substitute would improve the situation of
some persons (primarily persons accused of--or destined to be
accused of--capital crimes) while worsening the situation of others
(primarily persons accused of--or destined to be accused of-all
other violent crimes).71 Moreover, even if this "reshuffling" problem
711. Id. at 363 (emphasis added); see also Brechtv. Abrahamson, 944F.2d 1363,1371(7th
Cir. 1991) (observing that the exclusionary rule is "an extra-constitutional device that helps
motivate adherence to [constitutional values], but that exclusion is not itself compelled by
the Constitution"); Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that both
Mirandaand the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule might be examples of 'common law'
development"), vacated sub nom. City of West Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1978);
Monaghan, supra note 653, at 314-15 (viewing exclusionary rule cases as constituting
constitutional common law); Schrock & Welsh, supranote 654, at 1118 (suggesting that 'the
Court's current treatment of the exclusionary rule" reflects "a subconstitutional calculation

of costs and benefits"). Cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (providing for
suppression of illegally seized evidence "in the absence of a more efficacious sanction").
712. See supratext accompanying notes 700-01.
713. There is a strong argument that the unconstitutionality of this worsening effect in
the Fourth Amendment context follows a fortiori from Miranda.In at least one important
area, after all, the Court has suggested that the substantive reach of Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule protections should and do reach farther than Miranda-based protections.
See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985) (viewing the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule as more far-reaching than Miranda'sFifth Amendment exclusionary rule
with regard to fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree evidence).
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is itself shuffled to one side, another separate question looms: Does
the substitute program, even in its aggregate operation, provide
protections fairly characterized as "equivalent" (or even nearly
equivalent) to the protections provided by the Court's extant
exclusionary-rule jurisprudence?
It is not at all clear (at least to me) how the Court would deal
with our hypothetical statutory-substitute case. Would it authorize
any substitute at all for the exclusionary rule? If so, would it
require equivalent individualprotections (for example, through the
provision of an immunity-free private damages action, with some
assured minimum recovery, for everyvictim of an unlawful search)?
Would the proposed three-part statutory program meet a test of
aggregate equivalence, assuming the Court deemed an overallimpact standard applicable? Would the answer to that question
differ for state defendants (many of whom would get additional
protections in federal collateral proceedings) and federal defendants
(who presumably would not)? Might the Court permit a substitute
program that provided something less than protections "fully"
equivalent to those afforded by the existing exclusionary rule? If so,
would the three-part substitute surmount whatever lower threshold
the Court imposed? Might the Court even go so far as to say that
the exclusionary rule is repealable en toto whether or not substitute
protections are afforded? By Congress? By the individual states?7 14
These questions illustrate the complexities-and, for many, the
dangers-that come with giving the Court authority to frame
constitutional common law rules.
C. Rules That Are Modestly Reducible
We have seen that some constitutionally inspired common-lawlike rules permit outright reversal by Congress,71 5 while other rules
empower Congress and the states to put in place "equiualent" legal

714. Notably, the Courfs recent Dickerson decision indicates that any attempted
legislative reversal of the exclusionary rule, with no simultaneous adoption of any rule
substitute, would be without effect. After all, the exclusionary rule-just like Miranda-has
always applied to "prosecutions arising in state court." Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct.
2326,2333 (2000). See also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) discussed supranote 713.
715. See supranotes 659-95 and accompanying text.
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safeguards.7 1 6 Still other rules, it appears, give Congress the power
to reduce, to a limited degree (but only a limited degree),
constitutionally inspiredjudicial protections. 717 The most prominent
of these rules concerns the availability of money damages to remedy
the sort of constitutional tort first recognized in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the FederalBureau of Narcotics. 718 In
Bivens, the Court upheld a money damages action against
individual federal agents who violated a plaintiff's Fourth
Amendment rights.7 19 In reaching this result, the Court noted that
it might decline to grant comparable redress in other constitutional
settings if Congress crafted its own remedial scheme. 720 After failing
to find a proper remedial alternative in two post-Bivens cases,72 ' the
Court invoked this limiting principle inBush v. Lucas to restrict the
relief available to a federal civil-service employee demoted for
exercising his First Amendment rights.722 In the Court's view, the
remedy available under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978-even
though not an "equally effective substitute" for a Bivens
action 7P-was "constitutionally adequate."7 2 4 Again, in Schweiker
v. Chilicky,7 5 the Court rejected the claimant's request for a fully
compensatory Bivens-based award (including emotional distress
damages) following an allegedly unconstitutional termination of
Social Security benefits.726 The Court reasoned that a retroactive
reinstatement of benefits, even though not "complete relief,"
716. See supra notes 696-714 and accompanying text.
717. See Burt, supra note 701, at 129 (noting possibility that Congress might have
authority to revise Miranda"around the edges).
718. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See generally Alfred Hill, ConstitutionalRemedies, 69 COLUM.
L. REv. 1109 (1969); Al Katz, The JurisprudenceofRemedies: ConstitutionalLegalityand the
Law of Torts, in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1968); Nichol, supranote 15; Note, Bivens
Doctrinein Flu= StatutoryPreclusionofa ConstitutionalCauseofAction, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1251 (1988).
719. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
720. See id.; Friedman, supra note 15, at 752 (noting that: (a) "in language that later
proved significant, the Court [in Bivens] implied the cause of action only because ...
Congress had not provided an alternative remedy that the Court believed to be adequate";
and (b) "[tlhis caveat seems inconsistent with the Marbury principle").

721.
722.
723.
724.
725.

See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
462 U.S. 367 (1983).
Id. at 372-73 & nn. 8-9.
See id. at 378 n.14.
487 U.S. 412 (1988).

726. Id. at 420.
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suiced for Bivens purposes because it emanated from Congress's
expansive and carefully crafted Social Security remedies scheme.7 27
In light of Bush andChilicky, the damages rules ofBivens and its
progeny seem to meet the description of constitutional common law:
they are part of a "substructure of substantive, procedural and
remedial rules drawing inspiration and authority from, but not
required by, various constitutional provisions." 7' At the same time
these rules operate in a constraining way. Congress may not (at
least in the absence of extraordinary circumstances) jettison
otherwise-operative "constitutional" damages rules in their entirety,
putting nothing in their place; 729 rather Congress may pare those
rules down, but only if its substituted scheme "provides meaningful
remedies."7 30
727. See id. at 425. These developments may have been foreshadowed by the Coures
decision in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). As Dean Nichol has observed:
In Carlson, then-Justice Rehnquist complained that the adopted "approach
permits Congress to displace this Court in fashioning a constitutional common
law of its choosing merely by indicating that it intends to do so." Justice
Brennan, who is not unaccustomed to debating with the Chief Justice, offered
no reply for the majority. The opinion thus suggests an accommodation that is
best left unexplored.
Nichol, supra note 15, at 1129.
728. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 2-3; see Nichol, supra note 15, at 1142 ("The Bivens
decisions, though based on the constitutional text, have conceded a significant role for
congressional oversight."); see also Id.at 1121 ("Courts... are not the only entities charged
withimakingthe guarantees ofthe Constitutionmeaningful. The focus throughout theBivens
decisions on alternative remedies afforded by other branches of government is, therefore, not
only legitimate; it has, if anything, been underdeveloped."). The Supreme Court itself noted
inLucas that "i]n the absence of... a congressional directive, the federal courts mustmake
the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal...."
Bush, 462 U.S. at 378; see also id. at 388 (noting that, in light of congressional intervention,
"the question we confront today is quite different from the typical remedial issue confronted
by a common-law court").
729. See Nichol, supranote 15, at 1145 (noting that "mere congressional declaration that
the plaintiff 'may not recover' is no appropriate bar to a Bivens claim"). I say "at least in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances" because the Court has not wholly foreclosed the
possibility that, in some highly discrete and exceptional contexts, a wholesale congressional
ban on Bivens recoveries would be effective. See, e.g., Bush, 462 U.S. at 378 n.14; Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1979) (refusing to dismiss damages claim against a
congressman, based on allegedly unconstitutional sex discrimination, where an "explicit"
congressional ban on such suits was lacking); cf.Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304
(1983) (rejecting Bivens actions brought by military personnel against superior officers in
part because "Congress, the constitutionally authorized source ofauthorityover the military
system ofjustice, has not provided a damages remedy").
730. Bush, 462 U.S. at 386; see also Nichol, supra note 15, at 1143 (emphasizing that
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A recent decision outside the Bivens context that might be viewed
as involving a modestly reduceable constitutional common law rule
is Smith v. Robbins.7 3 ' Robbins concerned a habeas corpus

petitioner's claim that his appointed counsel's handling of his state
appeal had violated the constitutional principles of Anders v.
California.s2 In Anders, the Court had "found inadequate
California's procedure-which permitted appellate counsel to
withdraw upon filing a conclusory letter stating that the appeal had
'no merit' and permitted the appellate court to affirm the conviction
upon reaching the same conclusion following a review of the
record." 3 The Court in Anders went on "to set out what would be
an acceptable procedure for treating frivolous appeals 3 -a
procedure that entailed the filing by counsel of"a brief referring to
anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal" and
a follow-up review by the appellate court to identify potentially
appealable issues. 3 5
Rejecting the lower court's conclusion that use of this procedure
was "obligatory upon the States,"7 36 a five-Justice majority in
Robbins deemed it merely "prophylactic" and declared that "the
States are free to adopt different procedures, so long as those
procedures adequately safeguard a defendant's right to appellate
counsel."73 7 Having formulated this standard, the Court found
"congressional authority to bar constitutional damages actions without providing adequate
alternative remedies... is inconsistent with our traditions ofjudicial review"); see id. at

1145 (adding that "the Court's traditional role as ultimate arbiter of the Constitution
necessitates that the final determination of adequacy be a judicial one").
731. 528 U.S. 259 (2000). I say "might be viewed" for two reasons: (1) Robbins may not
involve what we would normally think of as a constitutional common law rule, see infra note
747; and (2) the result in Robbins may go well beyond merely modestly reducing a
preexisting judicially declared rule, see infra notes 739-44 and accompanying text. Because

both of these points are debatable, however, Robbins is treated here.
732. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

733. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 264.
734. Id. at 271.
735. Id. (quotingAnders, 386 U.S. at 744).

736. Id. at 272.
737. Id. at 265; see also Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2344 (2000) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (describingAnders as having "outlined aprocedure that would meet [the Sixth
Amendment] standard... decreed, for safety's sake, by this Court"). The Court also offered
what appeared to be alternative formulations of its operative legal standard, including one
found particularly objectionable by the dissenting Justices. See infra note 739 and
accompanying text; see also Robbins, 528 U.S. at 284 (requiring procedures that afford

"adequate and effective appellate review").
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sufficient a state procedure that-while not requiring a full-scale
Anders brief-did require a filing by counsel that summarized the
case "with citations of the record," a review by an "appellate project
staff attorney" to double check for arguable trial errors and an
independent appraisal "of the entire record" (arguably more
exacting than the review required byAnders) by the appellate court
itself.7 38
Four Justices vigorously dissented from the Court's ruling in
Robbins, decrying in particular its foggy suggestion that anAnders
substitute need only "reasonably ensure[ ] that an indigent's appeal
will be resolved in a way that is related to the merit of that
appeal."" 9 The dissenters acknowledged that the Court had "not
held the details ofAnders to be exclusive," but they also emphasized
thatAnders provided the constitutional "benchmark."' The core of
this benchmark, according to the dissenters, was that counsel must
"show affirmatively, subject to evaluation, that he has made the
committed search for issues and the advocate's assessment of their
merits that go to the heart of appellate representation in our
adversary system." 41 In the dissenters' view, Anders had ensured
this result by specifically requiring "counsel to flag the best issues
[in writing] for the sake of keeping counsel on his toes and giving
focus to judicial review of his judgment." 42 Because the system at
issue in Robbins omitted this key safeguard-and therefore failed
to ensure "the partisan scrutiny.. :tthat defendants with paid
lawyers get as a matter of course" 7 -- it did not "measure up" to the
minimum requirements put in place byAnders.7'
Robbins illustrates the rich possibilities for post hoc
inventiveness created by a regime of constitutional common law. In
that case the Court cut back on the protections afforded to indigent
738. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 265, 266 n.1.
739. Id. at 296 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 276-77); id. at 289 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (same).
740. Id. at 297 (Souter, J., dissenting).
741. Id.
742. Id. at 298..
743. Id.
744. See id. at 297; id. at 291 & n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that 'simply putting
pen to paper can often shed new light on what may at first appear to be an open-and-shut
issue " and that the challenged procedure "does not force counsel to 'put pen to paper'
regarding those things most relevant to an appeal-legal issue").
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defendants by Anders-perhaps even (if one takes the view of the
dissenters) to the point of emasculation.7 Constitutional common
law provided the key to effectuating this result. InAnders, after all,
the Court did not say that its directives were subject to state-bystate revision (particularly in ways that would dilute those
directives' protections), but it also did not-at least in absolutely
express terms-foreclose that possibility either.746 This background
reality set the table for Robbins. In effect, the Court in that case
characterized (or more accurately, recharacterized) Anders along
the lines of a common law decision. 47 It was only because the Court
could and did make this analytic move that it was able to
uphold-without purporting to overrule Anders-a lessened
measure of appellate counsel's duties.
There is a curious and ironic aspect to this outcome, given the
Court's essentially contemporaneous refusal to cut down the
Miranda rule in Dickerson v. United States.748 After all, both
Mirandaand Anders were Warren Court landmarks handed down
745. See id. at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the validated system "does no
more to protect the indigent's right to advocacy than the no-merit letter condemned in
Anders"); id. at 289 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "procedure reviewed in
Anders ... would easily have satisfied [the majority's] standard"). This point of course is
highly debatable. The majority might well respond that the system involved in Robbins
involved a "third layer of review" that compensated (wholly or at least largely) for removal
of the requirement that counsel itemize possibly appealable issues. Id. at 266 n.1.
746. The suggestion in the text thatAnders lacked "absolutely express terms" is subject
to fair dispute, because the key language in the case was mandatory, not advisory or
precatory. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (noting that appellate counsel's request to withdraw
based on determination of appeal's frivolousness "must,however, be accompanied by a brief
referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal" (emphasis
added)). The key point, however, is that the Court did not take the next step, by further
stating that its mandatory directive was not replaceable, at least without adoption of a
substitute procedure that was no less effective in protecting the interests of indigent
defendants. Cf supra notes 698-99 and accompanying text (discussing the use of such
language in Miranda).
747. I say "along the lines of a common law decision" because Anders-as recast in
Robbins-may be viewed in either of two ways. First, it might be viewed as a true common
law decision-that is, a default rule that operates in the absence of a state's formal adoption
of an alternative procedure by the legislature or an authorized rulemaking body like the
state supreme court. Second, it might be viewed as merely providing a "safe harbor"
suggestion-that is, an advisory-opinion assurance that states would meet constitutional
requirements if (but not only if) they complied with the Anders procedures. In either event,
Anders (as reconceived in Robbins) is at least a common-law-like case in that it invited just
the sort of alternative-procedure reprise that the Court in Robbins ultimately upheld.
748. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000). Dickerson is discussed supra notes 714 & 737.
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within the span of a single year.7 4 9 Yet, it was in Mirandathat the
Court specifically acknowledged the modifiable nature of its ruling
and trumpeted its intention not to place states in a "constitutional
straightjacket."7 5 No similar rhetoric appears in Anders, presumably because the Court assumed its opinion set forth a hardand-fast constitutional rule. 5 1 In the longer term, however, the
Court's explicit acknowledgment of the common law features of
Miranda-and,in particular, its replaceable common law casemay well have given that decision a greater precedential strength.
Put another way, the lack of any talk about "fully effective
equivalent" substitutes 5 2 in Anders may have eased the judicial
retrenchment that occurred in Robbins. In sum, Robbins reveals
the potentialities of judicial nonspecificity in a world that
recognizes constitutional common law.
D. ConstitutionalCommon Law and StructuralReview
Are the Court's constitutional common law and common-law-like
rules structural in the pure sense? Most assuredly yes. To some,
these rules may appear, at least at first blush, to differ markedly
from other structural doctrines in our law. Rules of the common law
variety, for example, may not seem to resemble rules of clarity
because rules of clarity necessarily involve a judicial response to a
statute-that is, to something that a legislature has done. In a very
real sense, however, constitutional common law rules also respond
to what the legislature has done; their special mission is merely to
operate when what the legislature has done turns out to be nothing.
To say nothing, after all, is always to say something in the world of
law. For example, if a legislature says nothing about custodial
confessions made without warnings, it really is saying that such
confessions may be used in court under the preexisting background
principle that all relevant"evidence is admissible." 3 Thus, just as
749. Mirandawas handed down on June 13,1966, and Anders was handed down on May
8, 1967.
750. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
751. See supra note 746 (discussing mandatory, rather than precatory, verbiage of
Anders).
752. Miranda,384 U.S. at 476.
753. See, e.g., FED. R.EVED. 402.
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surely as rules of clarity respond to rules of law propounded by a
legislature, constitutional common law rules respond to legislatively
endorsed rules, albeit rules set forth in background norms allowed
to operate in constitutionally sensitive settings.
In the end, constitutional common law and common-law-like
rules operate like other structural doctrines. They protect
substantive constitutional values. They safeguard those values in
a provisional way. And they provide this provisional protection by
placing the burden of inertia on the side of those constitutional
values they are designed to protect. What's more, structural rules
of the common law ilk work to focus the attention of nonjudicial
policymakers on the constitutional values those rules embody and
reflect. They do so by establishing presumptively valid and clearly
visible governing principles, to which legislators must pay heed in
crafting revisions, if they choose to act at all.
There are other constitutional rules with a common law cast that
we shall not pause to canvass here. 5 ' Nor shall we add more to the
already extensive and lively commentary about the wisdom and
legitimacy of these sorts of rules. 5' 5 Enough has been said to show
754. See, e.g., County ofRiverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,53 (1991) (holding that "the
Fourth Amendment requires every State to provide prompt determinations ofprobable cause,
but that the Constitution does not impose on the States a rigid procedural framework" so
that "individual states may choose to comply in differentways"); DanielJ. Meltzer, Harmless
Errorand ConstitutionalRemedies,61 U. Cm. L. Rsv. 1 (1994) (asserting that the Chapman
beyond-a-reasonable doubt harmless error rule is modifiable "common law"); Henry P.
Monaghan, FirstAmendment'DueProcess',83HARv.L.REv. 518,550(1970) (suggesting that
ban on state court power to issue coercive orders against federal officers "stems from a
judicially fashioned (and congressionally reversible) common law offederalism"); Monaghan,
supra note 17, at 20 (viewing Wade-Gilbert lineup rules as akin to Miranda);Monaghan,
supra note 653, at 314 (suggesting that certain third-party-standing rules designed to
vindicate substantive rights may constitute constitutional common law); Schrock & Welsh,

supra note 654, at 1143-44 (asserting that Chapman harmless-error rule is modifiable
"common law"); see also United States v. Cappas, 29 F.3d 1187, 1193 (7th Cir. 1994)

(recognizing the emerging view that the Chapmanharmless error standard is constitutional
common law).
755. Compare Susan Bandes, ReinventingBivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 289,329-31 (1995) (expressing worry that Monaghan's notion of constitutional
common law may dampen acceptance of non-textual substantive rights), Merrill, supranote
695, at 57 (questioning broadly the legitimacy of constitutional common law except when
used to permit Congress to formulate adequate substitutes for judicial protections of

constitutional rights), and Schrock & Welsh, supranote 654, passim (questioning both the
authority for and the utility of constitutional common law), with Meltzer, supranote 754,
passim (arguing that constitutional common law is less intrusive than mandating
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that the Court, in a wide variety of settings, has used a common law
style of decision making to invite political-branch reevaluation of
judicially propounded "constitutional" doctrines. Such decisionswhether labeled as "constitutional common law" or the "subterranean homesick blues 7 5 6 -shift the burden of inertia to
legislative bodies, focus the mind of those bodies on constitutional
concerns, and push along an interbranch dialogue about the proper
reification of constitutional rights. 7 As a result, these ruleswhatever we might call them-are deeply structural in character.
IX.

PROPER-PURPOSE RULES

One important category of structural rules concerns legislative
motive.75 The application of these rules hinges upon whether a
constitutional rights, that courts have a distinctive expertise in formulating remedies, and
that such remedies neednot be a necessary component of due process in order to justify their
imposition).
756. BOB DYLAN, BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOmE (Warner Bros. Records 1965).
757. As noted by Professor Friedman:
The Bivens approach... is perfectly suited to foster... dialogue .... Bivens is
an invitation to Congress to join the remedial process .... Bivens permits
Congress to voice popular opinion as to a remedy that meets majoritarian
concerns, such as overdeterrence of official conduct. The Court reserves its say
as well, in that Congress cannot choose an "inadequate" remedy (whatever that
means); thus, Bivens is a doctrine that allows the branches of government to
work.
Friedman, supranote 15, at 770.
758. For some leading treatments of motive-based constitutional rules, see Brest,
ConscientiousLegislature'sGuide,supranote 16, at 589-94; Brest, supranote 385, at 99-102,
111-15; Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of
ConstitutionalAdjudication,52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36,99-156 (1977); John Hart Ely, Legislative
andAdministrativeMotivationin ConstitutionalLaw,79 YALEL.J. 1205 (1970); Symposium,
15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 925 (1978). The subject also is considered at length in BIcKEL, supra
note 6, at 208-22, and in ELY, supra note 88, at 136-45. Attentive to key definitional
questions, Professor Kagan has written:
I make no distinction between such terms as "purpose," "intent," "motive,"
"basis," and"reason." The Court has used these terms interchangeably, both in
First Amendment jurisprudence and elsewhere; in O'Brien, for example, the
Court treated the terms "motive" and "purpose" as synonymous. Moreover,
attempts by scholars to distinguish among these terms have proved unhelpful.
Kagan, supra note 633, at 426 n.40 (citing David A. Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent and the
Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 951 (1989), as noting "the interchangeable use of
these terms in equal protection law," and Ely, supra, at 1217-21, as criticizing efforts to
distinguish among these terms). I am in full agreement with Professor Kagan on these
matters, and the discussion that follows reflects that definitional perspective.
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challenged policy was the product of an impermissible purpose.7 5 9
These doctrines are structural, rather than substantive, because
they neither focus on nor preclude policymakers from achieving the
outcome embodied in the law at issue. 761 Instead, purpose-centered
rules involve disinfecting the work of lawmakers by ridding it of
7 6 Like other structural safeguards,
prohibited reasoning processes."
purpose-centered doctrines direct attention away from what rule
the lawmaker has issued to how the lawmaker has proceeded.7" 2 As
a result, invalidations of rules on improper-purpose grounds always
have a temporizing, remand-to-the-legislature quality. 6 3
An illuminating example is provided by Hunterv. Underwood.76 4
In that case, the Court considered whether Alabama's disenfranchisement of any person who committed a "crime . . .
involving moral turpitude" violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. 765 The Court found a violation, but only
because the Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901, which
promulgated the rule, was driven by a purpose of discriminating
against potential African American voters.7 66 As a result, Hunter
left the door open for Alabama to reenact, without alteration, its
1901 disenfranchisement rule in or after 1985.767 The Court,
759. See, e.g., infra notes 782-96 and accompanying text (describing various rules).
760. See, e.g., ELY, supranote 88, at 137 (noting"that the very same governmental action
can be constitutional or unconstitutional depending on why it was undertaken7).
761. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, An InterpretiveHistory of ModernEqual Protection,90
MICH. L. Rav. 213, 284 (1991) (noting that the intent standard "directs judicial review
towards purging legislative decisionmaking of certain considerations rather than guarding
against particular substantive outcomes").
762. See, e.g., Brest,supranote 385, at 115 (assertingthat amotive-based inquiry"focuses
on the process by which the rule or decision was made; it asks what criteria or objectives the
decisionmaker tookinto account"); Frickey, supranote 27, at 724 (arguing that motive-based
review "contemplates a judicial inquiry into the legislative process").
763. See BURT, supra note 555, at 363-64 (observing that "it follows from the logic of [a
purpose-based] disapproval that the legislature might reenact the statute if it can provide
amore explicit, fact-basedjustification for its action"); J. Morris ClarkLegislativeMotivation
and FundamentalRights in ConstitutionalLaw, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953, 1033 (1978)
(noting that, on a motive-based review,"[the decisionmaker... is generally entitled to reach
the same decision again 'in identical form, provided only that it is made for licit reasons"
(quoting Brest, supra note 385, at 115)); see also infra note 779 and accompanying text
(noting criticism of motive-based rules based on this feature).
764. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
765. Id. at 223 (quoting ALA. CoNST. of 1901, art. VIII, § 182).
766. See id. at 225, 233.
767. See id. at 233 ("Without deciding whether § 182 would be valid if enacted today
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however, emphatically demanded that, if Alabama's lawmakers
wished to retain this rule, they had to adopt it anew. The weighty
burden of inertia thus was placed where it had been before the
state's 1901 decision, 6 ' with a clarifying insistence that lawmakers
could resuscitate this restriction only if they proceeded free of the
noxious taint of racism.
Critics long have questioned the wisdom of purpose-centered
doctrines.7 0 They complain, for example, that these rules pose deep
problems ofapplication; 7 1 indeed, the Court itselfhas characterized
772

judicial inquiry into legislative purpose as "extremely difficult"

and a "hazardous matter."773 Why? In part because "[w]hat
motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not
necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it." 7 4 In
without any impermissible motivation, we simply observe that its original enactment was
motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account ofrace and... continues to
this day to have that effect. As such, it violates equal protection. . . ."). Of course, such a
reenactment, even if not subject to renewed attack on race-discrimination grounds, might
be challenged on a different constitutional theory. Cf. McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F.
Supp. 954,973 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (holdingthat disenfranchisement ofmisdemeanants violates
the "fundamental right" component ofthe FourteenthAmendment Equal Protection Clause).
768. See supra note 567 and accompanying text (noting significant practical effects of
location of burden of inertia).
769. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 232 (stating that "an additional purpose to discriminate
against poor whites would not render nugatory the purpose to discriminate against all
blacks" and suggesting that even if "the State has a legitimate interest in denying the
franchise to those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude," care should be
taken-when defining such crimes-not to include crimes "thought to be more commonly
committed by blacks"); id. at 233 (advising that despite "implicit authorization of§ 2 [of the
Fourteenth Amendment] to deny the vote to citizens 'for participation in rebellion, or other
crime,'" the Court is "confident that § 2 was not designed to permit the purposeful racial
discrimination attending the enactment and operation of § 182").
770. See, e.g., United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 299 (1935) (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting) (citing"a wise and ancient doctrine that a court will not inquire into the motives
of a legislative body" and arguing that "the process of psychoanalysis [should not be carried
into such] unaccustomed fields").
*771. See, e.g., Clark, supranote 763, at 954 ("The major argument against a motivationbased test of constitutionality is a practical one..It is usually impossible to know the
subjective motivation of legislators by direct evidence, such as legislative history, with
enough certainty to declare a law unconstitutional as a result."). But see, e.g., Sunstein,supra
note 41, at 81 (stating that "it is often possible, notwithstanding the problems of mixed
motivations and the evidentiary difficulties, to discern the dominant motivation by using
conventional techniques").
772. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971).
773. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
774. Id. at 384; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,50 U. CIH. L. REV. 533,
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addition, "even if a consensus among legislators existed, it might be
difficult to ascertain because the views of few legislators are
recorded." 75 The Court also has said that:
[Tihere is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to
invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its supporters. If
the law is struck down for this reason, rather than because of
its facial content or effect, it would presumably be valid as soon
as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for
different reasons. 76
In a similar vein, "undue emphasis on actual motivation may result
in identically worded statutes being held valid in one State and
778
invalid in a neighboring State. 777 For these reasons and others,
the case against motive-centered review has garnered much
support. 7 9 But the Court has responded to the case against properpurpose rules-a case largely articulated in the Court's own
547 (1983) ("Because legislatures comprise many members, they do not have 'intents' or
'designs,' hidden yet discoverable. Each member may or may not have a design. The body as
a whole, however, has only outcomes."); Farber & Frickey, supra note 444, at 880-82
(discussing Judge Easterbrook's contention).
775. Clark, supra note 763, at 974; see Lawrence A. Alexander, Introduction:Motivation
and Constitutionality,15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 925, 938 (1978) (asserting that "the evidentiary
problems are staggering, especially when ...one keeps in mind that there is no difference
in theory between enacting and repealing on the one hand (action), and failing to enact or
repeal on the other (inaction)"). The problem presented by identifying wrongful motives is
compounded by "the ease of legislatures' offering pretextual motives and the difficulty of
courts' discovering the real ones." Kagan, supra note 633, at 414.
776. Palmer,403 U.S. at 225; see Brest, supra note 385, at 125 (noting that legislators'
ability to "conceal their illicit objectives" may strengthen this "futility" argument).
777. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (citing as support Rundlett v. Oliver, 607 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1979), in which
Maine's statutory rape law was upheld, andMeloon v.Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1977),
in which New Hampshire's statutory rape law was struck down).
778. See, e.g., Clark, supranote 763, at 974-75 ("[Striking] down useful laws passed for
putatively bad purposes... would be dysfunctional because it would serve only to chasten
legislative immorality rather than to advance the public good. [In addition,] psychological
examination by courts of coordinate branches of government (or of state government) has
been said to be demeaning or disrespectful.").
779. In addition to the materials already cited (and particularly the Court's decisions in
O'Brien and Palmer, see supra notes 772-74), see, for example, Fleming v. Nestor, stating
that: "Judicial inquiries into Congressional motives are at best a hazardous matter, and
when that inquiry seeks to go behind objective manifestations it becomes a dubious affair
indeed." 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960); see also infra note 784 (noting, inter alia, the City ofErie
plurality opinion which declined to strike down a statute on the basis of an illicit motive).
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opinions 78 -- by recognizing such rules in almost every area of
constitutional law.78
The following examples prove the point:
N Government rules that advance religion violate the
Establishment Clause unless (among other things)
the policymaker acted with "a secular legislative
purpose."75 2
780. See supranotes 770-77 and accompanying text.
781. Related to improper-purpose rules is what we might call the rule ofimproper recital
or phrasing. In City of Atlanta v. McKinney, for example, the Georgia Supreme Court
invalidated a city ordinance that provided benefits to "domestic partners" because the
ordinance recognized domestic partnerships as involving "a family relationship." 454 S.E.2d
517, 521 (Ga. 1995). Given this recital, the court found that the law exceeded the city's
constitutional authoritybecause "cities in this state maynot enact ordinances definingfamily
relationships." Id. at 520. Following the decision in McKinney, however, the city reenacted
much of the same ordinance but excised all references to familial relations. When the new
ordinance found its waybackto the Georgia Supreme Court, Justice Carley lodged avigorous
protest to the city's "semantic maneuver." See CityofAtlantav. Morgan, 492 S.E.2d 193,197
(Ga. 1997) (Carley, J., dissenting). As he wrote:
The City's ordinance disclaims the creation of marital relationship and the
intent to alter or affect Georgia laws regulating private or civil relationships.
However, phraseology cannot save a municipal ordinance which is
unconstitutional. The "special laws" provision of the Georgia Constitution,
which prohibits a municipality from enacting an ordinance defining a family
relationship, "would be nullified if by play upon words and definitions the
courts should hold valid a special law when there existed at the same time of
its enactment a general law covering the same subject-matter."
Id. (quoting City ofAtlanta v. Hudgins, 19 S.E.2d 508,511 (Ga. 1942) (emphasis in original)).
By a five-to-two vote, however, the Court upheld the new ordinance because "the City
followed our holdingi-Mcinney and carefully avoided the constitutional flaw in its previous
benefits oidinance by eliminating from [the] definition of 'dependent' any language
recognizing any new family relationship similar to marriage." Id. at 195. For a case that
presented an analogous issue, see Wallace v. Jaffree, which invalidated a moment-of-silence
law because it specifically authorized "meditation or voluntary prayer." 472 U.S. 38, 41
(1985). Justice O'Connor, conurringinJaffree, foundthe particular statute unconstitutional
even though "moment of silence laws in many States should pass Establishment Clause
scrutiny," i at 76, and noted that "the face of the statute... may clearly establish that it
seeks to encourage or promote voluntary prayer," id. at 73; see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 828-36 (1995) (rejecting the argument that allowance of write-in
candidacies transformed the state's stipulation of an ostensibly impermissible qualification
based on prior service into a permissible regulation of the "Manner" of holding elections
under Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the Constitution; relying in part on the statutory
preamble that specified an intent to "limit the terms of elected officials").
782. Lemonv. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612 (1971) (emphasis added); accord,e.g., Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 590 (1987) (striking down a creation-science statute because of
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0 Strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause is
triggered "if the object of a law is to infringe upon or
restrict practices
because of their religious
83
motivation."

E3

In assessing whether a law is "unrelated to the content
of expression"-so as to avoid strict scrutiny under the
Free Speech Clause-courts deem the "government's
purpose.., the controlling consideration."7'

"the legislature's preeminent religious purpose"); see also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,
255 (1982) (holding a fund-collecting restriction unlawful because of legislators' "express
design-to burden or favor selected religious denominations").
783. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,533 (1993) (emphasis
added); see id. at 534 (emphasizing that "[flacial neutrality is not determinative" because
"[tihe Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked as well
as overt").
784. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (emphasis added); accord,
e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480,2491 (2000) (following Ward in declining to invalidate
a state medical buffer-zone law that "was not adopted 'because of disagreement with the
message it conveys'"); id. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that "because of' question
is "the principal inquiry" under Ward); id. at 2517 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (advocating
invalidation of the statute in part because "testimony to the Colorado legislature7 revealed
that "the legislature's true purpose" was "to restrict speakers on one side of the debate: those
who protest abortions"); id. at 2521 (concluding that "the statute is a failed attempt to make
the enactment appear content neutral, a disguise for the real concern of the legislation);
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 645 (1994) (stating that "even a regulation
neutral on its face may be content based ifits manifest purpose is to regulate speech because
of the message it conveys"), later opinion after remand, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 81 n.4 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (notingthat
"an intent or purpose to restrict the communication itself because ofits nature would make
the O'Brientest inapplicable). But ef City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 120 S. Ct. 1382,1392 (2000)
(plurality opinion) (upholding a prohibition on nude dancing and relying on'O'Brien in
declaring "As we have said before, ... this Court will not strike down an otherwise
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit motive); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U.S. 560, 582 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (voting to uphold a nude
dancing law against First Amendment attack in part because "[olur appropriate focus is not
an empirical enquiry into ...actual intent"). See generally Kagan, supra note 633, at 414
(arguing that "notwithstanding the Court's protestations in O'Brien,.. . First Amendment
law, as developed by the Supreme Court over the past several decades, has as its primary,
though unstated, object the discovery ofimproper governmental motives"). An early example
of purpose-based analysis in the free-expression area is provided by Grosjeanv. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (striking down a tax applicable to widely circulated
periodicals "because, in the light of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a
deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information
to which the public is entitled"). A useful discussion of Grosjean appears in ELY, supranote
88, at 143-45.
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a State laws that inhibit interstate commerce are subject
to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity' if rooted in a
"discriminatory purpose."5
* Government restrictions offend the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of liberty if their "purpose...
is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking [a previability] abortion."7"'
* In applying the Bill ofAttainder Clause,"[tihe question
...

is whether the legislative aim was to punish [an]

individual for past activity."787

Rules that focus on lawmaker motives protect a variety of other
constitutional rights as well.788
Perhaps most important, the Court has developed two separate
purpose-centered doctrines in the equal protection field. First,

facially neutral government policies trigger heightened scrutiny if
enacted with the motive of discriminating against a protected or
quasi-protected class. 89 Under this principle, any rule adopted with
785. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 & n.15 (1981) (quoting
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)) (emphasis added).
786. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (emphasis added); see also
Stenbergv. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597,2620 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (reiterating and
applying Casey's "purpose or effect" standard); id. at 2650 n.19 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(reading Justice Ginsburg's concurrence "to suggest that even if the Nebraska statute does
not impose an undue burden on women seeking abortions, the statute is unconstitutional
because it has the purpose of imposing an undue burden).
787. Flemmingv. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,614 (1960) (emphasis added) (quoting DeVeauv.
Braisted, 363 U.S. 144,160 (1960) (pluralityopinion)); accord,e.g., BellSouth Corp. v. F.C.C.,
162 F.3d 678, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("BellSouth II) (rejecting the argument that section 271
of Telecommunications Act of1996, which restricted the provision of long distance telephone
service by Bell operating companies, was an impermissible bill ofattainder, in part because
"there is no unmistakable evidence of legislative intent to punish); see also United States
v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,311, 314 (1946) (discussing legislative history that showed a goal of
"purging" government of subversives, which constituted an impermissible "purpose" of the
bill's sponsors).
788. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999) (declaring "unequivocally
impermissible," under the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause, "a
purpose to deter welfare applicants from migrating to [a state]"); City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55 (1980) (Fifteenth Amendment); Wiley v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Ex Post Facto Clause); see also Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (Double
Jeopardy Clause).
789. See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541,546 (1999) (noting that a "faciallyneutral
law" is subject to strict scrutiny "ifit can be proved that the law was 'motivated by a racial
purpose or object'" and that such a determination requires "a 'sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available'); Washington v. Davis, 426
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the purpose of disadvantaging persons based on race, ethnicity or
sex (even if the law is facially neutral) carries with it a powerful
presumption of invalidity.9 Hunter illustrates well the operation

of this rule. 91
Second, if a government rule is subject to elevated means/
ends equal protection scrutiny (most often, because it creates
a suspect classification on its face), the Court will consider in
defense of that rule only those goals that its propounders in fact
intended to pursue.79 2 In Mississippi University for Women v.
U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (noting that the "necessary discriminatory ... purpose" need not be
"express or appear on the face of the statute"); see also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535,
548 (1972) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a state's welfare program disbursement
scheme in the absence of evidence that the "difference in treatment among... grant classes"
was racially motivated). But cf.Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464,
472 n.7 (1981) (plurality opinion) ("Even ifthe preservation offemale chastity were one ofthe
motives ofthe statute, and even if that motive be impermissible, petitioner's argument must
fail because'[it is a familiar practice ofconstitutional law that this court will not strike down
an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.'
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968))). Of
course, it has been controversial whether equal protection jurisprudence should focus on
purity of process as opposed to evenhandedness of results. See generally Paul Brest, The
Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword:In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple,90
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976) (arguing for a continuing strong judicial role in enforcing the
antidiscrimination principle); Owen M. Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come:
AntidiscriminationLaw in the Second DecadeAfter Brownv. Board ofEducation, 41 U. CHi.
L. REV. 742 (1974) (analyzing various arguments in support of both process-based and
results-based approaches); Michael J. Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory ofRacial
Discrimination,125 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1977) (calling for a more thorough analysis by the
Court ofdisparate racial impact theories). Whatever position one might bring to this debate,
Washington v. Davis and its progeny in fact reflect the modem Court's insistence on
examining legislative purpose.
790. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616-22 (1982). An early case is Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). Auseful discussion ofthe case appears in ELY, supranote 88,
at 139-40.
791. See supra notes 764-69 and accompanying text. Some analysts have claimed that the
substantive right affected by the allegedly invidious decision helps determine the intensity
ofmotive review, particularly invoting rights cases. As stated by one such observer "Judicial
intrusion can be properly heightened without reducing the institutional legitimacy of the
court where those interests essential to individual participation in the democratic process
are at stake." Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1118-19 (1998).
This aspect of motive analysis, if in fact it is present in our law, comports with basic
structural theory by adapting structural protections to take account of the nature and
intensity of the substantive interest at issue. See supranotes 530-31 and accompanying text.
792. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 212-17 (1977) (rejecting an argument
that "Congress may reasonably have presumed that nondependent widows, who receive
benefits (underthe OASDI program], are needier than nondependent widowers, who do not,
because ofjob discrimination against women (particularly older women), and because they
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Hogan,7 93 for example, the Court considered the constitutionality of
Mississippi's operation of an all-women's nursing school, which the
state's lawyers sought to justify as compensating for longstanding
discrimination against women.79 4 Because the program involved a
sex-based classification, the Court required the state to show "that
the alleged objective is the actual purpose underlying the
discriminatory classification." 9 Examining the legislative record
(and noting the inherent implausibility of a remedial need to
expand nursing-career opportunities for women), the Court found
that "the State has failed to establish that the legislature intended
the single-sex
policy to compensate for any perceived discrimi796
nation."
are more likely to have been more dependent on their spouses" since "inquiry into the actual
purposes' of the discrimination," as shown by statutory text and legislative history, reveals
Congress was not motivated by this reasoning (citations omitted) (quoting Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,648 (1975))); Weinbergerv. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,648-53 (1975)
(rejecting a characterization of the OASDI "classification... as one reasonably designed to
compensate women beneficiaries as a group for the economic difficulties which still confront
women who seek to support themselves and their families" because "it [was] apparent both
from the statutory scheme itself and from the legislative history of § 402(g)" that Congress
in fact "intended to permit women to elect not to work and to devote themselves to the care
ofchildren); id. at 648 (warning that "the mere recitation ofa benign, compensatory purpose
is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes
underlying a statutory scheme"); id. at 648 n.16 ("This Court need not in equal protection
cases accept at face value assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination of the
legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have
been a goal of the legislation."); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972) (rejecting
state's defense of its anticontraception law in part because "we cannot agree that the
deterrence of premarital sex may reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the
Massachusetts law"); see also TRIBE, supranote 24, § 17-2 at 1681 (observing that "the Court
has with growing frequency found itself... prepared, as a form of intermediate review, to
reject justifications for a government action where those justifications had not actually been
considered). By forcing policymakers to identify and focus on actual, permissible purposes,
this rule disciplines the policymaking process in much the same way as findings-and-study
rules. See supraPart V. As Professor Sunstein has stated: "[Imdentification of the legitimate
public purposes purportedly served by statutory classifications should improve
representative politics by ensuring that the deliberative process is focused on those purposes
and the extent to which the classifications serve them.... ." Sunstein, supranote 41, at 78;
see also id.at 84 ('The requirement that measures be justified rather than simply fought for
has a disciplining effect on the sorts of measures that can be proposed and enacted. At the
same time, this requirement will make it more likely that citizens and legislators will act for
public-regarding reasons.").
793. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
794. See id. at 727.
795. Id. at 730 (emphasis added).
796. Id. at 730 n.16.
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The Court has imposed this same actual-purpose limitation in
other heightened-scrutiny cases,7 97 and some observers have
798
advocated its extension to the minimum -scrutiny context as well.
797. See, eg., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505-06 (1999) (considering a Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge and deeming irrelevant possible
justificatory purpose for law where the state "represented to the Court that the legislation
was not enacted for any such reason"); Lundingv. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S.
287, 308-09 (1998) (suggesting a need to focus on what "actually is a rationale" for a statute
challenged under the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause); Erznoznik v.
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1975) (invalidating a ban on nudity for publicly visible
outdoor movie screens on free speech grounds; noting that claimed traffic-safety motivation
was unsupported by the legislative record); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779, 829-30 (1995) (rejecting an argument that forcing selected incumbents to run as
write-in candidates was permissible "manner" regulation and noting that "[w]e must...
accept the state court's view of the purpose of its own law," which was to "'limitthe terms of
elected officials'); cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (eschewing, in the context
of substantive due process, a "proclaimed purpose" because the Court cannot "shut [its] eyes
to the fact" that many similar laws are "passed from other motives" that are impermissible).
798. See Gunther, supranote 30, at 20-22, 37-38,43-46. In Schweikerv. Wilson, 450 U.S.
221 (1981), Justice Powell noted in dissent that "[wlhen a legitimate purpose for a statute
appears in the legislative history or is implicit in the statutory scheme itself, a court has
some assurance that the legislature has made a conscious policy choice." He added, however,
that "the Court should receive with some skepticism post hoc hypotheses about legislative
purpose, unsupported by the legislative history" in orderto "preserve equalprotection review
[under the FifthAmendment] as something more than 'amere tautological recognition of the
fact that Congress did what itintended to do."'Id. at 242-45 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,180 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring
in judgment)); see also id. at 244 n.6 (noting that while some Supreme Court cases "suggest
that the actual purpose of a statute is irrelevant... and that the statute must be upheld 'if
any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify' its discrimination ...
[a]scertainment of actual purpose to the extent feasible... remains an essential step in
equal protection" (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,426 (1961))); United States
R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 187-88 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing cases that support his argument that "this Court has frequently recognized that
the actual purposes of Congress, rather than the post hoc justifications offered by
Government attorneys, mustbe the primary basis for analysis under the rational-basis test");
cf. ELY, supra note 88, at 129 (noting that, "while I share the instinct that animated
Professor Gunther's suggestion and that seems intermittently to be moving the Court, rm
skeptical that a method of forcing articulation ofpurposes can be developed that will be both
workable and helpful"); Linde, supranote 27, at 222 (criticizing Professor Gunther's approach
to rational-basis review, under which "a judge is to assess the challenged law in relation to
actual, not merely conjectural, purposes").
In one set of purportedly rational-basis cases, the Court arguably has invalidated laws on
the basis of wrongful actual motivations, without seriously exploring the possibility that
anotherrightful purpose might justifythe statute. See Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996);
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. 473 U.S. 432 (1985); United States Dep't of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). For an interesting discussion of these cases, see
Sunstein, supranote 434, at 10 (arguing that "Romer v. Evans... show[s] a willingness to
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The Court, however, has shied away from this position by often
expressing its willingness to assess run-of-the-mill constitutional
challenges on the basis of hypothesized legislative ends.7 99 This
tendency, it bears emphasis, does not bespeak an antipathy to
structural doctrines. Rather, the Court's reservation of this
specialized structural protection for heightened-scrutiny cases
reveals exactly what we should expect and what we have seen
before: Structural protections are most likely to take hold when the
substantive rights they safeguard apply with the greatest force."' 0
Although motive-based analysis has attracted a bevy of
detractors, most critiques occupy ground that is already wellcovered.0 1 There is, however, one distinctive critique that cannot be
sidestepped in the context of this work: namely, the claim of
Professor Bickel that motive-based analysis is not structurally
justifiable because it provides an ineffectual tool for fostering
fruitful interbranch dialogue.0 2

look behind enactments in order to see if they rest on constitutionally unacceptable
'animus'). See also Gunther, supra note 30, at 35 (asserting that the Court in the early sex
discrimination case, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), focused "on uncovering the actual
purpose which the Massachusetts legislature had in fact pursued," even while purporting to
apply minimum scrutiny); Linde, supra note 27, at 213 (asserting that in Moreno -the
legislative record showed that the 1971 amendment was aimed at disqualifying so-called
'hippy communes,' and the Court was prepared to declare this an impermissible aim to harm
a politically unpopular group").
799. See, e.g., Fritz,449 U.S. at 176 (discussing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549
(1972)); id. at 179 (stating that"[w]here... there are plausible reasons for Congress' action,
... [ilt is, ofcourse, 'constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the
legislative decision" (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960))); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (stating that a law is to be upheld "if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it"and citing for support Kotch v. BoardofRiver Port
PilotCommissioners,330 U.S. 552 (1947),MetropolitanCasualtyInsuranceCo. v. Brownell,
294 U.S. 580 (1935), Lindsley v. NaturalCarbonicGas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), andAtchison,
Topeka & SantaFe RailroadCo. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899)). See generally Gunther,
supra note 30, at 20 (discussing "traditional" deference to legislative ends exemplified by
McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969)). For a strong
version ofthe critique on purpose-related inquiries in this context, see Linde, supranote 27,
at 233 (claiming that "nothing limits a lawmaker to purposes that qualify for benefit-cost
analysis").
800. See, e.g., supra notes 540-41 and accompanying text.
801. See supra notes 770-79 and accompanying text.
802. See BICKEM, supranote 6, at 215-21.
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According to Professor Bickel:
The Court, as in Kent v. Dulles, may fail to apply a statute in
the teeth of a reasonably well-determined legislative purpose,
because it embarks upon a colloquy with the legislature, asking
it to pass on certain consequences of the statute once more and
more explicitly. This is initselfnot altogether fictive. Something
that is made explicit in the statute is more soundly imputable
to the majority than if it is merely mentioned in debate or
otherwise known. At any rate, the end to be achieved is quite
clear and real; and that is to obtain a second legislative
consideration.8 "'
He continues:
But the method of motive can lead to no similar colloquy, can
produce no such end. If a statute is denied application for being
impermissively motivated, how is the legislature to respond? It
can respond to Kent v. Dulles by re-enacting the statute with
certain explicit provisions in it. How can it respond so as to
make sure that its statute is correctly motivated? Presumably
only by imposing upon some of its members a requirement of
less candor in debate. This is scarcely a desirable consummation. Even so, it may not suffice, since the wrong motive
may be found in other materials than the debates; it is, after all,
as difficult to disprove as it is to prove. As a colloquy, therefore,
as a device of not doing which gives the legislature the
opportunity to overrule the Court, the method of motive is
euphemistic; it is an unacknowledged way, either of cutting off
legislative power, or of leaving its specific exercise wholly to the
discretion of judges to allow or forbid, with
no relation to
84
principle or, indeed, to articulable reason. 0
Although this argument is provocative, three points suggest that
Professor Bickel misstepped in concluding that a motive-based
invalidation "permits no effective legislative reprise.""0 5 First, it is
not true that a legislature that wishes to consider reenactment of
a law invalidated on motive-based grounds will inevitably resort to

803. Id. at 216.
804. Id.
805. Id. at 221.
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"less candor in debate.""'8 If the Court has a special expertise and

role to play in safeguarding constitutional values, as it surely does,
one should not assume lightly that its instructions will be blithely
ignored. Indeed, in another part of his book, Professor Bickel

advanced much the same observation in eloquent and forceful
terms:
see to it that the political judgment of
[Tihe Court can..
necessity is undertaken with awareness of the principle on
which it impinges. In American life, the Court is second only to
the presidency inhaving effectively at its disposal the resources
of rhetoric. Hence... the Court can explain the principle that
is in play and praise it, and thus also guard its integrity. ... No
one should underestimate the dominion of ideas in a nation
the rule of principle as well as to majoritarian
committed to
07
democracy.

Given these premises, why should we suppose that legislatures will
greet judicial pronouncements of wrongful motive with little more
than self-serving strategic behavior? Legislators, like judges, take
an oath of fealty to the Constitution. 08 It thus seems neither
accurate nor fair to assume that those who legislate will simply
ignore ajudicial directive, aimed directly at them, that expounds in
pointed fashion what motivations for acting the Constitution does
and does not permit.0 9
806. Id. at 216.
807. Id. at 188; see also id.at 252 (noting the Court's "great and mystic prestige" and "the
skilled exertion ofits educational faculty"); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices ofthe "Passive
Virtues"--A Comment on Principleand Expediency in JudicialReview, 64 COLuM. L. REV.
1, 7 (1964) (describing judges as "effective 'teachers to the citizenry" (quoting BICKEL, supra
note 6, at 69)); Wellington, supranote 8, at 503 (opining that "often it is difficult for Congress
to ignore values that may be of constitutional dimension and that are called to its attention
by the Supreme Court").
808. See FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFULCTS, supra note 14, at 233-34 ("All public

officers-executive, legislative, and judicial-are constitutionally required by Article VI,
Clause 3, 't support this Constitution.' As elaborated by statute, executive and legislative
officials 'solemnly swear (oraffirm)... [to] support and defend the Constitution of the United
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; ... bear true faith and allegiance to the
same; ... take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
and ... well and faithfully discharge the duties [of their office].'" Id. (alterations and
omissions in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 and 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (1994)).
809. See Eisenberg, supra note 758, at 116 (noting that "[slome legislators, after being
informed that they initially acted unconstitutionally, may refuse to vote for reenactment).
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A second problem with Professor Bickel's depiction of how
motive-based remands operate is that it overlooks a vital force in
our constitutional processes: the built-in time lag that almost
always accompanies judicial review of legislative action. This
dynamic ensures that a motive-based invalidation of legislation
followed by an effort at reenactment typically will produce a fresh
appraisal by "new politicians in a new set of circumstances, and
with a new set of people looking at them."10 Whatever one might
assume about the defiant deviousness of a legislature whose own
motives have been impugned, one cannot suppose that a
reconstituted legislature will resort to dissembling to protect the
wrongful work of a body that no longer sits. For this reason too,
Professor Bickel's suggestion that motive-based rulings are
exercises in futility, inevitably destined to be met with legislative
deviousness, overlooks important practical realities.
Finally, Professor Bickel overstates the case to be made against
motive-driven rules based on their supposed susceptibility to
judicial abuse. All doctrines are abusable, so the real question is
whether there is some special reason for attacking motive-based
rules on this ground."' 1 Professor Bickel, however, fails to show that
motive-based doctrines carry with them a distinctive risk ofjudicial
misbehavior. Why, for example, must we conclude that a motivebased ruling "decides the issue.., without facing it as such" 1 2 by
"cutting off legislative power" in "an unacknowledged way?" 13 To
be sure, some judges might try to manipulate motive-based
This is all the more true if, as much political science literature suggests, legislative officials
do not act solely out of selfish, political interests. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, supranote 444,
at 889 (noting and endorsing the conclusion of Richard Fenno that the action of
congresspersons is dictated not only by aspirations for reelection and influence, but also by
desire to "mak[e] good public policy"); see also Eskridge, Public Values, supra note 116, at
1070 (citing "modern scholarship suggesting that public values do play a critical role in
politics"). In addition, there is a deep justification for motive-based rules, even if they often
carry with them a built-in futility, that was suggested by Professor Bickel himself "Ifthe
political institutions at last insist upon a course of action that cannot be accommodated to
principle, it is no part of the function of the Court to bless it .... ." BICKEL, supra note 6, at
188.
810. Calabresi, supranote 13, at 105.
811. As Justice Story observed in Martin v. Hunter'sLessee, "[iut is always a doubtful
course, to argue against the use or existence of a power, from the possibility of its abuse." 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,344 (1816).
812. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 221.
813. Id. at 216.
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doctrines, 1 ' but we are in a bad way if we must assume that our
courts in general behave in this manner. No less important, the fact
remains that motive-based rulings (like other structural rulings and
unlike traditional hard-and-fast dispositions) have an intrinsic selfcontaining quality because they always leave open at least some
possibility of a successful legislative reprise.815 There is, moreover,
a practical fact-perhaps unknowable to Professor Bickel more than
thirty years ago-that should substantially reduce the worries he
expressed about judicial overreaching. The fact is that real-world
decisions, particularly decisions, of the Supreme Court, reveal a
marked attentiveness to applying motive-based rules not with
recklessness, but with restraint.1 '
All these points-which focus on the potential for fruitful
dialogue driven by motive-based rules, the importance of time's
passage in this process, and the reluctance of courts to reach too far
based on wrongful mbtivations-are illustrated by the Eleventh
Circuit's ruling in Coleman v. Miller. 17 In Coleman, the plaintiff
challenged Georgia's incorporation of the Confederate Battle
Emblem into its state flag. Georgia had taken this action in 1956,
close on the heels ofthe Supreme Court's declaration that the South
had to bring about the desegregation of its public schools." 8 Based
814. See infra notes 1090-91 and accompanying text.
815. See supranotes 63-64 and accompanying text.
816. See, e.g., Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S.
841, 856 n.15 (1984) (requiring "unmistakable evidence of punitive intent"' in bill-ofattainder cases and declaring that "several isolated statements" fail to show such intent
(quoting Flemmingv. Nestar, 363 U.S. 603,619 (1960))); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,39495 (1983) (noting that the Court's decisions reflect "reluctance to attribute unconstitutional
motives to the States" inthe Establishment Clause context); PersonnelAdm'r v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 278-80 (1979) (refusing to find a purpose to discriminate against women through
the enactment of a preference for veterans based on the principle that persons will be
deemed to intend the "natural and foreseeable consequences" of their acts); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 n.18 (1977)
(emphasizing that an inquiry into purpose by "[p~lacing a decisionmaker on the stand is ...
'usually to be avoided' (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
420 (1971))); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,246 (1976) (refusing to find that the record
established purposeful discrimination despite significant disparate impact ofa police-officer
qualification test).
817. 117 F.3d 527 (11th Cir. 1997).
818. See id. at 528 (noting that the "flag design was adopted during a regrettable period
in Georgia's history when its public leaders were implementing a campaign of massive
resistance to the Supreme Court's school desegregation rulings"); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
349 U.S. 294 (1955) ("Brown H"); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("Brown I).
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on this fact and others, the district court found "that discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor in the legislature's passage of [the
flag bill], though it was not the only factor." 19 This finding put that
court in a position to invoke the same motive-centered structural
rule deployed by the Supreme Court in the Hunter case. 20 In
particular, the district court might have remanded the entire
matter to the state legislature for an untainted, present-day
consideration whether race-neutral concerns of regional pride (or
the like) warranted continued use of the Confederate symbol. Put
another way, the court could have held that, if Georgia's waving of
its Confederacy-celebrating flag was to persist, it had to be the
product of a fairer fight than occurred in 1956.21
In the end, however, both the district court and the circuit court
panel avoided this result by holding that the plaintiff had not
shown that the Georgia flag carried with it any continuing
discriminatory effects. 22 From a structural perspective, this
reasoning is interesting in two respects. First, the courts' analysis
of discriminatory effects reflects the application of a sort of

819. Coleman v. Miller, 885 F. Supp. 1561,1569 (N.D. Ga. 1995). The subsequent history
of the ruling that embodied this pronouncement is set forth infra note 822.
820. See supranotes 764-69 and accompanying text.
821. The unfairness of the fight cannot be gainsaid, particularly given the powerful
presence of the Ku Klux Klan in the state during that time and the association of the
Confederate Battle Flagwith its causes. It bears emphasis that the sort ofpolitical dynamics
that surrounded adoption of the Georgia flag, laden with prejudice against blacks and
charged with rage about school desegregation, are paradigmatic of the sort of conditions a
traditional CaroleneProducts approach would deem supportive ofjudicial intervention. See
supra notes 458-60 and accompanying text. More fundamentally, these background
circumstances suggest the presence of the sort of passion-laden factional action that most
centrally concerned James Madison and other Framers of the Constitution. See supranote
453 and accompanying text.
822. See Coleman, 117 F.3d at 530 (finding plaintiffs evidence at the summary judgment
hearing "insufficient to establish 'disproportionate effects [of the Georgia flag] along racial
lines'" because the record contained only "anecdotal evidence of intangible harm to two
individuals, without any evidence regarding the impact upon other African-American citizens
or the comparative effect of the flag on white citizens" and a "mere allegation, without any
accompanying support" that "the flying of the flag promotes violence against blacks and
continues to represent a symbol of Georgia's efforts against integration); id. at 531 n.8
(concludingthat "appellanthas failed to demonstrate that the Georgia flagpresently imposes
a discriminatory racial effect'); Coleman v. Miller, 912 F. Supp. 522, 530 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
(holding that "Plaintiff... failed to make a specific showing that he... suffered disparate
harm from the [Georgia] flag's existence" because he "rest[ed] solely on his own assertions
that he... suffered a disparate impact').
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legislation-saving time-driven rule. 23 We already have seen how
changed circumstances may warrant the invalidation of a dated
program coupled with a judicial invitation for legislative
reassessment. 2 ' Here, in contrast, changed conditions appeared to
block a judicial remand for legislative reconsideration. Both the
district and circuit courts in Coleman suggested, in so many words,
that while the state flag might once have been unconstitutional, it
no longer was so in light of a modem-day muting of its message of
white supremacy and constitutional defiance.
Second, the courts' sparse-record reasoning on the discriminatory-effects issue8 2 creates a very real chance that another
plaintiff in another case could fill the evidentiary breach. Might a
federal court, faced with bolstered proof of a continuing disparate
and harmful impact, call on the Georgia legislature to take up de
novo the proper content of the state flag? To ardent proponents of
state autonomy, such a result might seem anathema. But such an
intervention surely is no more invasive than the race-driven judicial
reconstruction of state school systems (spearheaded by the "liberal"
Warren and Burger courts in the 1960s and 1970s)8 26 or of
legislative voting districts (spearheaded by the "conservative"
Rehnquist Court in the 1990s).121 Indeed, precisely because the
purpose-centered rule that would induce a reconsideration of the
proper content of the Georgia flag is structural in nature, concerns
about judicial overreaching should be much reduced.' It seems,
after all, a limited affront to a state's autonomy for a court simply
to call on its present-day legislature to consider this important
issue afresh, free of past segregationist motives. 29
823. See generallysupra notes 494-618 (discussing time-driven structural rules).
824. See supra notes 542-60 and accompanying text.
825. See supra note 822 and accompanying text.
826. See Dayton Bd. ofEduc. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. ofEduc. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Swannv. Charlotte-MecklenburgBd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1 (1971);
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Brown v. Board ofEduc., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)
("Brown I"); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("Brown r).
827. See Bushv. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shawv. Hunt, 517U.S. 899(1996) ("Shaw II");
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) ("Shaw r).
828. See supranotes 63-64 and accompanying text.
829. Nor would it suffice to say that the state can remove the flag, if its existence is no
longer justified, simply by repealing the law that put it in place. Such an argument did not
prevail in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985), see supra notes 764-69 and
accompanying text, and misses the essential point about properly allocating the burden of
inertia that underlies judicial application of structural constitutional rules. See generally
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To be sure, the current impact of the Georgia flag on African
Americans and others in the state may be difficult to calibrate and
capture in an evidentiary record. But this fact merely raises, rather
than answers, key constitutional questions presented by a case like
Coleman. In particular, the difficulty of measuring discriminatory
effect triggers the question whether a court can readily infer, in the
face of a finding of wrongful purpose, a decisive dissipation of a
preexisting discriminatory impact when psychological harms,
rather than statistically measurable outcomes, are at issue. 80 In
addition, this difficulty presents the question whether a finding of
unlawful purpose, at least in a psychological-impact case, should
shift the burden of proof on the discriminatory-effects issue from
the challenger to the state ."' Finally, it raises the question
whether, if in fact the burden is so shifted, the state must generate
an evidentiary record that is substantial to dispel the presumption
of continuing discriminatory impact. In Coleman, the lower courts
in effect answered these questions in favor of the state, but did so
without even acknowledging their presence in the case.
Judge Guido Calabresi has asserted that our "jurisprudence
requires that when the legislature has acted with haste or hiding
in a way that arguably infringes even upon the penumbra of
fundamental rights, courts should invalidate the possibly offending
law and force the legislature to take a 'second look' with the eyes of
the people on it." 2 Will the federal courts, if confronted with a
better-documented case of current discriminatory effects, employ
this approach in resolving the Georgia flag question? If they take
this route, it will be because a structural motive-centered doctrine
provides the vehicle for doing so.

supra note 463 (quoting Professor Ely).
830. Put another way, Hunter's seeming insistence that the voter-disqualification law
must continue to have a demonstrable disparate impact made some sense, since the impact
of such a law on actual voter eligibility is statistically measurable. A similar statistical
determination is not possible with respect to the effects of a symbol.
831. Cf.Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,27071 n.21 (1977) (reasoning that proof that the "decision by the Village was motivated in part
by a racially discriminatory purpose would... have shifted to the Village the burden of
establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose
not been considered").
832. Calabresi, supra note 13, at 104.
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RULES

Many rules of procedural due process focus on who qualifies as a
proper decision maker.8 3 The Constitution commands, for example,
that only an impartial judge and jury may sit in a civil or a criminal
case.8 34 Fair-decision-maker requirements of this sort bear a
kinship to the structural "who" rules that we shall consider here. In
particular, both sets of rules reflect a deep concern with those "legal
process" values that drive much of modern constitutional law.8" 5
Constitutional "who" rules, however, differ from due process properdecision-maker rules in two major ways. First, the "who" rules on
which we focus do not identify appropriate adjudicators of discrete
disputes, but instead designate the proper propounders of broad
government policy. Second, proper-decision-maker rules in the
procedural due process field vindicate generalized interests in
adjudicative fairness. In contrast, constitutional "who" rules, like
other structural doctrines, embody specialized protections of
particular substantive constitutional values such as federalism, free
speech, or religious liberty."6
833. See, e.g., Tumeyv. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,531-32 (1927) (disqualifying ajudge who could
recover a fee for his services only if he found the defendant guilty); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824-25 (1986) (extending Tumey to civil context where the judge has
a personal stake in the damages award); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973)
(applying Tumey to agency adjudications where members ofan agency board would benefit
from the decision).
834. See, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 726-27 (1992) (citing cases); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Constitutional provisions apart from the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment protections of procedural due process also require certain fairnessrelated attributes ofadjudicative officials. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900
(1984) (requiring "detached and neutral magistrate" for issuance of warrants). The Sixth
Amendment"-faircross-section" requirement is illustrative. See Taylorv. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 531 (1975) (holding that exclusion of women from juries violates Sixth Amendment).
835. See Calabresi,supranote 13, at 84n.9 (noting that "the legal process school, ofwhich
Ely is a distinguished member ... asks which institutions are best suited to do which job in
a given polity. It also asks what controls or roadblocks should be put in the way of any
institution to prevent abuses of power"). In particular, as Professor Strauss has explained:
"The Carolene Products rationale . .. that is seldom criticized as illegitimate judicial
usurpation... rests on an assessment of comparative institutional competence: the courts
should intervene in areas where they are competent and the legislatures are institutionally
likely to go wrong." Strauss, supra note 434, at 208-09.
836. As we soon shall see, the suggested separation between due process fair-decisionmaker rules and constitutional "who" rules is blurred at the margins, in part because
adjudicative rules, like structural rules, sometimes respond to particular substantive
constitutional vdlues. See, e.g., infra notes 962-70 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the
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A leading case on constitutional "who" rules is Hampton v.Mow
Sun Wong.837 There the Court considered whether the Fifth
Amendment permitted a broad prohibition on governmental
employment of lawful resident aliens promulgated by the federal
Civil Service Commission.131 In striking down this regulation, the
Court did not say that the Commission had exceeded its delegated
authority.8 39 The Court also did not proclaim that the discriminatory ban was ipso facto invalid under equal protection
principles." ° Instead the Court scuttled the rule on the ground that
the Commission was not a proper promulgator of the prohibition in
light of the government interests invoked in its support. Those
interests included (1) giving the President a bargaining chip in
treaty negotiations by enabling him selectively to waive the alienemployment ban; and (2) encouraging aliens to become American
citizens and thereby participate more fully in our national life.841
These interests, the Court said, might have supported the ban if it
had been adopted by Congress or the President.84 In the Court's
basic distinction between adjudicative-decision-maker rules and structural "who" rules
remains extant and important. Our archetypical "impartial judge" rule, for example, has far
less to do with advancing a particular substantive constitutional policy (which is the stuff of
structural rules) than it has to do with a generalized process-centered interest in giving every
litigant a fair shake. Notably, the sorts of "who" rules we shall explore also differ from
familiar "institutional competence" rules typified by rules derived from so-called
"representation-reinforcement" analysis, see supranotes 456-60 and accompanying text. In
particular, that style of analysis focuses on the proper allocation of authority between courts
and political-branch actors. The rules discussed here, in contrast, focus on the competing
capacities not ofjudges versus lawmakers, but of one set of lawmakers versus another. Even
so, as later discussion will develop, the focus on institutional competence that underlies
representation-reinforcement theory suggests the plausibility of the sort of "who" rules we
turn to now.
837. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
838. See id.
839. See TRIBE, supra note 24, § 17-2, at 1679; Tushnet, supra note 24, at 817. As
Professor Tushnet has explained:
[Tihe Court did not invalidate the regulation because Congress had failed to
authorize the Commission to take foreign policy into account in formulating its
employment policies. Had it done so, Hampton would be an ordinary case in
administrative law, a case about an agency that exceeded the bounds of its
statutory authority.
Id.
840. See Tushnet, supra note 24, at 817 (noting that decision was not based on grounds
that it unlawfully discriminated against aliens as a substantive matter).
841. See Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 104.
842. See id. at 105; TUSHNET, supranote 443, at 203; Sunstein, supranote 434, at 47; see
also Komesar, supranote 595, at 386 ("[IThe Court, concluding that these were not normal
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eyes, however, the pursuit of these goals was too "far removed from
84
[the] normal responsibilities" of the Civil Service Commission, 3
which has "no responsibility for foreign affairs . . . or for
naturalization policies."18 4 In short, given the important substantive
values at stake, the Commission was not a proper
equal protection
5
84

"who."

Commentators interested in structural rules have lavished
attention on Mow Sun Wong."A For our purposes, however, the
most noteworthy feature of the case is that it does not stand alone.
In fact, Mow Sun Wong is surrounded by decisions in which the
Court has shaped substantive constitutional doctrine by taking
account of the differing capacities of different government decision
makers. Some of these rulings operate in a "who"-centered way that
is both familiar and noncontroversial. These decisions assume the
permissibility of policymaking by a government authority, while
ratcheting the level ofjudicial review up or down to take account of
that decision maker's structural strengths or weaknesses. Settled
doctrine, for example, mandates judicial deference to the choices of
generals, admirals, and other nonjudicial authorities because their
circumstances, required clearer indications of deliberativeness... in the prior delegation of
responsibility.").
843. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 105.
844. Id. at 114; see alsoid. at 116 (requiring that, if this decision is to be made by the Civil
Service Commission, it "be justified by reasons which are properly the concern of that
agency"). A final justification offered for the rule-that of establishing a bright-line test of
total exclusion when security concerns undeniably render citizenship a proper requirement
for some jobs-also did not support the ban. The Court recognized that this interest, driven
by "administrative convenience" and "promotion ofan efficient federal service" fellwithinthe
ambit of the Commission's legitimate concerns. Id. at 114-15. But this justification failed
because (1) it was far from clear that the justification made sense; (2) there was no indication
the Commission had actually considered orstudied the matter, and (3) any conceivable merit
in the justification was overwhelmed by the powerful "interest in avoiding the wholesale
deprivation of employment opportunities," id. at 115, which was an "aspect of liberty"
protected by the Fifth Amendment, id. at 116. The second of these rationales demonstrates
Mow Sun Wong's structural character not only as a "who" rule case, but also as a case deeply
concerned about proper findings-and-study rules. See supraPartV; see also supranotes 79297 (identifying a structural actual-purpose requirement developed in heightened means/ends
scrutiny cases).
845. See TUSHNET, supranote 443, at 203 ("Hampton'sapproach finds unconstitutional
the delegation of some authority to the wrong agency."); i& ("ITIhe Court said that Congress'
attempt to authorize the Commission to worry about foreign policy was constitutionally
impermissible.").
846. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 24, § 17-2, at 1680-82; Komesar, supranote 595, at 38487; Tushnet, supranote 24, at 817-18.
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capacity to evaluate military exigencies is far superior to that of the
courts. 7 I group these sorts of cases under the rubric "quasistructural 'who' rules" and will illustrate their operation in short
8
order. 4
In another set of cases, well exemplified by Mow Sun Wong, the
Court has drawn on concerns of institutional capacity to forge true
second-look rules. It has done so by wielding the tool of outright
disqualification to channel important decisions from one set of
political-branch policymakers to another, thereby forcing a de novo
reassessment of a constitutionally sensitive substantive policy
choice. These rulings thus entail judicial remands to political
authorities 4 9 but, for two important reasons, do not produce
"remands to the legislature" in the usual sense. First, the
invalidation of a policy on 'who"-rule grounds does not necessarily
return that policy to Congress or the state's lawmaking assembly.
InMow Sun Wong, for example, the decision about employing aliens
was redirected to either the Congress or the President. In fact,
following the Court's decision, President Ford reinstated the hiring
ban by way of executive order, and that action-not surprisingly-was upheld in the courts. 5 0 Second, in contrast to an
ordinary remand-to-the-legislature rule, structural "who" rules
never operate to return an invalidated policy to the same decision
maker that propounded it in the first instance."' Indeed, the
essential purpose of "who" rules is to shift policymaking responsibility away from the initial decision maker. Despite these
differences, constitutional "who" rules share a deep connection with
typical remand-to-the-legislature techniques because both sets of
devices respond to a "legitimacy deficit" that marks the initial
847. See infra notes 943-46 and accompanying text.
848. See infra notes 930-61 and accompanying text.
849. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 24, § 17-2, at 1680; Sunstein, supra note 434, at 96
(likening the who-based approach of Mow Sun Wong to the remand-to-the-legislature
approach used inthe desuetude context discussed supra notes 516-41 and accompanyingtext;
noting that with "desuetude... the problem is temporal rather than bureaucratic," but that

"the basic problem-the legitimacy deficit-is the same).
850. See Mow Sun Wongv. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980); Vergara v. Hampton,
581 F.2d 1281, 1287 (7th Cir. 1978). See generally TRIBE, supranote 24, § 17-2, at 1680 n.15;
TUSHNET, supra note 444, at 203.
851. See TRIBE, supra note 24, § 17-2, at 1680 (noting that cases like Mow Sun Wong
envision judicial validation of"a somewhat revised provision if... reconsideration leads to

its enactment ... in the same form but by a different body").
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formulation of the challenged rule.8 52 The special feature of "who"
rules is that this deficit exists because of the incapacity, interest, or
other institutional shortcoming of the "who" whose action has been
attacked.5 3
Even the most skilled students of constitutional law tend to
assume that judicial use of structural "who" rules is "unusual."'
After all, under "[clonventional constitutional analysis," it is the
substance, rather than the source, of a challenged policy that
determines its compliance with the Bill of Rights and Civil War
Amendments. 5' The Justices, however, have endorsed a wide array

of structural "who" rules that parallel the doctrinal approach of
Mow Sun Wong. Consider the following important examples:

852. See Sunstein, supranote 434, at 47, 96.
853. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, InsularMajoritiesUnabated:Warth v. Seldin and
City ofEastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 91 HARV. L. Rzv. 1373, 1414 (1978). As noted by
Professor Sager.
Mow Sun Wong posits a right to procedural due process which requires that
some legislative actions be undertaken only by a governmental entity which is
so structured and so charged as to make possible a reflective determinationthat
the action contemplated is fair, reasonable, and not at odds with specific
prohibitions in the Constitution.
Id.; see also Carlson & Smith, supra note 27, at 230 (noting that Justice Stevens's "analysis
of delegatedlawmaking responsibilities inMow Sun Wong ... suggests an expansive judicial
role in determining that certain bodies-because of lack of interest, information, or
expertise-are unlikely to act rationally, and hence are not competent lawmakers");
Sunstein, supranote 434, at 48 (noting that the "democracy-forcing" function of Mow Sun
Wong "was expressly founded on the idea that publicly accountable bodies should make the
contested decision that was challenged in the case"),,See generally Farber & Frickey, supra
note 444, at 924 (observingthat this 'appropriate decisionmaker'modelis quite promising").
For an unsuccessful invocation of capacity-centered logic in a rational-relation equal
protection case, see United StatesR.R. RetirementBd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,190,193 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (expressing concern about retirement-benefit legislation that
disadvantaged "no longer active railroaders" where legislation was developed, at Congress's
request, by current railroad management and labor representatives who did not "represent
the interests" of the disadvantaged group and whose "frequent and unrebutted"
misrepresentations were "relied on" by Congress).
854. See TUSHNE, supranote 443, at 202 (describing rules ofthis sort as "novel); Adler,
supranote 119, at 867 (describing Mow Sun Wong as "an unusual case").
855. Sandalow, supranote 13, at 1192-93; see, e.g., IsSAcHARoFF ET AL., supranote 306,
at 710 (identifying the "view that for constitutional analysis, all law is the same, regardless
of its source"; stating that this approach is the "position the Court has generally taken"; but
asking "does this only show that the Court continues to fail to think carefully about the
difference between different lawmaking processes?"). See generally supra notes 6-13 and
accompanying text (discussing conventional constitutional analysis).
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0 Justice Powell's dispositive opinion in Regents of the
University of Californiav. Bakke8" expounded the view
that broadly accountable state officials-rather than
"isolated" university authorities-should take
responsibility for forging remedial race-conscious
admissions programs.
In Fullilove v. Klutznick,m s a

plurality of the Court applied the flipside of this approach
in upholding a race-based contract-set-aside program in
part because it had been adopted by the national
Congress. 5 9 Rightly or wrongly,8 60 these opinions tend to
channel decisional responsibility in the affirmative-action
field to broadly representative and politically accountable

856. 438 U.S. 265,307,309(1977).
857. As Justice Powell wrote:
We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as
members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent
individuals in the absence ofjudicial, legislative, or admini trative findings of
constitutional or statutory violations ....
[The Board of Regents] does not purport to have made, and is in no position to
make, such findings. Its broad mission is education, not the formulation of any
legislative policy or the adjudication of particular claims of illegality....
[Isolated segments of our vast governmental structures are not competent to
make those decisions, at least in the absence of legislative mandates and
legislatively determined criteria. Cf Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88
(1976).
Id. at 307, 309 (citations omitted).
858. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
859. See id. at 476-78.
860. One criticism of Justice Powell's approach in Bakke is that it may push decision
making about educational affirmative action away from those persons who are most
knowledgeable aboutthe justifiability and wisdom ofintervention. Cf.Kende,supra note 395,
at 608 (stating that in post-Bakke cases "courts have been extremely deferential to school
boards which have found that they themselves discriminated in the past" and that "findings
of fact in these situations are made more reliable by their special access or proximity to the
violation"). In addition, the Powell position has been criticized as "seriously
underestimat[ing] the degree of political attention that university affirmative action plans
... receive," whether ornot they are formulated by school officials. TuSHNET, supranote 443,
at 207. Approaching the issue from yet another angle, Justice Stewart in Fulilove faulted
the Powell position for vesting de facto judicial authority in legislatures that have 'neither
the dispassionate objectivity nor the flexibility that are needed to mold a race-conscious
remedy."Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Kende, supranote 395,
at 587 (discussing Justice Stewart's position). For a similar view, see Wygant v. Jackson
BoardofEducation,476 U.S. 267,313 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Chang, supra
note 618, at 88 (suggesting that the "institutional differences between the judicial branch on
one hand and the legislative and executive branches on the other simply preclude legislators
and agencies from objectively and apolitically considering the need for affimative action).
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officials who operate in conditions of high visibility."' 1
Bakke and Fullilove thus can be understood, in keeping
with the broader goals of structural review, as decisions
that "promote both democracy and deliberation" in the
framing of government policy in a field of great
constitutional delicacy. 6 2

a The Court has fashioned another set of structural "who"
rules to deal with the "area of special constitutional
sensitivity" occupied by cases that concern government

discrimination against aliens."s

In Plyler v. Doe, for

example, the Court held that Congress, rather than the

states, must balance whether the criminality of a parent's
immigrationjustifies the exclusion of illegal-alien children
861. See Fuiilove, 448 U.S. at 498-99 (Powell, J., concurring) (reiterating that in Bakke,
the Regents lacked authority to remedy identified discrimination because they were
"entrusted only with educational functions," whereas "[uinlike the Regents..., Congress
properly may-and indeed must-address directly the problems of discrimination in our
society"); see also Kende, supra note 395, at 591 (noting that "while he required that
nonlegislative bodies such as the Regents make particularized findings, Justice Powell
significantly relaxed the stringency of this requirement for Congress"); id. at 606 (arguing
that the findings requirement should be relaxed when it is applied to Congress as it was by
the Court in Fullilove).
862. Sunstein, supranote 434, at 48; accord,e.g., TUSHNT, supranote 443, at 205-06; see
also Sunstein, supra note 41, at 67-68 n.172 (stating with regard to Mow Sun Wong: "'The
basicnotionis that deliberative processes are anecessary surrogate forbroadrepresentation;
when the latter is absent, the former is required. The same notion is at work in opinions
concluding that only proper decisionmakers, susceptible to special electoral control or
reflecting broad deliberation, may undertake 'affirmative action."). The play-out of "who"
questions in the difficult affirmative action area has been predictably confusing. Issues
include: Do those bodies that can adopt remedial plans include local legislative bodies? Do
they include all elected decisionmakers? Do they include school boards (whether elected or
not)? Do they include unelected agencies when they act pursuant to, or not pursuant to,
explicit or implicit legislative declarations? When acting to remedy their own past wrongs?
When they are marked by a high level of visibility or specialized expertise? Lower court cases
that touch on these issues are collected in Kende, supra note 395. Kende advocates "an
approach that aligns the rigor of the findings requirement with the strength of the
authorization" to engage in remedial affirmative action. Id. at 612. Kende further argures:
State legislatures, like Congress, have characteristics which indicate a high
degree of reliability in finding past violations; the courts should not require
particularized findings before judging them competent to adopt such plans.
Local representative bodies share some of these characteristics, though to a
lesser extent, and should therefore be required to make somewhat more
particularized findings. Nonelected government administrative agencies may
also be competent, but in most situations only after compiling much more
specific findings.
Id. at 623.
863. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,226 (1982).
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from public schools. s"' Likewise, in cases involving legal
aliens, the Court has shifted policymaking authority from
state lawmakers to Congress by holding that "state
classifications denying aliens benefits receive strict
scrutiny while congressional acts which do the same thing
are only subject to the rational basis test.""5 InNyquist v.
Mauclet, the Court added to this principle the notion that
the encouragement of naturalization was a goal properly
pursued only by the federal government and not by the

individual

states.

6

By

constitutionally

confining

particular decisionmakers to the advancement of
particular ends, the Court in Mauclet followed exactly the
same analytical
path earlier laid down in Mow Sun
7

Wong.

3

86

In Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastalCouncil, the Court in
effect devised a "who" rule in the service of protecting
private property rights under the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause." In that case, the Court held that land
use restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional when
they deprive landowners of all "economically beneficial or
productive use of land." 69 At the same time, the Court
declared that "background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance" couldjustifyregulatory actionthat
negated all such valuable use of one's property.170 In
taking this approach, the Court effectively disqualified
state legislatures from engaging in total takings without

compensation, while simultaneously authorizing such
action by state courts through the creative shaping ofstate
864. See id. at 224-25 (stating "we are unable to find in the congressional immigration
scheme any statement of policy that might weigh significantly in arriving at an equal
protection balance concerning the State's authority to deprive these children of an
education").
865. TRIBE, supranote 24, § 16-23, at 1551 n.57; accord,e.g., Conkle, supranote 69, at 49
n.160 ("Relying on Congress' power over immigration and naturalization.... the Court
typically upholds federal classifications that disadvantage aliens even though similar state
classifications are likely to be invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause."). A leading
case on this point is Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-86 (1976).
866. See 432 U.S. 1,10 (1977); see also id.at 7 n.8 (distinguishing a case upholdingfederal,
as opposed to state, statute on grounds that "Congress... enjoys rights to distinguish among
aliens that are not shared by the States"); Tribe, supranote 398, at 875 (discussingMauclet).
867. See supra notes 837-45 and accompanying text.
868. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
869. Id. at 1015.
870. Id. at 1029.
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nuisance law."' Lucas thus allocated authority in a way
that structural theory would predict: In an area fraught
with constitutional difficulty, it shifted power away from
potentially faction-dominated state legislatures to the
presumably more temperate members of state judicial
departments. 2
m In New York Times Co. v. United States, the famous
"Pentagon Papers Case," a decision-determining bloc of
three Justices applied a "who"-centered analysis to quash
a government ban on the publication of alleged military
secrets. 7 According to these Justices, the prohibition was
constitutionally defective because no support existed for it
in any action of the Congress. In other words, a unilateral
executive-branch claim that suppression was justified
failed to meet First Amendment standards even though
the executive's action apparently would have stood if
coupled with congressional authorization. 7 4 In another
871. The majority recognized, in this regard, that applicable "background principles of
nuisance and property law" were typically embodied in indeterminate standards; that these
principles were to be applied by state courts "in the circumstances in which the property is
presently found"; and that 'changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what was
previously permissible no longer so." Id at 1030-31. The point is that, to render a total taking
noncompensable, the state "must do more than proffer the legislature'sdeclaration that the
uses.. . are inconsistent with the public interest." Id. (emphasis added); see id. at 1052 n.15
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). At the same time, broad authority was left in state courts to
endorse legislative predictions that particular land uses constitute common law nuisances
under present-day conditions.
872. See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947) ("Judges are supposed to be men
of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate."). Of course, many state judges are popularly
elected and thus more susceptible to political influences than their federal counterparts.
Even so, many "who"-related reasons support the channeling oftakings-determinative statenuisance-law "rulings" from state legislatures to state courts. For example, state
judges-even if elected-are trained in law; perceived as having a countermajoritarian role;
selected in typically less partisan elections; immersed in a work culture that strongly
emphasizes impartiality;, and routinely responsible for deciding cases that present
constitutional claims of entitlement In addition, because state legislatures have
responsibilityforbalancing state budgets-they may be more predisposed than courts to look
with disfavor on even the most powerful claims of entitlement to takings-based
compensation.
873. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
874. See TRIBE, supra note 24, §§ 17-1 to 17-2, at 1676-77. The structural lay of the land
in the case has been aptly sketched by Professor Komesar
There were three dissenters and, of the six Justices who rejected the
government's plea, three took positions suggesting that the result would have
been different had the injunction been sought on the basis of a violation of an
act of Congress or even ofthe violation of a prior Executive Order. It appears,
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national security case, Greene v. McElroy, the Court used
unmistakable "who"-rule logic to undo a Defense
Department ban on the employment of Communists by
military contractors.8 75 Citing First Amendment
association rights, the Court swept away the prohibition,
while signaling that it might well have withstood
challenge if(as in Mow Sun Wong) the policy had received
"explicit authorization from either the President or
Congress." 76
thus, that the government might well have been able to impose a prior restraint
on publication if the proper political institution had made the decision-a
formulation quite analogous to the "structural due process" approach taken in
Hampton.
Komesar, supranote 595, at 392. Professor Komesar goes on to note that: "Justices Marshall
and White stressed the absence ofcongressional action outlawing such publication. Justices
Stewart and White stressed the absence of either a congressional act or clearly promulgated
executive regulations." Id. at 392 n.86 (citations omitted). As Professor Komesar's statement
indicates, it is possible, in light ofJustice Stewart's concurring opinion, that the publication
ban would have stood up if supported (even in the absence of congressional action) by
preexisting "executive regulations." See New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 729 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). But Justice White's separate opinion clearly focused on the "absence of express
and appropriately limited congressionalauthorizationfor prior restraints in circumstances
such as these." Id. at 731 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Notably, even the
dissenters in the PentagonPapers Case embraced constitutional "whor-type reasoning "to
protect the values of the First Amendment against political pressures." Id. at 757 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). In their view, "the judiciary may properly insist that the determination that
disclosure of the subject matter would irreparably impair the national security be made by
the head of the Executive Department concerned-here the Secretary of State or the
Secretary of Defense-after actual personal consideration by that officer." Id.
875. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
876. Id. at 508. As Professor Adler has noted:
This distinction in Greene between agencies and elected bodies (the President
and Congress) is particularly significant for a theory of restraint in the
administrative state, both because it properly views the administrative state as
potentially directed by, but not equivalent to, the Presidency, and, reciprocally,
because it raises the possibility that presidential, like congressional, direction
might give reviewing courts proper grounds for restraint.
Adler, supra note 119, at 866. This sort of "who"-centered thinking, according to Professor
Adler, provides the "best defense" of the Court's controversial decision in Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991). See Adler, supranote 119, at 872. Professor Adler begins by recognizing
that the agency-promulgated abortion gagrule at issue in that case was vulnerable to serious
structural attack under the avoidance principle. See supranotes 118-43 and accompanying
text. He then proposes, however, the following refutation to this challenge:
Good restraintist grounds to refrain frominvalidating the agency's gag rule also
exist. In particular, the gag rule rests upon the anti-abortion policy that this
Presidency has verypublicly espoused, which, we must assume, has the support
of the majority of the citizenry. So, whatever the applicability of the "serious
constitutional doubts" test in some other case, it is inapplicable here.
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* Cases that involve application ofrules of clarity often have
an important "who"-rule dimension. In Kent v. Dulles, for
example, the Court struck down a prohibition on international travel by Communists, because Congress had not
definitively empowered the executive branch to adopt this
policy in enabling legislation." By using the interpretive
avoidance principle in this way, the Court deflected a
constitutionally sensitive policy choice from the Secretary
of State, whose day-to-day work focuses on national

security concerns, back to Congress, whose broadly
representative membership might well bring to the issue

a more balanced and embracing perspective."7 Likewise,

in United States v. Rumely, s 79 the Court protected First
Amendment freedoms by reading a congressional grant of
authority to an investigative committee as failing to

permit it to punish a witness who would not identify the
buyers of a controversial political tract. Analysts have said
that these decisions and others like them resuscitate the
long-stagnant nondelegation doctrine in those situations
Adler, supranote 119, at 872. Professor Adler concludes his discussion by noting that "foin
this reading, the debate between majority and dissent in Rust replicates, in the domain of
constitutional law, the debate about the role of the Presidency that has been conducted, with
great vigor, within ordinary administrative law." Id. See generally Estreicher, supra note
139, at 1144-45 n.54:
With respect to the broader question of legitimacy, certainly agencies are
without authority to override statutory limits. Within the zone ofthe discretion
permittedby the organic statute, however, they canbe sensitive to majoritarian
shifts in policy preferences-communicated through the appointment and
confirmation processes and at several points of executive and congressional
influence.
877. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). Kent already has received extended attention. See supra notes
123-31 and accompanying text.
878. Cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,190 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "one might claim that courts, when interpreting statutes, should
assume in close cases that a decision with 'enormous social consequences' should be made
by democratically elected Members of Congress rather than by unelected agency
administrators"; basing this assertion in part on Kent's assumption that "Congress did not
want to delegate the powerto make rules interfering with exercise of basic human liberties").
879. 345 U.S. 41 (1953). For a discussion of Rumely and related cases, see BICKEL, supra
note 6, at 156-64, 181-83. In one ofthose related cases, Barenblattv. United States, 360 U.S.
109 (1959), the Court did find a proper delegation of authority to a congressional committee.
In a vigorous dissenting opinion in that case, Justice Black wrote: "[W]e are dealing here
with governmental procedures which the Court itself admits reach to the very fringes of
congressional power. In such cases more is required of legislatures than a vague delegation
to be filled in later by mute acquiescence." Id. at 139-40 (Black, J., dissenting).
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where particularly important constitutional rights are at
stake." ° Whatever the merits of this characterization,
these cases are suggestive of an important "who'-driven
principle: Courts will not readily infer that Congress has
delegated authority to intrude on important constitutional
values to a less-than-wholly-representative agency or
committee that engages in just one line of work 8 1
880. See Adler, supra note 119, at 842; id at 839 n.214 (collecting cases). Judge Calabresi
has made this point in these terms:
Obviously, what was unconstitutional to Chief Justice Hughes in the 1930s as
undue delegation would typically not be so today. But this is not because the
concept ofundue delegation has changed. Rather, it is because the entitlements
to which the concept was applied no longer seem even putatively fundamental.
The doctrine can thus be readily applied to new cases in which a challenged
rule approaches the violation of fundamental rights.
Calabresi, supra note 13, at 120 n.131 (citations omitted). Elsewhere he has noted that:
The Court's opinion in Kent and Justice Black's dissent in Barenblattrelied in
part on a pair of delegation opinions by Chief Justice Hughes dating from the
1930s. These were treated as using a similar approach because, in the 1930s,
the statutes at issue were at the fringes of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause.
Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716,739 n.12 (1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring), rev'd, 521 U.S. 793
(1997); see also Sunstein, supra note 434, at 38 n.155 ("[The Kent v. Dulles] 'clear statement'
idea is the post-New Deal version of the nondelegation doctrine; it shows that the doctrine
is not really dead but is used in a more modest and targeted way to ensure that certain
decisions are made by Congress rather than the executive branch."); id. at 88 (describing
Kent as "directly related to Schecter Poultry" and illustrative of "[modest and targeted]
nondelegation cases" that limit "the power to invade constitutionally sensitive domains");
Indeed, while the nondelegation doctrine focuses on actions of Congress, rather than actions
of state legislatures, at least one case suggests that "who"-rule notions may invalidate the
action of a state executive official on nondelegation-type grounds when important First
Amendment rights are at issue. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,254-55 (1957)
(plurality opinion) ("The lack of any indications that the legislature wanted the information
the Attorney General attempted to elicit from petitioner must be treated as the absence of
authority. It follows that the use of the contempt power... was not in accordance with...
due process .... ").
881. As noted by Professor BlackThe Court's typical-and seemingly harmless-solution [for vague delegations
of authority] has been to read the delegation itself as not including the power
to tamper with important constitutional rights, so that-on this purportedly
statutory ground-the official is held without power to do what he has done.
This was the holding in ... Kent v. Dulles .... I have called this method of
solution harmless, and it is that, as long as the Court keeps firmlyinmind that
in such a case it is not confronting Congress at all, and remains institutionally
free, and indeed bound, to make its own judgment unembarrassed by
presumptions.
BLACK, supranote 100, at 79. Professor Sunstein has voiced much the same view:
In.. . cases [like Kent v. Dulles],the Court has suggested that the Constitution
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w The Court can divert constitutionally sensitive decisions

from specialized policymakers to the more representative
and accountable full membership of Congress without
speaking the language of "clear statement" or
'nondelegation." The Court recently indicated, for
example, that it might well channel decisions from federal
agencies to federal legislators through the application of
differing levels of means/ends scrutiny to congressional
and administrative pronouncements. The key suggestion
along these lines came in Turner BroadcastingSystem,
Inc. v. F.C.C.,"52in which the Court deferred to a decision
made by Congress to force cable television operators to
carry broadcast stations' programming. In the process of
upholding this "must-carrf legislation, the Court
pointedly observed: "In reviewing the constitutionality of
a statute, 'courts must accord substantial deference to the
predictive judgments of Congress.'... [Slubstantiality is
to be measured in this context by a standard more
deferential than we accord to judgments of an
administrative agency."'
The implications of this
permits certain disabilities to be imposed on groups only when an accountable
actor has so decided.... Decisions of this sort impose a "clear-statement"
principle to the effect that important decisions are to be made by accountable
actors and that only a clear statement to the contrary will rebut this
presumption.
Sunstein, Interpreting,supra note 119, at 470 n.237; see also Estreicher, supra note 139, at
1151 n.76 M"he 'clear statement' doctrine enjoys a special force as a basis for selective
insistence on explicit legislative authorization of agency action operating pursuant to very
broad statutory grants."). The dangers of lawmaking by agencies-including, most
prominently, risks ofcapture and nonaccountability-are explored at length by other writers.
See, e.g., ELY, supranote 88, at 131-32 (noting, among other things, the risk of buck-passing
by Congress). Professor Sunstein makes an interesting argument that the Court erred, under
the principle of cases like Kent v. Duties, in sustaining capital punishment in the military
context in the absence of explicit Congressional action:
The factors that justify a decision of death should be chosen by the legislature,
not by the President (in this context, bureaucrats of some kind, realistically
speaking). Congress may not grant open-ended discretion to impose the death
sentence to someone who is not, under the constitutional regime, the national
law maker. The authority for this proposition comes from the clear statement
cases, which show that there is a problem from the standpoint of legitimacy
when certain constitutionally sensitive decisions are made by the executive.
Sunstein, supra note 434, at 88-89 (discussing Loving v. Virginia,388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
882. 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (TurnerI1).
883. Id. at 195; see also City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 311 n.1 (2000) (Souter,
J., concurring) (noting that "[tihe nature of the legislating institution might . .. affect"
judicial analysis of "means-end fit"; citing Turner II for the proposition that "[wie do not
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suggestive observation remain unclear, particularly
because the Court noted that its differing-deference
principle applied only "in this context."'" It may be, for
example, that the Court someday will declare that a rule
of elevated deference to congressional pronouncements
applies only in "heightened scrutiny" cases, or only in First
Amendment cases or only in First Amendment cases of a
certain kind.8 5 Whatever the scope of the principle,
however, it responds to the same perceptions that have
spawned other constitutional "who" rules. The controlling
notion is that courts should shape constitutional doctrine
require Congress to create a record in the manner of an administrative agency and we accord
its findings greater respect than those of agencies"). Justice Souter also suggested that the
differing-deference approach of Turner H might well reach beyond the Congress-agency
context. See id. at 311 n.1 (suggesting that the Court, in applying means/end review, "might
.defer less to a city council than we would to Congress").
884. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 195.
885. See supra note 440 and accompanying text (discussing similar possibilities in
application of findings-and-study rules). One signal that there may be limits on the principle
comes from a case of some antiquity, Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176
(1935). There the Court considered a state agency's order that stipulated the size and shape
of berry containers. See id. In upholding the order, the Court wrote:
It is urged that this rebuttable presumption of the existence of a state of facts
sufficient to justify the exertion of the police power attaches only to acts of the
legislature; and that where the regulation is the act of an administrative body,
no such presumption exists, so that the burden of proving the justifying facts
is upon him who seeks to sustain the validity of the regulation. The contention
is without support in authority or reason, and rests upon misconception. Every
exertion of the police power, either by the legislature or by an administrative
body, is an exercise ofdelegated power. Where it is by a statute, the legislature
has acted under power delegated to it through the Constitution. Where the
regulation is by an order of an administrative body, that body acts under a
delegation from the legislature. The question of law may, of course, always be
raised whether the legislature had power to delegate the authority exercised.
But where the regulation is within the scope of authority legally delegated, the
presumption of the existence of facts justifying its specific exercise attaches
alike to statutes, to municipal ordinances, and to orders of administrative
bodies.
Id. at 185-86 (citations omitted). In TurnerII, the Court did not cite PacificStates Box, and
perhaps that case is somehow outside the orbit of the TurnerH principle because it did not
involve the sort of "predictive judgment," related to emerging technologies, involved in the
must-carry context. Alternatively, the Court's utterance in TurnerImight have beenmeant
to involve not the comparison of different constitutional standards, but of a constitutional
standard applicable to Congress and a statutory standard applicable to federal agencies
under the Administrative Procedure Act. The more natural reading, however, surely is that
different levels of constitutional deference are to be accorded to Congress and to
administrative agencies.
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in light of institutional strengths and weaknesses, which
in this case include the superior representative (and
perhaps factfinding) capacities of legislative institutions
and the susceptibility of administrative agencies to
narrow-mindedness and capture."5
886. See Adler, supra note 119, at 857 ("Might not a court legitimately invalidate a rule,
order or action as violating some constitutional criterion (some aspect of justice), and yet
subsequently uphold a statute with the same or similar content, just by virtue of the
institutional differences between legislatures and agencies?"). Existing commentary suggests
that the courts should act (or already have acted) in this differing-deference way. See, e.g.,
id. at 764 (suggesting "the possibility that arguments for judicial restraint, effective with
respect to the judicial practice of invalidating statutes, might have little or no force with
respect to the practice of invalidating agency rules, orders and actions"); Shapiro & Levy,
supra note 39, at 429 (noting that, according to seminal Supreme Court decisions,
"administrative agencies, unlike legislatures, are not entitled to the same presumption of
correctness because they are neither politically accountable nor directly subject to checks and
balances"); Sunstein, supranote 41, at 66 3163 ("For a time, agency decisions were treated
with the same respect as legislative enactments. Now, it is clear that less deference is
applied, both because of constitutional principles and because of the Administrative
Procedure Act."). SeegenerallyFarber & Frickey, supranote 444, at 887 (noting that interest
group influence is strongest when, among other things, "the group is able to move the issue
to a favorable forum"). There also have been suggestions that, in particular constitutional
contexts, the Court should or does engage in different levels of review based on whether it
confronts legislative or agency action. See Foster, supranote 791, at 1128 ("Policy decisions
by administrative bodies [in the Court's impermissible-motive cases] receive less judicial
restraint then if the same decision would have been made by a legislature or more
accountable executive actor. Decisions made by administrative bodies lack the level of direct
accountability that would otherwise accompany a silar legislative decision."); see also
Brest, supranote 385, at 130n.171 (advocating application of"clear and convincing" standard
to motive inquiries, but suggesting possibility of applying "different standards to judicial
review of administrative and legislative decisions" under which courts would require "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt as to the latter). A concrete effort to apply differential review to
strike down an agency program appears in Justice White's dissenting opinion in New York
City TransitAuthorityv. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). In that case the issue was whether an
equal-protection violation inhered in a New York City Transit Authority rule that barred
employment ofmethadone users. See id. Among Justice White's arguments for invalidation
was the following.
Petitioners are not directly accountable to the public, are not the type of official
body that normally makes legislative judgments of fact such as those relied
upon by the majority today, and are by nature more concerned with business
efficiency than with other public policies for which they have no direct
responsibility. Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103, (1976) [sic].
Both the State and City of New York, which do exhibit those democratic
characteristics, hire persons in methadone programs for similar jobs.
IcL at 609-10 n.15 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice White's argument, of
course, did not persuade the Court that the rule lacked the "rationality" required by
minimum-level equal-protection review. See id. at 593. An interesting question is whether
the argument would have fared better in a heightened-scrutiny context.
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u There are occasional suggestions by federalism-minded
commentators that only Congress-and not federal
agencies-may adopt measures that preempt state law. 8s 7
The Court, however, does not (at least so far) seem drawn
to this idea.m Even so, some Justices have warmed to the
thought that agency efforts at preemption should (at least
sometimes) be viewed with more circumspection than
similar efforts of Congress itself."9
887. See Massey,supranote 175, at 193 (arguingfor aCongress/federal-agency distinction
with respect to the displacement ofstate law). In suggesting this approach, ProfessorMassey
has argued:
A plain statement by the agency ofits intent to direct state behavior should not
be sufficient, because the reason for the plain statement rule is to ensure that
the national political process of Congress is conscious of its decision to intrude
upon state sovereignty. There is no similar assurance of the consciousness of
the national political process, consisting of state representatives deciding the
issue, when federal administrators act pursuant to vaguely worded statutory
authority.
Id.; see also id. at 213 ("[Algency action in the absence of a congressionalplain statement of
intent to bind the States, evenwhen the agency plainly states its own intent to govern states,
seems to be the product of a defective political process because there has been no effective
input into the immediate agency decision by state representatives."). A ban on agency
preemption also seems implicit in-or at least logically extractable from-Professor
Gardbaum's process-centeredinsistence that"Congress ... think seriously" aboutpreemptive
action. Gardbaum, supranote 69, at 800 (emphasis added).
888. See, e.g., HillsboroughCountyv. AutomatedMed. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707,713 (1985)
("We have held repeatedly that state laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well
as by federal statutes.").
889. For example, in the HillsboroughCounty case, see id., the Court declared itself"more
reluctant to inferpre-emption from the comprehensiveness ofregulations"--that is, fromthe
actions of agencies-"than from the comprehensiveness of statutes'--which entail full-scale
congressional action. Id. at 717-18. In reaching this result, the Court relied on considerations
of both competency and capacity, noting that agencies have "specialized functions" and the
flexibility to express preemptive intentions through a "variety of means," such as
"regulations, preambles, interpretive statements, and responses to comments." Id. Citing
Hillsborough County, Justice Stevens argued in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., for
application of a super-clear-statement rule when agency action (rather than congressional
action) is implied to preempt (whether via "conflict" or "field" preemption) historic forms of
state regulation. 120 S. Ct. 1913,1940-41 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf supranotes 16165 and accompanying text (discussing clarityrules with respect to congressional preemption).
Focusing squarely on structural concerns, he reasoned that such an approach would
appropriately tend "to ensure that States will be able to have a dialog with agencies
regarding pre-emption decisions ex antethrough the normal notice-and-comment procedures
... ." Geier,120 S. Ct. at 1940-41; see also id. at 1928 (objecting on federalism grounds to the
determination that airbag tort actions are preempted, and noting that "[tlhe rule the Court
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Perhaps the best way to conceive of the "dormant
Commerce Clause" is to say that it embodies yet another
constitutional "who" rule."g On this view, the validity of
government policies that endanger the value of economic
nationalism depends upon their source. Courts will uphold
such policies if they emanate from the nationally minded
Congress, but will not uphold them (absent congressional
authorization) if they come from state or local authorities
who are presumed to take a more short-sighted and
parochial view. 9' As Professors Schrock and Welsh have
put the point, the dormant Commerce Clause principle
involves "determining the locus of power in a federal
union." 92 In other words, the dormant Commerce Clause
concerns "who decides which rule is to govern a particular
transaction, Congress or the states." 3
In addition to rules already endorsed by the Court, a variety of
proposed "who" rules have surfaced in the legal literature. Perhaps
the best known proposal comes from Professor William Cohen, who
has argued that the principle of congressional reversibility that
marks the dormant Commerce Clause cases should operate in other

fields of law as well. 94 In particular, Professor Cohen contends that

enforces today was not enacted by Congress and is not to be found in the text of any
Executive Order or regulation" because the majority chose to rely on "the final commentary
accompanying an interim administrative regulation and the history of airbag regulation
generally").
890. The dormant Commerce Clause is discussed supranotes 674-82 and accompanying
text.
891. As stated by one commentator.
[T]he Constitution and Marbury v. Madison require such legislation to be
overturnedpreciselybecause state legislatures would otherwise predictably opt
for the short-term benefits of economic protectionism rather than for the longtermbenefits offree trade and free movement, given that out-of-staters bearing
the most immediate burdens ofeconomicallyprotective laws are unrepresented
in the legislatures.
Clark, supra note 763, at 986-87.
892. Shrock & Welsh, supranote 654, at 1140.
893. Id. at 1139 (emphasis added). Some constitutional "who" rules work the other way
around, in the sense that they channel authority away from the national government. For
example, judicial applications ofthe EleventhAmendmentmayin generalbe overturned only
bythe very state governments the Amendment aims to protect; overrides by Congress (except
pursuant to the federalism-diminishing Fourteenth Amendment) are impermissible. See
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
894. See Cohen, supranote 681, at 387-88.
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the power of the congressional override should extend to judicially
crafted, Fourteenth Amendment due process nexus rules, judicial
extrapolations of the Article IV Contract Clause, and any other
constitutionally inspired court pronouncement that applies only to
the states.8 95 As Professor Cohen articulates his thesis: "[Tihe issue
in each case concerns the constitutional limits on congressional
power. If the limits on state power are wholly inapplicable to
Congress, Congress can remove those limits from the states.8 9 6
This proposal -like the dormant Commerce Clause--embodies a
"who" rule that shifts decisional authority in constitutionally
sensitive areas from state to federal policymakers. Thus far,
however, the Court has not embraced Professor
Cohen's creative
7
brand of "who"-centered structuralism. 1
895. See id. at 400. For a similar suggestion, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 644
(1969) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) in which Chief Justice Warren, in dissent, voted to uphold
a one-year residence requirementfor state welfare benefits eligibility, which would otherwise
have been deemed unconstitutional, because authorized by Congress. See also id. at 675
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that a "presumption of constitutionality attaches to state
statutes, particularly when, as here, a State has acted upon a specific authorization from
Congress" (citing United States v. Des Moines Navigation and Ry. Co., 142 U.S. 510,544-45
(1892) and Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1888))).
896. Cohen, supranote 681, at 400. Professor Cohen's thesis is usefully elaborated in the
following passage:
Justice Rutledge's theory [of congressional reversibility] is not limited to the
commerce clause. Nor is it restricted to those limitations on state power that
are implied from the existence of federal power. The limitations imposed by the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, the
privileges and immunities clauses, and the contracts clause are not always
matched by identical limits on federal power. The federal government is
permitted to make decisions that are forbidden to the states. To the extent that
the Constitution does not "outlaw the action taken entirely from our
constitutional framework," Congress should be able to consent to otherwise
unconstitutional state laws.
Id. at 400 (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408,436 (1946)). One example
Professor Cohen offers concernsASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 458 U.S. 307
(1982), in which the Court held that a state tax apportionment formula violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it operated to tax income earned
beyond the state's borders. In Professor Cohen's view, Congress could respond to the
ASARCO ruling by authorizing the state's apportionment formula precisely because the
sovereignty-tied due-process limits relied on by the Court inASARCO are inapplicable to the
national government. See Cohen, supranote 681, at 389-90,401. For a brief discussion of the
impact of Professor Cohen's thinking on state regulation ofelectronic commerce, see Walter
Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation ofElectronic Commerce: Reflections on the Emerging
Issues, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691, 723 & n.l11 (1998).
897. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) (stating that with
respect to constitutional tax-nexus rules, "while Congress... may authorize state actions
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Other proposals for maldng some or all constitutional decisions
issued by the judiciary "reversible" by Congress have been
advanced." 8 These proposals, however, seem more far-reaching
than Professor Cohen's and thus even less likely to gain a sweeping
judicial endorsement. 99 There is one area, however, in which the
Court has recognized a significant congressional power to overturn
judicial decisions that define the constitutional authority of the
states. According to the Court, Congress may, in a proper case,
reverse a state's assertion that a state rule is constitutional-even
when that assertion has been upheld by the federal courts-by
exercising its enforcement powers under the Thirteenth,
that burden interstate commerce, it does not similarlyhave the power to authorize violations
of the Due Process Clause"). But Ff. Hellerstein, supra note 896, at 723 & n.112 (quoting
Professor Regan for the view that there is "no settled doctrine on this question" and opining
that it is "unlikely" that the Supreme Court would block "an administratively workable
solution to the problem of state taxation ofelectronic commerce" by invoking congressionally
nonreversible due process rules).
898. The main suggestions along these lines come from Professors Conkle, Dimond, and
Komesar, Dean Sandalow, and Judge Calabresi. See, e.g., Calabresi, supranote 13; Conkle,
supra note 69; Dimond, supra note 69; Komesar, supra note 595, at 368; Sandalow, supra
note 13, at 1188-89, 1192-93 (suggesting that policies that trench on "fundamental" values
might be constitutional if they reflect the "deliberate judgment of representative
institutions," rather than "subordinate" governmental actors). In a related vein, Robert Bork
has proposed a constitutional amendment that would permit legislative rejection of
constitutional decisions by majority vote. See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS
GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERiCAN DECLINE 117 (1996); see also MARK
TUSHNET,TAKINGTHE CONSTITUTIONAWAYFROMTHE COURTS 163-64 (1999) (suggesting the
possible advisability of abandoningjudicial review altogether, while noting that courts can
protect constitutional values in other ways; observing, for example, that "[a] court that took
[subconstitutional ultra vires rules] very seriously could end up finding any official action
unauthorized unless the legislature specifically authorized it"). Notably, a sweeping power
of legislative revision of constitutional rulings has been built into Canadian constitutional
law. See id. at 127. As noted by Professor Conkle: "Although Canada's new constitution, for
example, authorizes judicial review, it generally permits Parliament and the provincial
legislatures to override judicially protected constitutional rights." Conkle, supranote 69, at
14 n.20 (citing CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS §§ 24(1), (33); see also Neuborne, supra
note 69 (discussing at length the connection between constitutionality and the source of
challenged policy under French law).
899. For example, Professor Conkle has described Dean Sandalow's approach in these
terms:
Although Sandalow does not fully delineate the ramifications of his theory for
the doctrine of judicial finality, the theory would appear to suggest that every
Supreme Court decision protecting individual rights should be subject to
reversal by deliberate congressional legislation (and perhaps by deliberate
legislation adopted by a majority of the states).
Conkle, supranote 69, at 51 n.164.
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Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments."' This aspect of the
enforcement power does not reflect a constitutional "who" rule in
the ordinary sense because it does not entail a wholesale judicial
disqualification of state decision makers from framing policy in
sensitive areas. Indeed, this body of enforcement-power law may be
said to embody a sort of reverse "who" rule in that it grants to
Congress a power to overturn state exercises of authority that have
been specifically authorized by the courts. Whatever label we put on
the principle, however, it reflects at bottom the same sort of
institutional considerations that drive more unalloyed structural
"who" rules: the perception that Congress has a greater capacity
(vis-a-vis the states) to implement national constitutional norms
and a greater competence (vis-a-vis the courts) to structure
sweeping institutional remedies.90 1
One much-discussed modern "who"-rule issue concerns statewide
plebiscites conducted by way of voter initiatives and referenda. 2
900. See Oregonv. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding alaw thatmade a literacy-test
ban applicable nationwide); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding
Congress's reliance on section five to outlaw certain literacy tests for voting even though
prior opinions had upheld literacy tests generally against constitutional attack).
901. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966) (noting the "specially informed
legislative competence" of Congress); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309 (noting
the failure ofthe states to protect constitutional rights); id. at 313 (describing the inadequacy
ofjudicial remedies). Another quite different "who"-rule-related attemptto recognize a power
to reverse (or at least sidestep) a finding of constitutionality surfaced in Justice Stevens's
dissenting opinion inMinnesotav. Clover Leaf CreameryCo., 449 U.S. 456 (1981). There the
Court majority upheld against equal protection attack a Minnesota law that banned milk
sales in plastic nonreturnable containers. See id. Applying minimum scrutiny, the Court
reasoned that the law was rationally related to the legitimate purpose of environmental
protection. See id. In his dissent, Justice Stevens acknowledged that such a holding would
have been correct had the Supreme Court been reviewing a ruling of a lower federal court.
See id- But in this case, the Minnesota statute had been struck down by the Minnesota
Supreme Court. See id. In this context, Justice Stevens argued that the state court's ruling
should stand because "this federal tribunal [should not] conduct its own de novo review of a
state legislative record in search of a rational basis that the highest court of the State has
expressly rejected." Id. at 482 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In other words, Justice Stevens was
prepared to give state courts broad authority to "unconstitutionalize," on national-law
grounds, otherwise constitutional state legislation in light of considerations of competence
and federalism: "[lt is not our business," Justice Stevens reasoned, "to disagree with the
state tribunal's evaluation of the State's own lawmaking process." Id. at 483-84. Justice
Stevens's position, however, is not the law; indeed, it was rejected by the majority in Clover
Leaf Creamery as "extraordinary and unprecedented." Id. at 463 n.6.
902. Initiatives are voter-written statutes, or constitutional amendments in some states,
which go to direct ballot (or, in some instances, to the state legislature) if sufficient petition
signatures are gathered. Referenda are laws enacted by local or state legislative bodies that
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Drawing on the Madisonian commitment to representative
government, many observers have urged courts to channel
constitutionally sensitive decisions away from the
"unmediated"-and thus potentially uninformed and intemperate--direct vote of electoral majorities." 3 Prominent
candidates for invalidation include initiative-generated laws that
impose "English-only" requirements, affirmative-action bans, and
limits on available legal protections for gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals.9 " 4 According to critics of direct democracy, such decisions,
or at least many of them, can and should be made only in the
presumably more deliberative environment of state and national
legislative assemblies." 5 The Supreme Court has not
are placed before voters for approval See ISSACHAROFFETAIL, supranote 306, at 665. There
is an enormous amount of literature on the constitutionality and wisdom of lawmaking by
initiative. A particularly useful treatment, which also collects a large number ofthe earlier
works is Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, JudicialReview ofInitiatives andReferendums in Which
MajoritiesVote on Minorities'DemocraticCitizenship, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1999). See also
Perspectiveson DirectDemocracy,4 U. CHI.L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1(1997) (containing articles
on direct lawmaking by Marci A. Hamilton, Elizabeth Garrett, Matthew L. Spitzer, and
Howard DeLong).
903. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 137, at 1136 n.29 (opining that"such mechanisms for
unmediated translation ofmajority will into legislation present disquieting prospects for the
preservation of minority interests"); Sunstein, supra note 335, at 1195-97 (noting that
"frieferenda may well be based on inadequate information and on popular passions that are
insufficiently influenced by reason-giving and understanding ofcontext' and that "[tih is was
of course a relevant concern in the framing period"; observing, as a result, that "[i]t is
plausible to say that the Court should be mildly more receptive to a constitutional challenge
when legislation has come through referenda).
904. See Lazos Vargas, supranote 902, at 403.
905. Anumberofcommentaries have cast a skeptical eye on lawmaking direct democratic
action. See, e.g., Charles L. Black Jr., NationalLawmakingby Initiative?Let's Think Twice,
HUb. RTS., Fall 1979, at 30-31 (notingthat ordinary legislative processes contain structural
and procedural safeguards that protect minority interests and promote compromise); Julian
N. Eule, JudicialReview ofDirectDemocracy,99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1549 (1990) (arguing that
judicial review is especially important for initiatives because the initiative process fails to
provide Madisonian checks and balances); Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and
Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 CARDOZo L. REV. 807, 813 (1999) (arguing that the
Framers believed, based on "the post-Revolutionary experience... that democracy must be
mediated, not only by a legislature, but also by an Executive with true power"); Hans A.
Linde, When IntiativeLawmakinglsNot "RepublicanGovernment": The CampaignAgainst
Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV.19 (1993) (arguing for invalidity of certain categories of rules
adopted by initiative, even if otherwise permissible); Merritt, supra note 78, at 22 n.122
(citing support for the use of'the Guarantee Clause to protect individual rights andto correct
structural defects inherent in lawmaking by initiative); Sager, supra note 853, at 1402-23
(discussing "who" problems presented by lawmaking via initiative or referenda); James J.
Seeley, The Public Referendum and Minority Group Legislation:Postscriptto Reitman v.
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yet studiously explored or staked out a definitive position on the
constitutional status of lawmaking by way of citizen initiative."' At
Mulkey, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 881,905-10 (1970) (arguing that the Guarantee Clause should
be used to challenge"discrimination-prone" public referenda); see also CALABESI, supranote
500, at 71 ("Like most proposals to do away with checks and balances, [proposals that
endorse a shift to direct-democracy] fail for the... fundamental reason that all such changes
would reallocate power and make law revision too easy, in ways that have never found
acceptance in the United States."). See generally JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND
DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991).
Other articles have argued against special judicial skepticism about initiatives and
referenda. See, e.g., Robin Charlow, JudicialReview, EqualProtectionand the Problemwith
Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 527 (1994); Mark Tushnet, Fear of Voting: Differential
Standardsof JudicialReview of DirectLegislation, 1996 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 373. Notably,
some have suggested the particular appropriateness of lawmakingby initiative or referenda,
and thus the propriety ofaffordinggreaterjudicial deference toward these devices, in certain
constitutionally sensitive contexts. See, e.g., Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S.
713, 742 (1964) (Clark, J., dissenting); id. at 758 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 258-59 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) ("Although I find the Tennessee
apportionment statute offends the Equal Protection Clause, I would not considerintervention
by this Court into so delicate a field if there were any other relief available to the people of
Tennessee.... Tennessee has no initiative and referendum."). As stated by one observer.
It would be a singular perversion of Madison's reasoning to interpret his
argument against legislative control of qualifications as a justification for
excluding the electors themselves from adding extra qualifications for the
elected through state constitutions. Madison's argument was a defense of the
elector's power, not a limitation ofit. His argument was premised on the power
of the electors, the state peoples, to control the elected.
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A Defense of State ConstitutionalLimits on Federal Congressional
Terms, 53 U. PrIT. L. REv. 97, 122 (1991); see also ISSACHAROFFETAL., supranote 306, at 1112 (suggesting the possible appropriateness of differing scrutiny of apportionment schemes
set by direct public vote versus those established by "political insiders"). To these thoughts,
Judge Calabresi has added the interesting observation that, at least in California, virtually
all state-constitution-based rulings that strike down legislation are subject to a"second look"
by way of the initiative process:
In California, amendments to the state constitution are relatively easily
achieved through citizen-initiated referenda. As a result, a holding of
unconstitutionalityby the California Supreme Court mayhave no greater effect
than a remand for a second look. The remand is simply to the public rather
than to the legislature.
Calabresi, supra note 13, at 105 n.72 (citation omitted).
906. See Lazos Vargas, supra note 902, at 405 (stating that, "rather shockingly, the
Supreme Court has failed to provide a coherent or even internally consistent analysis ofhow
courts ought to go about reviewing direct democracy measures affecting minority interests
and rights"). But cf. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,809 n.19 (1995) ("We
are aware of no case that would even suggest that the validity of a state law under the
Federal Constitution would depend at all on whether the state law was passed by the state
legislature or by the people directly through amendment of the state constitution."); James
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971) ("Provisions for referendums demonstrate devotion to
democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice."). For a recent discussion of possible

20011

CONSTITUTION OF COLLABORATION

1795

least one lower court has suggested, however, that something like
a constitutional "who"rule sometimes should block policymaking by
direct popular vote when "fundamental interests" are at stake.0 7
Perhaps the most familiar of all constitutional "who" rules is the
longstanding prohibition on "vagueness.""° In his seminal
treatment of the vagueness doctrine, Professor Amsterdam
demonstrated that it has long been used not so much to provide fair
notice as a general matter as to give special protection to the most
pressing constitutional values, 9 particularly freedom of speech.1
constitutional limitations on direct democratic action in a highly specialized context, see
CaliforniaDemocratic Party v. Jones, in which Justice Stevens, in dissent, questioned
whether action by state initiative-rather than state legislation-can control "the Times,
Places and Manner" of electing "Senators and Representatives" consistent with Article I,
Section 4, Clause 1. 120 S. Ct. 2402, 2422 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
907. See Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839,857 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd en banc, 131 F.3d 843 (9th
Cir. 1997); supranotes 266-80 and accompanying text.
908. See generally TRIBE, supra note 24, § 12-31, at 1033 (discussing the vagueness
doctrine).
909. See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
67, 87-88 (1960) (noting that "the vagueness doctrine is most frequently employed as an
implement for curbing legislative invasion of constitutional rights other than that of fair
notice."); id at 74-75 n.38 (noting that the "void-for vagueness doctrine was born in the reign
of substantive due process and throughout that epoch was successfully urged exclusively in
cases involving regulatory or economic-control legislation"; adding that "[slince the advent
of the New Deal Court, by contrast, there has been one economic vagueness case, and with
the ever increasing emphasis upon protection of first amendment liberties, free speech
vagueness cases have begun to proliferate"); see also BICKEL, supranote 6, at 182 (arguing,
in agreement with Justice Harlan, that a vagueness attack was available against the
application of a disorderly conduct statute in a state-action sit-in case because "unimportant
as it might be in the common ran of other situations, the statute here raised a constitutional
issue"). See generally John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Constructionof
Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 196 (1985) ("As Professor Amsterdam has taught us, a
paramount concern is whether the law's uncertain reach implicates protected freedoms.").
910. As explained in one commentary.
The primary thesis advanced here is that the doctrine of unconstitutional
indefiniteness has been used by the Supreme Court almost invariably for the
creation of an insulating buffer zone of added protection at the peripheries of
several of the Bill of Rights freedoms. With regard to one class of cases, those
involvingpotentialinfringementoffirst amendmentprivileges, this buffer-zone
principle has always been expressly avowed in the Court's opinions and
recognized by the commentators.
Note, supra note 909, at 75; id. at 75 n.39 (noting that "the so-called first amendment
vagueness cases are precisely what that name implies"). There are many cases that suggest
the special role ofvagueness rules in the First Amendment context. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) (noting that vagueness "is a matter of special concern" when
dealing with a content-based criminal statute "because of its obvious chilling effect on free
speech"); Dombrowskiv. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,494 (1965) (applying vagueness rule because
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It is equally true that the vagueness doctrine protects these
substantive values in a structuralway. This is true in part because
the vagueness doctrine operates as a thoughtful-treatment-of-thearea rule; it does so by forcing policymakers, whoever they might
be, to substitute deliberation-enhancing focus for sloppiness and
evasion when they frame laws that threaten important
constitutional rights.9"
But the vagueness doctrine also operates as a structural "who"
rule. The Court suggested why this is so in Kolender v. Lawson,
when it observed: "Wle have recognized recently that the more
important aspect of the vagueness doctrine 'is not actual notice, but
the other principle element of the doctrine-the requirement that
a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement."' Put another way, the vagueness doctrine serves to
"overly broad statute... creates a 'danger zone' within which protected expression may be

inhibited"); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (noting that when rules are vague,
speakers will "steer far wider ofthe unlawful zone"); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495,533 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that vagueness rule "is especially to be
observed when what is so vague seeks to fetter the mind and put within unascertainable
bounds the varieties of religious experience"); see also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372
(1964) ("The uncertain meanings... require [people] to 'steer far wider of the unlawful
zone,'than if the boundaries... were clearlymarked."). SeegenerallyGUNTHER&SULLIvAN,

supranote 30, at 1338 (noting that "afinding ofFirstAmendment vagueness has greater bite
than a finding of due process vagueness"); Jeffries, supra note 909, at 216 ("Where legal
uncertainty threatens free expression, the search for indefiniteness has a special rigor.").
911. See supra Part VIII.
912. 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); accord, Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73, 575 (1974) (noting that the vagueness doctrine "requires
legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact
in order to prevent 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement'; worrying that "[s]tatutory
language of such a standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue
theirpersonalpredilections"); Cantwellv. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,303-08 (1940) (worrying
about "leaving to the executive and judicial branches too wide a discretion" where "liberties
guaranteed by the First Amendment" are at stake); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214,221
(1876) (expressing worry about laws that "substitute the judicial for the legislative
department"); see also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263-64 (1937) ("The law, as thus
construed, licenses the jury to create its own standard in each case.... No reasonably
ascertainable standard of guilt is prescribed."). Professor Bickel noted the wide variety of
non-legislative officials who are empowered by vague statutes:
A decisive consideration here, as Mr. Amsterdam demonstrates, is ... that a
loosely worded statute allows latitude for "discontrol, irrationality, and
irregularity," for erratic, prejudiced, discriminatory, or overreaching (the
adjectives are all Mr. Amsterdam's) exercises of authority. The danger is
greatest from administrative officials-particularly from petty officials--but it
should be guarded against as well with prosecutors, who have power to harass,
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push responsibility for constitutionally troublesome judgments
about crimin'ality away from individual law enforcement officers (as
well as individual prosecutors, courts, and juries) onto the agenda
of more representative, more accountable, and more deliberative
lawmaking assemblies. 9 3 By operatingin this way, the doctrine not
and with judges and juries.
BICKEL, supra note 6, at 151.
913. See TRIBE, supranote 24, § 17-2, at 1678 n.7 ("This focus lof modern vagueness cases]
demonstrates that the form of the statute is important primarily because the legislature,
rather than the executive branch, must make the discretionary policy choice about which
actions are criminal.). As noted by Professor Jeffries:
Justifications for nullapoenasine lege, the vagueness doctrine, and the rule of
strict construction cluster around three kinds of arguments. The first concerns
the association of popular sovereignty with legislative primacy and the
consequent illegitimacy ofjudicial innovation. In contemporary constitutional
discourse, this sort of assertion is called "separation of powers."
Jefflies, supranote 909, at 201; see Sunstein, supra note 439, at 38 ("A court might strike
down vague laws precisely because they ensure that executive branch officers, rather than
elected representatives, will set the content of the law."); see also, e.g., United States v.
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265-66 n.5 (1997) (stating that "[tihe fair warning requirement...
reflects the deference due to the legislature, which possesses the power to define crimes and
their punishment" and citing HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LImITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION
79-96 (1968) for the "principle of legality," which stipulates "that conduct may not be treated
as criminal unless it has been so defined by [a competent] authority... before it has taken
place" (alteration in original)).
For this reason, the vagueness doctrine has a connection to the rule of lenity, which is
based in part "onthe plainprinciple thatthe power ofpunishment is vested inthe legislative,
not in the judicial department." Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 205 (1998) (citing
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820), for the proposition that "the
legislature, not the Court,... is to define a crime"). For the same reason, the vagueness
doctrine-at least inthe federal context-bears a relationship to the prohibition on common
law crimes. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (noting that "only
Congress, and not the courts.... can make conduct criminal"). Indeed, Professor Tribe has
suggested that the seminal decision that produced the "who"-related prohibition on common
law crimes was issued "undoubtedly for reasons related to freedom of speech and press."
TRIBE, supra note 24, § 17-2, at 1677 (discussing United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812)). The connection between the common-law-crime ban and the
vagueness doctrine is illustrated by United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948). There a
federal statute barred (1) bringing illegal aliens into the country and (2) harboring illegal
aliens. See id. at 483-84. The statute went on to detail a penalty for the bringing-in offense,
while specifying no penalty whatsoever for the harboring offense. See id. at 484. In a
prosecution for harboring, the government urged the Court to extrapolate a penalty for the
harboring offense (preferably the same penalty applicable to the bringing-in offense), using
ordinary tools of ambiguity-resolving statutory interpretation. See id. at 485. The Court,
however, concluded that "the choice the Government asks us to make is so broad and so deep,
resting among such equally tenable though inconsistent possibilities, that we have no
business to make it at all." Id. at 486. The Court added that "there are limits beyond which
we cannot go in finding what Congress.. . has left undefined or too vague for reasonable
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only safeguards First Amendment and other liberty interests; it
also advances the constitutional norm of equality by removing "a
convenient tool for 'harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local
prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit
their displeasure."'9 1 4 It is important to recognize that vaguenessbased invalidations are not-at least not primarily-centered on the
substantive reach of the challenged law because they do not
inevitably demand a narrowingof the law's coverage. Consider, for
example, a prohibition on bringing "dirty pictures" to school. One
possible reprise to a vagueness-based invalidation of such a rule
would be for the policymaker to target only that small amount of
material that is obscene in the technical constitutional sense.9 1 5 But
the lawgiver might also cure the vagueness problem by excluding
all items that include any image of "a naked human being." It
seems clear that this latter rule would, in operation, be more
restrictive of free speech than the rule it replaced. Depictions of
"any naked human being," after all, appear in many issues of
National Geographic and in innumerable anthologies of great
painting, sculpture, and photography that can hardly be described
as "dirty."9 16 And that is the critical point. A vagueness-based
remand to the legislature in a case like our "dirty pictures"
hypothetical is not based on the overreaching content of the law. It
is the law's ill-defined, oblique, and cryptic form, rather than its
unduly expansive scope, that compels a legislative reconsideration.
For these reasons, the vagueness doctrine, like other structural
"who" rules, does not seek to shape substantive outcomes so much
as it seeks to engender policymaker care.9 17 So long as the
assurance of its meaning" because "so far at least as concerns the federal powers, defining
crimes and fixing penalties are legislative, notjudicial, functions." Id.;see also BICKEL, supra
note 6, at 151-52 (arguing that "it is far from a sterile conceptualism to say that a vague
statute delegates power to make decisions that do not derive from a prior legislative
decision").
914. Kolender,461 U.S. at 360; see Jeifries,supranote 909, at 197 ("Manyvagueness cases
are irresistibly suggestive of racial bias, and the invalidation of the laws involved often may
plausibly be viewed as a prophylactic against such abuse."). The principles ofKolender were
recently restated and applied in City of Chicago v.Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
915. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
916. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975).
917. See Bickel, supra note 6, at 202 ("[U]nlike constitutional doctrines properly so called,
the devices ofvagueness, delegation, procedure, and constructionleave the otherinstitutions,
particularly the legislature, free-and generally invite them-to make or remake their own
decisions for prospective application to everyone in like cases.. . ."); see also Neal Devins,
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legislature defines its terms, it can, consistently with the vagueness
rule at least, go so far as to criminalize prayers directed to St.
Joseph when offered in the homes of female Korean Americans. For
vagueness purposes, it is not the "what" of the rule but instead the
"how"that is constitutionally all-important.9 1 At the same time, the
"how" helps shape the "what" in the important (but limited) sense
that it pushes decision making away from the potentially
idiosyncratic and uneven judgments of individual government
officials. In short, the vagueness doctrine tends to ensure that
responsibility for making policy falls where it is meant to lie in a
republic: in the presumably more systematic and less erratic hands
of legislative assemblies.9 19
The Last Word Debate.How Socialand PoliticalForcesShape ConstitutionalValues, A-B.A.
J., Oct. 1997, at 46, 50 (claiming that the invalidation of congressional treatment of an
Internet indecency law "on 'void for vagueness grounds,' returned that issue to elected
officials").
918. See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 152 (stating that the vagueness doctrine "does not hold
that the legislature may not do whatever it is that is complained of but, rather, asks that the
legislaturedo it, if it is to be done at all").
919. Professor Bickel put the point this way:
Avague statute delegates to administrators, prosecutors, juries, and judges the
authority ofad hoc decision, which is in its nature difficult if not impossible to
hold to account, because of its narrow impact. In addition, such a statute
delegates authority away from those who are personally accountable, at least
for the totality oftheir performance, to those who are not, at least not directly.
In both aspects, it short-circuits the lines of responsibility that make the
political process meaningful.
Id at 151. Professor Jeffries has made much the same observation:
The power to define a vague law is effectively left to those who enforce it, and
those who enforce the penal law characteristically operate in settings of secrecy
and informality, often punctuated by a sense of emergency, and rarely
constrained by self-conscious generalization of standards. In such
circumstances, the wholesale delegation of discretion naturally invites its
abuse, and an important first step in constraining that discretion is the
invalidation of indefinite laws.
Jeffries, supra note 909, at 215; see Note, supra note 909, at 90 (suggesting that the
vagueness doctrine is 'responsive to whim or discrimination unrelated to any specific
determination of need by the responsible policy-making organs of society"). Additional
discretion-dampening "who" rules responsive to substantive constitutional rights are
recognizable. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause requirement that legislatures
cabin sentencing-authority discretion in capital cases is illustrative. See Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). So are freespeech/free-press prohibitions on standardless licensing. See supra notes 627-31 and
accompanying text. In particular, Professor Schauer has argued that, in the field of First
Amendment prior restraints, "[itis the identity and discretion of the restrainers and not the
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There is a curious and significantly structural flipside to the
legislature-favoring approach embodied in the vagueness doctrine.
The Court has insisted in some cases, not that legislatures wield
discretion-limiting power, but instead that they leave significant
discretion with front-line government officials. In the Eighth
Amendment area, for example, the Court has said that the
sentencing authority-typically a trial jury-must have the final
say on whether to withhold the death penalty in light of the
precious uniqueness of every human life.9 20 In the free-exercise
field, the Court has insisted that front-line agency officials consider
an individual's religious-based justifications for claiming unemployment benefits regardless of legislatively created "bright-line"
rules that all able-bodied persons who can work must do so.92 '
timing of the restraint that is important." FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILoSOPHICALENQUIRY 152 (1982). Professors Gunther and Sullivan suggest three possible
arguments against nonjudicial prior restraints, at least the latter two ofwhich focus on whorelated concerns:
(1) It is easier for an official to restrict speech 'by a simple stroke of the pen'
than by the more cumbersome apparatus of subsequent punishment and thus
prior restraint is likely to restrict more speech;
(2) Censors will have an [sic] professional bias in favor of censorship, and thus
will systematically overvalue government interests and undervalue speech;
(3) Censors operate more informally than judges and so afford less procedural
safeguards to speakers.
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 30, at 1344; see also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer
Pubrg Co., 486 U.S. 750,760 (1988) (expressing concern about a censorship framework that
calls for decision by an "official charged particularly with reviewing speech. .. , breeding an
'expertise' tending to favor censorship over speech"); BICKEL, supra note 6, at 141 ("[A]
certain attitude of mind seems always to be engendered in professional censors (or perhaps
it propels people into the profession), which results in excesses and stupidities . . . ."); Note,

supranote 909, at 94 ("The probability of [rights] deprivation has been consistently regarded
as a function of what kind of tribunal is empowered to make the potentially deprivative value
judgment. Power given to courts appears more tolerable than power given to administrative
agencies....").
Another First Amendment line of decisions related to reducing law-applier discretion is
identified in Lee, supra note 438. As he states:
In early clear and present danger cases, the United States Supreme Court
contrasted convictions based on common law or general statutes with those
based on statutes specifically targeting expression. The Court emphasized that
sanctions for general offenses, such as contempt of court, "do not come to us
encased in the armor wrought by prior legislative deliberation."
Id. at 1273-74 & n.77 (citing Bridges v. California,314 U.S. 252, 296-303 (1941), as a case
involving "whether there was a 'real and substantial threat to impartial decision' in a
pending case unaided by the benefit of state legislation addressing the issue").
920. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976).
921. The operative case is Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). There the
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A similar attentiveness to individual dignity-combined with
substantive concerns about gender equality and reproductive
liberty-explains the Court's rejection in Cleveland Board of
Educationv. LaFleurof a "conclusive presumption" that all women
more than four months pregnant are unfit to teach.9'
Court rejected the case for free-exercise-based exemptions from generally applicable criminal
laws, but distinguished exemptions from laws that lend themselves "to individualized
governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct." Id. at 884. The Court
noted that the 'good cause" standard for unemployment-benefits eligibility "created a
mechanism for individualized exemptions." Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963)). Thus, "our decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the proposition thatwhere
the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend [its]
system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason."Id. In short, to the extent
it reaffirms Sherbert, Smith sacrifices a state-preferred rule of legislatively decreed equal
treatment on the altar of free exercise. It does so by requiring a regime of individualized
evaluations of religious sincerity, albeit only when a system of individualized evaluation
already is in place, instead of something quite like a discretion-defeating conclusive
presumption that insincerity is present.
922. 414 U.S. 632, 647-48 (1974); see also TRIBE, supra note 24, § 16-29, at 1577
(discussing LaFleur).Other Supreme Court cases seem to fit this pattern. See, e.g., United
States Dep'tofAgric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (striking down a statute that denied food
stamps to any household that contained an individual over the age of eighteen who was
claimed as a tax dependent for the previous year); id. at 518 (Marshall, J., concurring)
("[Wihere the private interests affected are very important and the governmental interest
can be promoted without much difficulty by a well-designed hearing procedure, the Due
Process Clause requires the Government to act on an individualized basis, with general
propositions serving only as rebuttable presumptions or other burden-shifting devices.");
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,454 (1973) (invalidating a statute that classified individuals
as permanent nonresidents ineligible for reduced tuition at state universities based solely
on their having a legal address outside the state at the time of application to the university);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (invalidating a statute that automatically
deprived unwed fathers of custody of their illegitimate children upon the mother's death
without allowing an individualized showing ofparentalfitness); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
542 (1971) (invalidating an automatic suspension of the license of every driver involved in
an accident who would not post the demanded security to cover alleged damages without
allowing the driver to present evidence of ultimate nonliability). As commentators have
suggested, such rules of individualized determination may make the most sense when
recognized as less restrictive alternatives required by heightened review under the Equal
Protection Clause or other strong constitutional protections. See, e.g., Note, The Irrebutable
PresumptionDoctrinein the Supreme Court,87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974). Many cases seem
to fit this mold. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (discussing the Court's
insistence in sex discrimination cases that "legislatures choose either to realign their
substantive laws in a gender-neutral fashion, or to adopt procedures for identifying those
instances where the sex-centered generalization actually comported with fact"); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,689 (1973) (rejecting as ajustification for a sex-based classification
the idea "that it would be both cheaper and easier simply conclusively to presume that wives
of male members are financially dependent upon their husbands, while burdening female
members with the task of establishing dependency in fact"); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
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These individualized-determination rules have a substantive
dimension. Under them, fewer felons will die, more free exercise
will occur, and a greater number of pregnant women will stay at
work. But these rules also pay close attention to how and through
whom government policy takes shape,9" lest the constitutional
92,100-01 (1972) ("Predictions about imminent disruption from picketing involvejudgments
appropriately made on an individualized basis, not by means of broad classifications,
especially those based on subject matter."); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971)
(invalidating a statutory preference for male over female administrators under the Equal
Protection Clause because the state could not use mandatory sex preference "merely to
accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits [and thus avoid] intrafamily
controversy"); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95 (1965) (mandating that state reject a
conclusive presumption and instead develop procedures to "winnow" out, for purposes of
voting qualifications, servicemen who are not bona fide residents); see also Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 543-45 (1942) (Stone, C.J., concurring)
(suggesting that state sterilization ofspecified classes of criminals could be permissible, but
only if an individual criminal had a hearing on whether he possessed "demonstrably
inheritable" injurious tendencies); cf. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 440 (1965)
(striking down as a bill of attainder a criminal provision that barred every member of the
Communist party from serving as a union officer or non-menial employee). See generally
GUNTHER &SULLIVAN, supranote 30, at 915 (noting critics' argument that "the finding of an
unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption was essentially the same as holding a
classification overbroad under equal protection" and concluding that "irrebuttable
presumption analysis seemed to be the equivalent of an extremely strict variety of 'means'
scrutiny"). For two of many lower-court cases that involve the proper scope of discretionmandating constitutional rules, compare Williams v. Salerno, 792 F.2d 323, 328 (2d Cir.
1986), which rejected an irrebuttable presumption that would "have the effect of completely
disenfranchising a person who abandons a former residence in a state other than New York
with the intent of becoming a domiciliary of the community in New York where he or she
attends school" by denying voting rights to all recently arriving students who live in school
dormitories, with Beller v. Middendorf,632 F.2d 788, 808 n.20 (9th Cir. 1980), which noted
that: "[t]he due process clause does not require the Government to show with particularity
that the reasons for the general policy of discharging homosexuals from the Navy exist in a
particular case before discharge is permitted," and that "individual hearings might be
appropriate on an equal protection theory" or "in some circumstances... by substantive due
process," but that "[tihis case ... involves neither middle-tier equal protection analysis nor
a situation where the only alternative means available to satisfy the Govermmens goals
consistent with due process is an individual showing of unfitness." Within or near the field
of mandatory discretion-granting rules, one might also place the ancient, overarching
principle that supports so-called jury nullification-that is, the rule that "itis not competent
for the court, in a criminal case, to instruct the jury peremptorily to find the accused guilty
of the offence charged." Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51,105 (1895). The arguable kinship
of this "who"-related doctrine to particularly significant substantive constitutional rights is
suggested by what may well have been its most famous invocation: the press-freedom,
seditious-libel trial ofcolonial publisherJohn Peter Zenger. See, e.g., IRVINGBRANTTHEBILL
OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 175-79 (1965).
923. See Linde, supra note 27, at 248-49 (discussing judicial tinkering with "the
lawmaking process by pushing it toward forms of adjudication, for instance in land-use
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value of individual dignity fall victim to a dehumanizing lockstep
rigidity.92 4 These rules require, as Professor Tribe has explained,
"leaving room for rebuttal and discretionary adjustment where
mandatory, per se rules are . . . too insensitive to personal
differences in matters of great moment." 925
planning" and "in the assault on 'conclusive presumptions' which the Supreme Court has
levied against disfavored legislative generalizations"; questioning this approach, but noting
that "at least it purports to concern the process of policy formulation, not the policy").
924. See Tribe, supra note 27, at 306 n.113 (advocating the appropriateness, in certain
situations, of"an individualized hearing of the case's facts-a particularized confrontation
with areality unprocessed byrule-bound categories"). It bears emphasis, particularlyinlight
of the Court's decision in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), that courts also may use
"who"-centeredindividualized-assessmentrules to protect constitutional interests unrelated
to individual dignity. In Alden, the Court held that Congress may not authorize private
money-damages actions against states, in state as well as federal court, under the Fair Labor
Standards Act or other legislation enacted pursuant to its Article I powers. See id. At the
same time the Court indicated that Congress could authorize "a suit by the United States on
behalf of the employees" because such a suit differs from a direct action by the employees
themselves. Id. at 759. In particular, the Court explained that a suit initiated in the name
of the United States "implicates a rule that the National Government must itself deem the
case ofsufficient importance to take action against the State."Id. at 759-60. From one angle,
this claimed distinction seems faulty, after all, by expressly providing for individual actions
under FLSA, "the National Government"-through the action of Congress-specifically
declared that cases like Mr. Alden's were "of sufficient importance to take action against the
State." Id. Effectively establishing a new "who" rule, however, the Court in Alden held that
congressional action standing alone was insufficient to overcome the strong constitutional
presumption of state immunity from suit. See id. at 757-60. Rather, to override this
immunity, it was necessary for the legislative and executive branches of the national
government to act in tandem, and in particular for the executive branch to make a discrete
decision to pursue a specific private person's distinctive FLSA claim in the specialized
context of assessing only that single claim of wrongdoing. See id. Such a process protects
substantive constitutional interests in state autonomy in a structural way. By providing a
"double-check" against the pursuit of FLSA claims against states-and a mandatory
individualized-assessment requirement by the executive branch before such suits are
brought-the rule ofAlden tends to ensure that money-damages actions against states will
be prosecuted only when most justifiable.
925. TRIBE, supranote 24, § 17-3, at 1684 (emphasis added). Professor Tribe has written
extensively and provocatively on this subject, particularly in the 1975 article from which he
drew in a more limited discussion of the same subject in the second edition of his treatise.
See Tribe, supranote 27. Professor Tribe advocates in his article "the ideal of conducting
dialogue within a mutually acceptable frame ofreference when limiting important areas of
liberty." Id. at 306. He urges in particular that when competing values involve a"mix of the
widely agreed and the deeply debated, the dialogue... cannot be meaningful if it can be
terminated by the [government's] invocation of a rule of thumb about [such matters as]
unwed mothers in school." Id. at 304 (emphasis omitted). Professor Tribe adds:
Rule-of-thumb disposition ofhuman liberty in an area affected by deep currents
of social flux is vulnerable to attack from yet another structural due process
perspective: such decisionmaking, whatever its legitimacy in the individual
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At first blush, these individualized-decision cases seem to stand
in awkward tension with discretion-countering "who" rules like the
vagueness doctrine. But tension is not inconsistency, and these
doctrines can and do peacefully coexist. Indeed, the discretionmandating rule of LaFleurand the discretion-cabining rule of the
vagueness cases counter much the same danger: the risk of
destructively discriminatory stereotyping by powerful government
decision makers. LaFleur responds to this risk by disallowing
blunderbuss rules, typically crafted by efficiency-minded government managers, in favor of insisting on case-specific dialogue with
individual human beings.926 The vagueness rule, as the Court
explained in Papachristouv. City ofJacksonville,"7 also addresses
the risk of unfair stereotyping. It does so, however, by helping to
case, permits the state to avoid participation, through a series of cases, inwhat
should be a dialogue over time about social values.
Id. at 306. According to Professor Tribe, his mode of analysis not only explains Supreme
Court decisions like LaFleur,but also
might plausibly be urged forpregnant girls and unwed mothers in public school,
for homosexual teachers, and for runaway adolescents challenging automatic
return laws, to suggest but a few obviously analogous cases. The rapid flux in
our culture's mix and range of attitudes relevant to childhood and sex roles and
the effect of that fluxon important, agreed-upon liberties with respect to family
style, could go far toward justifying the Supreme Court's insistence on
individualization in those settings.
Id. at 308. But cf. Beller, 632 F.2d at 808 n.20 (noting that the Constitution "does not
necessarily require the Government in each case involving changing norms to show that the
reasons for the regulation apply in the particular case"). Professor Tribe also has emphasized
a"feedback" justification for individualized decisionmaking. See Tribe, supranote 27, at 306.
He argues, by way of example, that high schools may not flatly ban attendance by unwed
mothers in part because
a board operating by rule-of-thumb is not contributing, either through its
decisions or through the reasons it offers for them, to what the general social
view of a particular matter like unwed motherhood in the schools-a matter
about which views had once been widely shared-now ought to be.
Id. Individualized decision making, Professor Tribe argues, will generate "new arguments"
and "new data" from which "a new consensus might emerge." Id. at 307. Of course, it is
important to see that these rules--like other structural rules--find expression only in
narrowly defined areas that involve, as Professor Tribe puts it, "matters of great moment."
TRIBE, supra note 24, § 17-3, at 1684. The desire to limit individualized-determination rules
to a limited set of exceptional cases is driven not only by-the desire for equal treatment and
predictabilityin the law, but also by powerful efficiency concerns. See, e.g., Foster, supranote
791, at 1107 (citing the "unbearable cost' on the policymaking process [generated] by
requiring government to create 'procedures for deciding every [issue] on its individual
merits' (quoting ELY, supra note 88, at 155)).
926. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 645-47.
927. 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
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equalize on-the-street treatment of "minorities as well as

majorities" and "the poor as well as the rich."928 Viewed through
this lens, the contrasting approaches of LaFleur and Papachristou
hardly reveal doctrinal incoherence. They show instead that our
Constitution may generate different structural rules in different
contexts, even when responding to the same substantive values.9 29

XI. QUASI-STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL RULES
The structural rules we have looked at so far share a common
bond. Each rule facilitates interbranch dialogue by letting judges
insist that the political branches use specialized structures to
evaluate (and often to reevaluate) constitutionally troublesome
policy pronouncements. 93 0 There are, however, many other ways in
which courts may safeguard substantive constitutional rights with
rules that focus on governmental processes and interbranch giveand-take. I refer to these devices as "quasi-structural rules" and
explore in this Part three doctrines of this sort. They are what I call
(1) quasi-structural "who" rules; (2) structural rules of adjudicative
procedure; and (3) means-centered proper-fit rules. Space
limitations preclude us from considering other important quasistructural devices and permit us to take only a brief glance at the
three -quasi-structural techniques we shall explore.93 ' This quick
928. Id. at 171.
929. Professor Tribe makes a similar observation with respect to other ostensibly
dissonant constitutional rules:
[A] judgment that respect for unconventional ideas or choices of lifestyle
precludes overly personalized government action in a context where
pamphleteers are being licensed is consistent with a judgment that the same
respect for the unconventional compels highly individualized adjudication
where custody decisions affecting unmarried males, or employment decisions
affecting pregnant females, are at stake. Again inescapable is the substantive
question: given the cultural and bureaucratic realities, which path currently
points toward the freedom protected by the relevant constitutional provisions?
TRIBE, supranote 24, § 17-1, at 1674-75.
930. See supranote 44 and accompanying text.
931. There are at least four dialogue-related quasi-structural tools we will not consider
further, except to mention them. First, even while upholding a law, a court may try to spur
legislative reform by volunteering its view that the law is unfair or unwise in light of
constitutional values. For example, in Coleman v. Miller, 117 F3d 527, 530 (11th Cir. 1997),
discussed supra notes 817-31 and accompanying text, the Eleventh Circuit offered the
observation that the Confederate Battle Emblem "offends many Georgians" and "has, in our
view, no place in the official state flag." See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as
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visit nonetheless serves to confirm the point at the heart of this
Article-that structurally minded doctrines lurk in every corner of
constitutional law.
A. Quasi-Structural"Who" Rules
True constitutional "who" rules channel policymaking authority
from one set of decision makers to another by wielding the sword of
outright disqualification.932 There is, however, another set of whocentered doctrines-what we might call "quasi-structural 'who'
rules"--that involve not the redirecting of decision-making
authority from one policymaker to another, but the calibration of
judicial scrutiny to take account of the nature of the government
policymaker whose action is at issue. In Madsen v. Women's Health
Center,Inc.,"' for example, the Court confronted a broad injunction,
issued by a state trial court, that limited the expressive activities
of anti-abortion protestors. This injunction, the Court held, was a
content-neutral restriction on speech in a traditional public

Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709 (1998). Second, even while upholding a law, the Court
may engender caution in the laws application by indicating that it stands ready to revisit the
law in future cases in light of its potential impacts. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1992) (noting that validation of twenty-fourhour waiting period for abortions was based "on the record before us" and made "in the
context of this facial challenge"). Third, a court might openly indicate that-while the court
itself cannot invalidate a state rule-Congress has the power to preempt it in light of
constitutional considerations. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. ofElections, 360 U.S.
45, 51 (1959) (upholding state literacy tests, while noting that they do not violate any
existing "restriction that Congress, acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, has
imposed"). Finally, the Court might seek to trigger political-branch involvement in sorting
through tough constitutional questions by rendering rulings that are highly fact-specific. As
explained earlier, see supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text, Professor Sunstein claims
that the Court has used this technique in dealing with the hard issues presented by raceconscious affi-mative action and in many other contexts as well. See, e.g., SUNSTFM, supra
note 106; Sunstein, supra note 335, at 1198 ("[Tihe Court has ... authority to issue highly
casuistical rulings that do not settle much, but that operate as a kind of 'remand' to the
public, alerting people to the existence of hard issues of principle and policy. In the
affirmative action context, the Court, whether or not intentionally, has done precisely this.").
Others have made similar observations as well. See, e.g., Michael Wells, Naked Politics,
FederalCourts Law, and the Canon of Acceptable Arguments, 47 EMORY L.J. 89, 96 n.22
(1998) (notingthe possibility that "jurisdictionalcomplexity is a good thing because it permits
some matters to remain unsettled and subject to reconsideration").
932. See supra Part XI.
933. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
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forum. 934 The Court noted that it assesses such restrictions, when

issued by a legislative body, by asking whether they are "narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest."3 5 In the
Court's eyes, however, its "standard time, place, 'and manner
analysis" was "not sufficiently rigorous" when applied to judicially
crafted injunctions.936 The Court thus asked not whether the
it was "necessary
injunction was "narrowly tailored," but whether
93 7
to serve a significant government interest."

The Court justified its resort to elevated scrutiny in this context
by explaining that content-neutral injunctions issued by individual
judges differ from content-neutral rules that "represent a legislative
choice." 3 ' Making much the same point that recurs in the
vagueness cases, the Court explained that legislative pronouncements are "imposed generally" and thus contain a "practical
guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government";939 in

contrast, injunctions issued by a single judge in a single case "carry
greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application." 4 In
short, the Court in Madsen adopted a quasi-structural "who" rule.
The Court did not, along the lines of Mow Sun Wong,9" channel the
task of issuing speech-inhibiting injunctions from judges to other
government officials. Rather, the Court recognized that, while
injunctions inevitably must come from individual judges, the nature
of judicial-as opposed to legislative-decision making poses
distinctive risks to free-expression values. As a result, "in this
context" the Court opted for "a somewhat more
stringent
9 42
application of general First Amendment principles."
934. See id. at 762-63.
935. Id. at 764 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
936. Id. at 765.
937. Id.
938. Id. at 764.
939. Id. (quoting Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,112-13 (1949)).
940. Id.; see also Hill v. Colorado, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 2488 (2000) (citing Madsen in noting
distinction between 'judicial decree" and "general ordinances" with respect to dangers to
First Amendment values).
941. See supranotes 837-48 and accompanying text.
942. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765. Interestingly, the Justices who concurred and dissented in
Madsen also relied on who-related considerations to support their own proposals for
specialized forms ofjudicial review. Contrary to the majority, Justice Stevens argued that
"injunctive relief should be judged by a more lenient standard than legislation." Id. at 778
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). Such a rule, he
argued, "gives appropriate deference to the judge's unique familiarity with the facts" of the
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Rules of this ilk pervade our law. The Court, for example, often
ratchets up the level of deference given to decisions made by certain
officials-like school,943 prison,4 and military 945 authorities-who
bring specialized experience and training to difficult fields of
action. 9 ' On the other hand, the Court may ratchet down the
case. Id. at 779. On the other hand, Justice Scalia contended that speech-constricting
injunctions should be viewed as content-based restrictions subject to full-bore "strict
scrutiny." Id. at 791 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). He
reasoned in part that: "[Injunctions] are the product of individual judges rather than of
legislatures-and often of judges who have been chagrined by prior disobedience of their
orders. The right to free speech should not lightly be placed within the control of a single
man or woman." Id. at 793.
943. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (rejecting a
First Amendment challenge to teacher control of school newspaper's editorial contentinpart
because of the "oft-expressed view that the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the
responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal
judges"); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,226 (1985) (emphasizing the
Court's "reluctance to trench on the prerogatives of state and local educational institutions"
because federal courts are not well "suited to evaluate the substance of the multitude of
academic decisions that are made daily by faculty members").

944. See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576,589 (1984) (upholding a bar on pretrial
detainees' contact visits with friends and family because "responsible, experienced
administrators have determined, in their sound discretion, that such visits will jeopardize
the security of the [detention] facility").
945. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689-90 (1985) (rejecting a First
Amendment claim because a "commanding officer has broad discretion to exclude civilians
from a military base" and because the Constitution denies "the judiciary the authority to
manage military facilities throughout the Nation"); Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 634
(2d Cir. 1998) (upholding a "don't ask, don't tell" policy in part because "[i]n the military
setting... constitutionally-mandated deferencetomilitary assessments and judgments gives
the judiciary far less scope to scrutinize the reasons, legitimate on their face, that the
military has advanced to justify its actions"); see also United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669
(1987) (barring a former serviceman from mounting constitutional claim against military
officials for subjecting him involuntarily to LSD); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983)
(rejecting a damages claim in discrimination suit against military superiors). With regard
to the Court's deference to congressional judgments in the field of military matters, see, for
example,Rostker v. Goldberg,453 U.S. 57,67 (1981) (upholding an exclusion of females from
draft registration: "None of this is to say that Congress is free to disregard the Constitution
when it acts in the area of military affairs.... [Blut the tests and limitations to be applied
may differ because of the military context. We of course do not abdicate our ultimate
responsibility to decide the constitutional question, but simply recognize that the
Constitution itself requires such deference to congressional choice.").
946. See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335-36 (1998) (emphasizing the
need to defer to legislative judgments about appropriate punishments in assessing claims
under the Excessive Fines Clause); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 620 (1969)
(stating that "a reviewing court must recognize the [Labor] Board's competence in the first
instance to judge the impact of [speech] in the context of the employer-employee
relationship"). Taking an approach akin to that ofMadsen, the Court has said that, in the
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deference it applies to choices made by other decision makers
because of concerns about interest, capacity, and the like.947
Madsen, as we have seen, reflects a rule of ratcheted-down
deference applicable to judicial decisions that concern First
Amendment values.9 Distinguishing the "adjudicative decision"
concerning only "an individual parcel," from more trustworthy
"legislative determinations classifying entire areas," the Court, in
Dolan v. City of Tigard,949 likewise endorsed an intensified review
of discrete agency actions to safeguard Fifth Amendment
protections against uncompensated takings.95 Some quasistructural "who" rules demand more aggressive review of state
policies than of federal policies when valued constitutional rights
are at stake.95 ' For example, the rule that requires strict scrutiny
substantive due process field, the "criteria to identify what is fatally arbitrary differ
depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a governmental officer that is at
issue." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
947. See TRIBE, supranote24, § 17-2, at 1678 n.7 (expressing a concern on accountability
grounds about constitutionally sensitive choices made by "a group of private citizens"); see
also Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 368 (1998) (declining
to extend Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applicable to police officers to parol officers
because police officers, unlike parole officers, are "engaged in the often competitive
enterprise offerreting out crime" (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984))).
948. See supra notes 933-42 and accompanying text.
949. 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
950. In Dolan, the Court entertained a Takings Clause challenge to a planning
commission's grant of a permit to modify property that was conditioned on the dedication of
part of the parcel for a flood-control greenway and a pedestrian/bicycle pathway. In finding
that the imposition of these conditions constituted an unlawful taking, the Court
distinguished earlier, government-supporting land-use rulings on the ground that "they
involved essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city, whereas
here the city made an adjudicative decision [concerning] an individual parcel." Id. In these
circumstances, the Court insisted that the burden of proof should be borne by the
city-rather than by the landowner-on the issue of whether the government action was
constitutional. See id. at 391-92 n.8. But see id. at 413 n.* (Souter, J., dissenting)
(questioning majority's characterization of Commission's decision as "adjudicative"). For the
suggestion that a differing intensity ofreview should apply to certain legislative and agency
actions, see Linde, supranote 27, at 234-35 (suggesting strong distinction between agencies
and legislatures with respect to judicial review of refusals to reconsider policies in light of
changed circumstances); see also supra notes 882-85 and accompanying text (discussing
differential review suggested by the Court's TurnerBroadcastingdecision).
951. This style of rule may reflect, at least in part, the deeply important point noted by
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989): "An acute awareness of the heightened danger of oppression from political factions
in small, rather than large, political units dates to the very beginning of our national
history." Id. at 523; see also Coenen, supra note 453, at 660-62 (noting centrality of this
proposition to James Madison's political thought and to his defense of the reforms reflected
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of state-but not federal-regulations that target legal aliens
responds to concerns that state decision makers may be
insufficiently tuned
in to the dangers of citizenship-based
52
discrimination.
in the American Constitution). For commentary along these lines that touches on important
doctrinal points, see, for example, Jefflies, supranote 909, at 197 (suggesting that Court has
applied vagueness doctrine more aggressively to local laws than to federal laws because
Court sees greater risk of discriminatory enforcement by local authorities); McCormack,
supra note 648, at 519-20 ("Hierarchical values accord a degree of deference to judgments of
governmental units depending on the breadth of constituency represented by the unit and
the unit's position within the hierarchy of the overall governmental structure. When
approaching actions with a disproportionate racial impact, a court is more likely to infer
discriminatory intent on the part of a local, isolated unit of government than on the part of
Congress. When race is used consciously to disfavor a minority group, strict scrutiny is the
rubric applied to all levels of government, but only those actions involving national security
interests are likely to survive. The higher a unit stands in the hierarchy ofgovernment, the
more important are the social problems with which it is likely to be dealing and the more
likely it is to have been responsive to the competing interests of a broadly based
constituency." (footnote omitted)); Note, supranote 909, at 82-83 ("[Vagueness attacks upon
state legislation have in general been far more successful than vagueness attacks upon
federal legislation (over whose enforcement the Supreme Court has considerably more
flexible powers of control) .... ."). Distinctions between state and federal regulation in
discrete constitutional areas resonate with longstanding suggestions that, in general, the
Court should be more willing to applyjudicial review to state, rather than federal, programs.
See, e.g., BICKEL, supranote 6, at 33 ("Manyjudges and commentators who have questioned
the power ofjudicial review offederal legislation have freely conceded the same power when
exercised with respect to state actions."); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 154 (1893) ("If a State
legislature passes a law which is impeached in the due course of litigation before the national
courts, as being in conflict with the supreme law of the land, those courts may have to ask
themselves a question different from that which would be applicable if the enactments were
those ofa co-ordinate department."). The Madisonianinsight about differences betweenlarge
and small governments also might help support constitutional rules that distinguishbetween
state and local governments. See, e.g, Kende, supra note 395, at 616 n.151 (arguing that
stricter scrutiny should apply to affirmative action plans adopted by local legislatures than
those adopted by state legislatures in part because of the Madisonian insight "that factions
may more easily dominate smaller, local legislative bodies" (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 9
(Alexander Hamilton)); see also Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274,280 (1977) (reaffirming that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to states, but not
to counties and cities); cf.Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding
that municipalities are "persons" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even though states and
state agencies are not).
952. See supra note 865 and accompanying text. In a similar vein, the Court for many
years drew a distinction between the levels of scrutiny it would afford to state and federal
affirmative action programs. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). In
Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), however, the Court overturned the
decisions that most strongly supported this state-federal distinction, by holding that "strict
scrutiny" applies to "allgovernmental racial classifications." Id. at 227-28 (emphasis added).
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Rules of this kind do not disqualify a government entity from
making constitutionally sensitive decisions. Judges still may issue
speech-related injunctions. Planning commissions still may limit
certain land uses. And states- are not foreclosed altogether from
placing many types of restrictions on legal aliens. The Court,
however, elevates the level of scrutiny in each of these settings for
a class of government decision makers to protect important
constitutional rights.
Some of these rules are controversial, but the root of their logic
is not.9"' Indeed, the sort of institutions-related reasons that
support all these rules drive much of our constitutional law.95 The
institutional limitations of courts, for example, help explain
innumerable doctrines that bear the mark of judicial restraint.9 5 5
Even while adopting this principle of "congruity," however, the Court issued a who-related
disclaimer of potentially great significance: "It is true that various Members of this Court
have taken different views of the authority § 5 ofthe Fourteenth Amendment confers upon
Congress to deal with the problem of racial discrimination, and the extent to which courts
should defer to Congress'exercise of that authority.We need not, and do not, address these
differences today." Id. at 230-31 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). By way of this
observation, the Court left open the door for application of a more deferential form of strict
scrutiny to at least some types of federal (as opposed to state) affirmative action programs.
953. By way of example, the Court in Madsen splintered into three camps with regard to
level ofjudicial scrutiny. Yet each of the opinion writers argued for his own preferred level
of scrutiny based on who-centered institutional considerations. See supra note 942 and
accompanying text.
954. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 306, at 11 (noting the centrality of questions
about 'which institutional arrangements should be used for resolving... substantive
questions"). For an important consideratio4 of how institutional capacities and substantive
interests interact in the field offederal-courts law, see Wells, supranote 931. Drawing on the
work of Professor Henry Hart, Professor Wells observes:
A distinctive feature of our system is its variety of government institutions.
There are federal courts, state courts, and legislatures at both the state and
federal levels, as well as state and federal administrative agencies. For Henry
Hart, this complexity was more an advantage than a source of confusion, for
each of these bodies may be better or worse at particular tasks. Consequently,
decisionmaking can and should be allocated with due regard forthe competence
of a given organ of government to handle a particular kind of problem....
Competence... refers to judgments as to which institution is better suited in
terms of ability and experience to do a good job with a particular issue.
Id. at 97-98 (footnotes omitted).
955. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981) (deferring to Congress on
military matters because "lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked"); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1973) (stating that"Justices ofthis
Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the
making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues" and
noting "this Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experience" with regard to
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The entire body of equal protection "suspect classification"
jurisprudence responds in large measure to who-related worries
about the institutional capacities of representative bodies when
certain forms of regulation are at issue." 6 Similar institutional
concerns have inspired other judicial interventions in such fields as
legislative apportionment,9 5 7 protection of the national market,9 58
'educational policy"); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952) (stating that "[ilt is
not within our competence to confirm or deny claims ofsocial scientists as to the dependence
of the individual on the position of his racial or religious group in the community"); see also
GUNTEIE& SULLIVAN, supranote 30, at 1217 (noting greater difficulty ofjudicial inquiryinto
legislative-as opposed to executive-motives and resulting judicial restraint in this area);
supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text (noting Court's embrace of clear-statement
Eleventh Amendment abrogation rule in part to counteract federal courts' structural
tendencies to expand their own jurisdiction). See generallySager, supra note 853. Of course,
constitutional doctrines may also reflect the comparative institutional strengths of the
judicial branch. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 88, at 102-03 (emphasizing special judicial
competence with regard to matters ofprocess); Komesar, supranote 595, at 379 ("Where the
legislation under review affects judicial procedure or quasi-judicial, administrative
procedure, judges feel more confident, probably with justification, in their ability to dispose
accurately and efficiently of the issue than where the legislation concerns subjects farther
from their common experience."); Nichol, supra note 15, at 1132 ("There are few tasks to
which courts are more accustomed than attempting to affix damages awards to deprivations
of legal rights."). Indeed, the rule of Marburyitself reflects institutional considerations. See
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (expressing concern that failure to
recognize judicial review would give to Congress "a practical and real omnipotence7); id. at
177 ("It is emphatically the province and duty of thejudicial department to say what the law
is.).
956. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (noting
that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry"); Calabresi, supra note 13, at 93 (noting that "[ilf the burdened group has
traditionally carried little weight in the political process, the results of that process are
necessarily untrustworthy, whether ornot intentto discriminate is manifest). Ofcourse, the
flipside of this principle is that judicial review should be most lenient if the interests
requesting judicial protection are necessarily well-represented in the political decisionmaking process. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551
(1985) (rejecting strong judicial restraints on state-restricting federal legislation because
states' influence in national political process is inherent "in the selection both of the
Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government").
957. See, e.g., supra notes 471-79 and accompanying text.
958. Compare Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.2 (1945) (emphasizing,
in invalidating state train-length law, that "to the extent that the burden of state regulation
falls on interests outside the state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those
political restraints normally exerted when interests within the state are affected"), with
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981) (rejecting dormant
Commerce Clause attack on milk-container restrictions in part because "(tihe existence of
major in-state interests adversely affected by the Act is a powerful safeguard against
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interstate
migration,9 5 9 and governmental abrogation of contract
0
96

duties.
What is important for our purposes is that the pervasiveness of
quasi-structural "who"-related doctrines lends credence to the
ostensibly more controversial true "who"rules typified byMow Sun
Wong. After all, if the Court can, as in Madsen, ratchet up constitutional scrutiny based on who makes a government policy, why
can it not in some cases raise the bar to the level of outright
disqualification?" 1 The broader point is that the full-fledged "who"
rules recognized in cases like Mow Sun Wong bear a kinship that
is easily overlooked, but nonetheless very close to well-settled

doctrines in our law.
B. Quasi-StructuralRules of Adjudicative Procedure
Full-scale structural rules bear a resemblance to another settled
set of constitutional doctrines-what I call "quasi-structural rules
of adjudicative procedure." InNew York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"2 for
example, the Court made history by holding that publishers can be
liable for defamation of a public official only if they act with "actual
malice." 6 In a less-noticed corner of its opinion, the Court also held
something more: that public-official plaintiffs have the burden of

legislative abuse").
959. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941) (striking down ban on instate migration of indigents in part because "non-residents who are the real victims of the
statute are deprived of the opportunity to exert political pressure upon the California
legislature in order to obtain a change in policy").
960. See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977) (adopting"dual
standard" of Contract Clause review because in evaluating a state's impairment of its own
contract "complete deference to a legislative assessment ofreasonableness and necessity is
not appropriate because the State's self-interest is at stake"); Energy Reserves Group, Inc.
v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 413 n.14 (1983) (recognizing "the stricter
standard of United States Trust Co.," but finding it inapplicable "because Kansas has not
altered its own contractual obligations").
961. Professor Strauss made essentially the same point in defending certain forms of
constitutionally inspired "irrebutable presumption" rules. See Strauss, supra note 434, at
191-95. As he puts it, "there is no sensible reason to distinguish between ... a barely
rebuttable presumption and the explicitly conclusive presumption" in determining the
legitimacy of rules that are based on constitutional values and institutional limitations. Id.
at 192.
962. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
963. Id. at 280.
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proving a publisher's malice with "convincing clarity."96 In later
cases, the Court has laid down a plethora of similar rules of "First
Amendment procedure. 65 Many of these rules-like the rule of the
New York Times case-operate in defamation actions.9 66 Additional
rules of First Amendment process apply to disputes that
concern obscenity, content discrimination, press access to trials,
and other nondefamation-related matters.96 7 The Court has
964. See id. at 285-86. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court made
it clear that this formulation required proof of actual malice by "clear and convincing"
evidence. Id. at 342.
965. Susan M. Gilles, Taking FirstAmendment Procedure Seriously: An Analysis of
Process in Libel Litigation,58 OHIo ST. L.J. 1753 (1998). Extensive literature exists on this
important subject. See, e.g., David S. Bogen, FirstAmendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37 MD.
L. REV.679 (1978); Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedurein PublicPerson Defamation Cases:
The Impact ofthe FirstAmendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 215, 220 (1987); Monaghan, supranote
754, at 518 (noting that "courts have lately come to realize that procedural guarantees play
an equally large role in protecting freedom of speech" and have forged procedural
requirements unique to First Amendment cases); see also William T. Mayton, Toward a
Theory ofFirstAmendmentProcess:Injunctions ofSpeech, Subsequent Punishment, and the
Costs of the PriorRestraintDoctrine,67 CORNELL L. REv. 245 (1982). See generally Waters
v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,669-71 (1994) (plurality opinion) (observing that"some procedural
requirements are mandated by the FirstAmendment," and noting burden-of-proof, quantityof-proof, and appellate-review-standard rules as illustrating this proposition).
966. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (holding that
plaintiffs in both public- and private-figure cases concerning matters ofpublic concern bear
the burden ofproofon the issue offalsity); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350 (extendingNew York Times
burden-of-proof rules to private-figure claims for presumed or punitive damages); Curtis
Pubrg Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (applying New York Times "convincing clarity"
rule for public-official plaintiffs to public-figure plaintiffs); see also Gilles, supranote 965, at
1761 n.29 (suggesting that, under these rules, "the clear and convincing standard is applied
in the vast majority of law suits"). In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of UnitedStates, Inc.,
466 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984), the Court required "independent appellate review" of
determinations that a libel defendant acted with actual malice, relying squarely on the
importance of protecting First Amendment values in this procedural way. See generally
Gilles, supra note 965, at 1772-74 (noting issues left open by Bose Corp.); Henry P.
Monaghan, ConstitutionalFact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 239-47 (1985) (discussing
Bose Corp.); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent
Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2465 (1998) (same). Another
significant case is Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). While the Court in
that case indicated it was setting forth standards generally applicable to the award of
summary judgment, commentators have said that "analysis... strongly suggests that free
speech concerns... influenced" the decision. Gilles, supranote 965, at 1763.
967. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1878, 1888 (2000)
(placing burden of proof on government to show that when "a plausible, less restrictive
alternative is offered to a content-based speech restriction, it... will be ineffective to achieve
[the governments] goals" and citing related burden-of-proof authorities, including
commercial speech cases); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
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Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,567 (1995) (applying independent appellate review to the question
ofwhetherpetitioner's activitywas protected speech); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1986) (banning denial of press access to preliminary hearing
transcript in criminal case absent "specific findings" ofneed because "First Amendment right
of access cannot be overcome by the conclusory assertion that publicity might deprive the
defendant" of a fair trial); Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 501-11 (collecting prior cases that support
First Amendment independent appellate judgment ofpurportedlyfactual findings, including
with respect to fighting words, obscenity, child pornography, and incitement to riot); Carroll
v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968) (stating that "there is
no place within the area of basic freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment for [ex parte]
orders where no showing is made that it is impossible to serve or to notify the opposing
parties and to give them an opportunityto participate"); Dombrowskiv. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
496 (1965) (striking down state law that required members of certain organizations to
register with the state as communists because statute relied on impermissible presumptionbased nonjudiciallisting oforganization as "Communist fronts"); Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (noting that burden of proof as to obscenity of film being screened is on
censor); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (holding that "due process certainly
requires... that the State bear the burden ofpersuasion" where exemption is denied based
on taxpayer's alleged support of violent overthrow of government); see also Air Line Pilots
Ass'n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866,874 (1998) (noting that First Amendment required "procedural
protections for [public] nonunion workers who object to the [agency-fee] calculation" to
ensure that fee payments do not go "to political candidates and to express political views
unrelated to [the union's] duties as exclusive bargaining representative"; procedural
requirements include explanation of the basis of the fee, prompt opportunity to challenge its
amount before an impartial decisioninaker, and an escrowing of disputed amounts until the
dispute is resolved); Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 498 (1962) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (providing decisive votes for reversal of Post Office's ban on allegedly obscene
mailing; relying on substantial First Amendment question "whether Congress, if it can
authorize exclusion of mail, can provide that obscenity be determined in the first instance
in any forum except a court"); Monaghan, supra note 754, at 536 (collecting cases in which
"the Court indicated that, like seizures, injunctions must follow adversary hearings, absent
an overriding emergency" when speech-related materials or activities are at issue); Volokh
& McDonnell, supra note 966, at 2437-38 ("[Rlecent cases have faithfully applied Bose to
alleged obscenity, incitement, negligent publication of criminal solicitation, speech by
lawyers supposedly interfering with the administration of justice, government employee
speech, speechin apossiblynonpublicforum, commercial speech, and content-neutral speech
restrictions." (footnotes omitted)). See generally TRIBE, supra note 24, §§ 12-37 to 12-39, at
1054-61. In addition to these illustrative rules of First Amendment procedure, there are a
variety of proposals for additional rules. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 965, at 1798-1800
(advocating modified pleading rules in defamation cases); id. at 1802-04 (advocating
entitlement to interlocutory appeal ofdenials of summary judgment in libel actions); see also
Monaghan, supra note 966, at 246 (raising question, in light of Supreme Court's Bose
decision, whether there is "a special requirement of some appellate review in first
amendment cases," notwithstanding "the general rule that there is no constitutional right
to appellate review in any civil case"); Monaghan, supranote 754, at 519 (broadly asserting
that "[ilf the Constitution requires elaborate procedural safeguards in the obscenity area, a
fortiori it should require equivalent procedural protection when the speech involved-for
example, political speech-implicates more central first amendment concerns"). The Court,
of course, does not always embrace sought-after procedural safeguards of First Amendment
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recognized constitutional process rules outside the First
Amendment area as well. 6 ' There are, for example, rules that
mandate particularly close appellate scrutiny of trial court rulings

rights. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984) (rejecting special personal
jurisdiction rules for media defendants in libel action: "We have already declined in other
contexts to grant special procedural protections to defendants in libel and defamation actions
in addition to the constitutional protections embodied in the substantive laws").
968. See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337 n.10 (1998) (requiring "de
novo review" of the question whether "a fine is constitutionally excessive" under the Eighth
Amendment); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112-16 (1995) (applying independent
review to in-custody determinations forpurposes ofMirandav.Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966));
see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 1038 (2000) (requiring "presumption of
prejudice"--but not "a per se prejudice rule"-when defendant "was-either actually or
constructively-denied the assistance of counsel altogether"); United States v. Hubbell, 120
S. Ct. 2037, 2045 (2000) (reaffirming that defendant granted immunity "does not have the
burden ofproving that his testimony was improperly used"; rather, there is "an affirmative
duty on the prosecution"); Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2062-63 (2000) (plurality
opinion) (rejecting--in light of substantive due process rights of a fit parent-the placing of
the burden of proof on that parent to show that grandparent visitation rights would harm
child; insisting instead on adherence to "the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act
in the best interest of his or her child" at least where visitation is not wholly blocked and
judge offers only "slender findings" in support of visitation order); id. at 2066-67 & n.2
(Souter, J., concurring) (expressing similar concerns about lack of presumptive controlling
effect of parent's decision); Kastigarv. United States, 406 U.S. 441,460 (1972) (holding grant
of derivative-use immunity consistent with Fifth Amendment puts the 'burden of proof" on
the prosecution not only to establish "a negation of taint," but also to carry out the
"affirmative duty" of showing "that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a
legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony"); BICKEL, supranote 6, at
179-80 (reading the Garnersit-in case, in which the Court overturned a disturbing-the-peace
conviction, as requiring "the trier of fact [to] expressly face the question of probable public
alarm and disturbance, and [to] place the basis for his conclusion in the trial record"; noting
that, while such procedures "may not ordinarily be required" they were "here required"
because the case involved a "grave constitutional issue," which warranted a "colloquy with
the trial court"). Outside the First Amendment context, as within it, see supra note 967,
commentators have proposed the adoption of new structural rules of adjudicative procedure.
See, e.g., Brest, supranote 385, at 128-30 (arguing that courts should not eschew motivebased constitutional analysis, but adding that they should refuse to invalidate a decision on
the ground that it was designed to serve illicit objectives unless that fact has been
established by "clear and convincing evidence"); see also Monaghan, supra note 966, at 272
n.237 (noting existence of specialized "Eighth Amendment due process" in the capital
punishment context and the possibility that it "requires that at least some state appellate
court engage in constitutional fact review").
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on the voluntariness of confessions 969 and on the existence of
probable cause under the Fourth Amendment.970
The important thing to see is that these rules are not so much
rules of procedural due process as they are safeguards of
substantive constitutional protections, such as the First Amendment. 97 ' The Court's burden-of-proof rules in the defamation field,
for example, are not designed-at least not primarily-to facilitate
fair and accurate determinations in individual cases. Instead, their
mission is to lessen the "chilling effect" that exposure to defamation
actions places on hardball speech in the real world. 2 These burden969. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (applying Bose by analogy in the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause context to the question whether a confession
was voluntary); Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 415 (1967) (same); Davis v. North Carolina,
384 U.S. 737, 741-42 (1966) (requiring the court to reexamine the entire record in order to
make an independent determination of whether confession was coerced); Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49,50-52 (1949) (same); see Monaghan, supra note 966, at 261 (noting establishment
of Supreme Court's authority "to make an independent judgment on constitutional law
application... particularly in the areas of coerced confessions [and] jury discrimination");
Note, Supreme Court Review of State FindingsofFact in FourteenthAmendment Cases, 14
STAN. L. REV. 328, 336-51 (1962).
970. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697-99 (1996) (applying de novo review
to probable cause decisions under the Fourth Amendment); Recznik v. City of Lorain, 393
U.S. 166, 169-70 (1968) (authorizing reviewing court redetermination of matters affecting
legality of an arrest); Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 966, at 2460 n.167 (noting that
Ornelasis hard to square with earlier cases and that "the best explanation seems to be that
the latter cases involved nonconstitutional matters that were peripheral to the merits"); cf
Monaghan, supra 966, at 265-66 (noting Court's unwillingness to apply independent review
ofconstitutional factindormant Commerce Clause; speculating that First Amendment cases
are distinguishable because they involve 'personal' constitutional rights"). For another,
recent independent-appellate-review case, see Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999)
(plurality opinion) (statingthat "when decidingwhether the admission ofa declarant's out-ofcourt statements violates the Confrontation Clause, [appellate] courts should independently
review whether the government's proferred guarantees of trustworthiness satisfy the
demands ofthe Clause").
971. See Monaghan, supra note 754, at 518-19 (noting that "rather than attempting to
apply the traditional requirements ofdue process to obscenity determinations, the Court has
judged the adequacy ofprocedures by a different [First Amendment] standard"); Monaghan,
supranote 966, at 230 (observing that the Bose rationale is "grounded entirely upon concerns
assertedly peculiar to the First Amendment"); id. at 259 n.167 (noting that the Court
indicates that "the general prohibition... contained in the Fourth Amendment and in the
due process clause takes on a special meaning where important substantive constitutional
values-such as freedom of speech-are at stake").
972. See Frederick SchauerFear, RiskandtheFirstAmendment:Unravelingthe "Chilling
Effect", 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 685 (1978) (noting that the "chilling effect concept has been
recognized most frequently and articulated most clearly in decisions chiefly concerned with
the procedural aspects of free speech adjudication"); accord,e.g., Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 505
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of-proof-based structural rules of adjudicative procedure, in other
words, serve a substantive constitutional end. Indeed, they serve
the same end advanced by the substantive actual-malice rule itself:
to ensure a "robust"
and "wide open" debate on critical issues of
973
self-governance.

There is another important set of rules that address substantive
constitutional values by shaping the processes of dispute resolution:
rules that concern the identity and jurisdiction of adjudicative
decision makers. In Younger v. Harris, 4 for example, the Court
relied on "our Federalism"in ordering federal courts to abstain from
deciding constitutional issues already under consideration in

(indicating that First Amendment procedural rules are required "to eliminate the danger
that decisions by triers offact may inhibit the expression of protected ideas"); Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,66 (1963) (noting need for "procedures that will ensure against
the curtailment of constitutionally protected expression); Gilles, supra note 965, at 1766
("Since New York Times, it has been clear that the aim of First Amendment process is to
minimize the chill on speakers. .. ."); Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 966, at 2465
(expressing concerns about "chilling effects"; "rigorous procedural safeguards' are needed
because 'the freedoms ofexpression must be ringed about with adequate bulwarks). Other
cases sound a similar theme in the nondefamation context. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of
Dallas, 493 U.S. 215,230 (1990); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,561
(1975); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1971).
973. See Monaghan, supra note 754, at 519 ("Like the substantive rules themselves,
insensitive procedures can 'chill' the right of free expression. Accordingly, wherever first
amendment claims are involved, sensitive procedural devices are necessary.... ."); see also
David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 487, 494 (1991)
(noting that, in the New York Times case, the Court "greatly expanded judges' control of
juries-a development that has had far greater practical effect than the actual malice rule
itself"). Another set ofsafeguards that bears akinship to these special procedural protections
is what we might call "individualized notice rules." The essential thought is that, when
particularly important rights are at stake, the government must give an individualized
warning to the target of its sanction, offering that target the chance to discontinue any
violation of the state's rule. This principle, for example, may help to justify the Supreme
Court's First Amendment hostile-crowd-reaction decision in Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S.
315, 321 (1951), which authorized a disorderly conduct prosecution for delivery of a speech
that threatened a disturbance when the speaker persisted in delivering after police officers
twice requested him to stop. See also United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 610-11
(N.D. Tex. 1999) (refusing to apply statute disallowing gun possession by anyone subject to
a domestic violence protection order, absent specific warning of this obscure prohibition,
given the protected liberty interest in possession of firearms).
974. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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In Flast v. Cohen,97 the Court

forged an exception to the general prohibition on taxpayer actions
in the service of safeguarding First Amendment Establishment
Clause values. And the Court has carefully structured its thirdparty standing rules in such a way as to facilitate the vindication
of substantive due process,97 equal protection, 978 free speech,9 7 9 and
other personal rights that might otherwise go unprotected. 980
975. But cf. Monaghan, supra note 754, at 549 & n.128 (arguing that because "federal
courts are particularly sensitive to first amendment claims ...the Court should completely
eliminate the abstention doctrine when first amendment interests are involved," and noting
that "substantial inroads on the abstention doctrine in the first amendment context" have
already been made in Supreme Court cases); Wells, supra note 931, at 91-92 (arguing that
given proper, though hidden, pervasiveness of "naked ideology" in federal-courts law,
"advocates ought to be permitted to argue openly that free speech claims deserve a special
exception from the doctrine of Younger... because federal courts are more sympathetic to
free speech claims").
976. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
977. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925).
978. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953).
979. See infra notes 990-94 and accompanying text (discussing overbreadth doctrine); see
also GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 30, at 1327; Monaghan, supra note 764, at 532
(stating that the standing rule embodied in the overbreadth doctrine exists "atleast in part
because ofthe overridingfirst amendment interest in seeing that legislationwhich chills first
amendment rights is struck down as soon as possible"). But cf.Monaghan, supra note 734,
at 4 (arguing that overbreadth involves first party, not third party, standing by barring
punishment under defective laws). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of
Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991) (providing a general analysis of the overbreadth
doctrine and how the courts should apply it in the future).
980. See generallyMonaghan,supra note 753. In a related vein, it has been suggested that
the jurisdictional "political question doctrine [has an] inevitable tie to the strength of the
constitutional claim." Nichol, supra note 15, at 1151 n.197. According to Professor Nichol,
"the strength of the underlying constitutional claims, in my view, kept cases like United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)... andNew York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971)... from being deemed [subject to dismissal due to their raising oil 'political
questions." Id. Professor Michael Wells has offered a range of insights on the connection
between constitutional rules that govern the jurisdiction of courts and substantive
constitutional values. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 931; Michael Wells, Behind the Parity
Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law ofFederalCourts,71 B.U. L.
REv.609 (1991); Michael Wells, Is Disparitya Problem, 22 GA. L. REV. 283 (1988); Michael
Wells, The Impact of Substantive Interests on the Law of FederalCourts, 30 WM. & MARYL.
REV. 499 (1989); Michael Wells, Who'sAfraid ofHenry Hart?, 14 CONST. CoBm5. 175 (1997).
Others have sounded some similar themes. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 965, at 1758 n.20
(asking whether "rules on... jurisdiction [should) be altered to make the legal system more
protective of free speech rights"); Sager, supranote 853, at 1389-90 (reading Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975), as based on strong preference for local legislative, rather than federal
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The Supreme Court has protected substantive constitutional
values not only by adopting specialized jurisdictional rules, but also
by developing rules that define the nature of proper factfinders.8 1
In Witherspoon v. Illinois,98 for example, the Court limited the
state's power to excuse prospective capital-case jurors who have
serious scruples about the death penalty. As explained by Professor
Tribe:
Witherspoon... seems most comprehensible as a simultaneous
expression and prophylactic enforcement of the eighth
amendment: it is morally unacceptable perse, and hence "cruel
and unusual," to execute a person as to whom a representative
cross-section of community belief could not be convinced that
the death penalty is appropriate ....
The Court in Witherspoon
evidently assumed the absence of an abhorrence toward capital
punishment so widely shared as to legitimate judicially
judicial, control of local land-use choices). Substantive constitutional interests may also
influence the identification of appropriate decisionmakers in nonjudicial procedural due
process cases. In Goss v.Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), for example, the Court assumedthatthe
due process hearing that must accompany a public school student's suspension need not
occur before an adjudicator who is independent of the school system; rather a brief meeting
with an in-school"disciplinarian" will suffice. See id. at 582. Such a"who" rule is responsive
to interests in cost-saving and expedition unrelated to case outcomes, but it also-and less
obviously-reflects a substantive choice. By vesting authority in school personnel, the rule
ensures that important federalism-related interests in local educational management will
receive ample consideration as student-suspension decisions are made in the real world. See,
e.g., id. at 583 (suggesting that"further formalizing the suspension process... may not only
make it too costly... but also destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching process").
981. In particular, the Court-at least at times-has looked askance atjuries, at agencies,
and at state courts as adjudicators of constitutional rights, and it has shaped its doctrines
ofjudicial review accordingly. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 966, at 272-73 (observing that
"for nearly five decades the Court has, in substance, asserted a power to respond to perceived
dangers of distorted factfinding and law application in the state courts"; even though "the
rules announced governing the scope of review are now stated to be equally applicable to both
state and federal courts... the real bite of intensive review has been on the decisions of state
courts"); Monaghan, supra note 754, at 527 ("Like administrative agencies, the jury cannot
be expected to be sufficiently sensitive to the first amendment interests involved in any given
proceeding."); id. at 529 ("[F]irst amendment considerations should be read to confine, not
expand, the jury's role. This confinement follows from the perhaps unprovable premise that,
by virtue of their training and occupation, judges-are less inclined to be affected by passion
and prejudice and more inclined to realize the importance offirst amendment values."). One
case in which the Court adapted the nature of the decision maker to substantive
constitutional values is Larkin v. Grendel'sDen, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), which found an
Establishment Clause violation in a state's grant to churches ofthe power to veto the grant
of a liquor license within 500 feet of a church facility.
982. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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declaring the death penalty unconstitutional. Instead, the Court
mandated a structure through which eighth amendment
principles would be linked to community sentiments.
Defendants in individual cases would be entitled by that
structure to an opportunity for protection by the full range of
community belief at a given time on the death penalty question;
and afullyrepresentativejury system, expressingitselfthrough
the number and kinds of cases in which death penalties were
inflicted,
would be an important reflector of evolving values over
98 3
time.
In a similar vein, the Court in Freedmanv. Maryland, 4 set forth
a group of "procedural safeguards" to protect First Amendment
values against potentially overzealous state movie licensors. 8 5 The
Court's ruling in Freedman mandated that any pre-screening
obscenity determination had to be made the subject of a prompt
reconsideration by a judicial officer wielding de novo review
authority." 6 The purpose of such a rule is unabashedly to safeguard
substantive First Amendment values with rules that target
decision-making processes. In particular, the Freedmanrule steers
final licensing authority away from bureaucrats to judges who are
less susceptible to factional passions, more sensitive to rule-of-law
values, and (in part because of the generality of their work) more
likely to 9escape
capture and predispositions in favor of
87
censorship.
983. Tribe, supranote 27, at 295-96 (footnotes omitted).
984. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
985. See id. at 58 (adopting "procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a
censorship system"). Various post-Freedmancases have adapted its procedural requirements
to a wide array of other First Amendment settings. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493
U.S. 215 (1990) (licensing of sexually oriented businesses); Vance v. Universal Amusement
Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (obscene film review by court rather than agency censor); National
Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam) (parade permit);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (refusal ofpermission to stage
the musical"Hair"); Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968)
(permit for political rally); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968) (per curiam) (film
censoring ordinance that provided review within 50-57 days); see also Monaghan, supranote
754, at 524-26 (exploringimplications ofFreedman required-judicial-determinationprinciple
in other areas, including student expulsions, public-employee firings, congressional
contempt, and Labor Board rulings on speech-related unfair practices).
986. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59.
987. See id. at 57-58 ("Because the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger
that he may well be less responsive than a court... to the constitutionally protected
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As with quasi-structural "who" rules, quasi-structural rules of
adjudicative procedure help legitimize full-scale second-look
doctrines. The main point lacks complexity. If courts may and do
craft numerous rules of adjudicative procedure to protect
substantive constitutional values, why should courts not also be
able to craft rules ofpolicymaking procedure as well? One possible
answer to this question is that a power to fashion legislativeprocess rules does not follow from a power to craft adjudicativeprocess rules because the Court has more experience and
competence in the latter field. The Court, it might be said, is itself
an adjudicative tribunal, constantly reviews the adjudicative labors
of lower courts, and long has had responsibility for framing rules of
adjudicative procedure, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Federal Rules of Evidence. The full corpus of the Court's
work, however, is hardly limited to superintending the actions of
adjudicative officials. The Court, for example, routinely safeguards
constitutional values against invasion by state law enforcement
officers and members of the "co-equal" federal executive branch. 9"
Even more to the point, the institution of judicial review in its very
nature involves the Court in routinely overseeing the work of
administrative agencies, state and local legislatures, and the
federal Congress. There is much more to explore about these
matters. 98 9 But enough already has been said to show that the
interests in free expression."); Monaghan, supra note 754, at 523 (worrying about "narrow
and restricted viewpoint" and "tunnel vision" of licensors; noting advantages of courts that
come from "insulation," which facilitates "the 'long view' of issues," and "daily [exposure to]

a wide variety of situations," which tends to negate "excessive singlemindedness"); see also
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276,284-85 (1922) (insisting on independent judicial, rather
than conclusive agency, adjudicative determination of noncitizenship required to support
deportation; citing a "difference in security ofjudicial over administrative action"); JOHN H.
GARVEY& FREDERICKSCHAUER, THE FIlSTAMENDMENT: AREADER 275 (2d ed. 1996) (noting

that "[als a general proposition we may say that the First Amendment worries most about
legislative and administrative actions, and sees the courts as a beneficent influence");

Monaghan, supra note 754, at 520 ("Central to first amendment due process is the notion
that a judicial, rather than an administrative, determination of the character of the speech
is necessary."). See generally supra note 910.

988. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (forging
damages remedy against federal officers who violate Fourth Amendment rights); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (interpreting Fifth Amendment to mandate warnings about
self-incrimination rights for persons in custody).

989. In particular, one must face the predictable refrain that it is too invasive and
disruptive of legislative processes to implement rules of this kind. See supranotes 243-47 and
accompanying text (noting argument of this sort made by Justice Scalia in dissent in
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pervasive presence of quasi-structural doctrines of adjudicative
procedure supports to some degree process-centered second-look
doctrines directed at policymaking bodies.
C. Means-CenteredProper-FitRules
Under the overbreadth doctrine, the Court may strike down in
toto a statute "that is designed to burden or punish activities that
are not constitutionally protected" if "as drafted, it also includes
activities protected by the First Amendment."990 This doctrine
differs from others we have studied in that it focuses attention
squarely on the coverage of the challenged rule. Put another way,
the overbreadth doctrine has a substantive dimension because it
kicks in only when the substantive reach of a rule sweeps in
protected, as well as unprotected, speech. 99 '
At the same time, the second-look nature of an overbreadth
invalidation is apparent. In no uncertain terms, the Court instructs
the lawmaker that he or she may outlaw the same sort of
conduct-and often the very same conduct-the Court has freed
from the criminal sanction.9 92 To achieve that result, however, the
lawmaker must act again, legislating with greater care and
circumspection as a penalty for its prior display of sloppiness and
overreaching. 993 Indeed, using pointedly structural rhetoric, the
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)).
990. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 392, § 16.8, at 996. As pointed out by Professors
Nowak and Rotunda, the rule thus marks a departure from the general principle that "one
to whom application of a statute is constitutional" may not challenge it in federal court
litigation. Id- (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960)).
991. See generally TRIE, supranote 24, §§ 12-27 to 12-29 (discussing the overbreadth
doctrine). Later cases have indicated that, for the rule to apply, the challenged rule-at least
as ageneralproposition-mustbe "substantially overbroad." See Broadrickv. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
992. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982) (noting that overbreadth
doctrine permits attacks on statutes "even though the conduct of the person making the
attack is clearly unprotected and could be proscribed by a law drawn with the requisite
specificity").
993. See, e.g., GUNTHER& SULLIVAN, supranote 30, at 1325 ('The flaw in laws invalidated
on [overbreadth] grounds is procedurah government went about things the wrong way even
if the speaker might constitutionally be restricted if government went about it in a different
way."); Wellington, supranote 8, at 504-05 ('The class of plainly non-final decisions might
best be understood in terms of the Court saying to another governmental entity. 'You may
be able to achieve the substantive result you desire but you must proceed toward your
objective in a different fashion.' There is a family of such doctrines, procedural or structural
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Court has described the overbreadth doctrine as designed to ensure
"a considered legislative judgment that a particular mode of
994
expression has to give way."
This deliberation-enhancing conception of the overbreadth rule
directs attention to a deeper matter, for the rule imposes only one
of many restrictions on pursuing good goals by way of bad means.
In particular, the close linkage between structural rules and
overbreadth suggests that there may be a close linkage, too,
between structural rules and the innumerable means-centered
doctrines that pervade constitutional law.995 These doctrines raise
issues like: Is a legislative classification "rationally related" to
achieve the government's purpose?996 Is the government's method
for achieving its ends "narrowly tailored" or "the least restrictive
or least intrusive means?" 97 Is the legislative proscription
"underinclusive" (or overinclusive) in regard to advancing the
particular aims of the challenged government program?9 .
In one sense, the structural nature of these means-based rules is
apparent. Onits face, a means-based invalidation does not preclude
the government from pursuing the underlying goal of the
invalidated statute. Rather, it invites political-branch officials to
take a second look at whether they wish to pursue that same goal,
albeit in a different way. 99 At the same time, as we saw at the
in nature, such as... 'overbreadthP'). The overbreadth rule also illustrates a concept we
have encountered on a number of occasions in our study of structurally minded doctrines:
namely, that these rules tend to take hold in correspondence with the strength of the
substantive constitutional interests in play. Thus, while the doctrine clearly applies to
political expression, it does not apply to commercial speech because such speech does not
receive full-bore constitutional protection. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350,38081 (1977).
994. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973) (emphasis added).
995. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 30, at 108 n.2 (noting that 'judicial scrutiny
of means-ends relationships ... may well be the most frequently invoked technique in the
judicial review of the validity of federal and state legislation").
996. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,437 (1985).
997. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
998. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
999. This essential point was made by Justice Jackson in his famous celebration of the
merits of means-based equal-protection review vis-&-vis ends-centered substantive due
process scrutiny. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring). As Justice Jackson observed: "Invalidation of a statute or an
ordinance on due process grounds leaves ungoverned or ungovernable conduct which many
people find objectionable. Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other hand, does
not disable any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand." Id. at 112. It
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outset,100 0 means-centered doctrines are distinguishable from"true"
second-look structural rules because-like overbreadth rules-they
focus on the contentthat marks challenged legislation. To recognize
this distinction, however, is hardly to say that proper-means rules
have no relation to process-centered structural rules.100 ' They do, in
merits noting, in this regard, that the Court does not always couch means-centered analysis
in means-centered terms. For example, in Greater New Orleans Broad. Assn v. United
States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999), the Court considered the constitutionality of a ban on
advertisements about gambling. In invalidating the statute, the Court expressed its
reluctance to characterize a state's claimed interest in minimizing the social costs of
gambling as "substantial" because of the widespread "approval of state legislation that
authorizes a host ofpublic and private gambling activities." Id. at 187. The important point
to recognize is that a remand-to-the-legislature quality inheres in this sort of analysis
whether one sees the problem presented in terms of means-end fit or in terms of the
substantiality of a legislative goal. This is so because, either way, the legislature is free to
discourage gambling-perhaps even in speech-hampering or other constitutionally
questionable ways-so long as the legislature cleans up the statute books (in particular, by
peeling away the "host" of ways it currently endorses gambling).
1000. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
1001. The key point is that impermissible-means rules, in contrast to impermissible-ends
rules, do-like all the structural rules we have studied-invite a curative legislative reprise.
See BICE.L, supra note 6, at 232 (noting, by way of example, that "when the Commerce
Clause forecloses an economic regulation by a state, and very often when a state tax is struck
down, another measure, achieving much the same and sometimes precisely the same
purpose, arises to take its place"); Coenen, supra note 283, at 1001 & n.183 (describing
"second look" character of Court's means-related invalidation of truck-length law inKasseil
v. ConsolidatedFreightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981)); Gunther, supra note 30, at 26
(notingthe Court's means-based invalidationinJames v. Strange,which permittedthe Court
to avoid a "broad ground of decision" and instead strike down "only [the law] ofKansas with
its unique curtailment of debtor exemptions"). See generallyDimond, supra note 69, at 231
(noting that "the Court [can] use rational relationship review 'with teeth' ora suspensive veto
to remand congressional responses that do not fit the articulated purposes ofthe statute").
This point was made well by Professor Freund in discussing the Court's means-related
invalidation of state restrictions on door-to-door canvassing. As he observed:
Jehovah's Witnesses may not be forbidden by ordinance to knock on doors, but
presumably an ordinance may make it criminal to do so where the householder
has posted a notice. In actuality, therefore, these momentous constitutional
cases frequently come down to such details as whether the city fathers may
place on receptive householders the burden of posting a welcome or must place
on resistant householders the burden of posting a sign of inhospitality. The
difference is by no means trivial, but it need not be inflated to the dimensions
of irreconcilable principles.
Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties,4 VAND. L. REV. 533, 553-54 (1951)
(quotedin BICKEL, supra note 6, at 232-33). ProfessorBurt has been particularly enthusiastic
about the structural dimension ofmeans-based components of"mid level" scrutiny. "Its great
virtue," he says, "is its conversational character. when the Court invalidates a statute on this
basis, this action permits and even invites a legislative response." BURT, supranote 555, at
364. In similar fashion, Professor Gunther has emphasized the structural advantages of
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fact, have a close relation because questionable content may be
seen, with good reason, as merely a proxy for problems of process
that the law should be slow to tolerate. °2 Following this thought,
many commentators have asserted that the essential purpose of
means-centered review is to flush out process problems, particularly
problems of impermissible motive.0 0 3 The Court itself, on occasion,
means-centered scrutiny as part of a stepped-up rational-relation review. In his opinion:
Means scrutiny... can improve the quality of the political process-without
second-guessing the substantive validity ofits results-by encouraging a fuller
airing in the political arena of the grounds for legislative action. Examination
of means in light of asserted state purposes would directly promote public
consideration of the benefits assertedly sought by the proposed legislation;
indirectly, it would stimulate fuller political examination, in relation to those
benefits, of the costs that would be incurred if the proposed means were
adopted.
A common defense of extreme judicial abdication is that the state has
considered the contending considerations. Too often the only assurance that the
state has thought about the issues is the judicial presumption that it has.
Means scrutiny would provide greater safeguards that the presumed process
corresponds to reality-and would thereby give greater content to the
underlying premise for deferring to the state's resolution of the competing
issues. Means scrutiny would thus resemble the judicial technique of
remanding to the legislature, familiar in other areas of constitutional law.
Gunther, supra note 30, at 44-45.
1002. This pointmayhaveparticularly strongapplication to underinclusive legislation. The
problem with such legislation is that its targeting of a narrow group opens the door for
witting or unwitting oppression of minorities by majority factions. The most famous
articulation of the thought appears in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949):
Invocation of the equal protection clause . . . does not disable any

governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that
the prohibition or regulation must have a broader impact. I regard it as a
salutary doctrine that [governments] must exercise their powers so as not to
discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable
differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation. This equality is not
merely abstract justice....
ET]here is no more effective practical guaranty
against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed
generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively
as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply
legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited
upon them if larger numbers were affected.
Id. at 112-13 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also BICKEL, supranote 6, at 228 (noting that "to
hold that the prohibition or regulation musthave abroader impact' would indeed be to invite
more responsible--extraordinarily responsible-political action before deciding an issue of
principle that is extraordinarily difficult and far reaching").
1003. See ELY, supranote 88, at 145-46 (describing the "doctrine of 'suspect classifications,'
though not generally so understood, ... as a handmaiden ofmotivation analysis" and noting
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has echoed this sentiment, by explicitly linking means-centered
rules to the quest for "reasoned analysis" and "reasoned judgment"
by government policymakers.1 ° 4 These pronouncements lend
support to structural rules by suggesting that an essential purpose
of content-conscious means rules is to serve structural deliberationthat "special scrutiny, in particular its demand for an essentially perfect fit, turns out to be
a way of 'ushing out' unconstitutional motivation"); Alexander, supranote 775, at 941 ("In
a motive theory, suspect classifications,... Tit,' and less restrictive alternatives would all
serve evidentiary functions with respect to uncovering the motivation behind the enactment
.... ."); Brest, supra note 385, at 122 (arguing that "the fact that a regulation, though
minimally related to the promotion of health or educational achievement, is poorly or
dubiously suited to its supposed legitimate objectives, would lend support to other evidence
of illicit motivation"); Dimond, supra note 69, at 220 (noting "the Court often uses a meansend analysis as one aid in determiningwhether an invidious purpose or naked preference has
skewed the official decisionmaking process"); Kende, supranote 395, at 622 n.174 ("[M]eansend scrutiny is primarily a way of discerning whether a racial preference is impermissibly
motivated."). Professor Kagan has focused on this point in the free-speech context. See
Kagan, supranote 633, at 414 ("[T]he application of First Amendment law is best understood
and most readily explained as a kind of motive-hunting."); id. at 440-41 ("If courts cannot
determine motive directly, by exploring what went into the legislative process, perhaps they
can determine motive obliquely, by looking at what came out of it... We might think of
these rules as proxies for a direct inquiry into motive or as rules of an evidentiary nature.
These rules use objective criteria, focusing on what a law includes and excludes, on what
classifications it uses, on how it is written. But in making such inquiries, the rules in fact
serve as an arbiter of motive.").
1004. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26 (1982) ("The
purpose of requiring that close relationship [of means to ends] is to assure that the validity
of a classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather than through the
mechanical application oftraditional, often inaccurate, assumptions...."(emphasis added));
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982) (reasoning that intermediate scrutiny is designed to
provide "assurance that the classification reflects a reasoned judgment"). With regard to the
linkage ofquestionable means andquestionable motives, see City ofRichmond v. J.A Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989) ("The gross overinclusiveness of Richmond's racial preference
strongly impugns the city's claim of remedial motivation."), and Sunstein, supra note 434,
at 45 ("In [Griswold],Justice White suggested that the weakness of the connection between
means and ends showed that the statute in fact rested on something other than the state's
asserted justification."). See also Keystone Bituminous CoalAss'n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S.
470, 486 (1987) (distinguishing prior ruling that struck down coal-mining-subsidence law
because itimpermissibly focused on advancing"private," rather than "public," interests based
on reasoning that private purpose ofearlier legislation was signaled by its inapplicability to
coal-miner-owned lands, whereas landowner coal miners could engage in subsidence mining
under the latter Act only if the state consented). An interesting example of this kind of
reasoning surfaced in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). There the Court reasoned
that the connection between maximum ten-hour workdays and baker health was, in its view,
"shadowy and thin." See id. at 62. The Court added that"[w]hen assertions such as we have
adverted to" are made in support of a statute, "it gives rise to at least a suspicion that there
was some other motive--that is, an impermissible one--"dominating the legislature." Id. at
62-63.
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enhancing aims. After all, if the Court may seek to engender
"reasoned" policymaking through the indirect vehicle of meanscentered review, why should it not be able to pursue the same goal
by focusing directly on the quality of the policymaking process
itself?
The rhetoric of content-based means rules also helps to legitimate
a structural style of judicial review. This is so because, not
infrequently, the Court has expressed its test of heightened meanscentered scrutiny in terms ofwhether policymakers have "carefully"
tailored legislative programs to their underlying purposes. 10 5 This
description of the nature of means-based scrutiny raises a simple
and telling question: Ifreviewing policymaker carefulness is the key
in applying the great host of means-centered constitutional
doctrines, why should courts not consider whether-apart from the
content of resulting laws-government decision makers have used
policymaking structures that in their nature comport with
policymaker care? The Court has answered this question more with
its actions than with its words, by utilizing the profuse mix of
structural rules catalogued above.

1005. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 846 (1997) (expressing concern whether program
is "carefully tailored to the congressional goal of protecting minors"); Denver Area Educ.
Telecoram. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,783,806 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring
and dissenting) (finding challenged restriction on speech was not "drawn with enough care"
in part because "[p]artial service of a compelling interest is not narrow tailoring"); Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,126 (1989) (statingthat"the means must
be carefully tailored to achieve [congressional] ends"); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979)
(strikingdown state law because classification "must be carefully tailored"); see also Greater
New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) (couching meanstend
inquiry in terms of whether challenged regulation reflects that government '"carefully
calculated' the costs and benefits" of its program); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., 507 U.S. 410,417 (1993) (finding violation of "reasonable fit" requirement applicable to
commercial speech where city ordered removal of 64 of over 1500 news racks on litter
prevention grounds because they contained commercial handbills, rather than newspapers;
failure to regulate news racks' "size, shape, appearance, or number indicates that [city] has
not'carefully calculated' the costs and benefits associatedwith the burden on speech imposed
by its prohibition!); Board of the Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,480
(1989) (noting that while the rational-basis test bars judicial inquiry into whether a
challenged rule advances a permissible purpose at "inordinate cost," commercial-speech
standards "require the government goal to be substantial, and the cost to be carefully
calculated").
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XII. THE NORMATIVE CLAIMS OF STRucTURAL RULES
Structural rules raise nettlesome questions of legitimacy and
worth. Where do structural rules come from? Do they serve good
ends? Do they carry with them substantial dangers to the operation
of legislatures, the integrity of courts, and the development of
public policy marked by intelligence and justice? In the preceding
chapters we began the process of addressing these questions by
constructing a typology of the many structural rules that are at
work in our law. This typology should aid any investigation into the
propriety of judicial use of structural rules, but it may also
complicate the investigation. It aids the inquiry by revealing that
the territory occupied by structural rules is far broader than might
first meet the eye. If, as Holmes told us, "[tihe life of the law.., has
been experience,""' the critic must grapple with the persistent and
growing pervasiveness of structural review in constitutional
decision making. Looking at these rules together also shows that
superficially disparate doctrines may be closely related, thus
complicating efforts to debunk any particular doctrine without
taking fair account of its "neighbors" in the law.'
Finally, our
enumeration of these rules raises questions about their deepest
nature-about why they exist, why they take varied forms, how
they are linked, and how far their differing principles extend. Any
fruitful normative inquiry must attend to these matters of
innermost structure, logic, and scope.
There is, however, also some danger in gathering these rules
together. The danger is that important differences among the rules
may be underestimated or missed. Structural doctrines-at least so
far-are not tied together by the thread of a single neat theme. To
be sure, all pure structural rules are describable as "structural"
because they share one common characteristic: they support judicial
"remands" of challenged policies for a "second look" by political
authorities that is procedurally protective of some particular
substantive constitutional value. 1° 08 Beyond this, however, different
1006. O.W. HOLMES, JF., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).

1007. In a similar vein, a holistic focus on structural rules may support construction of the
sort of arguments by analogy that are common in our law. See supra note 534 and

accompanying text (notingProfessor Bickers reliance on vagueness doctrine to support rule
of desuetude).
1008. See supranote 22 and accompanying text.

1830

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1575

structural rules may well advance very different purposes in very
different ways.
Consider again the rule of Gregory v. Ashcroft.0 °9 We already
have suggested that this rule-which requires a super-clear
statement for Congress to interfere with a state's selection of key
governing officials-springs from the confluence of four thoughts:
1. Important substantive constitutional values are endangered
when the national government threatens state autonomy in
this distinctively invasive way.'01 0
2.
These interests are not (or at least historically have not
been) adequately protected by judicial use of on-or-off
constitutional restraints.' 1
The Court has justified this nonuse of on-or-off restrictions
3.
by relying on structural protections of state interests in the
national lawmaking process.1° '
4. A super-clear-statement rule augments the operation of
those processes by forcing Congress to confront squarely the
impairment3 of state autonomy its proposed action
01
portends.
A comparison of Gregory and Reno v. ACLU' 01 4 -which struck
down an Internet pornography law through use of a means-centered
findings rule-illustrates the many ways in which structural
doctrines may differ from one another. For example:
1.
The Reno v. ACLU rule does not protect Tenth Amendment
values of federalism. Instead, it implements First
Amendment values of free expression.
2. First Amendment values, unlike federalism values, have
long been routinely protected by courts with on-or-off rules.
The argument based on judicial "underenforcement" of
rights available in Gregorythus may well be out of reach in
Reno v. ACLU.'0 15
1009. 501U.S. 452 (1991). For earlier discussions of Gregory, see supranotes 28-33, 179-88
and accompanying text.
1010. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
1011. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
1012. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
1013. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
1014. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). For a discussion of Reno u. ACLU, see supra notes 417-24 and

accompanying text.
1015. For a discussion of this underenforcement rationale, see supra note 177 and
accompanying text.
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3.

Heavy reliance on political processes to protect constitutional values is hardly a dominant theme in First
Amendment law. If anything, our traditions suggest that
courts must protect free-speech values with the most
vigorous constitutional safeguards lest majority factions
undermine too readily the basic freedoms of dissidents and
minorities.' 1 6 Gregory's "protective-process augmentation"
argument thus does not easily carry over to the Reno v.
ACLU context.1 °17
4. Finally, the rule of Reno v. ACLU differs from the Gregory
rule with regard to the nature of the structural protection it
affords. The Gregory rule focuses on the specificity with
which Congress expresses its ultimate will. By mandating
clarity, Gregorypushes Congress to wrestle with the yea-ornay value judgment it has been called on to make about
national regulation of state selection of important
decisionmakers. The Reno v. ACLU rule, in contrast,
involves a judicially compelled legislative examination of
alternative means for achieving a concededly permissible
end. The point of the rule is not (or at least not merely) to
induce a careful weighing of constitutional costs and
offsetting benefits; instead the Court seeks to force the
legislature to engage in a thoughtful evaluation and ranking
of a range of goal-advancing options by bringing to bear the
significant predictive and fact-finding advantages that
legislatures possess. 1 8
This brief comparison raises tough questions. Why, for example,
should the Court have applied a structural rule in Reno v. ACLU if
First Amendment values (unlike-at least arguably-the federalism
values involved in Gregory) are not generally underenforced? 1' 1 9
Was a structural intervention justified because that Amendment
1016. See, eg., GUNTHER& SULLIVAN, supranote 30, at 1030 (stating that "the Court treats
speech as enjoying strong presumptive protection, and frequently intervenes to strike down
government regulation).
1017. For a discussion of this argument, as applicable to cases like Gregory,see supranote
185 and accompanying text.
1018. See supranote 544 and accompanying text.
1019. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supranote 116, at 631 (hypothesizing that Court has
backed offfrom applying avoidance principle in certain First Amendment contexts "because
those constitutional protections are not underenforced to the same extent" as others).
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occupies a "preferred position"1 121 that the Court felt a need to
safeguard in some way, even though it could not bring itself to
deploy an on-or-off rule? Was a structural intervention appropriate
in Reno v. ACLU because that case concerned developing
technologies that distinctively justified a provisional, instead of a
conclusive, treatment of the constitutional issues the Court
confronted?10 21 Was a means-centered dialogic approach particularly
appealing because of Congress's superior capacity to assess
alternative approaches to dealing with complex problems (and all
the more so because of their emerging, technological dimension)?' 2 2
Was the Court in Reno v. ACLU inclined to use a second-look
invalidation, rather than a flat-out invalidation,
because the case
10 23
involved "lower value" indecent speech?
These questions reflect the rich mix of factors courts must
consider as they work with structural rules. These questions also
suggest why different rules may emerge in different contexts to
protect different constitutional values in different ways. At the
same time, structural rules, in all their forms, reflect a distinctively
provisional and dialogue-centered approach to judicial review. 10 24
This fact raises the very large question toward which we have been
advancing: Does the "hard look" approach of these cases itself hold
up under the hard look of a systematic appraisal? 25
It may be surprising-given the now-demonstrated pervasiveness
of structural rules in our law-that there is any ground for
controversy about the meritoriousness of this doctrinal approach.
Simply assuming the appropriateness of structural rules, however,
would be deeply wrong for at least two reasons. First, the Court
itself (and, indeed, the broader academic community) has not
focused on structural decision making as a unitary phenomenon.
There is, accordingly, no systematic treatment of the merits and
1020. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). For Justice Frankfurter's
famous critique of the "preferred position" rubric, see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-97
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
1021. See infra note 1045 and accompanying text.
1022. See Sunstein, supranote 425, at 8 (noting that "a minimalist path usually... makes
sense when the Court is dealing with an issue of high complexity").
1023. See, e.g., GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 30, at 1155 (noting that Justice Stevens
has been a "leading advocate" of reduced scrutiny of"lower value" indecent speech).
1024. See supranotes 44, 62 and accompanying text.
1025. For a brief comparison of structural rules and the "hard look" doctrine of
administrative law, see supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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demerits of these rules in the academic literature and, even more
so, in the cases.0 26 One might say the Court has quietly-perhaps
even subconsciously-gravitated in the direction of structural rules.
It is an open question whether this doctrinal drift is a good idea.
Second, to the extent the Court has grappled with the wisdom of
structural approaches, it has been of two minds. Even while
endorsing proper-purpose rules, for example, the Court often has
excoriated purposive analysis in constitutional law. 27 In addition,
there are strong signals that structural analysis-in at least some
important contexts-has attracted one strong critic on the Court. If,
as Justice Scalia has suggested, "content" (rather than "form" and
"processes") must, at least ordinarily, determine the constithe future of
tutionality of state policy pronouncements,'
structural rules seems dim indeed. Among the other members of the
Court, Justice Stevens seems unflinchingly committed to structural
decision making.029 Other Justices--quite understandably-have
been groping their way through the pros, the cons, and the
complexities of structural analysis. The Court's opinions in Lopez
are telling in this regard. In his majority opinion, Chief Justice
Rehnquist (joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas) clearly sounded structural themes by noting the absence
of congressional affecting-commerce findings, while simultaneously
downplaying the significance of this omission.0'°" In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg), questioned the relevance of congressional findings, but
refused to say they would have no weight. 0 "' Even Justice Souter,
who seemed most bent on marginalizing the absence of
congressional findings in evaluating commerce power questions,
seemed unable in the end to go the whole distance.' 3 2 Against this
backdrop, there can be no escape from the hard work of carefully
assessing the rightness of structural review.
1026. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
1027. See supra notes 770-81 and accompanying text.
1028. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
1029. Seesupranotes399-406,417-38,837-44 and accompanyingtext (discussingMow Sun
Wong, Fullilove, Sable Communications,and Reno u.ACLU).
1030. See supra notes 351-63 and accompanying text.
1031. See supranote 363 and accompanyingtext; see also supranote372 (discussingJustice

Breyer's dissent in the Morrisoncase).
1032. See supranote 363 and accompanying text.
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Along our way, we have touched on arguments for and against
judicial use of structural rules. o3 Before developing a more
comprehensive and systematic list of arguments, it is worth putting
the role of structural rules in a broader context. Structural
review-as we consider it here-is not the exclusive, the dominant,
or even the most important style of constitutional decision
making. 0 34 It is merely one tool that courts may and do use to give
meaning and protection to constitutional guarantees. This onearrow-in-the-quiver view of structural rules helps to focus the
normative inquiry. The question is not whether structural rules are
wise in the abstract or standing alone. The question is whether it
makes sense for the Court to use these rules, along with many
forms of on-or-off rules, in carrying out its vital work as the judicial
guardian of the Constitution.
The arguments for using structural rules in this manner may be
counted and cast in different ways. A bill of particulars, however,
almost certainly would include the following litany of defenses:
1. Structural review recognizes the centrality of democratic
self-government, without stripping the Court of a special
role in protecting constitutional rights. 10 35 Put another way,
structural rules reflect a wise and deeply rooted
commitment to judicial restraint. 0 3 6 At the same time, these
1033. See, e.g., supra notes 443-55 and accompanying text (discussing pros and cons of
proper-findings-and-study rules).
1034. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
1035. See, e.g., FISHER,supranote 14, at 230 ("Through what Alexander Bickel once called
the Court's 'continuing colloquy' with the political branches and society at large, the
judiciary's search for constitutional principles can be reconciled with democratic values.");
TRIBE, supra note 24, § 3-4 at 39 (stating "democracy is surely less threatened by a system
of constitutional interpretation in which many may share significant and respected roles
than by a system with but one authoritative voice"); Dimond, supra note 69, at 209 ("This
vision of the Court as initiator of a dialogue about the meaning of the Constitution certainly
makes judicial review more consistent with the traditional theory of democracy.").
1036. Onthewisdomof, andjustificationsforjudicialrestraint, see generally United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that "head-on
confrontations between the life-tenured branch and the representative branches of
government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to either"; worrying that "Itihe public
confidence essential to the former and the vitality critical to the latter may well erode if we
do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power to negative the actions of the
other branches"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 470 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("[Jiudicial self-restraint is surely an implied, ifnot an expressed, condition of the grant of
authority ofjudicial review."); BICKEL, supra note 6, at 19 ("[Nlothing can finally depreciate
the central function that is assigned in democratic theory and practice to the electoral
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rules leave courts with significant powers, including (as we

just have noted) the power to 1deploy
traditional on-or-off
37
doctrines in appropriate cases.

2.

1

Structural rules comport with-and hold the potential of
largely systematizing-the reality that an interactive
interpretation of the Constitution, deeply involving
nonjudicial authorities, is pervasive and inescapable."3 "
This fact, perhaps overlooked in earlier times, is now well
documented. 39 Courts can use structural review to deal

process; nor can it be denied that the policy-making power of representative institutions,
born of the electoral process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the system. Judicial
review works counter to this characteristic."); Paul Brest, Interpretationand Interest, 34
STAN. L. REv. 765, 770-73 (1982) (arguing that the fact that the interpretative legal
community-the courts-is demographically composedof the rulingelite presents "normative
problems in a democratic polity"); David AL Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation,63 U. CHI. L. REv. 877, 934 (1996) ("The principles that require unelected
judges to be appropriately deferential to majorities are principles that any plausible theory
of constitutional interpretation should adopt, in any democracy, whether it has our
Constitution or any constitution. They are valid principles not because the text or the
Framers or the people commanded them, but because they are sensible ways of reconciling
judicialreviewwithdemocracy."); HarryH. Wellington, HistoryandMoralsin Constitutional
Adjudication, 97 HARV. L. REV. 326, 335 (1983) (book review) ('We the People' consent [to
judicial review] ... because we believe that, in one fashion or another, we have adequate
control over the content of the law that governs us."); Wellington, supra note 8, at 516
(opining that "itis a wise court that pays attention to the community-not out offear, but
out of obligation").
1037. With respect to the Court's retention of significant powers in using structural review
itself, see, for example, DIMOND, supra note 19, at 17 (noting that the Court, in exercising
structural review, "retains an essential role, first, in stimulating the dialogue over the
meaning of the Constitution and second, in shaping the national political process to assure
that it is open, fair, informed, and not skewed by systemic caste discrimination").
1038. See DIMOND, supranote 19, at 4 (justifying "provisional... review", in part based on
the Court's already evidenced responsiveness to the public's reaction to judicial decisions
over time).
1039. Some of the major work in this area has come from Neal Devins, Louis Fisher, and
Barry Friedman. See, e.g., Devins Testimony, supra note 390, at 2 ("Congress, the White
House, government agencies, interest groups, the general public and the states all play
critical roles in shaping constitutional values."); FISHER, supra note 14, at 44 ("Judicial
review... often serves as but one stage of an on-going constitutional process shared with
lower courts, the executive branch, and legislators."); id. at 87 ("For the most part, Court
decisions are tentative and reversible like other political events."); id. at 229 ("[Elven when
the courts render a constitutional interpretation, it is usually only a matter oftime before
Congress prevails ifitwants to. Through changes inthe composition ofcourts or adjustments
in the attitudes ofjudges who continue to sit, a determined majority in Congress is likely to
have its way."); Friedman, supra note 21, at 653 ("[Clonstitutional interpretation is an
elaborate discussion between judges and the body politic."); Devins, supra note 917, at 50
("Whether the issue is abortion, race or the rights of religious minorities, judges and
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with this phenomenon in a conscious, constructive, and
intellectually honest way.1040
Structural review facilitates a positive, cooperative, and
fruitful collaboration among the different branches of
government. 1

41

It does so by drawing on the strengths of

lawmakers are likely to shape the Constitution together."). Others have made valuable
contributions too. See, e.g., DIMOND, supra note 19, at 4 ("Over time, we the people respond
to the Court's interpretation, either by acquiescing in the ruling or by framing a different
understanding, whether by legislation, argument before the Court or in other public arenas,
our conduct, the appointment ofnewJustices, or constitutional amendment."); FISHER, supra
note 14, at 12 (noting that "careful studies by Robert Dahl, David Adamany, and Richard
Funston show that the Court generally stays within the political boundaries of its times");
Nagel, supra note 363, at 659 ("It does seem to be true that sooner or later the Supreme
Court goes along with the dominant trends of the time."); cf. WiIJAM G. ANDREWS,
COORDINATE MAGISTRATES: CONsTITUTIONAL LAW BY CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT (1969).

As noted by Professor Friedman: 'Robert Dahl observed in his now-famous article that over
half of the Supreme Court decisions striking down congressional legislation occurred more
than four years after the legislation was passed. where legislationwas overruled in less than
four years, Dahl found that Congress' policy view generally won out, albeit after a struggle."

Friedman, supranote 21, at 641 n.326 (citation omitted) (citing Dahl, supranote 495, at 15763); see also Tushnet, supra note 24, at 812 (discussing work of Dahl and concluding that
"Supreme Court decisions make a difference, it seems, when contemporary political
majorities, or near-majorities, want them to make a difference").
1040. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 116, at 646 (worrying that "a lack of recognition
and candor about what the Court has done recently with quasi-constitutional law has
submerged a variety of hotly contestable normative and empirical issues").
1041. See id. ('In the abstract there are powerful arguments for quasi-constitutional law
rooted in a vision of our public lawmaking processes as a partnership in which the judiciary
plays an active role, but eventually defers to the democratically accountable branches.").
Professor Sunstein (in speaking of the related subject ofnarrow, deliberation-forcing judicial
rulings) captures much the same idea:
Courts do best by proceeding in a way that is catalytic rather than preclusive,
and that is closely attuned to the fact that courts are participants in the system
of democratic deliberation. It is both inevitable and proper that the lasting
solutions to the great questions of political morality will come from democratic
politics, not the judiciary. But the Court can certainly increase the likelihood
that those solutions will be good ones.
Sunstein, supra note 439, at 101; see also John Denvir, Towardsa PoliticalTheory of Public
Interest Litigation,54 N.C. L. REV. 1133, 1139 (1976) ('Too often, litigation and legislation
have been seen as competing modes of reform, rather than as complementary approaches.");
Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separationof Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 391 (1976)
("[Tihe authors ofthe Constitution... did not envision a government in which each branch
seeks out confrontation; they hoped the system of checks and balances would achieve a
harmony of purposes differently fulfilled. The branches ofgovernment were not designed to
be at war with one another. The relationship was not to be an adversary one, though to think
of it that way has become fashionable."); Jonathan R. Macey, PromotingPublic-Regarding
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest GroupModel, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
223,226 (1986) ("Ihere need not be overt confrontation between the judicial branch and the
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each branch," 4 2 by providing the judiciary with valuable and
usable feedback to its thinking,"0 4 and by generating in the
end a "more10 vibrant and durable constitutional
interpretation." "
Structural rules offer courts a much-needed middle ground
for handling cases that involve such perplexing difficulties
as "alack of information,... changing circumstances, or...
moral uncertainty."' 45 These rules wisely provide courts
with room to maneuver when either an outright validation
or an outright invalidation of a government
program
10 46
constitutes a response that is too crude.

legislative branch in order for checking and balancing to take place.").
1042. See supranotes 943-61 and accompanying text. "
1043. See, e.g., BICKEL, supranote 6, at 176 (noting value of judicial use of "the technique
of the trial balloon"); FISHER, supra note 14, at 269-70 (arguing that by way of "the slow
evolution of [constitutional common law] rules, executive and legislative debate 'concerning
the means of implementing new-found values may provide the Supreme Court with much
needed feedback as to the implications, and indeed the propriety, of its activism" (quoting
Monaghan, supra note 17, at 45)); Robert F. Nagel, SeparationofPowers and the Scope of
FederalEquitableRemedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 680 (1978) ("Ifneither Congress nor the
executive nor the state institutions have the will to cooperate ... then it is entirely possible
that the court's objective is unwise.").
1044. Devins Testimony, supranote 398, at 7; see also Frickey, supranote 27, at 729 n.180
(noting "the importance of such a dialogue in contributing to a public law that is stable but
not static").
1045. Sunstein, supra note 434, at 8; see id. at 30 ("Minimalism becomes more attractive
if judges are proceeding in the midst of factual or (constitutionally relevant) moral
uncertainty and rapidly changing circumstances . . . ."); see also Denver Area Educ.
Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 777 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring)
("Because we cannot be confident that for purposes of judging speech restrictions it will
continue to make sense to distinguish cable from other tecbnologies, and because we know
that changes inthese regulated technologieswll enormously alterthe structure ofregulation
itself, we should be shy about saying the final word today about what will be accepted as
reasonable tomorrow."); Komesar, supranote 595, at 379 ("The more uncertain the judiciary
is about how to resolve the issue, and the more it needs to learn about the subject matter,
the greater will be its inclination to adopt a resolution couched in flexible terms....").
1046. See, e.g., Conkle, supranote 69, at 38 ("Provisional review could provide the Supreme
Courtwith an important middle ground, one that would permit itto enter the debate without
concluding it."); Merrill, supra note 695, at 54 (noting that the "principal virtue" of
constitutional common law, according to its adherents, is that it affords "a degree of
flexibility that traditional, Marbury-style constitutional interpretation does not"). Professor
Bickel referred to much the same notion when he wrote: "The means exist and are in
vigorous use for providing a wide-ranging and effective rule of principle, while at the same
time eschewing full dominion and affording the necessary leeway to expedient
accommodation. These means I [call] loosely and with benevolent intent 'the passive
virtues." BICKEL, supra note 6, at 200.
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Structural review facilitates judicial action that is
appropriately proportionate to the "creative" judge-made
character of many constitutional doctrines. 47 It does so by
permitting courts to identify constitutional norms while
simultaneously insisting that courts recognize the need to
involve other institutions in defining the contours of those
norms in48 light of preexisting and emerging societal
values.

10

1047. See ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURTANDTHECONSTITUTION 377 (1987); Sandalow, supra
note 13, at 1173 (noting that the "perception that the rules enforced by courts are not
contained in the Constitution poses a formidable challenge for the institution of judicial
review"); see also Calabresi, supra note 13, at 84 ("[Theorists and judges have yet to reach
any sort of consensus on what counts as a fundamental right" and it "is precisely the
indeterminacy of such an inquiry... that strongly commends the use of alternative modes
of judicial review in addition to [on-or-off fundamental rights] review.").
1048. See FISHER, supranote 14, at 5 (arguing that, in applying"competing sections" of the
Constitution "that contain conflicting political and social values," the Court needs "the
conscientious guidance and participation ofthe legislative and executive branches"); Agresto,
supranote 8, at 483 (noting that the "Constitution... is responsive to popular needs [and]
legislative acts"); Burt, supra note 701, at 128 (suggesting, in support of common-law-like
constitutional rules, that "Congress... can operate with greater flexibility than the Court
and can balance competing objectives with a more sensitive touch"). Professor Sandalow
offered particularly interesting insights on this point. As he explained:
[Clonstitutional law [must be] understood as the expression of evolving societal norms.
A court cannot lay a challenged statute beside a societal norm and decide whether the
former squares with the latter. Societal norms are not a "brooding omni-presence"
merely awaiting discovery by a sufficiently keen observer. They must be constructed
and, inevitably, their construction must be effected through some process. Ajudgment
whether governmental action is consistent with societal norms is, for that reason,
closely bound up with judgments about the process through which the norms should
be constructed. In deciding whether governmental action does conform to societal
norms, accordingly, a court must consider whether, by reason of the decisionmaking
process leading to it, the action ought to be understood as establishing those norms.
Sandalow, supranote 13, at 1185 (footnote omitted). Professor Winter has added:
("[Wihat is most salient is the importance of the dialogue between the Court
and society over the content of our norms and deepest values. Dialogue is
instrumental in maintaining the quality of the process of norm articulation and
the resulting norms. It also increases the legitimacy of that process. A Court
unconstrained by societal judgments in the explication of values would be
insufferably undemocratic. Conversely, a society that left the articulation and
development of its values solely to the partisan political process and the
expedience of governance would risk moral enfeeblement. By raising the
process from the unconscious and unspoken to the articulated and dialogical,
we achieve a significant advance over the dangers of the ad hoc and the
questionable legitimacy of value imposition.
Winter, supra note 570, at 701. See generally Devins, supra note 917, at 50 (claiming that
Court's recent assisted-suicide decisions "reflect... an increasing recognition on the part of
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Structural safeguards permit courts to educate nonjudicial
authorities about constitutional rules and principles. 49
These rules also provide tools to spur those authorities-and
the public at large-to reassume their proper responsibilities to pay heed to, and participate in bringing to life,
the Constitution's commands. 10 50

progressives, most notably Ruth Bader Ginsburg, that the Supreme Court does little more
than 'prolong divisiveness' when it 'ventures too far in the change it orders). One might add
to these observations, albeit at the risk of gilding the lily, the thought that structural
doctrines comportwith some of the very deepestvalues-temperance, modesty, humility, and
self-control-that our culture has endorsed for thousands ofyears. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra
note 1, at 1208 (advocating "a temperate brand of decisionmaking, one that was not
extravagant or divisive"); Strauss, supranote 1036, at 891 (noting that "the traditionalism
that is central to common law constitutionalism is based on humility," as well as the "idea
...that one should be very careful about rejecting judgments made by people who were
acting reflectively and in good faith, especially when those judgments have been reaffirmed
or at least accepted over time"); Sunstein, supranote 434, at 43 ("Those who favor narrow
decisions and incompletely theorized arguments tend to be humble about their own
capacities."); id. at 20 (noting that "the democratic argument for minimalism invokes the
need for prudence, social adaptation over time, and humility in the face of limited judicial
capacities and competence").
1049. See, e.g., Rostow, supra note 570, at 208 ("Justices are inevitably teachers in a vital
national seminar."); see also Sunstein, supranote 335, at 1182 (noting Court's important role
in "call[ing] public attention to a problem without forecl6sing public judgment).
1050. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 13 (1993) ("[Elected
representatives and citizens in general ought to be involved in the process of deliberating
about the contemporary meaning ofconstitutional principles. This process ofdeliberation is
not only for the judges."); Estreicher, supranote 139, at 1152-53-(describing one key purpose
of the remand to the legislature-and one that was "certainly more important [than issue
avoidance] to Bickel and Wellington7-as ensuring"that the statute, if reenacted, reflects a
conscious legislative determination focusing on the court's concerns"; also noting that
through judicial use of this technique, "the legislature has been brought into the
constitutional lawmaking process"); Anthony T. Kronman,AlexanderBickel's Philosophy of
Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1587 (1985) ("By offering a partial or reversible solution to a
constitutional problem, a solution that bespeaks its own uncertainty regarding the principle
or principles involved, the Court invites the other branches of government, and the public,
to rise to a consideration ofprinciple and address the problem in the same spirit."); see also
Sunstein, supranote 335, at 1187 (commending Court's largely restrainist affirmative action
decisions: "ifwe step back a bit, we might conclude that the Court has helped keep the
nation's eye on the affirmative action issue-on the questions of policy and principle that lie
behind the debate-while at the same time failing to preempt processes of public discussion
and debate" about them). Concerns about desensitizing the public to its constitutional
responsibilities may be traced back at least to the seminal work of Professor James B.
Thayer, who observed: "The tendency of a common and easy resort to [on-or-off judicial
review] ... is to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral
responsibility." JAMES BRADLEYTHAYER, JOHNMARSHALL 107 (1901). A prominent modern

proponent of the same idea is Professor Cass Sunstein. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION, supra at 9 ("[T]here has been far too much emphasis, in the last generation,
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Structural rules help conserve and consolidate the judicial
power by reducing "friction between the Court and
Congress"" 5 ' and between the Court and other nonjudicial
actors,too.1052 Structural rules also guard the Court against
the dangers of "self-inflicted wounds" 1 5 3 created by
erroneous outright on-or-offrule invalidations," 5 4 while still

on the role of courts in the American constitutional system. This court-centeredness.. has
helped to weaken the sense of responsibility of other officials and indeed ordinary citizens
... ."). Structural review tends to counter this weakening of responsibility by pushing
nonjudicial officials to consider constitutional values in the policymaking process. See
generally Missouri, Kan. & Tex Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904) (asserting "that
legislatures are ultimate guardians ofthe liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great
a degree as the courts").
1051. Eskridge, supra note 119, at 1017.
1052. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 119, at 468-69 (noting that "[tlhe principle that
statutes should be construed so as to survive constitutional challenge" is defensible because,
among other things, it "minimizes inter-branch conflict"). Many observers have noted that
techniques like structural decision making tend to preserve the Court's decision-making
authority. See, e.g., FISHER, supranote 14, at 6 ("Because of the shaky foundation ofjudicial
review, the Court consciously circumscribes its activities and invites other branches to
participate."); id. at 12 (noting that "[tihe Court maintains its strength by steering a course
that fits within the permissible limits of public opinion" and that"[if] ortheir own institutional
protection, courts must take account of social movements and public opinion"); Neuborne,
supra note 69, at 377 (noting that structural review tends to "minimize the unavoidable
waste of a court's political capital that results from direct conflict with the coordinate
branches"); Sandalow, supranote 13, at 1193 (asserting that "a more modest statement of
the courts' role may add significantly to its legitimacy"); Wellington, supranote 8, at 502 ("If
it can be shown... that often there is less finality in a constitutional decision than meets the
eye ....
then perhaps we can accept more readily the legitimacy ofjudicial review."); see also
Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme
Court, 36 AM. J. POL. Sci. 635, 660 (1992) ("[The bolder the Court is in confronting the
policies of Congress, the less confidence citizens bestow it as an institution."); see generally
ELY, supra note 88, at 47 ("[Wle are told that the Court's 'essentially anti-democratic
character keeps it constantly in jeopardy of destruction': it knows 'that frequent judicial
intervention in the political process would generate such widespread political reaction that
the Court would be destroyed in its wake." (quoting Philip B. Kurland, TowardA Political
Supreme Court, 37 U. CHI.L. REV. 19, 20 (1969) and Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Adjudication:The Who and When, 82 YALE L. J. 1363, 1366 (1973))).
1053. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 50 (1928).
1054. See, e.g., Agresto, supranote 8, at 485 (observing that "the obvious theoretical reason
for viewing the Court as apartner in the process of constitutional exegesis and not as the last
word.., is that the Court can, and often has, made serious errors regarding the meaning
and demands of the constitutional tex"; citing as examples the "racial cases of the 1880's,
the economic decisions of the earlier part of this century and the crisis of constitutional
adjudication in the first years of the New Deal"); Friedman, supra note 15, at 777-78
(describing "majoritarianparticipationindefiningrights" as "both inevitable and appropriate
...because the Court is neither omniscient nor invincible [and] [b]ecause courts, including
the Supreme Court, do not get everything right the first time, or even the second or third
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deeply involving the Court in identifying and shaping and
giving life to constitutional values.'0
The essential "democracy-forcing" goals of structural review
are powerfully good ones.'0° Structural doctrines cause
policymakers to focus on the impact of their work, to take
account of constitutional values, and to craft rules with
care." 5 7 These doctrines also wisely encourage "reasongiving in the public domain"0 58 and "promote democratic
accountability and democratic deliberation. " 'O" In these
ways, structural review tends to enhance both the quality
and the public acceptance of government rules.0 6 0

time"); see also Ginsburg, supranote 1, at 1205-06 (arguingthat, by way of the Court'swrong
decisions in the economic due process cases, "its precarious position as final arbiter of
constitutional questions was exposed"). See generally Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371,
400-01 (1943) (acknowledging Court's ability to "fallinto error"); United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 87 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting) (noting that "the courts ...
may falter or be
mistaken").
1055. See Agresto, supra note 8, at 493 (arguing that "if fear of mistake-fear of
finality-induces the desire for restraint, then the answer is to elucidate ways to restore the
Court into the active partnership of checks and balances, and not to ask it to be passive").
1056. See Sunstein, supranote 434, at 100.
1057. See, e.g., supra notes 448-54 and accompanying text.
1058. Sunstein, supranote 434, at 8.
1059. Id. at 7. To follow the thought ofProfessor Bickel, if the legislature has made a policy
"back-handedly, off-handedly, less explicitly than is desirable" then it seems self-evidently
sensible to remand that policy for an "orderly, deliberate, explicit, and formal
reconsideration," when an issue of"grave importance" is at stake. BICKEL, supra note 6, at
166. For similar views, see DImOND, supra note 19, at 17 (arguing that "the people's
representatives... have an obligation to raise and to decide.., issues frontally on the
merits" when "fundamental national rights" are at stake because otherwise "Congress may
inadvertently resolve the issue without even understanding itself what is being decided, let
alone allowing the people to debate the issue publicly"); Neuborne, supra note 69, at 377
(defending rules under which "acts in derogation of significant values would require
interbranch cooperation and at least an opportunity for reflection"); Sandalow, supra note
13, at 1188 (claiming that "ifgovernmental action trenches uponvalues that may reasonably
be regarded as fundamental, that action should be the product of a deliberate and broadly
based political judgment"); see also Carlson & Smith, supra note 27, at 232 (noting Justice
Stevens's gravitation to structural rules, so as to negate "arbitrary or uninformed decisions");
Sunstein, supra note 434, at 37 ("[Clourts should provide spurs and prods when either
democracy or deliberation is absent."). SeegenerallyFarber & Frickey, supranote 444, at 926
("Although still developing, 'due process of lawmaking' has the potential to strengthen the
democratic process.").
1060. See Gardbaum, supra note 69, at 825 (arguing that federalism-driven structural
restraints might, "like other required aspects ofthe national political process, significantly
affect both the content of federal legislation and the regard in which such legislation is
generally held"); see also George A. Bermann, Taking SubsidiaritySeriously: Federalismin
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Courts can use structural doctrines to fill the breach with

respect to otherwise underenforced constitutional norms. 1°6 1
In addition, structural rules can be adapted to take account
of the very dynamics that have caused an underenforcement
of norms in the first place.1 ° 2
10. Structural rules wisely comport with a view of the judiciary
that emphasizes its role in sharpening and strengthening

the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 391 (1994)

(suggesting that inquiries by the European Court of Justice into whether the political
institutions have adequately examined alternatives before legislatingwould generate greater
trust in the European Union's legislative outcomes); Clark, supra note 763, at 964 ("Laws
enacted because of'impure' motive or prejudice... create a sense of breach of faith between
the governor and the governed."). See generally Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and
Improving Legal Processes-A Pleafor "ProcessValues," 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (1974)
(emphasizing importance of process"not only as a means to good results, but also as a means
of implementing or serving process values such as participatory governance, procedural
rationality, and humaneness").
1061. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 119, at 862 (quoting approvingly Professor Sunstein's
suggestion that "aggressive construction of questionable statutes, removing them from the
terrain of constitutional doubt, can be understood as a less intrusive way of vindicating
norms that do in fact have constitutional status; and this point applies even if courts would
not invalidate those statutes if they were forced to decide the question"); Frickey, supranote
27, at 728 (claiming that "a critical factor" in the Court's findings-related and narrow ruling
in Lopez probably was that the federalism values it implemented "are difficult to enforce
through judicial review"); Sunstein, supra note 119, at 468-69 (noting that, among other
purposes, the avoidance principle "strengthens judicially underenforced constitutional
norms"); see also Rapaczynski, supra note 310, at 379 ("Tlhe very essence of the processoriented approach is that certain fundamental values cannot be sufficiently protected by a
conferral of entitlements on individuals, either because their enforcement would be
inefficient or because the courts would lack any manageable standards of adjudication. But
precisely because the values at stake are fundamental, if some institutional arrangements
can be devised to protect them indirectly, such arrangements may themselves become a part
of the constitutional structure... ."). See generallyLawrence Gene Sager, FairMeasure:The
Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
1062. See supranote 175 and accompanyingtext(discussingrole offederalism-driven clearstatement rules in facilitating informed operation of political processes relied on to protect
federalism values). One phenomenon related to the underenforcement of rights (what we
might call the phenomenon of"congressional underexercise of powers") is exemplified by the
judicially enforced principle of a borderless national market embodied in the so-called
dormant Commerce Clause. Traditional justifications for this principle focus on Congress's
predictable noninterference with commerce-undermining protectionist measures adopted by
states, due to tit-for-tat logrolling within Congress and Congress's preoccupation with other,
more pressing matters. To the extent these institutional deterrents exist, they cause a failure
to negate state measures incompatible with the constitutional plan. On this view, the
structural dormant Commerce Clause canbejustifiedonunderenforced-constitutional-norm
grounds.
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the processes of government.'a 3 This process-centered
conception of the judicial role-a conception that is deeply
ingrained in modern constitutional thought 0 6 4 -responds to
the courts' institutional strengths, serves to distinguish
judges from legislators, and comports with (rather than
subverts) the basic
constitutional commitment to democratic
10 65
self-government.
One signal of the potency of these arguments lies in a listing of
the champions of structural review. We surely cannot say that any
one group of scholars would endorse all the structural doctrines
enumerated in this Article. This is especially true because this
itemization ofrules has not appeared before, because all these rules
are subject to controversy, and because the existing commentary on
structural rules is limited and largely doctrine-specific. 06 6 At the
same time, the list of scholars who, among others, have endorsed
significant forms of structural review reads like a virtual all-star

1063. See, e.g., Linde, supranote 27, at 255 ("Ifthis republic is remembered in the distant
history of law, it is likely to be for its enduring adherence to legitimate institutions and
processes, not for its perfection of unique principles of justice and certainly not for the
rationality of its laws. This recognition... may well take our attention beyond the processes
of adjudication and of executive government to a new concern with the due process of
lawmaking."); Neuborne, supra note 69, at 368-69 ("When substantive-review judges identify
values and totally insulate them from majority will, the troublesome question ofwhy judges
are better than other officials at identifying and weighing fundamental values cannot be
avoided. But the assumption is less questionable in the context of process-based review.
When judges merely identify those areas in which scrupulous regard for procedural
regularity is most appropriate, their functional superiority would not be seriously
questioned.").
1064. See supra notes 88-93,456-60 and accompanying text.
1065. See, eg., ELY, supra note 88, at 88 (advocating process-driven, representationreinforcing judicial review on two main grounds: "The first is that a representationreinforcing approach to judicial review, unlike its rival value-protecting approach, is not
inconsistent with, but on the contrary (and quite by design) entirely supportive of, the
underlying premises ofthe American system ofrepresentative democracy. The secondis that
such an approach, again in contradistinction to its rival, involves tasks that courts, as
experts on process and (more important) as political outsiders, can sensibly claim to be better
qualified and situated to perform than political officials"); Wellington, supranote 8, at 500
(emphasizing that "process... is a comfortable and familiar domain oflawyers andjudges");
see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 116, at 631 (arguing that superstrong clearstatement rules are "notultimately undemocratic, because Congress can override the norm"
and that "ultimately such rules may even be democracy-enhancing by focusing the political
process on the values enshrined in the Constitution").
1066. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (noting limited prior treatment of
structural rules).
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10 67 Brest,' 68 Calabresi, 1
team of constitutional analysts: Bickel,
10 72 Frickey, 073 Gunther, 10 7 4 Linde, 10 75
71
Ely, 10 70 Eskridge, 10 Farber,
1067. See, e.g., supra notes 506-30 (discussing Professor Bickers views on desuetude); see
also Calabresi, supra note 13, at 103 (noting that use of second-look rules "could
appropriately be called the Bickellian' approach").
1068. See Brest, supra note 385 (defending motive-based review).
1069. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (noting strong structural views of Judge
Calabresi); see also Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 742 (1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring) ("What
I do say is that no court need or ought to make ultimate and immensely difficult
constitutional decisions unless it knows that the state's elected representatives and
executives-having been made to go, as it were, before the people-assert through their
actions (not their inactions) that they really want and are prepared to defend laws that are
constitutionally suspect."), rev'd, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
1070. See supra notes 461-64 and accompanying text (discussing structural aspects of
Professor Ely's process-centered style of review).
1071. See Eskridge & Frickey, supranote 116, at 631 (identifying values of"super-strong
clear statement rules").
1072. See Farber & Frickey, supranote 444, at 919 ("The prima facie unconstitutionality
of some classes of legislation should be rebuttable, if at all, only by clear and persuasive
congressional deliberation. At least, if evidence establishes that Congress did not make a
deliberate choice, otherwise 'suspect' legislation should receive even less judicial deference.");
id. at 918 ("[]n our view due process of lawmaking is sufficiently tied to constitutional
structure, to the Madisonian constitutionalideal ofdeliberative legislative policymaking, and
perhaps even to the federal common law to justify its continued use in constitutional
adjudication.").
1073. See supra note 1071; see also Frickey, supra note 27.
1074. See Gunther, supra note 30, at 44-45 (advocating expanded use of means-based
scrutiny in part because it would "resemble the judicial technique of remanding to the
legislature, familiar in other areas of constitutional law").
1075. See Linde, supra note 27. Justice Linde's name, it seems to me, belongs on this list,
notwithstanding his aversion to proper-finding-and-study rules, at least in the rationalrelation context, see supra note 340. Justice Linde, after all, coined the "due process of
lawmaking" moniker and strongly encouraged courts to give less attention to the substance
of ordinary legislation and more attention to legislative processes. See supranote 1063. See
generally Hamilton, supranote 268, at 179 (emphasizing Justice Linde's role in encouraging
structural analysis). While Justice Linde's seminal article did not focus specifically on the
interaction of structural and substantive constitutional rights, nothing in that article denies
the possibility of such a connection; indeed, Justice Linde's reliance on notions of a
procedural Due Process Clause-which take account of the nature of the private rights at
stake, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976)-suggests his likely receptiveness
to strengthening process-centered rules when concerns about free speech, free exercise, and
other core constitutional interests are at risk. Finally, Justice Linde has revealed strong
structural tendencies in casting a skeptical eye onpolicymakingby popular initiative where
dangers of factional oppression are great. See supra note 905; see also Hamilton, supranote
268, at 169 (noting Justice Linde's "fidelity to his structural perspective on the Constitution"
in broadly questioning lawmaking by way of popular initiative). It is not surprising, then,
that one of the most structural of all opinions-Justice Stevens's dissent in the Fullilove
case--drew most heavily upon the work of Justice Linde. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 549 n.24, 550-51 n.26 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Sandalow, 1 1 77

Sunstein, 0 7 8

Tribe,10

79

and

Wellington.'... If one may judge doctrines by the company they
keep, the case for some serious version of structural review seems
strong indeed.
On the other hand, structural doctrines have not escaped
enthusiastic criticism. Perhaps the most encompassing critique has
come from the powerful pen of Professor Mark Tushnet. 08 ' Justice
Scalia, in addressing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Thompson
v. Oklahoma, also voiced a hearty skepticism that logically extends
to a number of structural rules.' 8 2 And the dissenting opinion of
Justice Souter in Lopez v. United States...3 expressed concerns
about excessive use of structural review exercised by way of properfindings rules.'~ By drawing on the work of these and other
analysts, it is possible to construct a body of arguments against the
use, or at least the expansive use, of structural review. These
arguments, offered here in highly simplified form, are as follows:
1. There is no proper constitutional source for structural rules.
Indeed, judicial extrapolation of structural rules clashes
with the Constitution's express specification of only certain
lawmaking structures (such as bicameralism and
presentment) 1" and the Court's longstanding insistence
that due process
protections do not attach to government
086
policymaking.

1076. See Monaghan, supra note 17 (advocating use of constitutional common law).
1077. See Sandalow, supranote 13 (advocating a form of structural review).
1078. See Sunstein, supranote 434, at 100 (claiming that decisional "minimalism" he finds
commendable "connects the 'clear statement' cases, the concern with desuetude, the void for
vagueness and nondelegation doctrines, rationality review, and the requirementthat certain
forms of discrimination be justified by actual rather than hypothetical purposes"); id. at 8
(asserting that these structural doctrines "are connected with the basic foundations of the
system of deliberative democracy").
1079. See supranote 68 and accompanying text (noting Professor Tribe's endorsement of
this approach).
1080. See supra notes 68, 634, 993, 1036, 1052 and accompanying text (noting passages
from Dean Wellington's writings).
1081. See TUSHMET, supra note 443, at 201-13 (discussing political science and structural
review); Tushnet, supra note 24 (discussing structural review and questions arising from
related doctrine).
1082. See supranotes 243-47 (summarizing Justice Scalia's position).
1083. 514 U.S. 549, 603 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
1084. See supra note 363 and accompanying text.
1085. See infra note 1109 and accompanying text.
1086. See infra notes 1129-31 and accompanying text.
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Structural rules should be rejected because they lack a
limiting principle." 87 They leave courts at sea not only in
deciding when to trigger structural protections,
but also in
088
choosing what structural protections to apply.
Structural rules threaten a proper separation of powers by
permitting courts to regulate internal legislative processes.
This form ofjudicial intervention is deeply inconsistent with
legislative autonomy as revealed and defined by deep-seated
legal authorities and traditions. 8 9
Structural rules encourage judicial overreaching by giving
courts a too-convenient tool for invalidating government

1087. For examples ofthe invocation of this criticism see supranotes 243.45 (notingJustice
Scalia's assertion of this criticism in Thompson). See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 614 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (questioning, in commerce power context, judicial "review [of congressional
action] for deliberateness" when exercised "under standards never expressed and more or
less arbitrarily applied"); Merrill, supranote 695, at 58-59 (critiquing Professor Monaghan's
conception of constitutional common law on the ground it "is constitutionally unprincipled");
Sandalow, supranote 13, at 1194 ("[Ihe suggestion that courts ought to distinguish between
those acts of Congress that do and do not represent deliberate decisions fails to indicate how
courts are to make that determination. Although I believe that they can do so, and that
constitutional decisions are in fact often influenced by judicial perceptions of the
deliberateness of congressional judgments, the argument remains to be made."); Schrock &
Welsh, supra note 654, at 1146 ("Regrettably, while he acknowledges that providing criteria
by which to distinguish between irreversible constitutional exegesis and congressionally
reversible constitutional common law is'obviously crucial' to his entire enterprise, Monaghan
fails to provide workable criteria."). SeegenerallyBrogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398,406
(1998) (expressing worry about an "expansive, user friendly judicial rule" to the effect that
"criminal statutes do not have to be read as broadly as they are written" because "there is
no way of knowing when, or how, the rule is to be invoked").
1088. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 24, at 823 ("[S]tructural review fails to specify how
much attention an issue must get in the legislature" and "would leave the judges wholly
unconstrained in their determination of what the 'right' agency is.").
1089. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (noting Justice Scalia's view that
"interference in the States' legislative processes" goes to "the heart oftheir sovereignty" and
that he knows "of no authority whatever" for "specifying the precise form that state
legislation must take"); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 614 (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
"review [of congressional action] for deliberateness would be as patently unconstitutional as
an Act of Congress mandating long opinions from this Court"); see also Linde, supranote 27,
at 242-43 (asserting that "most courts and commentators find it improper to question
legislative adherence to lawful procedures" and attribute this restraint in part to "respect
between coordinate branches"); cf Brest, supranote 385, at 129-30 ("Especially where the
decisionmaker claims to have pursued only legitimate objectives, ajudicial determination of
illicit motivation carries an element of insult; it is an attack on the decisionmaker's honesty.
These concerns apply to lower-echelon officials as well as to legislators and high executive
officials. Our constitutional traditions, however, accord greater respect to the integrity of the
higher agencies.").
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policies.0 "0 Worse yet, these rules encourage judicial
subterfuge by letting courts hide substantive decisions in
purportedly provisional rulings that are only theoretically
reversible by political authorities.10 9 '
Structural rules carry with them the same doctrinecorrupting vices that mark the "passive virtues" championed
by Professor Bickel.""s2 In particular, structural rules invite

1090. See Neely, supranote 69, at 281 ("The primary objection then to a 'structural due
process! review power is that the power will be used in anunprincipledway, bypower-hungry
judges, increasing in effect the junta-like component of American government."); Schrock &
Welsh, supranote 654, at 1125 (arguing, in critiquing constitutional common law, that it is
"possible for a Court, animated by realism, to be constitutionally cautious but
subconstitutionally activist, even adventurist"); Sunstein, supra note 434, at 88 n.448 (noting
Frederick Schauer's concern "that clear statement principles often operate to foreclose
congressionaljudgments without requiring the Court to take on the responsibility associated
with a constitutional ruling" and adding that the "dangers of an excessive judicial role via
principles requiring clear statements from Congress are real"); see alsoEskridge & Frickey,
supranote 116, at 637 ("Because the Court sees itself as using up political capital every time
it invalidates a statute, it thinks twice about exercising judicial review. To the extent the
Court does not see itself as being'on the spot! when it interprets statutes, it may believe it
has more freedom to interpret statutes to thwart legislative expectations than it does to
strike them down."). For the expression of a related concern, see Tribe, supranote 27, at 303
("[Olne might well conclude that... 'structural due process' [risks] precipitous judicial
involvement in areas that would otherwise soon resolve themselves politically-and with
more constructive consequences than would be likely to attend judicial burial of statutes
almost, but not quite, dead.").
1091. See TUSHNEr, supranote 443, at 211 ("Clever judges will invoke structural review
when they predict that the legislature will be unable to enact legislation that contravenes
the judges' personal preferences; they will invoke other modes of review in other cases."); see
also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 614 (Souter, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that "a legislative
process requirement would function merely as an excuse for covert review of the merits");
TRIBE, supra note 24, § 17-3, at 1686 (noting others' criticism that structural rules "can
sometimes be used as a subterfuge to 'rig' a desired substantive outcome"); Eskridge &
Frickey, supranote 116, at 636-37 (noting that super-clear-statement rules may encourage
"judicial activism that is particularly questionable because it is backdoor" and "under-thetable constitutional lawmaking" and that "there is good reason to think that the Court's
super-strong clear statement rules might provide the Court with a cover for a great deal
more countermajoritarian activism, overall, than would open invalidation through judicial
review"); Neuborne, supranote 69, at 377 (noting possibility ofa "manipulative labelling" in
the exercise of structural rules); cf Merrill,supra note 695, at 26 (asserting, in critiquing
open-ended constitutional commonlaw power, that"legislative override would nottake place
very often in practice, and judicial lawmaking therefore erodes the principle that, under the
Constitution, public policy is to be determined by officials answerable to the people").
1092. See generallyGunther, supranote 807, at 22-24 (worryingwhether Bickels "passive
virtues" approach would encourage judicial dishonesty and abdication).
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the distortion and dilution of otherwise useful substantive
doctrines like the vagueness rule.'0 9 3
The employment of structural rules is inherently wasteful,
futile, and encouraging of deviousness by nonjudicial

authorities. 1 9 4 This is so because policymakers who

7.

encounter structural rulings often can and will resuscitate
invalidated laws simply by engaging in phony exercises of
feigned procedural attentiveness.' 95
The availability of structural rules, particularly in large
numbers, risks the dilution of vital constitutional
protections. 10 6 This is so, in large part, because courts
offered the ready option of structural review too often will
"chicken out" when called on to do the unpopular work of
using outright declarations of invalidity to safeguard
constitutional freedoms.' 97

1093. See id. at 21 (worrying that Bickel views "narrow constitutional doctrines such as
vagueness as essentially unprincipled").
1094. See, e.g., supranote 763 and accompanying text (noting Supreme Court's expression
of concern about motive review because of its potential futility).
1095. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, supra note 444, at 876 (worrying that "remanding an
issue to the legislature... is futile because the mechanistic process of legislation eliminates
the possibility of a thoughtful legislative response"); id. at 918 (stating that "[tihe
deliberation approach sometimes may be useful in screening out'backroom deals,' but it can
be evaded by sophisticated legislators who are savvy enough to construct an appropriate
legislative history"); see also TUSHNET, supra note 443, at 211 (suggesting that "structural
review is not constitutional review at all" because"it imposes no substantive limitations on
legislative activity").
1096. See, e.g., Schrock & Welsh, supra note 654, at 1159, 1165 (worrying that "adoption
of the constitutional common law methodology might precipitate a dilution or annihilation
of rights," because they would be placed"on a less firm foundation, since a common law rule
is reversible by Congress while a constitutional right is not"); see also Bandes, supra note
755, at 328-32 (suggesting that Professor Monaghan gives unintentional credence to the
textualist notion that what is not spelled out in the Constitution is not within the realm of
legitimate interpretation, thus undermining the Court's ability to enforce, with on-or-off
rules, important rights not derived directly from constitutional text). Professor Tushnet has
expressed a particular worry alongthese lines-namely, that"[s]tructural reviewwould force
into the legislative arena precisely those issues on which we are skeptical of the legislature's
ability to act fairly." TUSHNET, supra note 443, at 210. He argues that this problem is
illustrated by Justice Powelrs opinion in Bakke, see supra notes 394-98 and accompanying
text, which (he says) unwisely supports the idea that "legislatures may do things to or for
[suspect or quasi-suspect] groups" so long as it is clear "that [this] is what the legislature
really wants." Id.
1097. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 13, at 105 n.71 ("When he first described such a
scheme of judicial review, Bickel was criticized for providing too narrow and conservative a
role for the judiciary. The criticism was that judges who could use... remands would
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Frequent use of structural rules will erode the Court's power
by demythologizing the Court and its work""8 and by
creating a continuing source of conflict between the Court
and Congress. 9 9 These problems will grow as the Court's
use of structural rules fosters a perception that its
work-being often concededly provisional-lacks a
foundation in law and even the firm backing of the Court
itself."' 0 Against this backdrop, political officials and the
public may come to see the Court as little more than an
unelected policymaking organ with no special constitutional
competence or responsibility."'

hesitate to employ [outright] nullifications in the hope that the legislature would fail to
reenact the offending law and the issue would disappear."). For the expression ofyet another
worry about judicial enfeeblement, see DIMOND, supra note 19, at 154 ("[There is always a
riskthat a Court fearful of congressional override under provisional review willjust duck the
issue.").
1098. See DIMOND, supra note 19, at 19 ("The fiction of the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter in allconstitutional cases has served to compel the people to give at least a respectful
second look at the merits of legislation overturned by the Court. If the fictionwere uncovered
by the Court's explicit embrace of provisional review, it is possible that the Congress would
feel free to run roughshod over the Court's point of view; and the people might then lose
respect for the Court altogether."); Burt, supra note 701, at 133-34 (suggesting that a
recognition "that Congress has, to whatever degree, an independent' role in interpreting the
Constitution-is likely to remove an important restraint on Congress which has, inthe past,
usually counseled great wariness in trespassing on the Courts prerogatives" and that the
Court "will have surrendered, in part at least, one of the Court's most potent institutional
weapons: the authoritative tone of its constitutionalipse dixit");Schrock & Welsh, supranote
654, at 1175 n.288 ("Outrightjudicial legislation undermines judiciall authority not onlyby
being cavalier about constitutional sources for particular subconstitutional rules but also,
and more damagingly, by obscuring the boundaries of judicial review-and by showing a
willingness to dissipate its identity as acourt by casually donning a legislative hat. Asserting
a novel legislative, subconstitutional jurisdiction, the Court jeopardizes its established
Marbury,judicial and constitutional, jurisdiction."); see also Conkle, supranote 69, at 53
(noting that "overuse of provisional review.., might reduce the force of all of the Supreme
Court's constitutional opinions").
1099. See Schrock& Welsh, supranote 654, at 1154-55, 1157-58 (arguing that a Court that
aggressively uses provisional rulemaking techniques "becomes hard to distinguish from an
administrative agency or,... from a legislature," and once it has lost "its grip on the idea of
the judicial office" the Court "will encounter difficulty in summoning up a sense ofjudicial
authoritativeness on those occasions when the Constitution. and country need an
authoritative Supreme Court").
1100. See Kronman, supra note 1050, at 1587 (describing a "reversible solution to a
constitutional problem" as"a solution that bespeaks [the Court's] own uncertainty regarding
the principle or principles involved").
1101. See DIMOND, supra note 19, at 153 ([lf the people or their representatives in
Congress ever come to understand that the Court's decisions are in any part judge-made
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Structural rules are rooted in unrealistic assumptions about
political processes. 10 2 Among those assumptions is the false
notion that legislative officials can and should act like
judicial officials as they hammer out government policy in
an environment inescapably pervaded by party influence,
political logrolling,
vote-seeking, and practical
03
accommodation.
10. Structural rules, in any event, lack a proper precedential
pedigree."" °
choices that begin rather than end public debate over the meaning of the Constitution, there
may be a risk that they may disregard the Court's interpretation altogether as just another
policy-makingvoice."); Conkle, supra note 69, at 53 ("For the Court to recognize a broad new
role for Congress . . . might work to undercut the Court's preeminent, if plainly
nonoriginalist, role in identifying and articulating our nation's constitutional values.").
1102. See TUSHNET, supra note 443, at 207 (arguing, for a variety of reasons, that "who"
rules are "predicated on a vision of an imaginary policymaking process"); Farber & Frickey,
supra note 444, at 918 (noting that "the legislative deliberation model may reflect an
excessively tidy view of legislation); Sunstein, supra note 41, at 76 (noting the critique of
judicial power-sharing that emphasizes the "limitations of deliberation: "[A]t least under
conditions of widespread social, economic, and political inequality, it is necessary to
supplement or replace deliberative politics with exercises of power on the part or in the
interest of the disadvantaged. Requiring deliberation does little to accelerate social change
and may, in fact, strengthen the status quo by legitimizing purely'political' decisions of the
legislature.").
1103. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 24, at 826-28 (arguing that structural review cannot
serve as a theory of constitutional law because it requires a "judicialized legislature ... in
which interests are openly articulated and fairly balanced against each other"; denouncing
a model under which legislators, who are and should be "creatures of will are supposed to be
transformed into beings of reason); see also Linde, supra note 27, at 224 (observing that "at
its best, the legislative process is a far cry from the deliberative search for agreed ends and
the informed assessment of means that is postulated by the instrumentalist model"). For
illustrative discussions that contrast legislative and judicial behavior, see Brest, Congress
as ConstitutionalDecisionmaker, supra note 16, at 98-101; and Mikva, supra note 17.
Professor Fiss also has reflected fruitfully on this subject, making the argument thatIf the legislative process promised to get us closer to the meaning of our
constitutional values, then the theory oflegislative failure would be responsive
to this puzzlement. But just the opposite seems true. Legislatures are entirely
of a different order. They are not ideologically committed or institutionally
suited to search for the meaning of constitutional values, but instead see their
primary function in terms ofregistering the actual, occurrent preferences ofthe
people-what they want and what they believe should be done.
Fiss, supranote 595, at 9-10.
1104. See Neely, supra note 69, at 272 (noting that "courts have infrequently articulated
a 'second-lok' rationale"); see also Gunther, supranote 794, at 20 (suggesting that cases like
Kent v. Dulles do not support expansive use of "passive virtue" rules of constitutional law
because they rest "on statutory grounds").
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These arguments-particularly in the aggregate--cast a cloud of
doubt over structural doctrines. We cannot, however, even begin to
evaluate each of them on the merits in this already lengthy Article.
At the same time, any self-respecting appraisal must at least
preliminarily consider the first and most fundamental objection to
structural rules-namely, that they are wholly illegitimate because
they lack a proper source in the Constitution itself. An examination
of this foundational question will occupy this Article's final Part.
That that examination involves many twists and turns may help
along the critique that structural rules are too inherently "freewheeling" in nature 0 5 to provide workable tools of judicial
review. 1106 That examination also will reveal, however, that the case
for structural rules is not based on political and moral theory alone.
Rather, that case-as we now shall see-finds support in
constitutional text, tradition, history, and precedent.
XIII. THE SOURCE OF STRUCTURAL RULES
What is the source of structural rules? This question, like many
in constitutional law, turns out to have 'an answer that is both
simple and complex. The simple part of the answer goes something
like this: Structural safeguards of substantive constitutional rights
emanate from the substantive rights they serve to safeguard. The
complexities arise because of the need to confront counterattacking
arguments that challenge the legitimacy of structural rules based
on constitutional text and precedent."0 7 There are three arguments
1105. See Gunther, supra note 807, at 25.
1106. See generally supra notes 1087-88 and accompanying text (discussing lack-ofprinciple criticisms of structural rules).
1107. Before turning to these arguments, it is worth reemphasizing that structural rules
are not all cut from the same cloth. See supranotes 1008-18 and accompanying text. For this
reason examination of the source of structural rules must be, to a significant extent,
contextual. For example, it may be that at least some rules of clarity have such a strong
justification in the law ofstatutory interpretation that an investigation oftheir constitutional
roots is beside the point. But see supra note 251 (suggesting difficulty ofjustifying superclear-statement rules solely on traditional statutory-interpretation grounds). In a similar
vein, the vagueness doctrine is such a longstanding feature of our law that any suggestion
it is illegitimate would be farfetched indeed. Even with respect to the vagueness doctrine,
however, it remains important to considerwhether the structuralfeaturesofthe doctrine (as
opposed, for example, to its well-acceptedfair-notice features) are constitutionally legitimate.
Identifying well-founded structural justifications, after all, may well affect the scope and
operation of the doctrine. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58-59 (1999)
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of this kind. According to the first argument, judicial recognition of
structural protections (or at least many of them) is barred by a
negative implication drawn from the Constitution's express
recognition of only certain structural lawmaking requirements,
particularly bicameralism and presentment. According to the
second argument, judicial recognition of structural rules (or at least
many of them) conflicts with the Court's longstanding insistence
that due-process-type limits do not apply to government
policymaking. According to the final argument, it is just too much
of a stretch to extrapolate structural rules .(or at least many of
them) from such obviously substantive guarantees as the First,
Eighth, and Tenth Amendments. We turn now to a point-by-point
assessment of these critically important lines of attack. 11 8
A. The Negative-ImplicationArgument
Even the most careful reader will find in the Constitution no
"structural rights" clause. The Constitution, however, does lay out
a number of structural protections to be honored in the lawmaking
process, particularly the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment. 110 9 The negative-implication argument thus is made:
If our Constitution specifically mandates certain lawmaking
structures (namely, bicameralism and presentment), but makes no
mention whatsoever of other structures (such as legislative fact(invalidating criminal loitering statute on vagueness grounds despite strong argument that
it lacked any notice defect because arrest could occur only after loiterer disobeyed police
order to move on).
1108. The arguments are, as I say in the text, important precisely because it is a "critical
question" whether "these [structural] approaches can be traced fairly to constitutional
constraints on legislative and executive lawmaking." Farber & Frickey, supra note 444, at
917-18. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the
Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POLY 87 (1984) (emphasizing the need to trace judicial
decisions to independent sources of authority); Sunstein, supranote 434, at 77 n.205 (same).
Interestingly, it remains possible to argue for the legitimacy of even the most controversial
structural rules we have studied (such as proper-findings-and-study rules and constitutional
"who" rules) whether or not they can be qfairly traced to constitutional constraints" in the
narrow sense. The way to get to this outcome is to characterize such rules as themselves
proper manifestations of the permissibly structural constitutional common law. See supra
Part IX. This "house of cards" rationale can succeed, however, only if structural rules in
general (and constitutional common law rules in particular) do not abridge some
constitutional dictate. The ensuing text advances the argument that they do not.
1109. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1 & 7, cls. 1 & 3. For a thorough discussion of these
requirements, see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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finding), how can courts force lawmakers to use those other
structures consistent with the constitutional text? Other pieces of
the Framers'handiwork bolster the negative-implication argument.
In particular, although generally imposing only the structural
requirements of bicameralism and presentment, the Constitution
provides that certain types of legislative action must conform to
specialized structural rules. Tax laws, for example, must originate
in the House of Representatives.'
Congressional appropriations
to "raise and support Armies" shall not "be for a longer Term than
two Years,"1 11 and some legislative actions-such as the ratification
of treaties-require a supermajority vote. in 2 To the negativeimplication argument, we thus may add a kicker: Because the
Framers knew how to stipulate heightened structural safeguards
in specialized contexts, we may assume they did not intend to
create the highly contextual, but wholly nontextual, structural rules
that concern us here. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius!"'3
This expressio unius argument may have a bark, but it has no
real bite. To begin with, it tells us little, if anything, about what
structural safeguards the Court can demand of state-as opposed
to federal-lawmakers. This is so because the Constitution's
treatment of such matters as bicameralism, presentment, and the
two-thirds-vote requirements concern the operation of only the
national government. Put another way, it is unwarranted to
extrapolate a wholesale preclusion of structural requirements for
state authorities from constitutional provisions that do not concern
state authorities at all. Indeed, to find a contraction of judicial
authority over state governments in clauses that concern only the
national government would seem to violate the expressio unius
principle itself."' 4
1110.
1111.
1112.
1113.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cL 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
One possible translation is: "The expression of one thing implies the exclusion of

another."

1114. Ofcourse, one might try to derive a separate negative-implication argument from the
Republican Form of Government Clause, gee U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, which does concern the
states. Perhaps the largest problem with such an argument is that this Clause is so
indeterminate that it is hard to say that-following the expressio unius formulation-it is an
"expression of one thing" that is any way inconsistent with the recognition of structural
rules. See supra note 1113 and accompanying text. Indeed, several commentators have
suggested that the Republican Form of Government Clause itself may constitute a proper
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Even more important, the expressio unius argument fails to
undermine any of the many structural doctrines-whether
applicable to the states or the national government-that emanate
from the Bill of Rights and other constitutional amendments. The
very point of the amendments is, after all, to qualify, within the
realm of their operation, the Constitution's preexisting text."' It
follows that any of the many structural rules traced to the lateradopted Amendments-such as rules derived from the First, the
Eleventh, or the Fourteenth Amendments-are immune to the
negative-implication argument because that argument is based on
the original Constitution. Lex posteriorderogate priori!"6
This lex posterior response to the expressio unius argument
carries with it a profound practical consequence because most
structural rules do in fact spring from the constitutional
amendments."' 7 At the same time, two structural rules-namely,
the "findings" rule derivable from Lopez"' 8 and the structural

source ofdemocracy-enhancing structural doctrines. See TR .BE, supra note 24, § 17-2, at 1678
n.7 ("It may be that decisions insisting that at least some types of governmental action be
taken only by bodies officially accountable to the constituencies most significantly affected
could rest more comfortably on article IV, § 4's guarantee of a 'republican form of
government' than on 'due process' notions."); Hamilton, supranote 268, at 178 (seeming to
approve Justice Linde's invocation of the Guarantee Clause to "extendo the concept of
legislative responsibility, which is at the heart of the Court's recent structural decisions,'
including by carefully scrutinizing lawmaking by way of initiative); Note, A Niche for the
Guarantee Clause, 94 HARV. L. REV. 681, 682, 696-99 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Niche]
(asserting that the Guarantee Clause "authorizies] judicial action where individual rights
defined in other provisions of the Constitution are threatened by structural defects in state
or local government.").
1115. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 24, § 3-25, at 174 (discussing Eleventh Amendments
overturning of law under original Constitution as expressed in Chisholm v. Georgia,2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419 (1793)).
1116. One possible interpretation is: "Later laws abrogate prior contrary laws." One
response to this line of argument might be that laws must be read inparimateria-thatis,
they must be "construed together." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 632 (3d ed. 1969). Of
course, any harmonious-interpretation argument made against amendment-based structural
rules is a distant cry from the all-out, prohibitory negative-implication argument with which
this discussion began. It also seems to me that such an argument adds little to the undueinterference separation of powers argument identified earlier. See supra note 1089 and
accompanying text. A full investigation of that argument, like the other policy arguments
previously enumerated, see supra notes 1085-1104 and accompanying text, must await
another day.
1117. Byway of example, see supraPart X (identifyingvarious motive-based rules derived
from constitutional amendments).
1118. See supra notes 351-74 and accompanying text.
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representation-reinforcing rule derivable from Garcia1M--seem to
arise from the original Constitution and thus to contravene that
document's express stipulation of particular structural safeguards.
Again, the argument is uncomplicated: Because Article I by its
terms requires only bicameralism and presentment when Congress
exercises its powers, it is wrong for courts to derive from Article I
additional findings requirements or other process-purifying
structural rules. As a result, the structural second-look features of
Lopez and Garcia should be rejected as incompatible with the
Constitution's text.
There are at least three difficulties with even this muchnarrowed version of the negative-implication argument. First, the
argument flows from the text's requirement of bicameralism and
presentment when Congress exercises its Article I powers; the
Lopez and Garciaprinciples concern, however, whether Congress
has acted within its Article I powers at all." ° The question about
whether Congress has acted within its enumerated powers (the
question presented by Lopez and Garcia)is different from, and
preliminary to, the question about how Congress can exercise the
powers it undoubtedly possesses.1 12 1 Thus what the Constitution
1119. See supranotes 479-90 and accompanying text.
1120. One might think it odd to conceive of the structural rules involved in Lopez and
Garciaas involving the seemingly "substantive" question whether Congress has exceeded its
enumerated powers. Perhaps this conception will seem less odd if one recalls Chief Justice
Marshall's fundamental admonition that Congress may not "under the pretext of executing
its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819). Reasoning from this principle,
it is quite possible to conceive of Lopez and Garcia as giving rise to ways for determining
whether Congress has acted pretextually-that is, outside its proper powers.
1121. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 268, at 173 (noting, in supporting Lopez's emphasis
of legislative findings, that "Congress's constitutional power to enact a law is a threshold
question that Congress has a duty to answer on the face ofthe act or through an explanatory
statement). The difference between the two questions is illustrated well byINS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983). There the Court considered whether the House or Senate could
overturn, byway of a so-called"legislative veto," a congressionally authorized suspension by
the Attorney General of a particular alien's deportation. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Powell found such congressional action unconstitutional because it constituted an exercise
ofthe judicial-rather than the legislative-power. See id. at 959-67 (Powell, J., concurring).
The majority, incontrast, found a constitutionalviolationnotbecause Congress lacked power
to bring about the deportation, but because it had exercised its power to take such action in
a constitutionally impermissible one-house-veto form. See id. at 944-59. In short, Justice
Powell asked and answered the "whether" question, which the Court's majority recognized
as wholly distinct from the "how" question on which it focused. See id. at 957 n.22 (reasoning
that because challenged veto constituted "legislative" action, itwas"subject to the procedures
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says about the latter "how" question logically tells us little, if
anything, about the separate "whether" question presented by
Lopez and Garcia.
Second, the structural principles of Lopez and Garciacan be said
to spring no less from the Tenth Amendment than from the original
Constitution itself."2 If this is so, however, the narrowed negativeimplication argument is dashed on the same shoals that undid the
negative-implication argument in its broader application to other
amendment-based structural rules. Again, the point is simple:
Structural rules based on the amendments are not subject to
negative implications based on the original text, for the very
purpose of the amendments is to "trump" that text."23 This
argument would seem to apply with no less force to Amendment X
than to Amendments
I through IX and to Amendments XI through
M
XXVII.1 4

Finally, even if anything remains of the negative-implication
argument, an irony would mark any effort to invoke it to scuttle the
structural rules suggested by Lopez and Garcia.The reason is that
these rules protect interests in federalism, and in this setting
(probably more than any other) the modem Court has not hesitated
to embrace nontextual, and even countertextual, doctrines to
vindicate underlying postulates of the Constitution."2 5 Perhaps the
set out in Art. I); see also id. at 967 (Powell, J., concurring) (refusing to consider "whether
legislative vetoes are invalid under the Presentment Clauses" because Congress "exceeded
the scope of its constitutionally prescribed authority").
1122. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-57 (1992) (emphasizing
significance of Tenth Amendment in discussing federalism-based limits on congressional
power); see also infra note 1124 and accompanying text.
1123. See supra note 1115 and accompanying text.
1124. One possible response to this point is that the Tenth Amendment is different from
the other amendments because it simply restates that the limited lawmakingpowers granted
by the original Constitution are in fact so limited. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
124 (1941) (describing the Tenth Amendment as stating a "truism"); United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (suggesting that the Tenth Amendment was adopted merely to forestall
suggestion that the United States is not a government of limited delegated powers). The
Supreme Court, however, has made it clear on a variety of occasions that the Tenth
Amendment does have legal effect. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7
(1975) (stating that "the Tenth Amendment... is not without significance").
1125. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). See generally
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547 (1985) (noting that "the text
of the Constitution provides the beginning rather than the final answer to every inquiry into
questions offederalism, for'[b]ehind the words ofthe constitutional provisions are postulates
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Court should scrap the structural rules of Lopez and Garcia(and
other structural doctrines as well) because they are unwise,
unworkable, anti-historical, or the like.11 6 To say these things,
however, is not to say that structural rules are fundamentally
illegitimate because they offend the specific directives of the
constitutional text.
B. The Due ProcessArgument
A second text-based critique of structural rules stems not from
the original Constitution, but from the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Each of those amendments. bars government
deprivations of "life, liberty or property without due process of
law."" 27 These few words-as even the constitutional newcomer
knows-place a sweeping array of process-based restrictions on
both the federal and the state governments." Beginning with
Londoner v. City of Denver" 9 and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v.
State Board of Equalization,"0 however, the Court has drawn a
strong distinction between adjudicative action (to which due process
protections clearly apply) and legislative actions (to which, it is
said, they do not).' This line of demarcation between law-applying
and law-giving drives the second argument against structural
review. According to the argument, courts may not bring in through
the back door constitutional rules against which the front door has
been bolted and blocked. In other words, if the Due Process Clause
does not support process-based restrictions on government
policymaking, then surely those restrictions may not be imported
by way of the more linguistically substance-focused Free Speech
Clause, Equal Protection Clause, Takings Clause, and the like.

which limit and control' (alteration in original) (quotingMonaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,
322 (1934))).
1126. See supra notes 1085-1104 and accompanying text (collecting arguments to this
effect).
1127. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
1128. See, e.g., TRIBE, supranote 24, §§ 10-7 to 10-19.
1129. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
1130. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
1131. See Kende, supranote 395, at 607 n.114 (notingthe distinction between "legislation"
and "adjudication" for procedural due process purposes); accord, e.g., San Diego Bldg.
Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 529 P.2d 570 (Cal. 1974).
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The first problem with this second argument is that its major
premise rests on an overreaching reading of the relevant
authorities. Londoner and Bi-Metallic did not hold that the Due
Process Clauses have no application to government policymaking.
In fact, courts often draw on these clauses when they strike down
legislative actions, as illustrated pointedly by the Court's expansive
abortion law jurisprudence." 2 Nor do the Londoner/Bi-Metallic
line of cases hold that procedural (as opposed to substantive) due
process puts no limits whatsoever on government policymaking.
There is authority, for example, that rulemaking by agencies may
be subject to procedural due process attack.

3

3

Even more

importantly, the Londonerand Bi-Metallic cases do not purport to
foreclose all procedural due process challenges aimed at the outputs
of legislative bodies. Rather, these cases establish only that "[t]he
Constitution does not grant to members of the public generally a
right to be heardby public bodies making decisions of policy""3 4 or
1132. See, e.g., Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,847-48 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(reaffirming the "essential holding" of Roe based on the Due Process Clause, invoking the
clause to invalidate a spousal-notification requirement, and itemizing numerous cases in
which the Court has applied the Clause's "substantive component" to invalidate legislation);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (relying on Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
to invalidate state's criminal ban on abortion). I shall not pause here to explore the complex
linkagebetween substantive andprocedural due process. I shallpause, however, to make one
obscure point. It might be said that so-called "substantive due process" review serves as a
prophylactic protection of the process values centrally embodied in the Due Process Clause.
On this view, substantive due process review is legitimate in constitutional law formuch the
same reason that (some have said) substantive-unconscionability review is legitimate in
contract law. In both instances, the argument goes, results that are seriously overreaching
as a matter of substantive outcome suggest such a high probability that procedural defects
led up to that outcome that a court should intervene. The obscure point to be made is that,
ifthis process-driven justification for substantive due process review were embraced, itwould
carry with it significant consequences for structural review. After all, ifcourts can invoke the
Due Process Clauses to impose substantive prophylactic restraints to purify legislative
processes, how can the clauses not be read to permit the imposition of direct and focused
procedural restraints as well?
1133. See, e.g., Thompsonv. Washington, 497 F.2d 626,634-35,641 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (voicing
the view that "basic considerations of fairness may under exceptional circumstances require
oral submissions even in a-legislative-type proceeding"); see also Linde, supranote 27, at 225
(noting that, "with or without the aid ofadministrative procedure acts or statutory standards
ofjudicial review, courts have spun out various procedural duties ofagencies which require
them to articulate their aims and their assumptions of fact, to examine available evidence
and consider alternative solutions, and sometimes to subject theirhypotheses to scrutiny and
possible rebuttal by interested parties"); supra note 451 and accompanying text.
1134. Minnesota State Bd. for Cmty. Coils. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 283 (1984) (emphasis
added).
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a right of "direct public participation in government
policymaking."" 3 5 The safeguards that concern us, however, do not
entail any such claim of right. They involve instead such devices as
form-based deliberation and proper-findings rules made applicable
only in discrete contexts when pressing constitutional interests are
in play.13 6 These rules, in contrast to the broad and overarching
right-to-be-actually-heard rules rejected in Londoner and BiMetallic, do not threaten a "massive intrusion 7 that could cause
our governments to "grind to a halt.""
There is a second and no less serious problem with the
LondonerBi-Metallic-basedattack on structural rules. The problem
is that, contrary to the argument's minor premise, a generalized
rejection of structural safeguards under the Due Process Clauses
would not logically lead to a repudiation of all structural rules
1135. Id. at 285 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 410
U.S. 224, 244-45 (1973) (reiterating the Bi-Metallic principle that "no hearing" is required
when the lawmaker is "promulgating policy-type rules or standards"). The case most
commonly associated with a lack ofnonstatutory restrictions on agency rulemaking, Vermont
Yankee NuclearPower Corp. v. NaturalRes. Def Council,Inc.,435 U.S. 519 (1978), also does
not generally provide that the Due Process Clauses have no application to any form of
government rulemaking. The Court in Vermont Yankee reaffirmed "the very basic tenet of
administrative law that agencies should be free to fashion their own rules ofprocedure." Id.
at 544. The Court's focus, however, was on what"Congress intended," id. at 546, with respect
to agency experts familiar with the industries which they regulate," id. at 525 (quoting FCC
v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965)). Even in this context, the Court applied its ban on
judicial supplementation of agency process requirements only in the absence of
"constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances." Id. at 543; see, e.g., id.
at 542 (noting possibility of judicial intervention when agency departs from "procedures of
long standing"); id. at 544 (notingprior holdingthat agency "normally be allowed" to exercise
discretion with respect to appropriate procedures, and that courts should not intervene in
such matters "in the absence of substantial justification for doing otherwise" (quoting FPC
v. TranscontinentalPipe Line Corp., 432 U.S. 326 (1976))). Moreover, muchas inBi-Metallic,
the Court's concerns were focused on the risk that agencies would be forced to "adopt full
adjudicatory procedures in every instance" of administrative rulemaking. Id. at 547; see also
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTVCorp., 496 U.S. 633,654 (1990) ("Vermont Yankee stands
for the general proposition that courts are not free to impose upon agencies specific
procedural requirements that have no basis in the APA."); id. at 655-56 (noting absence of
due process challenge to agency procedures); cf id. at 654 (noting case authority to the effect
that APA"§ 706(2)(A), which directs a court to ensure that an agency action is not arbitrary
and capricious,.. . imposes a general 'procedural' requirement of sorts by mandating that
an agency take whatever steps it needs to provide an explanation that will enable the court
to evaluate the agency's rationale at the time of decision").
1136. See supranote 44 and accompanying text (itemizing and defining structural rules).
1137. See Minnesota St. Bd, 465 U.S. at 285.
1138. Id.
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under other constitutional provisions. The reason why is that the
content of the Due Process Clauses (particularly to the extent they
have been read not to embrace far-reaching structural rules
applicable to all forms of lawmaking) exists independent of the
content of other constitutional provisions (particularly to the extent
that those provisions give rise to targeted doctrines that protect
discrete constitutional values untethered to the due process
guarantee). By way of example, even the strongest judicial rejection
of a generalized due process right to legislative findings would not
answer the question whether courts may and should recognize
carefully focused First Amendment or federalism-based properfindings rules. 13 9
The final difficulty with the Londoner/Bi-Metallic-basedchallenge to structural rules is that it comes too late in the day. After
all, the Court already has indicated that structural doctrines may
find their origins in the Due Process Clauses. In Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong,"4 for example, the Court was clear on this point. "[Wie
deal," the Court said, "with a rule which deprives a discrete class of
persons of an interest in liberty on a wholesale basis. By reason of
the Fifth Amendment, such a deprivation must be accompanied by
due process.""' In similar fashion, the Court has left no doubt that
the vagueness doctrine (which, we have seen, is highly structural
in nature) has its roots in the Constitution's due process
guarantees." 42 It is hardly surprising, in light of these cases, that
prominent observers have linked to the Due Process Clauses a
variety of structural doctrines."1
1139. See supraPart V.
1140. 426 U.S. 88 (1976). See generally supra notes 837-44 and accompanying text

(discussing Mow Sun Wong).
1141. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 102-03. The Court was equally clear that its ruling in

Mow Sun Wong rested squarely onproceduraldue process grounds. See supranote 1132 and
accompanying text (contrasting substantive and procedural due process). Recognizing that
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause "has a substantive as well as a procedural aspect,"
the Courtfound that it was "not necessary to resolve respondents' substantive claim" because
"essentialprocedureshave not been followed." Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 103 (emphasis

added).
1142. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,453 (1939).
1143. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 24, § 17-3, at 1683 & n.8 (advocating the rejection of
"formal" and "all-or-nothing" distinction between "rule-making and rule-applying" to "better
approximate due process concerns"); Dimond, supranote 69, at 226 ("Due process of law' can

... apply to congressional lawmaking. .. .");Linde, supranote 27, at 239 ("What might 'due
process of law' mean in lawmaking? The obvious answer is that government is not to take
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These authorities do more than undercut the due process-based
attack on judicial recognition of structural rules. They suggest
that the Due Process Clauses themselves provide a proper
source-indeed, a source that is already recognized-for structural
review. In the end, however, we need not rely on the Due Process
Clauses to conclude that structural doctrines have constitutional
legitimacy. Structural rules are properly grounded in the
Constitution if, as we now shall explore, they emanate from the
particular substantive constitutional provisions to which they give
meaning and protection.
C. The JudicialOverreachArgument
The final argument against the legitimacy of structural rules
builds on a substance-centered vision of the constitutional clauses
that concern free speech, cruel and unusual punishment, equal
protection, and the like. The argument posits that the historic and
intended role of these safeguards is to cabin the content of
life, liberty, or property under color of laws thatwere not made according to a legitimate lawmaking process. There is nothing very obscure in this reading of 'due process' ..... ); id.
(arguing that "the relevant question of due process in lawmaking is never what law was
made, but how it was made"); id. ("arguing that reading'process' to mean 'process' requires
us to decide which lawmaking processes are legitimate and which are not"); see also ELY,
supranote 88, at 137 (suggesting that impermissibly motivated government decisions might
involve a"denial of due process"); cf.Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855) (stating that due process "is a restraint on the legislative
as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the government"; adding that Congress,
accordingly, is not "free to make any process 'due process of law,' by its mere will").
Notably, the courts might well draw on the constitutional due process right in anotherway
to recognize structural protections: They might reason that the due process guarantee
operates in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech, to
generate a "hybrid" right. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,881-82 (1990). Although
Smith may represent the Court's most well-known articulation of a hybrid-rights approach,
that case hardly stands alone. See, e.g., Smith v. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. 746, 759 (2000)
(indicating that the constitutional right to a state-aided criminal appeal emanates from the
joint operation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 865 (1997) (describing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968), as a case
involving both free speech rights and "the parents' claim to authority in their own household
to directthe rearingoftheir children); RichmondNewspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
579-80 (1980) (plurality opinion) (reasoningthat the rights to free speech, free press, and free
assembly together give rise to a right of access to criminal trials); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564 & 568 (1969) (invoking both the right to free expression and the right ofprivacy
in holding that the viewing of obscene materials within one's home is constitutionally
protected).
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government action. Because these protections target substantive
policy, the argument continues, courts should implement them with
content-driven on-or-off rules. It is, in short, simply too much of a
stretch to extract from the Constitution's great protections of
substantive rights a plethora of proscriptions on policymaking
processes. 1 "
One difficulty with this argument is that it overlooks how
"substantive" constitutional protections work in the real world.
Take, for example, motive-based rules." 4 These rules are pervasive
in constitutional law. Yet, under these rules, the content of a law
does not determine its conformance with constitutional
requirements. To the contrary, these rules focus fixedly on process;
under them, it is the thought process of government decision
makers that is determinative of constitutionality."
Quasistructural rules of adjudicative procedure (as we already have
noted) likewise key on the "how," rather than the "what," of
government decision making, and they do so notwithstanding their
origins in the First Amendment and other purportedly substantive
protections." 7 The Court has said that the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine reflects concerns about lawmaking process." 8
All these examples show that there is nothing exotic in rooting
structural rules in supposedly "substantive" rights.
There is a deeper reason why courts may properly ground
structural rules in the Bill of Rights and other protections of
substantive constitutional values. The reason is that our
constitutional law is laced with doctrines designed to protect
interests of constitutional dimension in causative, instrumentalist
ways. Perhaps the most familiar example is the rule of Miranda v.
Arizona.149 The Fifth Amendment decrees that no one "shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."l5 0
1144. This overreach argument might also seek to draw on the constitutional text. To take
a simple example, the First Amendment says that"Congress shallmake no law... abridging
the freedom of speech .... ." Consequently, according to this argument, the role of the
amendment is to void laws that in fact abridge free speech, not to void only those
abridgements that are accompanied by careful findings or superspecific statutory terms.
1145. See supra PartX.
1146. See supra notes 761-62 and accompanying text.

1147. See supranotes 962-89 and accompanying text.
1148. See supranote 994 and accompanying text.
1149. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1150. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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It does not say a word about the need to give warnings to persons
in custodial settings. In Miranda,however, the Court extrapolated
a right to warnings (as well as a right to counsel)-or, more
accurately, an exclusionary sanction ifwarnings or counsel were not
provided-to render meaningful the basic anticompulsion
guarantee. 5 '- In short, the Court safeguarded Fifth Ainendment
values with a prophylactic rule.
Similar rules, which likewise give meaning to highly general
constitutional phrases in particular ways, abound in our law. The
First Amendment, for example, says nothing about public
forums." 2 It says nothing about compelling state interests or less
restrictive alternatives."' It says nothing about unconstitutional
conditions."' It says nothing about overbreadth' 5 5 or chilling
effect." 6 It says nothing about actual malice. 11 It says nothing
about content orviewpoint discrimination 58 or undue discretion 5 9
or de novo review."' The First Amendment does not, by its terms,
distinguish among political," 6" indecent, 62 or obscene. 6 speech;
or between the print and broadcast media; 1164 or between primary
and secondary effects." 65 Yet, the Supreme Court has recognized
the constitutional importance of all these concepts. It has done so
by expounding the First Amendment in a common-law-like fashion
6
to protect the underlying values of the free-speech guarantee."
1151. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 498.
1152. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).
1153. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993).
1154. See, e.g., Dolanv. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,385 (1994); Perryv. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972).
1155. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972).
1156. See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982).
1157. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
1158. See, e.g., R.AV. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 378 (1992).
1159. See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
1160. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485,492 (1984).
1161. See, e.g., New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 269.
1162. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
1163. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
1164. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
1165. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, n.34 (1976).
1166. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion) ("[S]ome
procedural requirements are mandated by the First Amendment and some are not .... None
of us have [sic] discovered a general principle to determine where the line is to be drawn....
We must therefore reconcile ourselves to answering the question on a case-by-case basis, at
least until some workable general rule emerges."); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
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Many constitutional rules have a prophylactic or instrumentalist
quality in that they establish standards and sub-rules designed to
safeguard broadly conceived constitutional values derived from the
constitutional text."16 7 In addition, as Professor Ely most famously
States., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502 (1984) (discussing New York Times "actual malice" rule:
"though the source of the rule is found in the Constitution, it is nevertheless largely ajudgemade rule of law" that "is given meaning through the evolutionary process of common law
adjudication"); Strauss, supra note 1036, at 883 ("In public and political debates over the
First Amendment, while the text is ritually incanted (no law'), in fact the text matters very
little (no one suggests that the First Amendment applies only to Congress), and instead the
public debate invokes notions derived from precedents-clear and present danger, prior
restraint, obscenity, fighting words, viewpoint discrimination, subsidy versus prohibition,
reckless disregard, incidental regulation, the centrality of political speech."); see Farber &
Frickey, supra note 444, at 927 ("On the whole, like Dean Calabresi, we believe that the
common-law style of building mid-level theories from the results of individual cases has
considerable merit."); Linde, supra note 27, at 198 (claiming that "[]ike common law, the
accretion of constitutional case law will reflect cumulative experience, not the original logic"
and noting that "Justice Stone, in 1936, could celebrate the rubrics by which judges protect
individual rights against government as part ofthe common law of the United States" (citing
Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. RzV. 4,23 (1936)));
HenryP. Monaghan, OurPerfectConstitution,56N.Y.U. L. REv. 353,393 (1981) (statingthat
"[clandor requires that one recognize that the common law approach... best describes the
development of constitutional law under the bill of rights"); Strauss, supra note 1036, at 885
(claiming that "ourwritten constitution has, bynow, become part of an evolutionary common
law system, and the common law-rather than any model based on the interpretation of
codified law-provides the best way to understand the practices of American constitutional
law"); id. at 934 ("The need to be appropriately deferential to popular majorities-like, for
that matter, all the rest of the institution of judicial review-has evolved over time, by the
common law method."); Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 966, at 2436 (urging that
constitutional rules "must be 'given meaning through the evolutionary process of commonlaw adjudication" (quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 502)); see also Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Judicial exegesis is
unavoidable with reference to an organic act like our Constitution, drawn in many
particulars with purposed vagueness so as to leave room for the unfolding future."); Noble
State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 112 (1911) ("With regard to the police power, as
elsewhere in the law, lines are pricked out by the gradual approach and contact of decisions
on the opposing sides.").
1167. See Strauss, supranote 434, at 195 ("'Prophylactic' rules are, in an important sense,
the norm, not the exception. Constitutional law is filled with rules that are justified in ways
that are analytically indistinguishable from the justifications for the Mirandarules."); see,
e.g., Hamilton, supra note 268, at 173-74 (describing legislative-findings requirement of
Lopez as a "prophylactic rule"); Note, Ex Post Facto Limitations on Legislative Power, 73
MICH. L. REv. 1491, 1503 (1975) (arguing that certain applications of the Ex Post Facto
Clause "can only be justified as [reflecting] a prophylactic rule to preclude improper
legislative manipulation ofthe adjudicatory and rehabilitative processes"). But see Dickerson
v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2337 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing Court's
claimed authority to develop "'prophylactic' restrictions" as entailing creation of a
"frightening anti-democratic power [that] does not exist).
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demonstrated (drawing on the Carolene Products footnote), these
doctrines often focus squarely on addressing subtle and recurring
problems in the lawmaking process." 6 The Court's commitment to
policing policymaking processes is particularly well revealed by its
adaptation of constitutional doctrine to the institutional
weaknesses and strengths of particular government decision
makers."69 The Court sometimes even acknowledges that "sub1168. Addressing such problems is, perhaps most significantly, the overarching purpose of
doctrines supported by the Court's famous "footnote four," see Carolene Prods. Co. v. United
States, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See generally supranote 456, and the seminal work of
Professor Ely. See, e.g., ELY, supranote 88, at 136 (advocating a "process-oriented system of
review"); id. at 100 (arguing for an "elaborate scheme designed to ensure that in the making
of substantive choices the decision process will be open to all..., with the decision-makers
held to a duty to take into account the interests of all those their decisions affect"); see also
Linde, supra note 27, at 251 ("It is not a new thought that 'to guarantee the democratic
legitimacy ofpolitical decisions by establishing essential rules for the political process' is the
central function ofjudicial review, as Dean Rostow and Professor Strong, among others, have
argued." (quoting Rostow, supra note 570, at 210 and citing Frank R. Strong, Toward an
Acceptable Functionof JudicialReview, 11 S.D. L. REV. 1 (1966))). See generally Gilligan v.
Morgan, 413 U.S. 1,11 (1973) (emphasizing courts' proper role in attempting "to strengthen
the political system by assuring a higher level offairness and responsiveness to the political
processes").
1169. See supra notes 932-60 and accompanying text. As noted by Professor Strauss:
[Iln deciding constitutional cases, the courts constantly consider institutional
capacities and propensities. That is, to a large extent, what constitutional law
consists of: courts create constitutional doctrine by taking into account both the
principles and values reflected in the relevant constitutional provisions and
institutional realities.
Under any plausible approach to constitutional interpretation, the courts must
be authorized-indeed, required-to consider their own, and the other
branches', limitations and propensities when they construct doctrine to govern
future cases. It is true that the relevant constitutional provisions-the first,
fifth, and fourteenth amendments, for example-do not explicitly instruct the
courts to take institutional realities into account .... But it makes much more
sense to read into the Constitution a general requirement that its various
provisions be interpreted in light of institutional realities than to insist that
those realities be ignored.
Strauss, supra note 434, at 207-08. Notably, although Professor Ely does not consider
structural rules in detail, he strongly embraces reasoning that would seem to support their
recognition on institutional-competence grounds. See, e.g., ELY, supranote 88, at 21 (stating
that "what procedures are needed fairly to make what decisions are the sorts of questions
lawyers andjudges are good at"); id. at 102 ("Lawyers areexperts on process writ small, the
processes by which facts are found and contending parties are allowed to present their
claims. And to a degree they are experts on process writlarger, the processes bywhich issues
of public policy are fairly determined.... ."); see also Calabresi, supra note 13, at 136-37
(noting that "legislatures are uniquely inept at... correcting their refusals to be held
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stantive" doctrines exist, at least in part, to serve deliberationenhancing, due-process-of-lawmaking ends.' 7 In short, our
constitutional heritage is a common law heritage that often has
involved the Court in deriving from broadly phrased substantive
guarantees a rich tapestry of discrete protections, including
safeguards that aim at enhancing policymaking processes. Against
this backdrop, it seems a small step-if a step at all-to say that
the Court may extrapolate rights-specific structural safeguards
from the great "invitational" clauses of our Constitution. 1 7
D. The BroaderLogic of StructuralRules
What has been said so far suggests that support for structural
rules lies in a myriad of sources: the Constitution's text, the Court's
process-centered jurisprudence, a long-evidenced judicial willingness to unfold constitutional doctrine in common-law-like fashion,
and the explicit structural rhetoric that marks many Supreme
Court decisions. The argument for structural rules, we also have
seen, gains strength from ten separate arguments that focus on
such values as judicial restraint, the wisdom of doctrinal
adaptability, and cultivation ofthe Article Ill power. 1172 The case for
constitutionally accountable").
1170. See supra note 1004 and accompanying text.
1171. See KAPLIN, supranote 50, at 131. This seems all the more true if we conceive the

purpose of indeterminate constitutional language in something like the manner it has been
depicted by Professor Waldron. As he has written:
Perhaps... we sometimes try too hard to determine a precise prescriptive
meaning for legal and constitutional provisions. Our urge is to get into a
position where we can always answer the question, "Well, is this prohibited or
is it not?" However, sometimes the point of a legal provision may be to start a
discussion rather than settle it, and this may be particularly true of the
constitutional provisions that aim at restricting and governing legislation. The
purpose of these provisions may be to have an impact on the process of
legislating rather than merely on the validity oflegislation conceived as some
sort of finished product. The rule of law, under this account, involves not just
the production of determinate norms, but respect for a certain heritage in the
subject matter and style of our legal and political debates.
... We do not agree on many things in our society, but perhaps we can agree
on this: that we are a better society for continuing to argue about certain issues
than we would be if such arguments were artificially or stipulatively concluded.
Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law andLanguage: Some PhilosophicalIssues, 82 CAL. L.
REV. 509, 539-40 (1994).

1172. See supranotes 1035-65 and accompanying text.
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structural review, however, does not stop there. It is carried along
by yet another enduring source of constitutional doctrine: the
discernible purposes and aspirations ofthe Founders themselves."73
"Above all," Professor Sunstein has written, "the American
74
Constitution was designed to create a deliberative democracy."
The term "deliberative democracy," of course, is not self-defining. At
its heart, however, lies the idea that our constitutional
arrangements were framed to advance two great goals, one
substantive and one structural in nature. From a substantive
perspective, the Framers conceived the overarching function of
government, particularly in the legislative department, as
promoting "the public good."" 7 5 Government's purpose was not to
pay heed to the best organized interest group or even to respond to
"the sum or consensus of the particular interests that made up the
community.""7" Rather, the mission of government was to pursue
"the greater good of the whole."" T It was "to discover somehow
above all the diverse and selfish wills the one supreme moral
good."" 7" An Enlightenment-driven philosophy took as a starting
point the existence of values that transcended short-term
majoritarian wishes and reflected a sober, deeper, longer view. The
role of government representatives was to seek out such publicspirited values and to pursue them with public-spirited measures.
From a procedural perspective, the great desideratum of
republican government was open-minded, reflective, and dialogic
deliberation. The underlying notion was that representatives with
"enlightened views and virtuous sentiments" would serve as "a
'disinterested and dispassionate umpire in disputes between
different . . . interests in the State."' 79 This vision of "heroic
impartiality,"" 0 in which"public officials [had] to invoke the public

1173. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 27, at 207 (noting that constitutional rules "may be
implied from the constitutional text or from history").
1174. SUNSTEIN, supranote 1050, at 19-20.
1175. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPURUc 55 (1969).
1176. Id. at 58.

1177. Id. at 53.
1178. Id. at 59.
1179. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 253, 255 (1992)
(quoting letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (April 8,1787), in THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, IX, at 384).

1180. See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, Introduction at xxiv (Buccaneer Books 1992).
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regarding reasons on behalf of their actions," 1181 required
"widespread discussion among representatives and the citizenry at
large."18 2 It envisioned and encouraged the "exchange of reasons in
the public sphere""" and the "modification of views to meet the
opinions of minorities. " 1184 "The framers," in short, "designed a
system in which representatives would ... engage in a form of
collective reasoning,""' including by "deliberating86 about the
contemporary meaning of constitutional principles."1
These dual fixations of deliberative democracy-on advancing
public values and on fostering democratic dialogue-lend a
credence, if not an elegance, to judicially crafted structural rules.
The overarching purpose of these rules is, after all, to promote both
the "public good""8 7 and "the process of discussion.""' As to the
matter of advancing public values, there is an endemic problem in
constitutional law. The difficulty is that the pursuit of the public
good can provide little practical guidance in forging doctrine
because the line between public and private values is inevitably
"thin.""8 9 This will-of-the-wisp-ness difficulty, however, does not
undermine the case for deliberation-driven structural rules. Why?
Because, if any substantive values qualify as having a "permanent
validity,"" 0 they are the values that structural safeguards, by
definition, distinctively seek to protect-namely, those enduring
substantive values (like free speech, free religion, equal protection,
and federalism) rooted in the Constitution itself. In similar fashion,
structural doctrines unmistakably comport with the deeply dialogic
procedural vision of deliberative democracy. They implement that
vision because their very reason for being is to "promote
deliberation." 1191 All of the structural rules we have considered
-despite their many differences-aim to enhance the deliberative
process by requiring of lawmakers heightened levels of dialogue,
1181.
1182.
1183.
1184.
1185.
1186.
1187.
1188.
1189.
1190.
1191.

SUNSTEIN, supra note 1050, at 61.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 134-35 (quoting JOHN DEwEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 207-08 (1927)).
Id. at 22.
Id. at 13.
See supra note 1175 and accompanying text (quoting Gordon S.Wood).
SuNSTEIN,supra note 1050, at 22.
Id. at 35.
BICIEL, supra note 6, at 27.
See THE FEDERALiST No.70 (Alexander Hamilton).
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focus, and care." 92 In short, structural rules emerge from, build on,
and resonate with the deepest themes of the founding period. 1193
To say that there is a connection between deliberative democracy
and structural review, of course, hardly ends debate about the
proper role and shape of second-look rules. An appeal to
history-especially one stated at a high level of generality-will not
answer hard questions about whether specific structural
safeguards, invoked in specific circumstances, should apply in the
modem world. At the same time, the nexus between structural
rules and the Founders' fundamental motivations has a practical
importance. The linkage of these rules to deliberative democracy
suggests that courts themselves must deliberate with seriousness
about whether, when, and how structural doctrines should take
hold. History conjoins with policy to show that courts may not reject
structural arguments out of hand.
There is another reason why structural rules merit judicial
respect, and it is a proper point on which to close our study of
structural decision making. If this Article-in all its length and
breadth-has accomplished nothing else, it has shown that
structural rules embody an important and continuing tradition in
constitutional law. There are nine separate categories of structural
doctrine, many of these categories include multiple subcategories,
and each is reflected in a variety of decisions from the United
States Supreme Court. Viewed as a whole, the Court's structural
decisions reinforce one another. They explode the notion that
structural review is aberrational and exotic. They show that, if
the Court wishes to apply structural rules more openly and
aggressively, there already exists a broad platform from which to
1192. See supranotes 1056-60 and accompanying text.
1193. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 444, at 918 (arguing for "continued use" of

structural review in part because it "is sufficiently tied to constitutional structure, [and] to
the Madisonian constitutional ideal of deliberative legislative policymaking"); Sunstein,
supra note 434, at 8 (discussing vagueness doctrine, clear-statement rules, doctrine of
desuetude, and actual-purpose rules: "All of these doctrines are connected with the basic
foundations of the system of deliberative democracy. They serve to ensure against outcomes
reached without sufficient accountability and reflecting factional power instead of reasongiving in the public domain."); Sunstein, Interpreting,supranote 119, at 471 (urging that

deliberative democracy "suggests, for example, that courts should develop interpretive
strategies that promote deliberation in government-by, for example, remanding issues
involving constitutionally sensitive interests or groups for reconsideration by the legislature
or by regulatory agencies when deliberation appears to have been absent").
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launch this project. They show, in other words, that if the Court
wishes to systematize or expand judicial use of structural rules, it
need not embrace revolutionary reforms or innovate much at all. It
need only build on the many structural decisions that already fill
the pages of the United States Reports.
In short, the most important fact about structural rules may be
summarized in two words: They're there. The persistent and
pervasive presence of structural rules in our law demands the
attention of judges, lawyers, and scholars. We must think
systematically about these rules-about their different forms, about
their common nature, and about the normative claims that may be
made both against them and on their behalf. The need to think
through these matters will not go away. Rather, the opportunities
created by structural review for increased dialogue and restrained
adaptiveness suggest that just the opposite is true. Pressures to
apply structural rules will only mount with the increasing
complexity of modern law and modern life.

